Harish Chandra Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh
1992-04-01
M.P.SINGH
body1992
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT M.P. Singh, J. - The object of premature or compulsory retirement of a Government servant is to weed out the inefficient, corrupt, dishonest or deadwood from the Government service. This right is exercised by the Government in accordance with the service rules. All that is necessary is that the Government before passing an order of compulsory retirement should consider the report of the screening committee which is based on full and complete analysis of the service record of the employee concerned. 2. Fundamental Rules 56(c) confers powers on the Government to review the working of its employees at the end of their period of service referred to therein and to require the Government servant to retire from service if in its opinion public interest calls for such an order. The rule does not prescribe any other guidelines or criteria except the public interest. 3. The law of compulsory retirement has been reviewed recently by the Supreme Court in a case reported in 1992(2) SLR 2 (SC), Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada, after examining all its earlier decisions. The following principles of law have been laid down in that case : "(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the Government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a Government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate Court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) malafide, (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be perverse order. (iv) The Government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter of course attaching more importance to record and performance during the last year.
(iv) The Government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter of course attaching more importance to record and performance during the last year. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a Government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This aspect has been discussed in paras 30 to 32 above." 4. In view of the principles thus enunciated the merits of the instant case is to be examined. 5. Facts - The petitioner was permanent Principal of Industrial Training Institute, Deoria. Adverse entries were awarded against him for the years 1983-84 and 1984-85. It has been averred that representation regarding the adverse entries of 1983-84 is still pending. The representation against the adverse entry of the year 1984-85 has been rejected but the review application is pending. 6. On 9.10.1986 the petitioner was suspended. This order was subsequently recalled on 4.3.1987 but the disciplinary proceedings continued. Charge sheet was served. He filed his reply. The enquiry officer after completing the enquiry submitted his report to the Government. The petitioner's case further is that the said order of compulsory retirement is based on the said report. 7. The petitioner further stated that the entire service record of the petitioner was examined by the screening committee in the year 1989-90. It found it to be a fit case in which the order of compulsory retirement should not be passed. 8. Ultimately an order of compulsory retirement has been in February, 1992. The said order has been assailed on the following grounds :- (i) During the pendency of the representation and the review application against awarding adverse entries, the order of compulsory retirement could not have been passed.
8. Ultimately an order of compulsory retirement has been in February, 1992. The said order has been assailed on the following grounds :- (i) During the pendency of the representation and the review application against awarding adverse entries, the order of compulsory retirement could not have been passed. (ii) The adverse entries were not of such serious nature as could have resulted in the order of compulsory retirement. (iii) Screening Committee has considered the record of the petitioner for the year 1989-90 and did not think it proper to recommend for compulsory retirement. There was no occasion for re-consideration of the same. (iv) In view of the G.O. dated 6.2.1989 and according to the existing fundamental rules, the case of the petitioner should have been recommended to the screening committee immediately on his attaining the age of 50 years. Having not done so the order of compulsory retirement could not have been passed. First point 9. The view of the Supreme Court expressed in the case of Gurdial Singh Fiji v. State of Punjab, 1979(1) SLR 804 (SC) : AIR 1979(SC) 1622 and Amarkant Chaudhary v. State, 1984(1) SLR 470 (SC) : AIR 1984 (SC) 531 was that unless a representation, made by the employee, against adverse entry is disposed of, the order of compulsory retirement should not be passed. This view has now been held to be no more a good law (Baikuntha Nath Dass) (supra). 10. A Government servant in order to escape the consequences of compulsory retirement and to defeat the object of fundamental Rule 56(c) may keep the matter alive by filing a representation/appeal or reference before Service Tribunal. He can successfully keep it pending. The process is quite time consuming. The Government will feel helpless in passing the order of compulsory retirement unless the representation is finally disposed of. In case if the Government is compelled to wait till the final decision, then the whole object of passing an order of compulsory retirement will frustrate. 11. In the case reported in 1980(1) SCR 736 Union of India and N.E. Reddy, it was held that even an uncommunicated adverse remark can also be relied upon while passing an order of compulsory retirement. Rule 56(c) need not await the disposal or the final disposal of the representation. This view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das (supra).
Rule 56(c) need not await the disposal or the final disposal of the representation. This view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das (supra). It takes me to a logical conclusion that if an order of compulsory retirement can be passed relying on the uncommunicated entries, then why the Government should wait for the final decision of the communicated adverse entries. In the case of Baikuntha Nath Das (supra) it has been held :- "We may not be understood as saying either that adverse remarks need not be communicated or that the representations, if any, submitted by the Government servant (against such remarks) need not be considered or disposed of. The adverse remarks ought to be communicated in the normal course as required by the Rules/orders in that behalf, any representations made against them would and should also be dealt with in the normal course, with reasonable promptitude. All that we are saying is that the action under F.R. 56 (i) (or the Rule corresponding to it) need not await the disposal or final disposal of such representation or representations, as the case may be."(emphasis supplied) 12. Thus an order of compulsory retirement can be passed even during the pendency of the representation against the adverse entries. Second Point 13. It is for the screening committee to examine whether the order of compulsory retirement could be passed on the basis of the entry in the service record. This committee has been given the power to recommend for compulsory retirement after being satisfied from the service record. The Law intends to serve the purpose. The executive authorities are expected to be fair and just. Their actions must satisfy the test of reasonableness without the shadow of arbitrariness and malafide. It is not the function of this Court while exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to function as a Court of appeal and to examine the sufficiency or insufficiency of the material on record and to record its own finding whether the order of compulsory retirement could be passed on the basis of the entries in the service record. (Refer to AIR 1977 SC 388 Beant Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 477 ; Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1975 SC 1297 Babhutmal Haichand v. Laxmibai ) Third Point 14.
(Refer to AIR 1977 SC 388 Beant Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 477 ; Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1975 SC 1297 Babhutmal Haichand v. Laxmibai ) Third Point 14. A vague averment has been made in the writ petition that the case of the petitioner was considered by the Screening Committee in the year 1989-90. It did not find any material on record to recommend for compulsory retirement. This statement has been sworn by the petitioner on the basis of his personal knowledge. The learned counsel was put a direct question by the Court as to how could the petitioner had a personal knowledge of this fact. He was unable to give any satisfactory reply. The petitioner has filed no material on record to substantiate the fact that the service record of the petitioner was examined by Screeinging Committee in the year 1989-90. In the absence of any factual foundation the contention needs no further discussion and is rejected. Fourth Point 15. The learned counsel's contention, that in view of the G.O. dated 6.2.1989 and according to the existing fundamental rules the case of the employees should have been considered immediately on his attaining the age of 50 years and not thereafter, is devoid of merit. 16. The use of word 'immediately' does not mean that just on the date of attaining the age of 50 years the matter should have been referred to the Screening Committee by the Government. It could be done after his attaining the age of 50 years. The word 'immediately' should not be given a very rigid interpretation. The Government was free to refer the matter to the screening committee after the petitioner attained the age of 50 years. It takes some time for the Government machinery to move. 17. The use of the word 'immediately' has a reference to 'as soon as possible'. If the contention of the learned counsel is accepted, that would frustrate the purpose and object of fundamental Rule 56(C). 18. At times the intention of the legislature is clear but the unskilfulness of the draftsman in introducing certain words in the Statute results in apparent ineffectiveness of the language. In order to make a statute workable a reasonable interpretation is to be given by the Court to the words so used. It is not necessary that natural and grammatical meaning should always be given.
In order to make a statute workable a reasonable interpretation is to be given by the Court to the words so used. It is not necessary that natural and grammatical meaning should always be given. At times a departure is permissible. Courts should give harmonious construction to the language in order to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy or failure to attain the purpose and object. 19. The intention is only this much that steps should be taken by the Government after he attains the age of 50 years as soon as possible. 20. An order of compulsory retirement after putting the prescribed qualifying period of service does not mean any punishment. It is always passed in the public interest (Shyam Lal v. State of U.P., 1955(1) SCR 26 ). 21. It is not necessary for the screening committee to dig out the old service record. Fundamental Rule 56(C) authorises the Government to review the working of its employees at the end of their period of service referred to therein and to retire them from service if in its opinion the public interest calls for such an order. In the case decided by the Supreme Court on 26.3.1992 (Posts and Telegraphs Board v. C.S.R. Murthy), an order of compulsory retirement was upheld where the work standard of the employee declined in the last two years only. 22. An order of compulsory retirement can be passed even if the representation against awarding of adverse entry is pending. It is not a punishment under the service rules. The Government servant is not entitled to be heard before passing the order. Principles of natural justice is not attracted. The Court's power of scrutiny is very limited. It can only interfere if the order suffers from the vice of malafide or in arbitrary. Facts of the instant case do not satisfy any of these tests. 23. I find no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed in limine.