JUDGMENT - Dr. E.S. DA SILVA, J.:---In this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioners are challenging the communication dated 24-10-1985 sent by the first respondents to the respondents No. 2 and 4 and all other nationalised, scheduled or other Banks directing the latter to obtain the prior approval of the said respondents for the continuation of Export Packing Credit Facility granted by respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 to the petitioners and/or for the grant of any fresh export credit facilities by the respondents No. 2 to 4 and/or other nationalised, scheduled or other Banks in India to the said petitioners or any of them. 2. The 1st petitioners are a Private Limited Company carrying on business of extraction of iron ore from mines situated in Goa and export of such ore to foreign countries. The 7th and 8th petitioners are the Managing Director and the Joint Managing Director respectively of the 1st petitioners and hold 60.17 per cent of the paid up share of the 1st petitioners. The 2nd petitioners are a Private Limited Company carrying on business inter alia of export of manganese ore from Goa to foreign countries The 7th and 8th petitioners are the Managing Director and the Joint Managing Director respectively of the 2nd petitioners and hold 95% of the shares of the paid up share capital of the 2nd petitioners. The 3rd petitioners are a partnership firm and are carrying on business of export of ore from Goa to foreign countries. The 7th petitioner is a partner in the firm of 3rd petitioners. The 6th petitioners are a Private Limited Company carrying on business inter alia of processing and refrigeration of sea foods and export thereof to foreign countries. The 7th and 8th petitioners are the Directors of the 6th petitioners and hold 92.88% of the paid up share capital of the 6th petitioners. The 1st respondents are an incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 fully owned by and are an undertaking of 5th respondents carrying on business of guaranteeing payment of the amounts which may be advanced by nationalised banks, scheduled or other banks by way of packing credit or otherwise to individuals, firms or companies carrying on business of export of commodities from India to foreign countries. Respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 are nationalised Banks and are undertakings fully owned by the 5th respondents. 3. Respondents No. 2, 3 and 4 are nationalised Banks and are undertakings fully owned by the 5th respondents. 3. In or about the month of December, 1982 the 4th respondents extended Export Packing Credit Facilities to the 5th petitioners to the extent of Rs. 5,00,000/- for export of bauxite ore from Goa to the United Arab Emirates with interest thereon of 2.5% per annum above the bank rate subject to a minimum of 12.5% with quarterly rests or at such other rate or rates as may be notified by the 4th respondents to the 5th petitioners from time to time. The said Packing Credit Facility of Rs. 5,00,000/- was enhanced by the 4th respondents at the request of the 5th petitioners to Rs. 10,00,000/- on or about 28th April, 1983 on the execution of similar documents by the 5th petitioners and the 7th and 8th petitioners as Directors of the 5th petitioners in favour of the 4th respondents. The fourth respondents had advanced to the 5th petitioners an aggregate sum of about Rs. 10,00,000/- in respect of the said Packing Credit Account upto about the end of the year 1983. Thereupon the petitioners entered into a contract with Agencies Company Limited of United Arab Emirates for export of bauxite ore from Goa but on account of certain difficulties which arose some litigation had to be filed by them against the master of the ship, the ship owners and its agents as well as against the Company which was supposed to carry on the loading of ore, as a result whereof the 5th petitioners could not receive any amount in respect of the value or price of 13,500 tonnes of ore loaded in the said ship and consequently the balance amount of the said Export Packing Credit extended by the 4th respondents to the 5th petitioners remained outstanding. As a result the 5th petitioners were disabled from making any payment in respect of the said Export Packing Credit Facility extended by the 4th respondents by reason of wrongful and illegal conduct of the Company, the ship and the ship owners and its agents. As its consequence the 4th respondents had filed a Special Civil Suit No. 34 of 1988 in the Court of the C.J.S.D., Vasco-da-Gama against the 5th petitioners and 7th and 8th petitioners for a decree of Rs. As its consequence the 4th respondents had filed a Special Civil Suit No. 34 of 1988 in the Court of the C.J.S.D., Vasco-da-Gama against the 5th petitioners and 7th and 8th petitioners for a decree of Rs. 18,77,662.66 and interest for the sale of stocks of bauxite purported to be hypothecated to the 4th respondents and for costs of the suit which is pending in the said Court. 4. Similarly the 6th petitioners had been extended by the 4th respondents Export Packing Credit Facility from about the month of October, 1982 initially to the extent of Rs. 25,00,000 in connection with their business of export of marine products including sea foods and for various reasons namely the sudden slump in international market on account of substantial fall in the demand for shrimps timely repayment of the loan could not be made and the 4th respondents filed Special Civil Suit No. 35 of 1988 against the 6th petitioners, the 2nd petitioners, the 7th petitioners and others in the Court of C.J.S.D., Vasco-da-Gama for a decree of Rs. 60,03,929.60 and interest. 5. All this risk of Export Packing Credit Facilities extended by the 4th respondents to the 5th and 6th petitioners was insured by the 4th respondents with the 1st respondents. By reason of disability of the 5th petitioners as well as 6th petitioners to pay the amounts advanced to them by the 4th respondents the said 4th respondents submitted their claims to the 1st respondents for payment of the amounts due to them in respect thereof. 6. The 1st respondents thereupon sent communications to the respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and all other nationalised and scheduled Banks to the effect that the entire Bandekar group of Companies including the petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 had been placed in the "Prior Approval List" or "Caution List" maintained by the 1st respondents and directed them all, including the respondents Nos. 2, 3, and 4 to discontinue Export Packing Credit Facilities which were being enjoyed inter alia by the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 relating to their respective business and particularly export of iron ore and bauxite ore carried on by petitioners Nos, 1 to 4 and further not to extend any fresh Export Packing Credit Facilities to the entire Bandekar group of Companies, including the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4, without the prior approval of the 1st respondents. 1 to 4 relating to their respective business and particularly export of iron ore and bauxite ore carried on by petitioners Nos, 1 to 4 and further not to extend any fresh Export Packing Credit Facilities to the entire Bandekar group of Companies, including the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4, without the prior approval of the 1st respondents. As a result of the said communication respondents Nos. 2 to 4 discontinued the Export Packing Credit Facilities which existed in favour of petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 from about the month of March, 1986 and the outstanding amounts in the said Export Packing Credit accounts of the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 were converted into overdue cash credit accounts. In addition the rate of interest was progressively reduced from about 12.5 per cent per annum which prevailed in or about the year 1983 to about 7.5 per cent per annum upto about the year 1986 by the Reserve Bank of India by several Notifications issued in that behalf. As such that interest has been purported to be debited in the said several accounts of the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 with the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 from about the month of March 1986 at the rate of about 16.5 per cent per annum with quarterly rests instead of the rate chargeable in the said Export Packing Credit Accounts in accordance with the Rules and Regulations and/or Notifications issued by the Reserve Bank of India in that behalf. As a consequence of that communication the respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 and/or other nationalised Banks are threatening to discontinue granting any further credit facility to the petitioners or to any one of them and further to appropriate amounts which may be realised by the respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 on account of the petitioners towards their existing liabilities and not to permit them to utilise the said funds for the continuation of their business activities. This illegal conduct of business of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 has brought the operation of the business of the petitioners to a complete standstill. 7. 2, 3 and 4 on account of the petitioners towards their existing liabilities and not to permit them to utilise the said funds for the continuation of their business activities. This illegal conduct of business of respondents Nos. 2 to 4 has brought the operation of the business of the petitioners to a complete standstill. 7. The petitioners stated that the aforesaid policy or instructions of the 1st respondents of placing the associate concerns of a defaulting party on the "Prior Approval List" thereby preventing all the Banks from extending any Export Packing Credit Facilities to any such associate business concerns and further compelling them to convert the same into overdrafts or cash credit accounts are wholly irrational, arbitrary, capricious and perverse in their nature amounting thus to unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights of the petitioners of carrying on business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In any event their fundamental right of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution has also been violated by the 1st respondent in issuing such instructions or by acting upon such policy in so far as such associate business concerns are thereby adversely affected. 8. No notice or communication was sent by 1st respondents to petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 or 7 and 8 for placing or including them in the "Prior Approval List" or in the "Caution List" of the respondents or before giving instructions or sending communication to respondents Nos. 2 to 4 or any other Nationalised, scheduled or other Banks directing them to discontinue the existing Export Packing Credit Facilities extended to petitioners Nos. 1 to 4, 7 and/or 8 and/or directing them not to grant any fresh Export Packing Credit Facilities to the petitioners or any of them without the prior approval of the 1st respondents. No opportunity was also afforded by the 1st respondents or by the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 to the petitioners to show cause why the petitioners should not be placed in the said "Prior Approval List" or "Caution List". The 1st respondents have thereby acted in gross breach or violation of the principles of natural justice. 9. Finally it was stated by the petitioners that the petition is filed after making all efforts to persuade the 1st respondents to withdraw or cancel the said instructions given by the 1st respondents to respondents Nos. The 1st respondents have thereby acted in gross breach or violation of the principles of natural justice. 9. Finally it was stated by the petitioners that the petition is filed after making all efforts to persuade the 1st respondents to withdraw or cancel the said instructions given by the 1st respondents to respondents Nos. 2 to 4 as well as to other nationalised, scheduled and other Banks to discontinue extending Export Packing Credit Facilities to the petitioners. Thus the petition is filed without any avoidable delay. But in any event a prayer was made that the delay, if any, in filing the petition be condoned. 10. The respondents Nos. 2 and 4 in their affidavits have denied that any communication or instructions were issued to them by the respondents No. 1 to discontinue the Export Packing Credit Facilities which they were giving to the petitioners consequent upon the said communication. It was averred by the said respondents that it is true that in or about January, 1986 a communication was received from the respondents No. 1 about the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 being placed in the "Prior Approval List " or "Caution List" maintained by the 1st respondents. But no directions had been sent to discontinue the facilities enjoyed by the petitioners or any of them . It was further stated by the said respondents that whenever a party is placed on the "Prior Approval List " by the respondents No. 1 any advances to be made to the said party should be with the prior approval of the respondents No. 1 if the Banks making such advances are desirous of availing insurance coverage from the respondents No. 1 . The respondents also denied that any amounts in Export Packing Credit accounts of the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 or any of them were converted into overdue cash credit accounts by the said respondents. It was also denied that from about March, 1986 consequent upon the impugned communication the respondents charged an interest at the rate of 16.5 percent per annum on any Export Packing Credit granted to the petitioners. The respondents stated that the interest by charged them in respect of all the credit facilities granted to the petitioners were in accordance with the Rules and Regulations of the Reserve Bank of India in that behalf . 11. The respondents stated that the interest by charged them in respect of all the credit facilities granted to the petitioners were in accordance with the Rules and Regulations of the Reserve Bank of India in that behalf . 11. It was further averred that when the said communication of the respondent No. 1 was received Export Packing Credit Facilities were continued and the said accounts were continued as Export Packing Credit accounts and interest was charged thereon accordingly at concessional rates as per the Reserve Bank Rules till the same were closed on the dates respectively set out against them in the respective Annexures by the payments received in the said accounts thereby liquidating the said outstanding dues. Even thereafter and despite the said communication some of the respondents advanced Export Packing Credit Facilities to the petitioner No. 1 and further similar facilities to the petitioner No. 3 and the interest charged on all these accounts was also at the concessional rate chargeable on such Export Packing Credit Accounts as per the Reserve Bank directives and at no time any higher rate of interest was charged. It was, however, clarified that one of the usual conditions of the Export Packing Credit Facility advance is that if such Credit granted is not liquidated within a reasonable time i.e. within about 180 days then the same is to be converted into overdue cash credit account and wherein the interest charged is at the rate of 16.5 per cent per annum and further penal interest at rate of 2 percent per annum on compounding basis with quarterly rests. 12. Shri S. K. Kakodkar, learned Counsel for the petitioners, after submitting that the respondent No. 1 is running a monopolistic business with regard to the insurance cover of the Export Packing Credit Facilities made available to them by the respondents Banks, has made a grievance that by the aforesaid communication dated 24-10-1985 which was known to the Banks only in 1986 the Banks were made bound to the judgment of the respondent No. 1 regarding all the petitioners solvability. It was submitted by Shri Kakodkar that the Banks are Public Bodies and masters of their own destiny but the communication addressed to them by the respondent No. 1 was like a condemnation of the petitioners issued to them by practically placing the petitioners in the black list with disastrous consequences for their business. It was submitted by Shri Kakodkar that the Banks are Public Bodies and masters of their own destiny but the communication addressed to them by the respondent No. 1 was like a condemnation of the petitioners issued to them by practically placing the petitioners in the black list with disastrous consequences for their business. It was further submitted by the learned Counsel that the said communication was circulated without the petitioners which ex facie could not be held as deliberate. It was therefore the manner in which the whole exercise was conducted by the respondents that the petitioners were assailing in the present petition. Shri Kakodhar argued that there was no compulsion when a party is in default with regard to the payment of their loans that it should be immediately blacklisted. The companies are different from shareholders and each has its own identity. Therefore the petitioners Nos. 1 to 6 could not be confused with the petitioners Nos. 7 and 8. They were different and thus the question of mixing both would not arise. Besides there was a fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on their business and blacklisting was violative of this right. Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on the case of M/s. Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and another, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 266 wherein it was held that in matters of contracts with the Government placing the name of a person in black list creates a disability which has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purpose of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist. A citizen has a right to claim equal treatment to enter into a contract which may be proper, necessary and essential to his lawful calling. Where the blacklisting order involves civil consequences its cases a slur. The blacklists are instruments of coercion. Hence a person must be given an opportunity of hearing before his name is put on the blacklist. 13. Where the blacklisting order involves civil consequences its cases a slur. The blacklists are instruments of coercion. Hence a person must be given an opportunity of hearing before his name is put on the blacklist. 13. It was further urged by Shri Kakodkar that the type of communication sent by the respondents No. 1 to the other respondents is likely to impress upon the Banks and to that extent affect their willingness to supply the Export Packing Credit Facilities. Besides although the communication was issued in March 1986 the petition was filed in 1990 only when its effect was felt by them at the time the Banks refused to supply to them the facilities which they were availing before the said communication. Further there appears to be also some sort of over reaction of the respondents No. 1 and as such the communication had to be viewed as a disproportionate, irrational and illegal action on their part leading to arbitrariness which would by itself entitle interference on the part of this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. This is apart from the fact that the alleged interrelationship between the various petitioners' concerns had to be understood within the context of their separate entity of each of the companies. 14. In his turn Mr. Trivedi, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents No. 1, has forcefully advanced several submissions, namely, the fact of the petitioners being guilty of gross latches and delay, disputing their locus standi to file the present petition, the fact of the petitioners' claim for damages being impermissible, the circumstance of the petition raising several disputed questions of fact, as well as the conduct of the petitioners and the nature of the alleged communication which is under challenge in this petition. Elaborating those submissions it has been urged by the learned Counsel that the purported Circular dated 24-10-1985 under dispute appears to have become known to the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 somewhere in 1986. However, the petition has been filed only in March, 1990. Besides the petitioners do not appear to have any locus standi to challenge by the present petition what according to Mr. Trivedi amounts ultimately to the terms and conditions on which the respondent No. 1 grant insurance cover to the Banks. 2 to 4 somewhere in 1986. However, the petition has been filed only in March, 1990. Besides the petitioners do not appear to have any locus standi to challenge by the present petition what according to Mr. Trivedi amounts ultimately to the terms and conditions on which the respondent No. 1 grant insurance cover to the Banks. In the same manner the claim for damages made by the petitioners being of the nature alleged by them cannot obviously be pursued in the exercise of writ jurisdiction by this Court. Similarly it could be seen that the petition is filed raising several disputed questions of fact and policies concerning to the terms on which an Insurance Company should carry on its business, the financial conditions of the petitioners and an assessment of their financial position by the respondents No. 1 as well as the proper rate of interest chargeable on advances to the petitioners. The learned Counsel has also referred to the conduct of the petitioners prior to the issue of the circular by mentioning that various credit facilities enjoyed by them from different Banks, namely, respondents Nos. 2 to 4 have come to the tune of crores of rupees. He also spoke about the interrelationship of the petitioners against some of whom suits had been filed by the banks due to their noncompliance with the terms of the agreements entered into with the said Banks and their defaults in making repayments of the said loans which defaults had been otherwise admitted by the petitioners in the very petition. Lastly the learned Counsel has contended that the communication sent by the respondent No. 1 to the banks contained only a request to obtain their prior approval before granting any advances under the respondents No. 1 guarantee to the exporters and also any other firms or Companies in which the partners or the directors or the proprietors noted therein are interested. 15. It was vehemently argued by Shri Trivedi that the aforesaid communication neither prevents the Bank from granting facilities and/or continuing the existing facilities to the petitioners nor the said communication states that the 1st respondents will not consider a proposal of the said parties in the future. 15. It was vehemently argued by Shri Trivedi that the aforesaid communication neither prevents the Bank from granting facilities and/or continuing the existing facilities to the petitioners nor the said communication states that the 1st respondents will not consider a proposal of the said parties in the future. Attention was drawn by the learned Counsel that the respondent No. 2 Canara Bank has granted facilities to the petitioners inspite of the said communication and this has been stated on oath before this Court by the respondent's No. 2 affidavit sworn by Mr. K. Annayya dated 11th April, 1990. It was also brought to our notice by the learned Counsel that a winding order has been passed against the 1st petitioners' Company somewhere in November, 1990 which has been reported in Company Cases 1992(74) 92 while winding proceedings are also going on against other Company of the petitioners in the case of (Kantilal Co. v. Rajarama Bandekar)2. It was further urged by the learned Counsel that there was no case of any blacklisting of the petitioners by the aforesaid Circular which is not aimed only against them but against a number of Companies which according to 1st respondents' judgment are to be viewed and assessed with more care and caution by the said respondents for the purpose of covering their insurance risk in respect of loans granted to them by the respondents Banks. For this purpose Shri Trivedi has placed before us two Volumes containing a specific Approval List of exporters as on 31st December 1988 equivalent to the Caution List which includes the names of the petitioner's Companies for the aforesaid purpose. The learned Counsel has also drawn our attention to the affidavits of the respondent No. 2 Canara Bank and respondent No. 4 Bank of India in Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 356 of 1991 in which they have reiterated the stand taken by them that the disputed communication is not aimed at stopping the granting of any credit facilities to the petitioners and instead was seeking only to suggest to the Bankers to obtain the respondents' prior approval in case they were willing to obtain the insurance cover from them in respect of the loans to be disbursed to the exporters included in the "Caution List". We were also reminded by the learned Counsel that at present facilities to the tune of Rs. We were also reminded by the learned Counsel that at present facilities to the tune of Rs. 1,72 crores have been granted by the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 to petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 wherein the petitioner Nos. 7 and 8 are the guarantors of the loans and in respect whereof recovery proceedings are still pending. 16. Finally Shri Trivedi has placed reliance in the case of (Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd. and other)3, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1370, wherein it was held that while it cannot be doubted that every action of the State or an instrumentality of the State must be informed by reason and that in appropriate cases actions uninformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. Article 14 cannot be construed as a charter for judicial review of State actions and to call upon the State to account for its actions in its manifold activities by stating reasons for such actions. If the action of the State is political or sovereign in character, the Court will keep away from it. The Court will not debate academic matters or concern itself with the intricacies of trade and commerce. If the action of the State is related to contractual obligations or obligations arising out of the tort, the Court may not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law character attached to it. In short the Court will examine actions of State if they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from examining them if they pertain to the private law field. 17. On behalf of respondents No. 2 learned Counsel Shri Timble has also urged that apart from the fact that the communication does not prohibit them to supply credit facilities to the petitioners and in fact such credit facilities had been made available to them after the said communication, facilities at concessional rates referred only to Export Packing Credit Facilities while other facilities for loading and unloading goods are not covered by the aforesaid communication. Besides the petitioners have been defaulters towards them in respect of the previous loans and therefore they had filed recovery proceedings against them in respect of amounts which go over six crores of rupees. 18. Similarly Mr. Besides the petitioners have been defaulters towards them in respect of the previous loans and therefore they had filed recovery proceedings against them in respect of amounts which go over six crores of rupees. 18. Similarly Mr. S.V. Kamat, learned Counsel for the respondents No. 3, while adopting the arguments of the other learned Counsels has disputed the right of the petitioners to seek a relief of the nature of a writ against the Banks for the purpose of directing them to grant credit facilities to the said petitioners. He has also urged that as far as the interest charged by the Banks is concerned they were bound by the directives of the Reserve Bank of India by pointing out that the Export Packing Credit Facilities were also granted as a matter of course for a limited period of time. It was contended by the learned Counsel that they are still granting finance to the petitioners even without the cover of the respondent No. 1 and in this connection he refers to a loan made available to the petitioners on 6-1-1987 after the issue of the disputed Circular. Shri Kamat argued that this fact by itself shows that they have not been influenced by the aforesaid Circular and that they are taking respondents No. 1's cover only when they find that the guarantees supplied to the respondents Banks are not sufficient to secure their loans. Lastly the learned Counsel has drawn our attention to para 10 of the agreement which implies some sort of contractual obligation acknowledged by the petitioners in respect of the loans granted by them and which are to be discharged by them within 90 days. Hence it was urged that there was no case for the petitioners to approach the courts for any directions either against the respondent No. 1 or any of the remaining respondents namely the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 as well as in respect of the aforesaid Circular. 19. There is no doubt a lot of substance in the submissions made by the respondents' learned Counsels and we are therefore unable to accede to the propositions advanced by Shri Kakodkar on behalf of the petitioners which otherwise do not appear to be based on any sound foundation either in facts or in law. 20. 19. There is no doubt a lot of substance in the submissions made by the respondents' learned Counsels and we are therefore unable to accede to the propositions advanced by Shri Kakodkar on behalf of the petitioners which otherwise do not appear to be based on any sound foundation either in facts or in law. 20. At the very outset it is pertinent to record the facts admitted by the petitioners themselves in their petition and the disclosures made therein regarding the credit position of the said petitioners not only amongst themselves but also vis-a-vis all the respondents Banks. 21. First of all on the face of the petition it is seen that the petitioners have acknowledged that they had been granted substantial advances and credit facilities by the various nationalised commercial Banks, namely, the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 in connection with their business which according to their own estimation are exceeding the huge amount of more than Rs. 1.72 crores. This by itself suggests that such amounts correspond to a heavy investment and the financial involvement made by the public sector Banks in favour of the petitioners' group of companies which are mainly represented by the petitioners Nos. 7 and 8. 22. It has also been represented by the very petitioners that all those Companies and firms mainly controlled and directed by the petitioners Nos. 7 and 8 who happen to be husband and wife are closely interrelated and being so it seems reasonable to infer that in such a situation a change in the financial condition of one of the interrelated concerns is likely to affect the financial condition of the other interrelated Companies. Thus and consequent upon the heavy financial involvement of the Banks with the petitioners it is only proper to conclude that the financial condition of the petitioners or of any or some of them is liable to have a serious consequence on the recovery of monies owing to the Banks and other financial institutions. 23. Further the record shows that from the disclosures made by the petitioners themselves the group of Companies owned, controlled and managed by the petitioners Nos. 7 and 8 are involved in litigation with regard to their export business thus facing serious difficulties in the smooth running of the aforesaid business. 23. Further the record shows that from the disclosures made by the petitioners themselves the group of Companies owned, controlled and managed by the petitioners Nos. 7 and 8 are involved in litigation with regard to their export business thus facing serious difficulties in the smooth running of the aforesaid business. As a result of this litigation the petitioners had been unable to regularly pay their liabilities towards the Banks and have failed to clear their outstanding dues owed to the respondents Nos. 2 to 4. Consequent upon this situation suits had been instituted by the Banks which are still pending for recovery of the loan amounts on account of defaults committed by the petitioners. The petitioners have admitted these large defaults although have sought to explain and justify the nonpayment of the amounts due to the Banks. On the other hand admittedly the respondent No. 1 are a Government company carrying on mainly the business of guaranteeing insurance in the export trade. Being so and as an Insurance Company doing business in export trade it is in the fitness of things that they should necessarily assess in every case the risk which may be involved in loaning funds to a particular exporter or against a particular transaction in which they are directly concerned. It is thus undisputeble that the respondent No. 1 are bound as a business organization to consider carefully the risk which may be involved in the process and exercise proper care and caution in its business dealings. It is in this context that the communication addressed by the said respondent No. 1 to the nationalised and other scheduled Banks, namely, respondents Nos. 2 to 4, informing them that the facilities provided by the said banks to the group of Companies, firms and individuals represented by the petitioners will be insured in the future by them only if a specific approval for the grant of facilities sought for is obtained from the said 1st respondents cannot be faulted and should be viewed bearing in mind the actual and present financial conditions of the petitioners and disclosed by them in their petition. It is therefore reasonable to accept that the object and purpose of this communication aims to minimise the risk that if the 1st respondents are to be required by the Banks to provide them any insurance cover against such advances made to the petitioners it should be necessary that due and proper care of the concerned facilities and transactions be strictly assessed. And as it was already averred by the concerned Banks the aforesaid communication has in no way prohibited the Banks from advancing funds or loans to the petitioners and all that was sought from them by the respondent No. 1 is to obtain their prior and specific approval if the said Banks required the said 1st respondents to furnish any insurance cover against the credit facilities involving the petitioners. 24. This being the position it is clear that the petitioners have no right to prevent the 1st respondents to take whatever steps they should feel like devising so as to safeguard and minimise the risk in their business as a measure of prudence and proper planning in the discharge of their commercial dealings involving public funds. Thus the fact of the 1st respondents having addressed their disputed communication cannot or should not be reasonably defaulted in the context of the circumstances which appear to have motivated and/or prompted them to ensure the safety of their business and for the specific purpose of streamlining the risk which they are covering in relation to the loans, transactions and facilities granted by the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 to the petitioners' Companies and others also in similar position. 25. This right of the respondent No. 1 to exercise proper care and caution has been otherwise unmistakably acknowledged in the decision of the Kerala High Court in an unreported case of (Seema Cashew Traders v. Manager, Export Trade Corporation of India Ltd. and others)4, dated 29th September, 1989 in Writ Appeal No. 767 of 1989 which has held that the purpose of including the names of persons in the Caution List is to include the names of persons about whom extreme care and caution has to be taken for a variety of reasons and that inclusion in the list is for the purpose of the Corporation itself in the exercise of its discretion which it is called upon to exercise. Therefore the prayer for quashing the name of the appellant from the said List falls outside the scope of writ jurisdiction of the Court as it is neither for enforcement of the statutory right or any fundamental right. The Court also observed when such List is only meant for the guidance of the Corporation itself it is difficult to understand as to how a person can complain about the cautious conduct of the Corporation in deciding before hand that whenever any such case comes up for consideration it should exercise greater care and caution. Therefore no relief to prevent the Corporation from exercising greater care and caution is admissible. 26. Besides, as it was rightly pointed out by Shri Trivedi, it seems that by challenging the impugned communication the petitioners seem to dispute the terms and conditions on which the 1st respondents are granting insurance cover to the banks which manifestly they are not entitled to do for lack of proper locus standi. The submission of Shri Kakodkar that the petitioners are not throwing such challenge and that in terms of the agreement entered into by them with respondents Nos. 2 to 4 the petitioners' final conditions and/or the 1st respondents' assessment of these conditions are irrelevant to the issue in question is not convincing to the extent that by expressly seeking a relief of Mandamus from the Court to withdraw, cancel or revoke the said communication directing the banks to obtain prior approval of the 1st respondents for the continuation of the Export Packing Credit Facilities granted by them to the petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 and forbear the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 from enforcing the policy of the 1st respondents on their behalf against the petitioners with a further direction for the respondents Nos. 2 to 5 to extend Export Packing Credit Facilities to the petitioners notwithstanding the default if any committed by them in fulfilling their obligations in respect of the facilities already extended by the respondents No. 4 to the petitioners Nos. 5 and 6 the petitioners are practically trying to circumvent the terms and conditions of the agreement purportedly entered into by the respondents No. 1 with the respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4. 27. To be noted also that in the affidavit of the respondents Nos. 5 and 6 the petitioners are practically trying to circumvent the terms and conditions of the agreement purportedly entered into by the respondents No. 1 with the respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4. 27. To be noted also that in the affidavit of the respondents Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in the oral submissions made before us the learned Counsels for the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 have contended that the petitioners have been defaulters towards them and therefore they were compelled to file recovery proceeding against them for the amounts due which are worth many crores of rupees and that inspite of the communication of the respondents No. 1 they had still granted finance even without cover which fact reveals that they had not been least influenced by the aforesaid communication of the said 1st respondents because cover is taken from them only when they find that the guarantees offered by the petitioners' companies for the purpose of granting them credit facilities are not sufficient. The aforesaid submissions also show that there has been no stoppage of such facilities made available to the petitioners even after the impugned communication. It is therefore obvious that in the circumstances it cannot be said that the said communication and actually influenced the Bankers/respondents to discontinue the flow of the credit facilities sought for by the petitioners as alleged by them. 28. This being the position it is only proper that we should see no merit in the various submissions advanced by Shri Kakodkar on behalf of the petitioners while assailing the impugned communication dated 24-10-1985. 29. As it stands the right of the 1st respondents to issue instructions to the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 as well as to the other Banks cannot be disputed and therefore the petitioners should make also no grievance that principles of natural justice had been violated by the said respondents No. 1 while issuing the said communication, so much so, there is also no case of any blacklisting of the petitioners' Companies which otherwise have been not the only ones to be covered or contemplated by the 1st respondents by the same communication. The authority cited by the petitioners in this regard in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd. and others, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1370 is manifestly not attracted to the circumstances of the present case besides being given on facts. In the case of (M/s. Chemicquip Ltd. and another v. Bank of Baroda and others)5, 1988 Bank. Journal 203, a Single Bench of this Court has held that it is not possible for the Court to determine the question as to whether a particular unit is viable or otherwise because the determination of such question would require examination of many facets including the financial implications and the courts are not in a position and are not equipped to undertake such detailed exercise. It is necessary for the Court to leave some discretion in favour of the financial institutions to determine whether a Unit is viable or otherwise and the Court should be extremely slow in forcing the financial institutions to advance public funds to private party on an assumption that the unit would be viable. The discretion exercised by financial institutions is not to be interfered unless it is made with oblique motives or for extraneous purposes or upon extraneous considerations. 30. We are satisfied that maintaining "Caution List" is a policy matter of the 1st respondents. We have seen two books where innumerable parties have been also put on "Caution List" and this is not a case where the petitioners have been singled out. On facts we also find that "Caution List" or "Prior Approval List" cannot be equated with blacklisting and therefore the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in M/s. Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and another, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 226, is not applicable. The question in the case cited supra was that the tenderer was put in the blacklist with the result there was no question of accepting his tender. The case at hand is entirely different where the request for cover of insurance was to be decided on merits of the application. 31. The question in the case cited supra was that the tenderer was put in the blacklist with the result there was no question of accepting his tender. The case at hand is entirely different where the request for cover of insurance was to be decided on merits of the application. 31. In this view of the matter we find that it is a mere fallacy on the part of the learned Counsel for the petitioners to contend in the light of the various prayers and reliefs sought for by the petitioners in their petition that the petitioners are not asking for a direction for this Court that the Banks should consider them as viable or reliable and that the interrelationship between the various petitioners; Companies is to be understood only within the context of their being separate entities different from each other. We are unable to accept the petitioners' argument that the communication dated 24-10-1985 has ultimately stopped the Banks, namely, the respondents Nos. 2 to 4, from granting them the Export Packing Credit Facilities on account of the directions given by the 1st respondents to obtain from them prior approval and therefore this direction is a fiat or a command which has ultimately dried up the flow of credit which the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 were making available to them prior to the issue of the communication. 32. In the result we are of the view that nothing survives in this petition which thus seems to us totally misconceived and devoid of any substance. Hence we hereby dismiss the same and discharge the Rule made with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. *****