Judgment : This revision filed under Secs,397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is directed against the order of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Devakkottai passed in Crl.M.P.No.110 of 1987 in Sessions Case No. 196of 1986 on 13. 1988 discharging respondents 1 to 38 herein from the trial for the various offences alleged against them. 2. Short facts of the prosecution case as culled out from the case records and the order passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge are extracted as follows: The revision petitioner is the complainant and the first witness in the charge-sheet filed by respondent No.39 viz., Inspector of Police, Devakkottai Town Police Station. The petitioner was having a shop in front of the police traffic point in Tirupat-thur Road in Devakkottai town in which he was having the office for the Right Communist Party. It appears further that in connection with the bidding in the Municipal Auction for daily and weekly sandies, there was some misunderstanding and competition between the petitioner and his supporters on the one hand and respondents 1 to 38 and the other 15 accused on the whole numbering about 53. In this connection, the case of the petitioner is that on a prior occasion prior to the occurrence though the respondents herein and other accused were requested to give the prosecution party a chance to bid in the auction, they refused. While that being so, at about 10.30 p.m. on 13. 1986 when the petitioner herein along with the other prosecution witnesses by name Palanisamy, Sivalingam, Karunanidhi, Muthu, Pichai Moideen Ganapathy was talking about the bidding in the abovesaid auction to be held on 13. 1986 in his office above referred, respondents 1 to 3 alongwith about 70 persons entered into the premises of the petitioner. The first respondent/accused 1 instigated the other accused to attack the petitioner and the prosecution witnesses with weapons like aruval, sticks and stones and accordingly, they were attacked and damages caused. Besides their attack and damaging all the things therein, they caused damage to the scooter, motor cycle belonging to the prosecution witnesses to the extent of Rs.2,000 and further, they robbed a Seiko wrist watch and a sum of Rs.1,500 from witness Palanisamy and went away. Besides their attack and damaging all the things therein, they caused damage to the scooter, motor cycle belonging to the prosecution witnesses to the extent of Rs.2,000 and further, they robbed a Seiko wrist watch and a sum of Rs.1,500 from witness Palanisamy and went away. Consequently all the prosecution witnesses who were injured got the treatment from the Government Hospital, Devakkottai and on the report of the petitioner a case in Devakkottai, P.S.Cr.No.82 of 1986 was registered against the accused and investigated by respondent number 39 viz, the Inspector of Police, Devakkottai Town Police Station. On completion on Investigation the Inspector of Police laid charge-sheet against the respondents 1 to 38 and 15 other accused under Secs. 147,148,323, 324, 325, 452, 109,114,307 read with Sec.149, I.P.C. 3. When the case was taken on file by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Devakkottai in Sessions Case No.196 of 1986 and posted for framing the relevant charges on the basis of the investigation done by the 39th respondent, Crl.M.P.No.110 of 1987 was filed before the learned trial Judge under Sec.227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pray-ing for the discharge of all the accused. On hearing both parties and perusing the entire case records the learned Assistant Sessions Judge has framed the various charges against A-4, A-5, A-6, A-10 to A-15, A-17, A-21, A-24, A-26 and A-27 in all 14 accused and found that there was no material to direct the trial against the rest of the accused namely, A-l to A-3, A-7 to A-9, A-16, A-18 to 20, A-22, A-23, A-25, A-28 to 35, A-37 to 53 in all 38 persons and accordingly, they were discharged from all the charges alleged against them. In so far as A-36 is concerned, since he was away from the country at that time, the case was split up and a separate case number S.C.No.61 of 1988 was assigned for the case against him. Against the order of discharge, the first witness namely the complainant has preferred this revision. 4. I have heard Mr.P.K.Rajagopal, learned counsel for the petitioner. Against the order of discharge, the first witness namely the complainant has preferred this revision. 4. I have heard Mr.P.K.Rajagopal, learned counsel for the petitioner. He contended firstly that the learned trial Judge erred seriously in assessing the entire documentary evidence filed by the prosecution before the trial was commenced with reference to its pros and cons as if he was sitting on the trial of the above case and that thereby discharged the present respondents 1 to 38 which is erroneous in law and cannot be sustained and secondly, that the court below purposefully avoided and overlooked the names of the respondents who were accused in the first information report itself with their address in every detail and that the first information report was preferred without any delay and that during the investigation, the prosecution witnesses including the petitioner had clearly spelt out the.various overt acts of all the accused namely all the respondents including the other accused in all 53 and the manner in which who caused the bleeding injuries on them and damages to their vehicles and other articles in their office and that thirdly the investigation done by the Inspector of Police consequent to the report lodged to him immediately after the occurrence, the recovery of the damaged articles under the cover of mahazars and the sustaining of various bleeding injuries by the prosecution witnesses and their respective treatment from the Government Hospital, Devakkottai as evident from the wound certificates, issued by the medicos clinchingly provide every material and grounds for framing charges against all the accused particularly against the respondents 1 to 38 as was stated in the charge-sheet by the Inspector of Police, the 39th respondent herein and that while being so, the observation given by the Court below in paragraphs 7 to 9 of the order under challenge in this revision are not only incorrect but also against the principles of law and that so much so, the Court below committed serious error in discharging all the respondents 1 to 38 herein. 5.Per contra, Mr.M.Karpakavinayagam, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 38 supported the order of discharge passed by the court below on the ground that since the court below has found no material and triable ground has correctly discharged the respondents 1 to 38 herein and that for doing so, Sec.227, Crl.P.C. provides every right to the trial Judge that if in case he finds no material or ground to proceed with the trial, he can do so. Accordingly on the perusal and appraisal of the entire case records, the court below has discharged the respondents herein and that as such no ground or material is available in this revision to interfere with the order of discharge passed by the court below. 6. In this context, the only question that has arisen for consideration is whether the court below is right in passing the order of discharge against respondents 1 to 38 of all the charges alleged against them as contemplated by law? 7.Point: It is the admitted case that among the 53 accused who stood charged by the 39th respondent, since A-36 by name Narayanan had not attended the court below in spite of warrant issued against him and he was away from the country, the case against him had been split up as S.C.No.61 of 1988. Originally, 53 accused stood charged by the 39th respondent herein for the various alleged offences above referred for having trespassed into the shop, belonging to the petitioner at about 10.30 p.m. on 13. 1986 in which the petitioner along with the other prosecution witnesses was talking in connection with their participation in the Municipal Auction for daily and weekly san-dies to be held on the next day, under the direction and supervision of A-1 to A-3, the rest of the accused attacked the prosecution witnesses including the petitioner and caused several bleeding injuries to all the witnesses with lethal weapons and stick and damaged motor cycle and scooters belonging to them which resulted in the lodging of the first information report immediately to the police and the prosecution witnesses had been to the Government Hospital, Devakkottai and got treatment. The 39th respondent took up investigation and recovered all the damaged articles by preparing observation mahazar and seizure mahazars and examined the witnesses and investigated the case and filed charge-sheet against 53 accused in the court. 8. The 39th respondent took up investigation and recovered all the damaged articles by preparing observation mahazar and seizure mahazars and examined the witnesses and investigated the case and filed charge-sheet against 53 accused in the court. 8. The reasoning given by the court below for passing the order of discharge against the respondents 1 to 38 are the following: The court below has stated in para 8 of its order that in the printed first information report it has been stated as first accused and others and that only subsequently, when the charge sheet was filed it was made against 53 accused and that secondly according to the prosecution since claimed on the time and day of occurrence, the complaint P.W.1 has stated that the first accused Peria Karuppan, second accused Kalimuthu Ambalam, third accused Ramalingam along with 70 persons came to his shop and attacked the prosecution witnesses. The above aspect has not been stated in their Sec.161(3), Crl.P.C. statements so specifically with reference to their overt acts and that even so, there was no light element available so as to identify the various overt acts of all the accused herein and that therefore the case of the prosecution against all the respondents herein were highly improbable. Then the court below pointing out certain contradictions with regard to some other accused in respect of causing damages to their vehicles in question, robbing the wrist watch and cash to the tune of Rs.1,500, has arrived at a conclusion that the entire case against the respondents are false. Thus a careful perusal of the findings given by the court below in para 8 of its order makes it manifestly clear that the learned trial Judge has analysed the case records, namely the first information report and statements recorded under Sec.161(3), Crl.P.C. by the investigating agency as if he is probing the same after the full-fledged trial. In paragraph 9 of its order also, the court below has adverted to the overt acts of the other accused alone against whom the various charges were framed, but simply passed on by merely stating that there are no materials made available regarding the overt acts of the present respondents 1 to 38 and consequently the court below has discharged the respondents 1 to 38 from all the charges alleged against them. 9. 9. In the context of the above position and the arguments advanced on behalf of the respective parties, I have carefully perused the case records more particularly the printed first information report, observation mahazar, recovery mahazars and the statement of the revision petitioner and witness Palanisamy recorded on 13. 1986 itself under Sec.161(3), Crl.P.C. by the Inspector of Police, Devakkottai as well as the statement recorded from Dr.A.N.Rajan, who is witness number 18 in the charge-sheet. The alleged occurrence which took place at 22.30 hours on 13. 1986 in the scene of crime had been duly reported to the Devakkottai Town Police Station at about 23.45 hours by the first witness in this case and in which the names of accused 1 to 48 and others also were clearly given by the petitioner herein, and with regard to the overt acts of almost all the accused had been spelt out in the first information report itself by the petitioner himself at the earliest point of time. Further, the petitioner has categorically alleged that the first three accused 1 to 3 trespassed into their shop at the time of occurrence and directed all the accused to commit the alleged offences and that they were throughout and that they were they who refused on prior occasions to allow the prosecution party to get the lease of the daily and weekly shandies held on 13. 1986. 10. The overt acts alleged against A-1 to A-3 by all the prosecution parties were manifest, consistent and cogent followed by the overt acts of the other accused. A careful perusal of the statements recorded by the investigating agency under Sec.161 (3), Crl.P.C. from all the prosecution witnesses clearly reveals the various and several overt acts of the respondents herein also alongwith the 14 other accused against whom charges were framed by the court below. Further, the statement of the doctor who treated the injured prosecution witnesses and gave wound certificates provides ample material in support of the prosecution claim coupled with the recovery mahazars and the observation mahazar prepared by the investigating agency at the earliest point of time. In the observation mahazar prepared in the early morning at 3.0’ clock on 13. Further, the statement of the doctor who treated the injured prosecution witnesses and gave wound certificates provides ample material in support of the prosecution claim coupled with the recovery mahazars and the observation mahazar prepared by the investigating agency at the earliest point of time. In the observation mahazar prepared in the early morning at 3.0’ clock on 13. 1986 by the Inspector of Police, it has been clearly stated that in the place of occurrence, the front doors of the shop were damaged and the scattered wooden plywood planks were seen and in front of the said shop, the head light of the scooter TNF.6525 as well as driver seat were found damaged. The same was the case for the bullet motor-cycle TNU.4980 and another two wheeler TNY.6762. Thus, a careful perusal of the entire case records clinchingly reveals that there is enough material and ground made available by the prosecution against the respondents 1 to 38 herein also and on the basis of which various charges are to be framed and to be proceeded further in accordance with law. On a careful perusal, I am rather surprised to see as to how and on what basis and material, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge has arrived at a conclusion for passing an order of discharge against the respondents herein by ignoring the contents of the very first information report, statements recorded under Sec.161(3), Crl.P.C. from the injured witnesses, observation mahazar, recovery mahazars and so on. Even otherwise, it has become so manifest that the Assistant Sessions Judge has looked and perused all the records relied on by the prosecution as if he was writing the judgment after the full-fledged trial, which in my firm view is clearly an erroneous one and cannot be sustained even for a moment. 11. Even otherwise, it has become so manifest that the Assistant Sessions Judge has looked and perused all the records relied on by the prosecution as if he was writing the judgment after the full-fledged trial, which in my firm view is clearly an erroneous one and cannot be sustained even for a moment. 11. At this juncture, it has become necessary for me to advert to Sec.227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which reads as follows: “If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.” Sec.228 also becomes relevant in the context of the instant case which reads as follows: “Framing of charge: (1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which .(a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and thereupon the Chief Judicial Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant cases instituted on a police report; (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. .(2) Where the Judge frames any charge under Clause (b) of Sub-sea(1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.” 12. With regard to the legal position, I have heard the learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr.I.Subramaniam, appearing on behalf of the 39th respondent, Inspector of Police, Devakkot-tai. He countered the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents 1 to 38 by Mr.M. Karpagavinayagam. With regard to the legal position, I have heard the learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr.I.Subramaniam, appearing on behalf of the 39th respondent, Inspector of Police, Devakkot-tai. He countered the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents 1 to 38 by Mr.M. Karpagavinayagam. It was contended by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that in considering the various charges to be framed on the basis of the final report filed by the investigating agency and relied by the prosecution against the accused, the learned trial Judge has necessarily to look into the absence of any ground for proceeding further against the accused and that was the only parameter to be taken into consideration which would mean that if there are enough materials and grounds even to the extent of prima facie case against the accused, then Sec.228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure comes into operation. 13. In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1962, the Apex Court has dealt with the matter so elaborately by following the earlier case laws and the legal ratios laid down by the Supreme Court which are extracted as hereunder: ‘‘Sec.227, introduced for the first time in the New Code, confers a special power on the Judge to discharge an accused at the threshold if ‘upon consideration’ of the record and documents he considers ‘that there is not sufficient ground’ for proceeding against the accused. In other words his consideration of the record and document at that stage is for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether Or not there exists sufficient grounds for proceeding with the trial against the accused. If he comes to the conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Sec.228, if not he will discharge the accused. It must be remembered that this section was introduced in the Code to avoid waste of public time over cases which did not disclose a prima facie case and to save the accused from avoidable harassment and expenditure. 6. The next question is what is the scope and ambit of the ‘consideration’ by the trial court at that stage. Can he marshal the evidence found on the record of the case and in the documents placed before him as he would do on the conclusion of the evidence adduced by the prosecution after the charge is framed? 6. The next question is what is the scope and ambit of the ‘consideration’ by the trial court at that stage. Can he marshal the evidence found on the record of the case and in the documents placed before him as he would do on the conclusion of the evidence adduced by the prosecution after the charge is framed? It is obvious that since he is at the stage of deciding whether or not there exists sufficient grounds for framing the charge, his enquiry must necessarily be limited to deciding if the facts emerging from the record and documents constitute the offence with which the accused is charged. At that stage he may sift the evidence for that limited purpose, but he is not required to marshal the evidence with a view to separating the grain from the chaff. All that he is called upon the consider is whether there is sufficient ground to frame the charge and for this limited purpose he must weigh the material on record as well as the documents relied on by the prosecution. In the State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1978)1 S.C.R. 257 : A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2018, this Court observed that at the initial stage of the framing of a charge if there is a strong suspicion-evidence which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979)2 S.C.R. 229 : A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 366, this Court after considering the scope of Sec.227 observed that the words ‘no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’ clearly show that the Judge is not merely a post office to frame charge at the behest of the prosecution, but he has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine that a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities but he may evaluate the material to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value establish the ingredients constituting the said offence. After considering the case law on the subject, this Court deduced as under: “(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Sec.227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence tor the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. .(2) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. .(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence adduced before him while giving rise to suspicion, but not grave suspicion against the accused he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. .(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Sec.227 of the Code the Judge which (sic.) under the present Code is a senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a post officer or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.” 14. Again in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, A.I.R. 1980S.C. 52: (1979)4 S.C.C. 274 ,thisCourt observed in paragraph 18 of the judgment as under: “The standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be applied finally before finding, the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Sec.227 or 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.” From the above discussion, it seems well settled that at the Secs.227-228 stage the court, is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The court may for this limited purpose sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to commonsense or the broad probabilities of the case. Thus, in the light of the above legal ratio enunciated by the Apex Court in the cited references it is well settled that a Judge exercising his power under Secs.227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure while framing a charge or no charge, he is required to evaluate the entire material and documents made available on record with the object of finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence and for this limited purpose, the Judge may sift the evidence as he cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. The probing of the entire case records and the materials relied on by the prosecution to find out the existence of any material available against the accused towards the projection of the alleged offences were or were not in existence is the parameter and consideration to be mandatorily adopted by the Judge while framing the charge and that was the reason why the provision has been so aptly worded under Sec.227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that if the Judge considers that-there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. But what is ‘not sufficient ground’ is a matter to be considered by the Judge who is sitting on Sec.228 with the guideline clearly laid down by the Apex Court in the above cited case laws. 15. In the light of the above legal ratio and applying to the facts of the present one and on perusal of the order passed by the court below, I am not satisfied that the court below has adhered to the legal ratios enunciated while discharging respondents 1 to 38 from all the charges alleged against them. Even the reasoning given by the court below in passing the order of discharge is not on par with the various legal pronouncements. As I have already observed, there are ample materials and ground existing in the case records relied on by the prosecution against the respondents herein and to this extent the court below has clearly fell into error in passing the order of discharge. Per contra, Mr.Karupakavinayagam, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 38 drew my attention to the following case laws in support of the order of discharge passed by the Court below. C.S. & M.F.G Co. v. State of Maharashtra, 1972 Crl.L.J. 329: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 545, Mohan Lal v. State of U.P., 1982 Crl.L.J. 1998, Marappa Gounder v. Venkat-achalam, (1983) L.W. (Crl.) 1, Bansi Lal v.Laxman Singh, 1986 Crl.L.J. 1603: A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1721, State v. W.P.F.Robers, (1988)Crl.L.J, 1415,State of Karnataka v. L.Muniswamy, (1977)3 S.C.R. 113 : A.I.R. 1977S.C. 1489. On a careful perusal of these case laws on different facts and circumstances, in my considered view would not render any help or assistance to the case of the respondents 1 to 38 and the case laws clearly enunciated by the Apex Court in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja, A.I.R. 1990 S .C. 1962, provides a full answer for the instant case. In this context, I am not inclined to traverse each and every one of the case laws cited and referred above on behalf of the respondents 1 to 38 and discuss this matter. 16. This is a revision preferred by the complainant who lodged the first information under Secs.397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this context, I am not inclined to traverse each and every one of the case laws cited and referred above on behalf of the respondents 1 to 38 and discuss this matter. 16. This is a revision preferred by the complainant who lodged the first information under Secs.397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Considering the scope and ambit of the above position of law adumbrated in Secs.397 and 401, Crl.P.C. in the light of my specific observations and conclusions given above, I hereby set aside the order of discharge passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge in Crl.M.P.No.110 of 1987 in S.C.No.196 of 1986 and remand the entire matter to the file of the learned trial Judge to consider afresh in the light of the observations made above and the legal ratios enunciated by the Apex Court and records available and proceed further in accordance with law. None of the observations made in this case would be taken note of or shall influence the mind of the learned trial Judge. Since the charges framed against the other 14 accused was also stayed and considerable time has been consumed for the disposal of this revision, I hereby direct the learned trial Judge to consider the matter afresh and to proceed further in accordance with law within a period of three months. 17. In the result, the revision is allowed. The order of the trial Judge is set aside. The entire matter is remanded back to the trial Judge to consider afresh and to proceed further in accordance with law within a period of 3 months from today.