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1992 DIGILAW 437 (KAR)

LURDHA SWAMY v. R. SHANTHAMMA

1992-12-14

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S. A. HAKEEM, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision by the landlord is directed against the trial court's order rejecting his claim for eviction of the respondent on the grounds under Section 21 (1) (a), (d) and (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (the Act) ( 2 ) THE case of the petitioner, in brief, is that he is the landlord and the respondentis the tenant in respect of the petition premises on a monthly rent of Rs. 55/-, the tenancy month being English calender month. The respondent occupied the premises in the year 1974 agreeing to vacate the same soon and also to pay the rent regularly. Instead, she has filed an application before the Rent Controller seeking regularisation of her tenancy. The tenancy was accordingly regularised, obviously under Section 31-C of the Act. The landlord sought for eviction on the ground that the tenant has failed to pay the rent inspite of demands; that she is guilty of creating nuisance and annoyance to his family members and also to his neighbours; and that the premises is required for his own bonafide use and occupation. ( 3 ) THE tenant resisted the claim by denying the relationship of landlord andtenant between herself and the petitioner in view of the property having been acquired by the B. D. A. As such the petitioner was no more the owner of the premises. The tenant has further denied the averments stated above and sought for dismissal of the petition. ( 4 ) ON these pleadings the learned trial judge framed the following points for consideration:"1. Whether there exists jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondent in this proceeding?2. Whether the respondent is in arrears of rent for the period as stated in Section 21 (1) of the KRC Act, 1961? If so, whether non-payment is with sufficient cause?3. Whether the respondent created nuisance and annoyance as contended in the petition?4. Whether the claim of the petitioner that he requires the possession of the petition premises for his own use and occupation is reasonable and bonafide? ( 5 ) WHETHER hardship would be more if an order of eviction is made thanrefused? ( 6 ) TO what reliefs the parties to this proceedings are entitled?"5. Whether the claim of the petitioner that he requires the possession of the petition premises for his own use and occupation is reasonable and bonafide? ( 5 ) WHETHER hardship would be more if an order of eviction is made thanrefused? ( 6 ) TO what reliefs the parties to this proceedings are entitled?"5. In view of his finding on Point No. 1, the learned trial judge held that the other points do not survive for consideration and rejected the petition. 6. Sri. N. S. Sanjay Gowda, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the trial court, having found that there was existence ofjural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties it was not justified in rejecting the petition on the alleged ground that the landlord had lost title to the property by virtue of the alleged acquisition of the land in which the premises is situated. It is further suomitted that admittedly the tenant having got her occupation regularised by filing an application under section 31-C of the Act, was estopped from disputing the title of the landlord. Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the question as to whether the landlord has perfected his title to the premises to seek eviction of the tenant on any of the grounds under Section 21 (1) of the Act irrelevant. There appears to be considerable force in these contentions. ( 7 ) HAVING considered at length the evidence on record the learned trial judge hasfound that the landlord who was residing in the adjacent house, had let out the premises to the tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 55/- and at the inception of the tenancy the title of the landlord was never disputed. He has also referred to the admission of the tenant that she had taken the premises on rent from the petitioner and payment of rents to him. None the less he has ultimately come to the conclusion that although jural relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties, it is lost on account of the subsequent event, namely, the acquisition of the premises by the B. D. A. Evidence has been let in by the tenant regarding the acquisition of sy. N. 174 of kethamaranahalli Village in which the petition premises is situated. N. 174 of kethamaranahalli Village in which the petition premises is situated. Exhibits R. 1 to r. 9 disclose that certain acquisition proceedings had been taken in respect of the entire survey number and that formal possession of the land had been taken by the b. D. A. , obviously for the purpose of development. None the less it is nobody's case that either the petitioner or the tenant were sought to be dispossessed at any time from the residential premises in their occupation. However, even if it is held that the premises is situated within the acquired land, the status of the tenant as well as the landlord would be that of unauthorised occupants, which may afford a cause to the b. D. A. , to evict them by due process of law. It is the case of the tenant that she had herself applied for reconveyance of the premises. It is difficult to comprehend how she could have done it as she did not own the premises but was in occupation thereof, admittedly, as a tenant under the petitioner. It is well-settled that once the tenancy is established it is only the landlord who can terminate the tenancy and seek eviction of the tenant The tenant, in such proceedings is estopped under Section 116 of the evidence Act from questioning the landlord's title. The tenant cannot deny that the landlord had title to the property at the commencement of the tenancy. Even under the General Law in a proceeding between the landlord and the tenant the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant. This view is taken by the Apex Court in Sri ram Pasricha v Jagannath and Others, AIR 1976 SC 2335 and followed subsequently. In that view of the matter it is difficult to sustain the impugned order. ( 8 ) IN the result, I make the following order: C. R. P. is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The matter is remitted to the trial court with a direction to consider all the points raised in the proceedings and to give its finding thereon in accordance with law after allowing the parties to adduce any further evidence in respect of their case. The impugned order is set aside. The matter is remitted to the trial court with a direction to consider all the points raised in the proceedings and to give its finding thereon in accordance with law after allowing the parties to adduce any further evidence in respect of their case. Since the matter is pending for a long time the trial court shall dispose of the same expeditiously and, in any event, within six months from the receipt of this order. --- *** --- .