A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) 1 Is it necessary to record reasons in support of an order imposing a minor penalty on an employee found guilty of some misconduct ? This is one of the main questions arising in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the legality and validity of the order passed by respondent No. 2 on 7/01/1981 imposing on the petitioner the penalty of withholding of one increment without any future effect in exercise of the powers vested under Rule 7 (4) of the Gujarat Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1971 (the Discipline Rules for brief ). ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this petition may be summarised thus : The petitioner was appointed as Junior Engineer in the Public Health Engineering Department at 01pad sometime in 1971. It is not in dispute that it was and is a Class-II gazetted post He was transferred from Bharuch to Jambusar in May 1976 in the Public Health Sanitary sub-division headed by respondent No. 3 at the relevant time. It appears that the petitioners headquarters were shifted from Jambusar to Vagra by respondent No. 2 vide his order of 17/11/1979. It appears that the petitioners headquarters were re-shifted from Vagra to Jambusar by the order passed by respondent No. 3 on 27/02/1980. By one order passed on 12/12/1980 the petitioner was subjected to transfer from Jambusar to Billimora. Its copy is at Annexure A to this petition The petitioner has questioned its correctness as well in this petition While the petitioner was in service at Vagra respondent No. 3 directed him to manage for carting of cement from Ranavav to Padra Jambusar Patan and Prantij from the factory of Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries Limited Ranava v. It appears that the petitioner was unable to carry out this assignment in view of certain health problems. He apprised respondent No. 3 of his health problems and requested him to depute some other officer for the purpose. He apprised respondent No. 3 of his health problems and requested him to depute some other officer for the purpose. It appears that respondent No 3 assigned this piece of work to some other officer This happened sometime in the last week of October 1980 The petitioner was however served with one confidential letter of 3/11/1980 calling upon him to submit his explanation with respect to three points mentioned therein In substance they related to his defying orders of respondent No 3 for assignment of work of managing carting of cement from Ranavav to several other places as aforesaid and for trying to assault respondent No. 3 in his chamber on 1/11/1980 His explanation was also sought for his indisciplined behaviour towards respondent No 3 in his chamber on 1/11/1980. The petitioner submitted his reply thereto on 13/11/1980. He denied the charge of indisciplined behaviour and assault He tried to explain his position as to how he could no carry out the work assigned to him by respondent No. 3 It appears that his reply of 13/11/1980 was not found satisfactory. Respondent No. 2 thereupon caused to serve to the petitioner one charge- sheet on 18/12/1980 levelling on the petitioner charges of insubordination and assault on respondent No. 2 on 1/11/1980 The petitioner was called upon to submit his reply within seven days from receipt of the said charge-sheet. It does not become clear from the petition or the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondents when the charge- sheet of 18/12/1980 was served to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his reply on 7/01/1981 Curiously enough on that very day respondent No. 2 passed one order in exercise of his powers under Rule 7 (4) of the Discipline Rules imposing on the petitioner the penalty of withholding of one increment without any future effect A copy of the said order is at Annexure B to this petition. The petitioner has also questioned its legality and validity in this petition. ( 3 ) SO far as the challenge to the order of transfer at Annexure A is concerned it no longer survives in view of the fact that the transfer order was carried out at the relevant time. The challenge remains only for academic interests. This Court need not decide any question of academic interests only in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The challenge remains only for academic interests. This Court need not decide any question of academic interests only in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In that view of the matter I think it is too late in the day for the petitioner to question the validity of the transfer order at Annexure A to this petition after having allowed it to be implemented against him. ( 4 ) SHRI Thakkar for the petitioner took great pains to convince me that respondent No. 2 could not have exercised his powers under Rule 7 (4) of the Discipline Rules. According to Shri Thakkar the petitioner was never in subordinate service inasmuch as he was a gazetted officer and under the relevant provisions contained in The Bombay Civil Services Rule 1959 (the B. C. S. Rules for brief) a gazetted officer can never said to be in subordinate service. The status of the petitioner as a Class-II gazetted officer is never challenged by Shri Chauhan for the respondents. Shri Chauhan has however made a grievance that no such point has been raised by the petitioner in this petition questioning the competence of respondent No. 2 in passing the impugned order. If such challenge was made runs the submission of Shri Chauhan the respondents could have shown that respondent No. 2 was competent to impose the penalty imposed by him under the impugned order. Shri Chauhan for the respondents has alternatively tried to justify the impugned order of penalty under Rule 7 (2) of the Discipline Rules by saying that wrong mention of provisions of law in the order would not vitiate it. Al this stage Shri Thakkar for the petitioner has tried to point out that respondent No. 2 was never the Head of Department at the relevant time and he could not have exercised his powers under Rule 7 (2) of the Discipline Rules. Shri Thakkar for the petitioner has tried to take me through the relevant provisions contained in the B. C. S. Rules to convince me to come to the conclusion that respondent No. 2 was never the Head of Department at the relevant time. ( 5 ) I think it is not necessary to embark upon the enquiry whether or not respondent No. 2 was the Head of Department in absence of any relevant factual data on record. ( 5 ) I think it is not necessary to embark upon the enquiry whether or not respondent No. 2 was the Head of Department in absence of any relevant factual data on record. Shri Chauhan for the respondents is right in voicing his grievance to the effect that the competence of respondent No. 2 for passing the impugned order at Annexure B hereto was never questioned by the petitioner in this petition. In that view of the matter it was not possible for the respondents to meet with this challenge raised for the first time at the stage of hearing. I think Shri Chauhans submission in this regard deserves to be accepted. In absence of any specific plea in the petition challenging the competence of respondent No. 2 for passing the impugned order the respondents did not have an opportunity to show that respondent No. 2 did possess the requisite authority to pass the impugned order at Annexure B to this petition. The point raised by Shri Thakkar challenging the competence of respondent No. 2 for passing the impugned order at Annexure B to this petition in a way involves investigation into certain factual data. Such plea requiring investigation into certain factual data cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time at the stage of hearing of the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 6 ) IN this connection a reference deserves to be made to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Jitender Tyagi v. Delhi Administration and Another reported in AIR 1990 Supreme Court at page 487 In that case the order of detention was challenged on several grounds. Al the stage of argument it was sough to be challenged also on the ground that the authority passing it was not competent to pass it on account of want of proper delegation of powers under the National Security Act 1980 Such plea was not raised in the memo of petition. The Supreme Court did not permit the petitioner before it to raise such plea as it involved investigation into certain factual position and the other side had no opportunity to meet with such plea. By analogy this ruling of the Supreme Court would be applicable in the present case. The Supreme Court did not permit the petitioner before it to raise such plea as it involved investigation into certain factual position and the other side had no opportunity to meet with such plea. By analogy this ruling of the Supreme Court would be applicable in the present case. ( 7 ) THAT brings me to the challenge to the impugned order at Annexure B to this petition based on the ground that it is not a speaking order. In this connection a reference deserves to be made to Rule 11 of the Discipline Rules prescribing the procedure for imposing minor penalties. It is not in dispute that withholding of one increment without any future effect can be said to be a minor penalty as specified in Rule 6 of the Discipline Rules. Rule 11 thereof inter alia requires recording of a finding on each imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour with which delinquent is charged. Sub-rule (2) thereof gives a mandate to the effect that the record of the proceedings for imposition of a minor penalty shall inter alia contain the findings on each imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour. It thus becomes clear from the scheme of Rule 11 of the Discipline Rules that a finding of guilt has to be recorded against the concerned delinquent if he is to be visited with any minor penalty. It cannot be gainsaid that such finding can be recorded only after examining the merits of the case. For the purpose the concerned authority will have to examine the charge or charges levelled against the delinquent and his explanation if any thereto and to weigh the pros and cons thereof in order to record the finding or findings of guilt if any against the delinquent on the charge or charges levelled against him. Such examination of the pros and cons of the matter and scrutiny of the charges in the light of the explanation if any rendered by the delinquent has to be reflected in the order. Clause (vii) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 11 of the Discipline Rules provides that the record of the proceedings culminating into the order of imposition of a minor penalty on the delinquent should contain the order on the case together with the reasons in support thereof. Clause (vii) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 11 of the Discipline Rules provides that the record of the proceedings culminating into the order of imposition of a minor penalty on the delinquent should contain the order on the case together with the reasons in support thereof. It may be mentioned at this stage that an order passed under Rule 11 of the Discipline Rules has been subjected to appeal under Rule 18 thereof. If the order of penalty does not reflect the process of examination and scrutiny of records or does not contain reasons for the purpose of recording the finding or findings of guilt against the delinquent it will not be possible for the appellate authority to know what weighed with the punishing authority in inflicting the punishment in question on the delinquent when the order is appealed against. It is therefore necessary that the order of punishment imposing a minor penalty on the delinquent should record reasons in support thereof. ( 8 ) I am supported in my view by the ruling of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of G. Papaiah v. Assistant Director Medical Services Secunderabad reported in AIR 1976 Andhra Pradesh at page 75. In that case the order imposing a minor penalty was found no to be a speaking order. It has been held that the punishing authority exercised quasi-judicial powers while imposing the penalty on the delinquent and the order of such quasi judicial authority should be a speaking one. ( 9 ) A reference also deserves to be made to the ruling of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Harchand Singh v. The State of Punjab reported in 1980 (3) Services Law Reporter at page 711 in that case also the minor penalty of stoppage of increment came to be imposed on the delinquent. It has been held that such an order ought to contain reasons for rejecting the explanation submitted by the delinquent. The view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of Harchand Singh (supra) buttresses the view taken by me in this case. ( 10 ) THE impugned order at Annexure B does not ex facie show any finding on the two imputations levelled against the petitioner in the charge-sheet of 1 8/02/1980. The view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of Harchand Singh (supra) buttresses the view taken by me in this case. ( 10 ) THE impugned order at Annexure B does not ex facie show any finding on the two imputations levelled against the petitioner in the charge-sheet of 1 8/02/1980. In fact on neither of the imputations any finding is given by respondent No. 2 therein. Shri Chauhan for the respondent has not been able to show to the Court the record of the proceedings culminating into the impugned order showing recording of the finding of guilt on the two imputations or either of them. Shri Chauhan has submitted that it is not possible for the respondents to trace out the record of the case after a lapse of nearly 12 years from the date of the impugned order at Annexure B to this petition. Be that as it may the fact is that there is no material before the Court to come to the conclusion that the record of the proceedings contains any finding of guilt on the imputations or on either of them against the petitioner. As aforesaid the impugned order at Annexure B to this petition does not ex facie show any finding recorded against the petitioner on the two imputations levelled against him or on either of them. In that view of the matter I am of the opinion that the impugned order is passed in contravention of the relevant provisions contained in Rule 11 of the Rules. ( 11 ) SHRI Chauhan for the respondents has submitted that the penalty of withholding of one increment without future effect cannot be said to be a penalty in view of the first explanation given below Rule 6 of the Rules. It may be mentioned that the first explanation to Rule 6 of the Rules pertains to withholding of one increment on account of non-passing of some examination required to be passed by the concerned employee. In that case withholding of increment would be on account of omission on the part of the employee to pass some examination. Such omission is not considered to be a penalty within the meaning of that term as understood in Rule 6 of the Discipline Rules. In that case withholding of increment would be on account of omission on the part of the employee to pass some examination. Such omission is not considered to be a penalty within the meaning of that term as understood in Rule 6 of the Discipline Rules. Withholding of increment by way of punishment cannot be likened to withholding of increment on account of non- passing of some examination. Withholding of increment by way of punishment is usually imposed for some act of misconduct. It is an act of commission and not of omission. In that view of the matter I am unable to accept the submission urged before me by Shri Chauhan for the respondents to the effect that the penalty of withholding of increment cannot be said to be a minor penalty in the light of the first explanation to Rule 6 of the Discipline Rules. ( 12 ) SHRI Chauhan has then submitted that imposition of the penalty on the part of the employer is within the domain of his administrative function and as such it is not necessary for him to record reasons for imposition of such penalty. It is a se the principle of law that when a statute requires particular thing to be done in a particular manner it has to be done only in that manner and in no other manner. This position of law has been settled by the Supreme Court in its ruling in the case of Ramachandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare and Others reported in AIR 1975 Supreme Court at page 915. It has been held therein:"where a power is given to do certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all and other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden". The Discipline Rules by which such power of imposing a penalty on the delinquent is conferred are made under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. They are statutory in character. When the exercise of such power is circumscribed by the relevant provisions contained in the Discipline Rules such power has to be exercised in accordance therewith and in no other manner. They are statutory in character. When the exercise of such power is circumscribed by the relevant provisions contained in the Discipline Rules such power has to be exercised in accordance therewith and in no other manner. ( 13 ) BESIDES in view of the aforesaid ruling of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of C. Papaiah (supra) and that of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Harchand Singh (supra) it would be difficult to agree with the submission of Shri Chauhan for the respondents to the effect that the powers exercised by the punishing authority are not quasi judicial in nature. ( 14 ) ONCE the powers exercisable by the punishing authority are held to be quasi-judicial in nature the order of punishment passed by such punishing authority will have to be supported by reasons in view of the rulings of the Supreme Court in the case of Messrs. Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U. P. and Others reported in AIR 1970 page 1302 and in the case of The Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. The Union of India reported in AIR 1676 at page 1785 ( 15 ) AS pointed out hereinabove respondent No. 2 has acted contrary to the relevant provisions contained in Rule 11 of the Discipline Rules while imposing on the petitioner the minor penalty of stoppage of one increment without future effect by means of impugned order at Annexure B. Such contravention is not permissible in law. Besides it is not a speaking order. Such order cannot be sustained in law. It has to be quashed and set aside. ( 16 ) IN the result this petition is partly accepted. The impugned order at Annexure B is quashed and set aside. The petitioner would be entitled to consequential benefit as if unaffected by the impugned order at Annexure 13 to this petition. Rule is accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid extent however with no orders as to costs. (RPV) .