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1992 DIGILAW 441 (KER)

Kammukutty v. Joint Registrar

1992-11-13

PAREED PILLAY

body1992
Judgment :- Petitioner is a member of the 4th respondent Vadakkumpuram Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. Managing Committee assumed office on 1-10-1989. The Managing Committee passed a resolution on 11-7-1992 to conduct election. The proposal was to hold election on 30-9-1992. Ext.PS election notification dated 6-8-1992 was issued. 2. Contention of the petitioner is that as the. Term of the Managing Committee expired on 30-6-1992 the resolution passed on 11-7-1992 is not in conformity with Rule 35 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules. Petitioner seeks to quash Ext.PS notice and the whole election process including the resolution passed by the 5th respondent as illegal and contrary of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969. 3. Respondents 3 and 4 contended that the period of the Managing Committee did not expire on 30-6-1992 and as the period of expiry was on 30-9-1992 the resolution passed on 11-7-1992 is not in violation of Rule 35 and the petition is devoid of merit. 4. If the term of the Managing Committee expired only on 30-9-1992, the election notification is not in violation of Rule 35, Rule 35(1) provides that the (Committee shall meet at least 60 days in advance of the date of expiration of its term and I >ass a resolution fixing the date, time and place for the conduct of the election of the new committee. 5. The question that arises for consideration is whether the term of the Committee expired on 30-9-1992 as per the byelaws or on 30-6-1992 as contended by the petitioner. S.28(1) states that the general body of a society shall constitute a committee in accordance with the byelaws and entrust the management of the affairs of the society to such committee. Rule 39 states that the byelaws of every society shall provide that the term of its committee shall expire on the same day as may be specified. The Act has not ignored the byelaws of the society. Rule 39 makes the position clear that if no such date is specified in the byelaws the date of expiry shall be 30th of June of that year in which the term expires. It is apparent that if any date is specified in the bye-laws regarding the date of expiry it should prevail. 7. Rule 39 makes the position clear that if no such date is specified in the byelaws the date of expiry shall be 30th of June of that year in which the term expires. It is apparent that if any date is specified in the bye-laws regarding the date of expiry it should prevail. 7. Reliance is placed on the Explanation to Rule 39 by the petitioner to hold that for the purpose of calculating the term of a Committee the year shall be taken to be the period commencing on the first day of July of the year and ending with 30th June of the succeeding year and that each year of the term shall be calculated so as to end on 30th June of the y 8. Explanation cannot over ride what has been stated in Rule 39 in cxpiicii terms and in cases where the bye-laws of the society do mention about the expiry period of the society it has to prevail and only incases where the bye-laws remain silent about it the date of expiry of the society shall be 30th of June. The terms of the committee of a society is fixed by the bye-laws and not by the Act or Rules. S.28 as amended does not prescribe the terms of the Society and it does not encroach upon the period prescribed as per the byelaw. S.28 only sets the maximum period of the Committee as three years. "Year" is defined under S.2(u). "Year" means the period commencing on the first day of July of any year and ending with 30th of June of the succeeding year or in the case of any registered society or class of registered societies, the accounts of which are made upto any other date with the previous sanction of the Registrar, the year ending with such date. S.2 does not attempt to define the expiry of the term of the society. The above definition is useful to understand the significance of "Year" in the Act and not the "year" in the bye- laws. The date of expiry mentioned in the bye -laws is given its due importance in Rule 39. Normally an explanation to a section has to be read so as to harmonise with the main section and also to consider any ambiguity in it. It cannot be construed to nullify what the section has declared. The date of expiry mentioned in the bye -laws is given its due importance in Rule 39. Normally an explanation to a section has to be read so as to harmonise with the main section and also to consider any ambiguity in it. It cannot be construed to nullify what the section has declared. Explanation to Rule 39 cannot wipe out what has been enacted in the Rule in categoric terms that where a date is specified in the bye -laws it has to prevail. When the Rule says that if no date is prescribed under the bye-laws regarding the terms of expiry of the society it shall be 30th June, it is patently clear that in a case where date is prescribed in the bye-laws it has to be sustained. In that view of the matter, it has to be held that the relief's prayed in the O.P. cannot be granted. In the result, the Of. is dismissed. No costs.