Judgment :- Revision petitioner is the 3rd judgment debtor in O.S.No.140 of 1967 before the Munsiff's Court, Nedumangad. The decree holder is the respondent in the revision. 2. The suit was one for recovery of possession after setting aside two sale deeds; in exercise of a right of preemption. The petitioner was in possession of the properties on the strength of the sale deeds sought to be set aside. Though the suit was dismissed by the trial court, in appeal the decree was reversed and the suit was decreed allowing recovery of the plaint schedule properties after setting aside the sale. The appellate decree was confirmed in Second Appeal also. 3. It is important to note that in the suit, the 3rd defendant has not raised any claim for value of improvements even alternatively. Consequently, there was no occasion for any of the courts to go into the question whether the 3rd defendant had effected any improvements in the properties and if so what is the value of such improvements. The decree passed in the suit has also not reserved any right in favour of the 3rd defendant to raise the said issue in execution or in other appropriate proceedings. 4. Now in execution, the petitioner has contended that she has effected valuable improvements in the properties and that she is entitled to get value of improvements before she is actually evicted from the properties in execution of the decree. In order to establish the claim so made, the petitioner moved the Execution Court for appointing a Commissioner by filing E.A.No.193 of 1992. That application has been dismissed by the Execution Court finding that there is no provision in the decree for payment of value of improvements and that the petitioner is not entitled to raise such a claim for value of improvements for the first time in execution. The petitioner has challenged the sustainability of the said order in this revision petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Krishnamani has very vehemently contended that under S.51 of the Transfer of Property Act, (for short 'the T.P. Act') a bona fide holder under defective title who makes improvements in the property is entitled to claim value of such improvements at the time of eviction and the proper time for raising such a claim is the time when actual eviction is sought for in execution. According to learned counsel the fact that such a claim for value of improvements has not been made in the suit and no provision is made in the decree regarding value of improvements may not disentitle a bona fide holder under defective title from claiming value of the improvements for the first time in execution if he-satisfies the other requirements of the Section. The learned counsel has contended that the petitioner in this case is a person who satisfies all the requirements of S.51 of the T.P- Act and as such is entitled to claim value of improvements in the execution proceedings for the first time and get it adjudicated and paid before actual eviction. The view taken by the Execution Court that since no provision regarding value of improvements is made in the decree, the petitioner is not entitled to get value of the improvements is unsustainable in law in the light of the provisions contained in S.51 of the T.P. Act which specifically confers a right to claim value of the improvements at the time of eviction. In this connection the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Narayana Rao v. Basavarayyappa (AIR 1956 SC 727) was also strongly relied upon by the learned counsel. 6. The only question to be considered is whether the petitioner is entitled to put forward a claim for value of improvements for the first time in execution and call upon the Execution Court to adjudicate the same and direct payment of value of improvements as determined by the court as a condition for ordering delivery of the properties. 7. Section 51 of the T.P. Act is in the following terms: "51. Improvements made by bona fide holders under defective titles. --When the transferee of immovable property makes any improvement on the property, believing in good faith that he is absolutely entitled thereto, and he is subsequently evicted there from by any person having a better title, the transferee has a right to require the person causing the eviction either to have the value of the improvement estimated and paid or secured to the transferee, or to sell his interest in the property to the transferee at the then market-value thereof, irrespective of the value of such improvement. The amount to be paid or secured in respect of such improvement shall be the estimated value thereof at the time of the eviction. 8. The amount to be paid or secured in respect of such improvement shall be the estimated value thereof at the time of the eviction. 8. Even assuming that the petitioner is a person who is entitled to claim the right conferred by S.51 of the T.P. Act, she was entitled to put forward her claim for value of improvements based upon such right in the suit itself and get appropriate reliefs in the suit. The right to claim value of improvements conferred under S.51 of the T.P. Act could and should have been put forward in the suit itself in answer to the claim for recovery of possession at least as an alternate pica. The fact that as per S.51 of the T.P. Act a person sought to be evicted is entitled to be paid value of improvements before eviction as estimated at the time of eviction is no reason to hold that it is a right which cannot be claimed in the suit or that the proper time for putting forward the right is at the time when eviction is sought for in the execution proceedings. Whether a person who claims value of improvements under S.51 of the T.P. Act has effected any improvements on the properly, whether he satisfies the requirements of the Section for claiming value thereof and if so what is the estimated value of such improvements are all matters to be pleaded and if denied to be proved in the suit itself. There is nothing in S.51 of the T.P. Act to hold that it is a right which can be put forward by the parties only during the execution proceedings. It was up to the petitioner to have put forward such a claim in the suit itself for adjudication and get appropriate reliefs regarding the same in the decree itself or to get appropriate directions to get it adjudicated in the execution proceedings. Normally Execution Court is bound to execute the decree as it stands and cannot grant any other relief other than what is granted as per the decree, unless there is any provision of law specifically empowering the Executing Court to do so as in the case of the provision Contained in S.5(3) of the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act 29 of 1958. The fact that the value of improvements to be paid is to be estimated at a date as near as possible to the date of actual eviction cannot make the right conferred by the Section one enforceable only in execution. It cannot also cloth the Execution Court with jurisdiction to adjudicate for the first time a claim put forward for value of improvements and give necessary relief in that regard in execution unless the decree contains a provision regarding such ascertainment of the right in execution either wholly or in part. The observations of the Supreme Court in Narayana Rao v. Basavarayappa (AIR 1956 SC 727) relied upon by the learned counsel in support of his submission may not justify the acceptance of the same. The relevant observation is thus: "... Having regard to the provisions of S.51 if the evidence enable a Court to do so, it Should assess the valuation of the improvement as at a date as near as possible to the date of actual eviction rather than the date of election as has been done in this case." The above observation cannot be made use of to contend for the position that the Executing Court is entitled or bound to reopen every decree for recovery of possession of the property passed without a provision for payment of value of improvements, for the purpose of adjudication of the claim for value of improvements based upon S.51 of the T.P. Act and to make it a decree granting delivery on condition of payment of value of improvements claimed for the first time in execution and adjudicated by the Executing Court. It is relevant to note in this connection that a more or less similar contention was rejected by Justice T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer in the decision reported in Ammalu v. Vellachi (1973 KLT 842) by observing thus: "S.51 of the T.P. Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Narayana Rao v. Basavarayappa (AIR 1956 SC 727) can only help the appellant to show that the date of ascertainment of the compensation for improvements should be as near the date of eviction as possible. That cannot afford any help to the appellant in this case. That cannot afford any help to the appellant in this case. If the trial court has done a wrong thing in not doing so, or in nor issuing such directions to the execution court to implement S.51 of the T.P. Act in the way in which it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court, the appellant has to thank himself. That will not in anyway, confer power upon the execution court to decide the matter over again. No benefit can therefore, accrue to the appellant on the basis of S.51 of the T.P. Act. The plea that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court interpreting S.51 of the Transfer of Property Act every decree should be deemed to contain a clause by implication empowering the execution court to reopen the claim for improvements to satisfy the terms of S.51 of the T.P. Act does not appeal to me." 9. In this case, the petitioner has not put forward any claim for value of improvements, in the suits and there is also no adjudication of the said question in the suit. There is also no provision in the decree relegating the claim for value of improvements for adjudication in the execution proceedings. In the circumstances, in my view, the Execution Court was perfectly justified in taking the view that the petitioner is not entitled to raise for the first time a claim for value of improvements in the execution proceedings. In this view, the dismissal of the application for issuance of a commission is also perfectly justifiable. I do not find any irregularity or illegality in the order challenged in the revision which is liable to be corrected in exercise of the provisions contained in S. 115 C.P.C. C.R.P. is accordingly dismissed in limine.