Judgment :- Venkataswami, J. Admit by consent, the writ appalls are taken up for final disposal. These writ appeals are directed against a common order of the learned Judge dismissing the writ petitions which challenged acquisition proceedings. 2. The grievances of the appellants being common, learned counsel appearing for the appellants addressed common arguments and consequently we dispose of these appeals by this common judgment. 3. Mr.M.Raghavan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in Writ Appeal Nos.1381, 1455,1464 and 1507 of 1991, advanced the leading arguments, and Mr.C.Chinnaswami, learned senior counsel, Mr.E.Padmanabhan and Mr.M.Padmanabhan, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in the other appeals, while adopting the arguments of Mr.M.Raghavan, added one or two points also. 4. Under the impugned notifications published under Scc.4(l) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) (herein after referred to as ‘the Act’), an extent of 459-72-0 hectares situated in Palayakayal Village, Srivaikuntam Taluk, Chidambaranar District, was sought to be acquired under the Act for the purpose of puttting up a new zirconium and titanium sponge plant at a cost of Rs.240 crores. Though there is more than one notification issued under Sec.4(1) of the act, except the schedule, all the 4(1) Notifications are otherwise the same. We will set out one such 4(1) Notification at the appropriate place. The main argument on which much concentration was laid by Mr.M.Raghavan was that mentioning of Sub-sec.(1)of Sec.17 of the Act in the 4(1) Notification is illegal and unsustainable, which vitiates the 4(1) Notification. According to the learned counsel, Sec. 17(1) or/and Sec.l7(2) can be invoked only after Secs.6, 7 and 9 stage of the Act and not before. He, however, admits that Sec. 17(4) can be invoked along with Sec.4(1) but not Sec.17(1) or Sec.17(2) along with Sec.4(1) of the Act. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the object of Sec.l7(4) is to dispense with the enquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act, to enable the authorities to pass Sec.6 declaration immediately whereas the object and purpose of Sec.l7(1) of the Act is different, namely, to obtain possession even prior to Award enquiry under Sec. 10 of the Act. Therefore, the invocation of See. 17(1) at the stage of Sec.4(1) being illegal, the impugned 4(1) Notifications have to be quashed. Therefore, the invocation of See. 17(1) at the stage of Sec.4(1) being illegal, the impugned 4(1) Notifications have to be quashed. In support of that, he placed heavy reliance on a Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Hakim Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, A.I.R. 1970 All. 151 (F.B.). Apart from that, generally, on the scope of Sec.(l) of the Act and dispensing with Sec.5-A Enquiry, he placed reliance on the following judgments: Natesa Asari v. State of Madras, (1953)2 M.L.J. 684 : A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 481: 66 L.W. 999, Nadeshwar Prasad v. U.P.Government, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1217: (1964)3 S.C.R. 425 : (1965)1 S.C.J. 90 and Narayan Govind Gavate, etc. v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 183: (1977)1 S.C.C. 133 :1977 S.C.C. (Crl.) 49: (1977)1 S.C.W.R. 62: (1977) 1 S.C.R. 763. The learned counsel further submitted that inasmuch as the object and purpose of Secs. 17(1) and 17(4) being different there must be application of mind before mentioning the invocation of those provisions. According to the learned counsel, there is no such application of mind, and on that ground alos, the impugned Notifications are vitiated. 5. Mr.C.Chinnaswami, the learned Senior Counsel and Messrs. E.Padmanabhan and M.Padmanabhan, learned counsel, respectively appearing for the appellants in some appeals, while reiterating the same contentions that were advanced by Mr.M.Raghavan, as above, also submitted that even though steps were taken initially during 1985-86 Notification under Scc.4(l) was issued only in October, 1989 and, therefore, there was no real urgency to invoke either Sec. 17(4) or Sec.l7(l) of the Act. They also submitted that from a reading of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the fourth respondent, it will be seen that the project in question is to be included in the next Five year plan and therefore, there is no urgency in this case. They also pointed out from a perusal of the file that there is nothing to suggest that the authorities concerned wanted invocation of Sec. 17(4) of the Act. According to them, they have suggested invocation of Sec.17(1) alone and not Sec. 17(4). They have also submitted that when the Notification under Sec.4(l) of the Act was first issued, it contained the invocation of not only Sec. 17(1) but also Sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 17 which also shows that there was no application of mind before invoking the urgency clause. According to them, they have suggested invocation of Sec.17(1) alone and not Sec. 17(4). They have also submitted that when the Notification under Sec.4(l) of the Act was first issued, it contained the invocation of not only Sec. 17(1) but also Sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 17 which also shows that there was no application of mind before invoking the urgency clause. The fact that they subsequently deleted Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 17 by issuing erratum will confirm that when the notification under Sec.4(1) was published, there was no application of mind. There is a long gap between the administrative sanction of acquisition proceedings and the publication of Sec.4(1) Notification in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette. The delay was nearly 11 months, and that also shows that there was no real urgency. On these grounds, the Notifications under Sec.4(1) of the Act were challenged. 6. More or less, the same grounds were urged before the learned Judge who rejected the same and consequently dismissed the writ petitions. In addition to the decisions relied on by Mr.M.Raghavan, Mr.M.C.Chinnaswami also placed reliance on the following decisions: Raja Anand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1081: I.L.R. (1967)1 All. 511,Natwarlal v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1971 Guj. 264, State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 319, Swadeshi Cotton Mil’s etc. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 818: (1981)1 S.C.C. 664 :51 C.C. 210:58 F.J.R. 190: (1981)2 S.C.R. 5.?.?, Chinnamma and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1986 Mad. 55 and Chandramani Sohu and others v. State of Orissa and others, A.I.R. 1991 On. 205. 7. Mr.M.ASadanand, learned Government Pleader invited our attention to the relevant communications in the file in answer to the contentions that there was no application of mind for invoking urgency clause. He also submitted that in addition to the materials available in the file, the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government and also on behalf of the fourth respondent will clearly establish the urgency in this case. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the mentioning of Sec.17(1) in the 4(1) Notification is not fatal as contended by the counsel for the appellants. He cited a recent Division Bench judgment of this Court in Mathur Village Residence Welfare Association v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1992)1 L.W. 383 , which according to him,answersalmost all the points raised on behalf of the appellants. 8. He cited a recent Division Bench judgment of this Court in Mathur Village Residence Welfare Association v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1992)1 L.W. 383 , which according to him,answersalmost all the points raised on behalf of the appellants. 8. We have considered the rival submissions. 9. As the arguments revolve round the notifiaca-tion published under Sec.4(l) of the Act, we consider that it is necessary to set out the exact terms of the 4(1) Notification, leaving out the Schedule. They Read as follows: INDUSTIRES DEPARTMENT Acquisition of Lands. (G.O.Ms.No.633, Industries (M1A-2) 12th September, 1989). No.II (2) IND 6087/89 whereas in exercise of the powers conferred by..."Clause (1) of Art.258 of the Constitution of India, the President of India has in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Community Development and Co-op-eration (Department of Agriculture), notification No.4-1/65, General II, dated the 23rd April, 1966 entrusted to the Government of Tamil Nadu with their consent the function of the Central Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894), in relation to acquisition of the lands for the purpose of the Union in the States; And, whereas, the lands specified in the schedule below are needed for a public purpose to wit, for the establishment of a New Zirconium and Titanium Spongs Plant at Palayakayal in Srivaikuntam Taluk, notice to that effect is hereby given to all to whom it may concern in accordance with the provisions of Sub-sec.(l) of Sec.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act I of 1894) And, whereas, it has become necessary to acquire the immediate possession of the lands specified, in the schedule below, the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby directs that the lands be acquired under the provisions of Sub-secs.(l) and (2) of Sec.17 of the said Act. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.4 of the said Act, the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby specifically authorises the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Unit No.11, Zirconium and Titanium, Tuticorin and his staff and workmen, to exercise the powers conferred by the said subsection. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.4 of the said Act, the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby specifically authorises the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), Unit No.11, Zirconium and Titanium, Tuticorin and his staff and workmen, to exercise the powers conferred by the said subsection. Under Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.17 of the said Act the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby directs that in view of the urgency of the case, the provisions of Sec.5-A of the said Act shall not apply to this case.“ It will also be useful to set out Sec.l7(l), (2) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, which reads as follows: ”17. Special Powers in cases of urgency: (1) In cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Sec.9, Sub-sec.(l), take possession of any waste or arable land needed for public purposes or for a Company. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrance. (2) Whenever, owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making there on a riverside or ghat station, or of providing convenient connection with or access to any such station, the collector may, immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned in Sub-sec.(11) and which the previous sanction of the appropriate Government enter upon and take possession of such land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances: Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any building or part of a building under this sub-section without giving both occupier thereof atlest forty-eight hours notice of his intention so to do, to such longer notice as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier to remove his movable property form such building without unnecessary inconvenience. .(3) xxx xxx xxx .(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of Sub-sec.(l) or Sub-sec.(2) arc applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Scc.5-A shall not apply, and, if it does not so direct, a declaration may be made under Sec.6 in respect of the land at any time after the publication of the notification under Sec.4, Sub-sec.(l).“ 10. Let us first take the principal convention, namely, whether the mentioning of Sec. 17(1) in the 4(1) Notification is fatal, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants. As mentioned earlier, in support of that, heavy reliance was placed on a Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in Hakim Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, A.l.R. 1970 All. 151 (F.B.). In that, the Full Bench was called upon to consider a question which reads as follows: ”Whether a notification under Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.17 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) can be issued if a notification under Sec. 17(1) of the Act has not already been issued?“ That question was referred to the Full Bench in view of an earlier Division Bench Judgment in Sheikh Ghulam Maula v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.l.R 1964 All 353, taking a view that a notification under Sec. 17(4) of the Act without there being an earlier notification under Sec.17(1) of the Act would be invalid The Full Bench answered the question as follows: ”For the reasons mentioned above we are of the opinion that the direction under Sec.17(4) of the Act does not suffer from any defect either of fact or law. No other point has been raised in these petitions. We, therefore, dismiss them but direct the parties to bear their own costs." (para. 12) The passage relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant reads as follows: "There is yet another reason for the view indicated above. A direction under Sec. 17(1) is to be given only in respect of land "needed for public purpose". It is only by means of a declaration under Sec.6 of the Act that it is determined as to what land is needed for public purposes. The difference in the language of Sec.4 and that of Sec.6 of the Act has to be kept in view. It is only by means of a declaration under Sec.6 of the Act that it is determined as to what land is needed for public purposes. The difference in the language of Sec.4 and that of Sec.6 of the Act has to be kept in view. It shall thus appear that it is not possible to issue a direction under Sec. 17(1) along with a notification under Sec.4. In fact a direction under Sec. 17(1) can be issued only subsequent to the determination of land needed for public purposes and they can be done only by a declaration under Sec.6. So, if the direction under Sec. 17(4) cannot issue without the issue of the direction under Sec.l7(l), it would follow that the very purpose of issuing a direction under Sec.17(4) would stand defeated for the simple reason that a direction under Sec.l7(l) cannot issue till after the declaration under Sec. 17(4) has been issued a declaration under Sec.6 cannot be made without allowing an opportunity to file objection under Sec.5-A of the Act. That would positively show that the view expressed by the Division Bench in the case referred to above cannot be sustained." (para. 11) No doubt the first portion of the above paragraph (No.11) supports the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. But the second portion of the same paragraph really does not support the case of the appellants. Further, the Full Bench was not considering a situation like the one on hand, namely,if a mention is made of Sec. 17(1) of the Act in the Notification published under Sec.4(l) of the Act, whether that will vitiate the 4(1) Notification itself. 11. In our view, Sec. 17(4) of the Act can be invoked in the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, provisions of Sub-sec.(l) or Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.17 is applicable. Therefore, while invoking Sec.17(4) of the Act, necessarily a mention has to be made about the urgency, whether it is under Sec.l7(l) or under Sec.l7(2) of the Act. Because, the urgency arising under Sec.l7(1) is different from the one arising under Sec. 17(2) of the Act. Looking at this matter from another angle, we think that mentioning of Sec.l7(l) or Sec.l7(2) in the 4(1) notification is beneficial to the landowner, in one sense. Becuase, Sec. 17(1) can be invoked if the lands are waste or arrable. Because, the urgency arising under Sec.l7(1) is different from the one arising under Sec. 17(2) of the Act. Looking at this matter from another angle, we think that mentioning of Sec.l7(l) or Sec.l7(2) in the 4(1) notification is beneficial to the landowner, in one sense. Becuase, Sec. 17(1) can be invoked if the lands are waste or arrable. By mistake or otherwise, if Sec.l7(1)of the Act was invoked when the lands are not waste or arable, the landowner/s can approach the Government or this Court for relief only if a mention is made in the 4(1) Notification about the nature or urgency. However, the factual taking possession under Sec.17(1) of the Act will have to be only after the publication of notice under Sec.6(1) of the Act. Subject to that, mentioning of nature of urgency either under Sec. 17(1) or Sec.l7(2) of the Act in the 4(1) Notification cannot be considered as fatal to the Notification published under Sec.4(1) of the Act. It is true that the question whether a land is needed for public purpose or for a company can be arrived at only after the publication of the declaration under Scc.6of the Act. Merely because of that reason, it cannot be said that by mentioning the provision of Sec.l7(l) in the 4(1) Notification, the Government have decided that the land was needed for a public purpose or for a company before complying with the requirement under Sec.6 of the Act. The mentioning of Sec. 17(1) in the 4(1) Notification as we pointed out earlier is to bring to the notice of the landowner/s under what category of urgency Sec.l7(4) of the Act was invoked. The direction given while invoking Sec. 17(1) of the Act along with Sec.4(1) of the Act in this case has to be understood that that direction would be carried out strictly in accordance with the mandate of Sec.l7(l) of the Act. We may also point out here factually in all these cases it is only after publication of notices under Secs.9(1) and 10 of the Act, possession was taken and not immediately after the 4(1) notification and before the publication of the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act. To this extent, with respect, we are unable to agree with the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in Hakim Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, A. I. R. 1970 All. To this extent, with respect, we are unable to agree with the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in Hakim Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, A. I. R. 1970 All. 151 (F.B.). We may also state that identically worded notification was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Mathur Village Residence Welfare Association v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1902)1 L.W. 383. No doubt, in that case, the notification was not challenged by raising the contention as above. The notification upheld by the Division Bench (relevant portion) reads as follows: "...And, whereas, it has become necessary to acquire the immediate posession of lands specified in the schedule below, the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby directs that the lands be acquired under the provisions of Sub-sec.(l) of Sec.17 of the said Act, under Sub-scc.(4) of Sec.17 of the said Act, the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby directs that in view of the urgency of the case, the provisions of Sec.5-A of the said Act, shall not apply to this case." For all these reasons, we are not impressed with the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants that the notification under Sec.4(l) of the Act is vitiated by reason of invoking Sec. 17(1) of the Act along with the 4(1) notification. 12. The next main contention is, regarding non-application of mind for invoking the urgency clause. In support of that contention, as noticed earlier, it was contended that though the proceedings for acquisition were initiated during the year 1985-86, notification under Sec.4(1) was issued only in October, 1989. Further, though administrative sanction was issued on 211. 1988, Sec.4(T) notification was issued 11 months thereafter and, therefore, there was no real urgency. In this connection, it is sufficient to note the following judgments to answer the point. 13. In Jaga Ram v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1033, the Supreme Court has observed as follows: "Now coming to the question of urgency, it is clear from the facts set out earlier that there was urgency. The Government of India was pleased to extend time for the completion of the project upto April 30, 1969. Therefore, urgent steps had to be taken for passing through the project. The Government of India was pleased to extend time for the completion of the project upto April 30, 1969. Therefore, urgent steps had to be taken for passing through the project. The fact that the State Government or the party concerned was lethargic at an early stage is not very relevant for deciding the question whether on the date on which the notification was issued, there was urgency or not. The conclusion of the Government in a given case that there was urgency is entitled to weight, if not conclusive", (emphasis supplied) 14. In V.Doraiswami Pillai v. Government of Tamil Nadu. A.I.R. 1990 Mad. 321, a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows: "These decisions go to show that in the absence of any oblique motive the question as to whether the purpose is a public purpose or not, and whether the urgency provisions could be invoked or not, are not for judicial review. Hence, in the light of these authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioner as referred to earlier, cannot be of any assistance to hold that the pre-notification delay or the post notification delay by official would always constitute a ground to vitiate the invocation of urgency provisions under the facts and circumstances of a particular case". (emphasis supplied) 15. In Kasireddy Pappdiah v. State, A.I.R. 1975 A.I.R. 269: (1975)1 An.L.T. 70, Chinappa Reddy,J., as she then was, has observed as follows: "Therefore, one can never venture to say that the invocation of the emergency provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for providing house sites for Harijans is bad merely because the officials entrusted with the task of taking further action in the matter are negligent or tardy in the discharge of their duties, unless, of course, it can be established that the acquisition itself is made with an oblique motive. The urgent pressures of history are not to be undone by the inaction of the bureaucracy", (emphasis supplied) 16. In Biharilal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1979 Del. 84, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, after noticing an earlier Full Bench judgment of that court, has observed as follows: "No amount of delay on the part of the Government prior to the issue of the notification under Sec.4 is relevant. In Biharilal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1979 Del. 84, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, after noticing an earlier Full Bench judgment of that court, has observed as follows: "No amount of delay on the part of the Government prior to the issue of the notification under Sec.4 is relevant. It is only when Sec.4 notification is issued that it has to be considered whether compliance with S.5-Ashould be dispensed" With and action under Sec.l7(1) should be taken after issuing notification under Sec.6". (emphasis supplied) From the ratio laid down as extracted above in various judgments of this Court, other High Courts and the Supreme Court, it is clear that any delay on the part of the Government prior to the issue of Sec.4(1) notification is not relevant and cannot be pressed into service. It is not the case of the appellants that after the issue of Sec.4(1) notification, the respondents deliberately delayed the matter. Therefore, the contention based on delay is not sustainable. 17. The other aspect of the contention that there was no application of mind which vitiates the 4(1) notification can now be considered. It is seen from the file that the Government of India, Department of Atomic Energy, in the course of correspondence, informed the State Government as follows: “An extent of 1136-99 acres of patta dry land and an extent of 103.80 acres of poromboke land are required to be acquired for setting up the project. Since the project is required to be commissioned latest by mid-1992 and for this purpose the land acquisition is to be complete by March, 1989, this is to request you to take immediate action to acquire the patta lands under the uregency provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and also transfer the promboke lands to dae immediately”. Pursuant to this, a note was circulated during the Governor’s rule, and the concerned Adviser has signed the note file which contains the following statement: “They have now requested this Government to initiate acquisition proceedings in respect of patta lands under the urgency provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and also to transfer the promboke lands to the Department of Atomic Energy latest by 33. 1989 as the project is required to be commissioned by mid 1992”. 1989 as the project is required to be commissioned by mid 1992”. In the circumstances, it is for orders, whether administrative sanction may be accorded for acquisition of an extent of 1136-99 acres of patta dry lands in Pazhayakayal Village, Srivai-kuntam Taluk, Chidambaranar district for setting up new Zirconium and Titanium Sponge Plant by the Department of Atomic energy, Government of India, under the urgency provisions, under Sec.l7(l) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, on collection of cost of acquisition of lands including cost on special land acquisition staff to be appointed for the purpose, from the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India. It is also for orders, whether an extent of 103-80 acres of Government Promboke lands are specified by the Department of Atomic Energy may be transferred to them and the District Revenue Officer, Chidambaranar District may be requested to send transfer proposals to Government in Revenue Department“. This note was approved by the concerned authorities including the Adviser to Government on 111. 1988. On the basis of this note, G.O.Ms.No.1222, Industries Department, dated 211. 1988 was passed. Here again, paragraph 2 reads as follows: ”The Government after careful consideration accord administrative sanction for acquisition of 1136.99acres of patta drylands in S.Nos.295 etc., of Pazhayakayal “Village Srivaikuntam taluk, Chidambaranar District, under the urgency provisions under Sec. 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Part II) and place at the disposal of the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India to set up the new Zirconium and Titanium Sponge Plant. The cost of acquisition staff to be appointed for the purpose, shall be met by the Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India”. In view of this, we are not in a position to accept the contention that there was no application of mind regarding invocation of urgency clause. This court, various other High Courts and the Supreme court have consistently held that a decision on the question of invoking urgency is ordinarily justiciable except on the ground of mala fide or arbitrary exercise of powers-vide the decisions in Natesa Asari v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 481, Jagga Ram v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1033, S.K.Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1977 Del. 209, V.Doraiswami Pillai v. Government of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1990 Mad. 321 and Ram NarainRai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1991 All. 330. 481, Jagga Ram v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1033, S.K.Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1977 Del. 209, V.Doraiswami Pillai v. Government of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1990 Mad. 321 and Ram NarainRai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1991 All. 330. In view of the factual position and also in view of the legal position mentioned above, we are unable to accept the contention that the urgency clause has been invoked in this case without application of mind. We may at once state that no argument was addressed challenging the invocation of urgency clause on the basis of mala fide or arbitrary exercise of powers. 18. Though on the basis of materials available in the files and the ratios laid down by High Courts and Supreme Court we have come to the above conclusion, we would like to set out the factual position as well, as given in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government (Respondents 1 and 2). In paragraphs 2 to 4, it is stated as follows: “I submit that the Government of India has given highest priority for generation of electricity for boosting Industrial Production for over-all development of country. The Department of Atomic Energy has, therefore, set up a strategy for constructing a series of Nuclear power stations during the next 10 years for achieving 10,000 MW. of power production as approved by the Government of India. In this connection, the Department of Atomic Energy has proposed to” set up a new Zirconium sponge project for production of Zirconium metal, which is required for construct ion of new power stations and also for manufacturing of fuel required for the operation of “Nuclear power stations. Thus, this project is directly connected with the generation of electrical energy, which is required for the overall development of the Country. Simultaneously, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (D.R.D.O) had envisaged the set ting up of the Titanium Sponge Project for production of Titanium metal which is required for manufacturing of condensors and heat exchangers for all thermal and Nuclear Power Stations and which is also required for the high technology arc as like space, aeronautices, petrochemicals, etc. The technology for the development of these two metals has been developed indigenously by the respective Central Government Organisations. India is one of the few countries in the world to develop this technology. The technology for the development of these two metals has been developed indigenously by the respective Central Government Organisations. India is one of the few countries in the world to develop this technology. I submit that the defence research and development organisation authorised the department of Atomic Energy to identify a suitable site for the project as well. Accordingly,” a Departmental site selection Committee consisting of specialities including senior environmental scientists from the constituent units of Department of Atomic Energy and Defence Research and Development Organisation was constituted for this purpose. The Committee evaluated totally 21 sites in four States, viz., Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Kerala and Tamil Nadu with the assistance of the respective State Governments. After preliminary evaluation, the committee personally inspected 9 (nine) sites in the above states and evaluated them, taking into account among various factors, the availability of raw material, chemicals, water, power land facilities for effluent disposal, engineering and transport infrastructures, skilled man power etc., and then identified three sites viz., (1) One in Tamil Nadu, (2) One in Andhra Pradesh, and (3) One in Orissa. As regards these three sites, the committee again worked out the related criteria for selection, such as site-related capital and variable costs and other socioeconomic factors such as land, water, power, skilled man power, etc., Baded on the above, a merit order was drawn and the site at Palayakayal village, Srivaikun-tam taluk, Chidambaranar District, “Tamil Nadu was found to be the most meritorious site for the above two projects and place first in the merit list. I further submit that as the next step, the three sites were again inspected and detailed evaluation was carried out by a high level committee of Government of India viz., the sub-committee of the Nuclear Fuel Complex Board and this Committee after taking into account various strategic factors and techno and socio economic aspects, unanimously concluded that the site of Palayakayal village in Tamil Nadu would be the most suitable site for setting up the new Zirconium Spoge Project. Accordingly, a request was made to the Tamil Nadu State Government by the Department of Atomic Energy on 27. 1989 to acquire the lands identified both for the industrial plant and housing at Palayakayal village invoking the urgency provisions of Sec. 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.” The above extract will justify the delay, if any before the 4(1) Notification. 1989 to acquire the lands identified both for the industrial plant and housing at Palayakayal village invoking the urgency provisions of Sec. 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.” The above extract will justify the delay, if any before the 4(1) Notification. Viewed from any angle, therefore, we are not impressed by the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants that there was no real urgency justifying the invocation of Secs.17(1) and (4) of the Act in this case. We also agree with the learned Government Pleader that a Division Bench of this Court, in the case reported in Mathur Village Residence Welfare Association v. Stale of Tamil Nadu, (1992)1 L.W. 383 , after noticing almost all earlier eases, has taken the same view as the one now taken by us. In the circumstances, we do not think that we need to discuss all the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellants to appreciate the scope of Secs. 17(1) and (4) of the Act. 19. The next contention that there is nothing to suggest in the file that the Authorities concerned have suggested the invocation of Sec. 17 (4) of the Act is also without substance. The fact that the Authorities have mentioned about the urgency and invocation of Sec.l7(l) of the Act in particular, necessarily implies the invocation of Sec. 17(4) of the Act. After referring to the urgency, the Authorities have further specified the nature of urgency by mentioning Sec. 17(1) of the Act. That does not mean that the Authorities concerned have not borne in mind Sec.l7(4) of the Act. Likewise, the contention that mentioning of Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.17 in the 4(1) Notification vitiates the Notification itself on the ground of non-ap-pliation of mind, is without force. For, we have seen that the Authorities have mentioned only Sub-sec.(l) of Sec.17 of the Act and in the circumstances, it must be presumed that issuing the actual Notification, the Land Acquisition Officers has, by mistake, inserted Sec. 17(2) of the Act. Inasmuch as that has been subsequently deleted by issuing an erratum, the defect, even if any, at the initial stage has been cured. Inasmuch as that has been subsequently deleted by issuing an erratum, the defect, even if any, at the initial stage has been cured. We also do not see any force in the argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that a perusal of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the 4th respondent will show that there was no real urgency, and in support of this, learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on a statement made in the concluding portion of para.7 in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the fourth respondent-Union of India, without referring to the opening portion of the same paragraph in the same counter-affidavit, which is in conformity with the materials available in the files. Even otherwise, we do not think, there is any force in the argument, having regard to the discussion already made. 20. For all these reasons, we hold that there arc no merits in these writ appeals. The writ appeals are, therefore, dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.