K. S. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE tenant of the residential premises is the first petitioner herein; the 2nd petitioner is the alleged sub-tenant. Parties, will be referred to hereinafter, with reference to their rankings in the trial Court petitioner landlady filed the eviction petition under Section 21 (1) (a), (f) and (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 ('the Act' for short ). The claim under clause (a) no more survives, as the landlady has not challenged the order of rejection under this ground. According to the landlady, the residential premises was leased to the 1st respondent on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,850/- and that he had shifted to Bombay as a permanent resident and that he has inducted the 2nd respondent as a sub-tenant. The rents sent on a few occasions by the 2nd respondent were accepted by the landlady, only as paid on behalf of the 1st respondent. Landlady has 3 daughters, she has no male issue; the elder daughter has completed her MBBS and at the time of filing the eviction petition (i. e. , in July, 1983) she was undergoing internship. Landlady, averred in the petition that she required the schedule premises "reasonably and bona fide for the occupation of the said daughter who is to be married and the said daughter is intending to open a clinic of her own and live separately in the schedule premises. " Thus, clause (h) was invoked in order to enable the daughter to open a clinic of her own and for her separate residence. Initially the 2nd respondent filed the statement of objections; he stated that the 1st respondent was not served with the notice, as the address of the schedule premises was not correctly stated by the landlady in the notice. He asserted that both the respondents are direct brothers and they have been living in the schedule premises with their respective wives and children as members of "one corporate household" and that they constitute one Hindu joint family. Therefore, question of sublease did not arise. The negotiations for lease were conducted by the 2nd respondent in the year 1974 and the token advance of Rs. 500/- was paid by the 2nd respondent Negotiations for lease took place at the residence of Mr. Mohamed, Real estate Agent. Initially, monthly rent was Rs. 1,700/ -. It was increased to Rs. Therefore, question of sublease did not arise. The negotiations for lease were conducted by the 2nd respondent in the year 1974 and the token advance of Rs. 500/- was paid by the 2nd respondent Negotiations for lease took place at the residence of Mr. Mohamed, Real estate Agent. Initially, monthly rent was Rs. 1,700/ -. It was increased to Rs. 1,750/- when actual lease was granted and within an year, it was further enhanced to Rs. l,850/~. He asserted that the landlady and her husband were trying to enhance the rent subsequently also. An advance of Rs. 10,000/- was with the landlady, a fact not disclosed in the eviction petition. According to this respondent, landlady had no children of her own and hence disputed her claim under clause (h) to establish her daughter. The premises under the occupation of the landlady, is quite spacious to accommodate her children and in the vacant space, clinic can be put up. The 1st respondent filed appearance subsequently. 2nd respondent filed his statement of objections in October, 1983 (it is dated 3-10-1983 ). When paper publication was ordered for service on the 1st respondent, the counsel for second respondent filed a memo dated 30-11-1983, enclosing the vakalat of 1st respondent and sought dispensation of paper publication. Whatever may be the technical legal requirement of a notice, to be served on a respondent in a proceeding, this conduct of 1st respondent keeping himself away from the proceeding inspite of his knowledge of the proceedings seems to be an attempt to delay the Court proceeding. Litigation is a legal warfare But every kind of diversionary tactics cannot be accepted as 'fair' in this warfare. Respondent filed a memo adopting the statement of objections filed by his younger brother (the 2nd respondent ). The trial Court held that the lease was granted in favour of S. G. Poddar (1st respondent) as the Sales Executive of a Company called "sevenseas Industries Pvt ltd. " This could be seen from his letter dated 15-1-1975; by this letter Sri Gopal poddar, Sales Executive of Sevenseas Industries Pvt. Ltd. , confirmed having taken the schedule premises in pursuance of the lease deed executed by him on behalf of "the above firm" along with the fixtures and fittings stated in Ex. P. 5. This letter is in the letter head of Sevenseas Industries Pvt Ltd. By another letter dated 20-11-1975 (Ex. P. 5. This letter is in the letter head of Sevenseas Industries Pvt Ltd. By another letter dated 20-11-1975 (Ex. P. 6), 1st respondent stated that he occupied the schedule premises for use of the Company and the agreement executed expired on 14-12-1975 and that the Company renewed the lease for a further period of 11 months on the same terms and conditions. The trial Court held that the case pleaded by the respondents in the objection statement is quite apposite to these documents and the Real Estate Agent referred to in the statement of objection was not examined and that there was some discrepancies between the depositions of the two respondents. Several notices issued to the 1st respondent at the schedule premises returned unserved and a notice to him was published in the Indianexpress news paper dated 26-12-1983. (From the records I find the vakalat was filed on behalf of 1st petitioner herein, on 1-12-1983, though it is dated 27-11-1983 and probably paper publication was ordered earlier ). The trial Court held that, the respondents failed to prove that the children of the 1st respondent were schooling at Bangalore and though 1st respondent asserted that meenakshi Departmental Stores in Bangalore was run by both the respondents, no documentary evidence came forth in support of this fact; 1st respondent as R. W. 2 exhibited complete ignorance of the relevant details of the said Departmental stores; as per Ex. P. 7 deposit of Rs. 10. 000/- was taken back by the 1st respondent; this was the deposit kept by the 1st respondent, when initial lease was obtained from the landlady. Trial Court held it insufficient to hold that 1st respondent resided in the schedule premises, only because, the telephone number bears his name and his car is registered in the said address, similarly, gas connection being in the name of the 1st respondent was held to be not sufficient to accept bis case of residence at the schedule premises. Consequently, the plea of sub-lease was accepted. From the deposition of the landlady (P. W. 1) and her daughter (P. W. 2), trial court held that the petitioner made out a case of bona fide and reasonable requirement of the premises for the occupation of P. W. 2 to start a clinic by her. Consequently, the plea of sub-lease was accepted. From the deposition of the landlady (P. W. 1) and her daughter (P. W. 2), trial court held that the petitioner made out a case of bona fide and reasonable requirement of the premises for the occupation of P. W. 2 to start a clinic by her. Having regard to the admitted financial status of the respondents, trial Court held that question of any hardship to them would not arise. Mr. Jayaram, the learned senior counsel for the respondents (the tenants) contended before me that the trial Court did not properly appreciate the legal requirements governing proof of a sublease and that the initial onus which is on the landlady was not discharged in the instant case; further, the evidence on record was insufficient to hold that there was legal parting of possession by the 1st respondent in favour of his brother, the 2nd respondent. On the 2nd question under clause (h), the learned counsel pointed out that, while the plea in tie eviction petition required the premises for starting of a clinic by P. W. 2 as well as for her residence, evidence of p. Ws. 1 and 2 sought the premises, only for the purpose of opening a clinic by P. W. ( 2 ) WHEN admittedly P. W. 2 is now married and her husband also is a Doctor, requirements of P. W. 2 must have stood altered, contended the learned counsel. Re. sub-letting: in Mis, Delhi Stationeries and Printers v Rajendra Kumar, AIR 1990 SC 1208 , supreme Court pointed out that a mere occupation of the premises by a person other than the tenant will not be a case of sub-letting; sub-letting involves parting with legal possession by the tenant The allegation was that the tenant had inducted his brother-in-law as an occupant of the premises. At page 1209, the Supreme Court held:"sub-LETTING means of transfer of an exclusive right to enjoy the property in favour of the third party and the said right must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or lent Parting of legal possession means possession with the right to include and also a right to exclude others. Mere occupation is not sufficient to infer either subtenancy or parting with possession. Mere occupation is not sufficient to infer either subtenancy or parting with possession. "therefore, it was held that a mere user of kitchen and latrine by Maliendra Singh cannot mean the appellant and transferred the exclusive right to enjoy the kitchen and latrine and had parted with the legal possession of the said part of the premises. In Gopal Saran v Satyanarayan, AIR 1989 SC 1141 , it was held that permission to put up advertisement boards on the terrace for consideration, is not sub-letting and that mere occupation by another person is not sufficient to infer either subtenancy or parting with possession. At p. 1149, Supreme Court held:"reliance was placed by Sri Tapash Ray on the observations of Farwell, J. of england in Stening v Abrahams, (1931)1 Ch. D. 470. There the Chancery division of the High Court of England was concerned in that case whereby the lessee's convent was not to "part with the possession of the demised premises or any part thereof and it was held that it was broken only if the lessee entirely excluded himself from the legal possession of the part of the premises. In the facts of that case a seven years' exclusive licence erect an advertisement board against the front wall of the lessee's house followed by its erection was held not to be a breach of the above covenant"earlier, in Jagan Nath (deceased) through L. Rs. v Chander Blum and Others, AIR 1988 SC 1362 , the Supreme Court had stated the relevant principle thus, at page 1364:"the question for consideration is whether the mischief contemplated under section 14 (1) (b) of the Act has been committed as the tenant had sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or part of the premises without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord. There is no dispute that there was no consent in writing of the landlord in this case. There is also no evidence that there has been any sub-letting or assignment The only ground perhaps upon which the landlord was seeking eviction was parting with possession. There is no dispute that there was no consent in writing of the landlord in this case. There is also no evidence that there has been any sub-letting or assignment The only ground perhaps upon which the landlord was seeking eviction was parting with possession. It is well settled that parting with possession meant giving possessions to persons other than those to whom possession had been given by lease, and the parting with possession must have been by the tenant, user by other person is not parting with possession so long as the tenant retains the legal possession himself, or in other words there must be vesting of possession by the tenant in another person by divesting himself not only of physical possession but also of the right to possession. So long as the tenant retains the right to possession there is no parting with possession in terms of clause (b) of Section 14 (1) of the act Even though the father had retired from the business and the sons had been looking after the business in the facts of this case, it cannot be said that the father had divested himself of the legal right to be in possession. If the father has a right to displace the possession of the occupants, i. e. , his sons, it cannot be said that the tenant had parted with possession. "in Ramegowda v Gowramma, ILR 1986 (1) Kar. 992, K. A. Swami, J. , held that merely because a relative or a friend resides with the tenant for a certain period continuously or otherwise does not amount to sub-letting as long as there is no exclusive possession of the premises or a portion thereof, by such a person. In Sarala Shetty v Ramakrishnayya, 1992 (1) Kar. L. J. 89 :ilr 1991 Kar. 3630, ramachandriah, J. , pointed out that it is by no means an easy task to prove sub-letting since direct evidence of sub-letting is seldom available. Therefore, the landlord would be deemed to have discharged the initial burden placed upon him if he succeeds in showing that the tenant had parted with and handed over exclusive possession and control of the demised premises to the alleged subtenant and it is thereafter for the tenant to prove and explain the circumstances leading to such a transfer of possession. In K. Achuta Bhat v Veeramaneni Manga Devi and Another, AIR 1989 SC 93 , transfer of a running business of hotel, was held to be a case of sub-letting. Here the terms of agreement between the lessee and the alleged subtenant were such, the supreme Court found them as resulting in parting of possession by the tenant is favour of the latter. The conduct of the parties also was taken into consideration to arrive at this finding. Kishan Chand v Banarsi Dass and Others, AIR 1990 P and H 160 was cited by Mr. Narayan to show that as to when onus to prove that there was no sub-letting shifts to the tenant. The precedents referred to above clearly lay down that without parting with legal possession by the tenant in favour of a third party there can be no sub-letting; this parting with legal possession results in depriving the tenant of his right to be in possession. A mere occupation of the premises by a third party cannot result in sub-letting. Initial onus to prove the facts leading to an inference of sub-letting is on the landlord. May be, it is difficult to prove sub-letting by a direct evidence. The legal relationship between the tenant and the alleged subtenant cannot be know to the landlord; this difficulty cannot be a reason to hold that the tenant has to prove that there is no sub-letting involved even though a third person to the lease agreement is in the occupation of the leasehold. The initial onus of proving the facts, which is on the landlord may be discharged, by proof of facts or circumstances, justifying a reasonable inference, that the tenant has let in a third person to occupy the premises in such a way that it is possible to infer further, that the tenant has parted with the legal possession in favour of the said person. An occupation by an utter stranger to the tenant in the sense that the occupier is not closely related to him, or is not his friend) and such occupation is continuously for a long time and it is an exclusive occupation without landlord using the premises at any time, may indicative of a secret dealing between the tenant and such an occupant However, a concurrent user of the premises by the tenant and another cannot give rise to the inference of sub-letting. In this area of proof of facts, it is impossible to lay down a general principle of universal application. Facts of each case will have to be examined carefully by the Court before drawing the inference whether the landlord has discharged the initial burden that is cast on him. In this regard, the observations of the Supreme Court in Kundan Lal Rallaram v Custodian, Evacuee Property, bombay, AIR 1961 SC 1316 is quite apposite. At p. 1318 it was held: "the phrase 'burden of proof has two meanings - one the burden of proof as a matter of law and the pleading and the other the burden of establishing a case; the former is fixed as a question of law on the basis of the pleadings and is unchanged during the entire trial whereas the latter is not constant but shifts as soon as a party adduces sufficient evidence to raise a presumption in bis favour. The evidence required to shift the burden need not necessarily be direct evidence, i. e,, oral or documentary evidence or admissions made by opposite party, it may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumptions of law or fact to illustrate how this doctrine works in practice, we may take a suit on a promissory note. Under Section 101 of the Evidence Act, whoever desires any court to give Judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts of which he asserts, must prove that those facts exists'. Therefore, the burden initially rests on the plaintiff who has to prove that the promissory note was executed by the defendant As soon as the execution of the promissory note is proved, the rule of the presumption laid down in Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act helps him to shift the burden to the other sale. The burden of proof as a question of law rests, therefore, on the plaintiff; but as soon as the execution is proved, Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act imposes a duty on the Court to raise a presumption in his favour that the said instrument was made for consideration. The burden of proof as a question of law rests, therefore, on the plaintiff; but as soon as the execution is proved, Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act imposes a duty on the Court to raise a presumption in his favour that the said instrument was made for consideration. This presumption shifts the burden of proof in the second sense, that is, the burden of establishing a case shifts to the defendant The defendant may adduce direct evidence to prove that the promissory note was not supported, by consideration, and, if he adduced acceptable evidence, the burden again shifts to the plaintiff and so on. The defendant may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and, compelling, the burden may likewise shift again to the plaintiff. He may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance those mentioned in Section 114 and other sections of the Evidence Act. Under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, "the court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Illustration (g) to that section shows that the Court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. A plaintiff, who says tha he had sold certain goods to the defendant and that a promissory note was extempted as consideration for the goods and that he is in possession of the relevant accounts books to show that he was in possession of the goods so!ti and that the sale was effected for a particular consideration, should produce the said account books, for he is in possession of the same and the defendant certainly cannot be expected to produce his documents. In those circumstances, if such a relevant evidence is withheld by the plaintiff, Section 114 enables the Court to draw a presumption to the effect that, if produced, the said accounts would be unfavourable to the plaintiff. This presumption, if raised by a Court, can under certain circumstances rebut the presumption of law raised under Section 118 of the Negotiable instruments Act. This presumption, if raised by a Court, can under certain circumstances rebut the presumption of law raised under Section 118 of the Negotiable instruments Act. Briefly stated, the burden of proof may be shifted by presumptions of law or fact, and presumptions of law or presumptions of fact may be rebutted not only by direct or circumstantial evidence but also by presumption of law and fact" further down, Supreme Court pointed that circumstantial evidence is as good as any other evidence. While burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, the onus of proof shifts and shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence, (vide Raghavamma v Chenchamma, AIR 1964 SC 136 at p. 143 ). When both parties have adduced evidence, the burden of proof ceases to be significant. In such a situation, Court is entitled to draw the necessary inference from the respective pleadings and the totality of the evidence read with the circumstances of the case. Originally lease commenced on 15-1-1975. Exs. P. 5 and P. 6 show that 1st respondent took the lease on behalf of Sevenseas Industries Pvt. Ltd. On 14-12- 1975 landlady refunded to the 1st respondent the deposit received by her under Ex. P,7. But Ex. P. 6, dated 20-11-1975 indicates that the lease wassought to be extended by another 11 months for the benefit of Sevenseas Industries Pvt. Ltd. However, 1st respondent was only a Sales Executive of the said Company and there is nothing else to show that rents were being paid by and on behalf of the said Company. Ex. R. 2 (6- 1-1983) is the copy of the notice sent by the landlady to 1st respondent referring him as the tenant; similar is the statement found in Ex. P, 1 (dt. 11-3-1983) which is a copy of the Lawyer's notice issued on behalf of the landlady to the 1st respondent. Ex, P. 1 further states that the 1st respondent was a chronic defaulter in the payment of rent and he was in arrears from October, 1982 to February, 1983 (five months) and that 1st respondent has shifted his residence to Bombay and that he had sub-let the premises unlawfully in favour of the 2nd respondent In Ex. Ex, P. 1 further states that the 1st respondent was a chronic defaulter in the payment of rent and he was in arrears from October, 1982 to February, 1983 (five months) and that 1st respondent has shifted his residence to Bombay and that he had sub-let the premises unlawfully in favour of the 2nd respondent In Ex. P. 3, the 1st respondent denied the factum of his shifting his residence to Bombay and of the alleged sub-letting. Landlady as P. W, 1 asserted that 1st respondent shifted to Bombay and that 2nd respondent has been residing in the said premises. But she does not assert that the occupation of 2nd respondent was exclusive, and that 1st respondent had parted with his possession in favour of 2nd respondent She further stated, "i do not know whether wife and children of respondent No. land wife and children of respondent No. 2 and their husbands are residing jointly in the schedule premises. " the second respondent as R. W. 1 deposed:"my direct elder brother Gopal Pothadar is the 1st respondent in this case. We both are residing in the petition schedule premises as tenants since 15th january, 1975. Our families are residing in that house. We both respondents are members of joint family. I myself negotiated in the 1st instance with regard to our tenancy through broker Mr. Mohd. At that time the rate of rent was fixed at rs. 1,700/- p. m. I paid Rs, 500/- to the petitioner as token advance in the presence of broker Mohammed. When we occupied the schedule premises it was not fully ready. Kitchen, platform, one room, toilet was not completed, ceiling fan was not installed. "he denies the sub-letting of the premises to him by his brother and asserted that he paying the rents and that children of respondents 1 and 2 were studying in the school near the schedule premises. The Departmental stores, near Mekri Circle, in the name of Meenakshi Departmental stores was started in 1978 under the partnership of the respondents and earlier they were carrying on the business in the schedule premises, in the name of Lakshmi Trading Co. , between 1975 to 1977. However, 1st respondent also worked as the Sales Executive of Sevenseas Industries pvt Ltd. Ex. P. 5 was also signed by the broker Haji Mohammed. , between 1975 to 1977. However, 1st respondent also worked as the Sales Executive of Sevenseas Industries pvt Ltd. Ex. P. 5 was also signed by the broker Haji Mohammed. R. W. 1 asserted that he has documents to prove that both the respondents belong to a joint family; he was not able to tell the Court when his brother ceased to work for Sevenseas industries Pvt. Ltd. , but asserted that his brother was doing textile business in bangalore. R. W. 1 produced a few documents to sustain his case that he has been residing in the schedule premises for long and that on occasions he sent rents. Some of these documents are of the year 1976. 1st respondent examined himself as R. W. 2. He asserted that he obtained the lease in his capacity as the Kartha of the joint family. Further he spoke about the telephone standing in bis name and his car, records which give the schedule premises as his address. Ex. R. 108 is the leased deed dated 16-12-1975 (after the expiry of the earlier lease dated 15-1-1974) executed by the landlady in favour of the 1st respondent; this deed describes the purpose by the lease for "residential-cum-office purposes" and the lessee as the 1st respondent who was the Sales Executive of Sevenseas Industries Pvt Ltd. R. W. 2 stated: "first lease was on 15th January, 1974 which was between me and petitioner. I have not vacated the premises after the first lease was over. I do not have copy of 1st lease. Since first lease was expired took second lease, Ex. R. 108. The first lease was only for 11 months. The second lease Ex. R. 108 according to me not been expired. It is false to suggest that I have taken the first lease on behalf of the sevenseas Industries Pvt. Ltd. I say now that I took lease on 15-1-1975 but not on 15-1-1974. The contents of Ex. P. 5 are correct. It is executed by me. The contents of Ex. F. 6 arc also true and correct. Even after going through the contents of Ex. P. 5 and P. 6, I say that the premises was not taken for lease by the sevenseas Industry Pvt Ltd. I was working as Sales Executive in the said sevenseas Industry. I executed Ex. It is executed by me. The contents of Ex. F. 6 arc also true and correct. Even after going through the contents of Ex. P. 5 and P. 6, I say that the premises was not taken for lease by the sevenseas Industry Pvt Ltd. I was working as Sales Executive in the said sevenseas Industry. I executed Ex. P. 7 just for adjustment of ten thousand rupees deposit amount against fresh lease. The Company had given tbe said amount to petitioner debiting the same to my account in Company records. I do not remember now whether I received Court notice in this case. I do not know whether Court notice was issued through news paper. My brother appeared first. Later on I appeared. Flat 20-A Walkeshwar Road, Bombay belongs to my mother. My sister and my brother-in-law Amith Agarwala and Jayanth Suklan are residing in that Flat. My wife and children are living in Bangalore. I have no any records to show that my wife and children are residing at Bangalore. Some of the documents filed by the respondents to show that the 1st respondents address is in the schedule premises, is after the present dispute and hence much importance cannot be given to them. The eviction petition was preceded by a notice which was issued in March, 1983, wherein unlawful sub-letting was alleged. The car insurance by R. W. 2 as per Ex. R. 104 was dated 17-2-1986 and Ex. R. 102 was dated 13-2-1984. Date of the gas connection is also forthcoming. Further, this is neutral factor because, first respondent, as well, may have allowed his brother to take advantage of the gas connection. The deposition of R. W. 2 does not evoke credibility in view of his assertions as to the lease having been obtained on behalf of the alleged joint family; his deposition in this regard is opposed to the documents Ex. P. 5, P. 6 and Ex. R. 108. However, some sort of explanation is found in Ex. R. 99 which is a copy of a reply sent by the 1st respondent's counsel, to the landlady on 22-2-1982. Earlier in ex. P. 5, P. 6 and Ex. R. 108. However, some sort of explanation is found in Ex. R. 99 which is a copy of a reply sent by the 1st respondent's counsel, to the landlady on 22-2-1982. Earlier in ex. R. 98 (dt 28-9-1981), also, through his counsel, 1st respondent asserted that he was the tenant and not the Sevenseas Industries Pvt. Ltd. ; here also it was stated that the 2nd respondent was his co-partner in business and his brother and they were residing as a compact household. Ex. R. 95 is a copy of the letter dated 8-4-1981 from the 2nd respondent to the landlady enclosing a cheque of Rs. 1,850/- towards the rent. Ex. R. 92 is an earlier similar letter. Such letters seems to have been sent with the cheques atleast from December, 1978 (EX. R, 51, etc. ). Ex. R. 40 discloses that as early as October 1976, 2nd respondent's address was the schedule premises. Ex. R. 33, dated 29-7-1976 is a letter from Bank of Madura Ltd. , to the 2nd respondent at the schedule premises. Ex. R. 31 is the gas connection given to the 1st respondent in the year 1975. During 1977-78 itself, 2nd respondent's son was studying in the local Nursery and Primary School (vide Ex. R. 25 ). Material, thus produced substantially establishes the fact that atleast since the year 1976 2nd respondent has been residing in the schedule premises. Being brothers, it is quite possible that both the respondents have been residing together. However, I find no clinching evidence to show that the 1st respondent has been residing in the schedule premises permanently with his wife and children. But evidence as to these brothers being members of a joint family and are trading as partners could be placed before the Court only by the respondents. Though R. W. 1 asserted that he had documentary evidence available with him, on these questions, they were not produced. The way r. W. 2 asserted as to the purpose of the lease and his status in obtaining tbe lease, again creates strong suspicion about his credibility. But that by itself is no ground to order the eviction. In the very nature of things, another opportunity has to be given for the landlady to prove that first respondent had parted legal possession to the 2nd respondent. But that by itself is no ground to order the eviction. In the very nature of things, another opportunity has to be given for the landlady to prove that first respondent had parted legal possession to the 2nd respondent. Having regard to the totality of the material on record, I am constrained to bold that a definite finding is not possible here and parties should be given a liberty to lead further evidence on this aspect of the case, in the light of the legal propositions slated by the Supreme Court. Re. clause (h): in the eviction petition, the landlady sought possession to provide accommodation to her daughter's clinic and residence. The evidence of P. W. 1 shows that premises was required to open a clinic and nursing home. No case was made out for the residence of the daughter. The daughter as P. W. 2 in no way improved the position; her deposition also seeks the premises for opening a clinic consisting of an examination room, sitting room for patients, a room for laboratory, small office, a room for latrine facilities. P. W. 2 is a post-graduate diploma holder in obstetric and gynaecology. Subsequently, P. W. 2 is married to a Doctor in view of this development whether p. W. 1 requires schedule premises is again a matter of subsequent event to be proved. In Ramesh v Balreddy, AIR 1990 SC 1376 , it was held that if the married daughter's husband is a Doctor and she was practicing by assisting her husband, the original requirement pleaded by the landlord may not survive. In the light of the subsequent events, it is for the landlady to prove her requirement properly. For the reasons stated above, this petition is allowed and the order under revision is set aside. The matter is remanded to the trial Court for a fresh consideration of the matter. Parties are given liberty to lead further evidence on their respective cases. They are also permitted to amend their respective pleadings having regard to the lapse of time. Parties are directed to be present in the trial Court on 10-2-1992 to take note of further proceedings. --- *** --- .