JUDGMENT The defendants are appellant. Both Courts have decreed the suit of the plaintiff and defendants are aggrieved. Two contentions are forcefully agitated in the second appeal and those are of law because I cannot make fresh investigation of facts in the second appeal. The suit was for declaration of title and for recovery of possession and two Courts have reached the concurrent finding that the title of the plaintiff was not affected though merely clouded in an illegal revenue-sale. Declaration was, therefore, granted of his title as claimed and decree for possession was also passed holding that the defendants were in illegal occupation of the land as they could not secure any legal right to remain lawfully on the suit land in virtue merely of their alleged purchase of the land in revenue-sale as the sale was illegal, void and without jurisdiction. Shri S.K. Jain, who appears for the defendant-appellants has, therefore, competently argued that both Court erred in law in not dismissing the suit as the suit was not maintainable. He also urged that the bar of limitation should have been considered to non suit the plaintiff inasmuch as the suit was governable by Article 113. However, I find both the contentions devoid of force and meritless. It is too late to re-state the law that ouster of Civil Court's jurisdiction is not to be readily accepted and law in that regard need not be cited except refering to the supreme dicta pronounced in 1969 in Dhullabhai's case 1969 JLJ 1 (SC). If any order of any authority passed under any law is not merely illegal but is without jurisdiction, it is not necessary for the aggrieved person to pursue remedies contemplated under the relevant enactment; it would be open to him to come to the Civil Court to agitate his civil right which may be a property-right. In the instant case, obviously the very foundation of the right was the land which was owned by the plaintiff, but was put up in the revenue-sale. His title was clouded because of that sale which was not conducted according to procedure contemplated for the same. There is an unassailable finding of the two Courts below that the sale-money was accepted beyond the date specified and that could not be done as that power did not vest in the officer concerned who accepted the money or confirmed the sale. There is an unassailable finding of the two Courts below that the sale-money was accepted beyond the date specified and that could not be done as that power did not vest in the officer concerned who accepted the money or confirmed the sale. Reliance Shri Chaturvedi placed on two decisions. One of this Court and another is of Apex Court to support the view taken by the Courts below. In Ravindranath ( 1988 JLJ 152 = AIR 1988 M.P 100 ) the case was of a Court-sale under Civil Procedure Code but the purpose of C.P.C. provisions and provisions of M.P. Land Revenue Code bearing on sale is the same. Indeed, provisions are in pari materia. This Court took the view that when there is a breach by the auction-purchaser of the rule enjoining upon him the duty to make deposit within the specified time of the bid-money the sale automatically terminates and the property becomes liable to be re-sold. The Court had no power to condone or to relax that breach. Taking that view the suit was decreed which suit was instituted as per specific provisions. The other decision is of Apex Court in the case of Sardarsingh (1990) 4 SCC 90 and that concerned a revenue sale under the Punjab Land Revenue Act. It was held that the provisions under the Act concerning deposit to be made by the auction-purchaser of the bid-money were same as contemplated under Rules 84 and 85 of Order 21 CPC and breach of the provisions which were mandatory rendered the entire sale null and void. The suit was instituted to avoid the effect of revenue-sale and that was for clearing the cloud on the title of the plaintiff. The Apex Court upheld the plaintiff's plea and the decree passed by the Courts below. In my view the holding in Sardarasingh clinches the issue, and the first contention of Shri S.K. Jain must, therefore, be effectively rebuffed despite his reliance on Ramsingh [1987 (I) MPWN 212]. The facts of that case were entirely different. It was not a case of a similar right being enforced in the Civil Court claiming the order passed under the Panchayat Act to be without jurisdiction. The facts of that case were entirely different. It was not a case of a similar right being enforced in the Civil Court claiming the order passed under the Panchayat Act to be without jurisdiction. Indeed, the "illegality" of the order passed under the Panchayat Act was challenged and the question was of interpretation of the "ouster clause" vesting expressly jurisdiction to decide the particular question in the Collector. His reliance on a decision, of learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Munne Khan [1989 (I) MPWN 84] is similarly of no avail. In that case, the holding is that suit in a civil Court has the prescribed period of limitation of two years and that was not maintainable when the right to recover possession under section 250 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code was agitated. That position does not obviously obtain in this case. In so far as the question of limitation is concerned I have no doubt at all that the suit is governed by Article 64 of the Limitation Act inasmuch as I have reached the finding and the conclusion that the suit was for declaration of title which had been clouded and it was not a suit simpliciter for setting aside the order passed in revenue-sale and for declaring that to be nullity. Reliance, therefore, on the Supreme Court decision in Mohd. Murtiza Khan (1966 JLJ 543 = 1966 MPLJ 933) is well merited. Indeed, a similar situation arose in that case and it was held that shorter period of limitation was prescribed for a suit instituted to set aside an order under Article 14 corresponding to the new Article 113 of the Limitation Act and that Article 114 of the Limitation Act, which corresponds to new Article 64, governs other cases. For all the aforesaid reasons I reiterate that the appeal is meritless and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs. 1969 JLJ 1 (SC), 1988 JLJ 152 , (1990) 4 SCC 90 and 1966 JLJ 543 relied on. 1987 (1) MPWN 212 distinguished.