Judgment S. B. Sinba J. 1. In this application the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents io pay his salary with effect from 16.11.1990. 2. The petitioner is said to have been appointed by the Regional deputy Director of Education on the recommendations of the Headmaster in Government Basic School, Bakhri in Matric Untrained scale by letter no.5832 dated 15.11.1990, as an Assistant teacher. The petitioner allegedly joined the said post on 1611.1990. According to the petitioner, he has, thus, become entitled to the salary payable to an Assistant teacher in the matric Untrained scale. The petitioner, thereafter completed his teachers training. The petitioner has contended that although he made representations before the District Education Officer for payment of his salary on several occasions, no relief has yet been granted to him. 3. In this case, a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents 1 to 4. In the said counter affidavit, it has been contended that the petitioner is not a genuine teacher and he was not appointed upon following the recruitment rules The purported offer of appointment is said to be a forged and fabricated document. It has been stated that the petitioner was never appointed by the officer concerned. According to the respondents even the headmaster of the School did not inform the concerned respondents about the appointment of the petitioner. It has been stated that neither advertisement had been issued nor any application for appointment had been received either from the petitioner or from any other candidate It has further been stated that the petitioner was neither appointed nor interviewed and as such, the question of payment of any salary does not arise. It has been stated that the headmaster has been taking work from the petitioner illegally for which a show-cause notice has been served upon him. It has been submitted that the purported letter vide memo No 5832 dated 15.11.1990 does not relate to the petitioner and the petitioner has manipulated the same as the said letter was addressed to the district Education Officer, Muzaffarpur being an order relating to adjustment of teachers A photostat copy of the said letter has been annexed with the counter affidavit and marked as Annexure A thereto. 4. 4. A reply to the counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioner wherein it has, inter alia, been stated that the petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in Shri Kuseshwar Harizan Awasiya middle School Seodarpur 23.12.1982 which was taken over by the State government under the precisions of Bihar Non-Govt. Elementary School (Taking Over of Management and Control) Act, 1976. The petitioner in the year 1988 applied before the District Education Officer for appearing in the teachers training course and he along with three other candidates were selected for undertaking the said course The petitioner undertook the said course at Primary Teachers Training School, Pokharia, Muzaffarpur. According to the petitioner in the meanwhile, he has also passed his I. A. examination in the year 1990. It has been contended that because of death of teachers in the basic schools in the Tirhut Division, the petitioner was sent to work at Basic School, Dhanaur, Muzaffarpur. Further by letter dated 12 10.1990, the Headmaster of the Govt. Basic School, Dhanaur recommended responded No 3 for his appointment and thereupon he was appointed by the respondent No 3 It has been contended that the Headmaster of the Govt. Basic School had informed about the joining of the petitioner by his letter dated 3.12.1990 which Is contained in Annexure 10 to the said reply. 5. In this case, it has been accepted by the petitioner that the recruitment procedures in respect of appointment of the teachers in respect of appointment of the teachers in a basic school and those in a nationalised primary school are different It has also been accepted that the cadre of teachers of both the categories of schools are different and the terms and conditions of service of the said teachers also are governed by different sets of rules The petitioner has not and could not have disputed that prior to issuance of the offer of appointment neither any advertisement was issued nor other recruitment rules were followed. There is thus violation of the mandatory provisions of the recruitment rules as also the provisions of article 16 of the Constitution of India The appointment of the petitioner was, therefore, a nullity. In terms of the said purported offer of appointment, no legal right was vested in the petitioner to continue to serve the said school. There is thus violation of the mandatory provisions of the recruitment rules as also the provisions of article 16 of the Constitution of India The appointment of the petitioner was, therefore, a nullity. In terms of the said purported offer of appointment, no legal right was vested in the petitioner to continue to serve the said school. In such a case, even a formal order of termination from services was not necessary to be issued. 6. Mrs, M. Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, however, submitted that the petitioner was entitled to an opportunity of hearing, if his appointment was to be cancelled. Learned counsel submitted that in any event as the petitioner had worked for a long time, he is entitled to his salary. Learned counsel in support of these contentions relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported In AIR 1991 SC 309 (Shrawan kumar Jha and others v The State of Bihar) and a Full Bench decision of this court in Vijay Kumar V/s. The State of Bihar, reported in 1983 BLJR 656 . 7. It is now well known that where an appointment is found to have been made without following the mandatory provisions of the recruitment rules and/or in violation of the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution of India or by an authority who had no jurisdiction in such matters, the appointment being a nullity, the principle of Natural Justice have no application in relation thereto. It is also well known that when an appointment is obtained on the basis of a forged or fabricated documents, the person concerned is not entitled to an opportunity of being heard. 8. In Shrawan Kumar Jhas case (supra), a controversy arose as to whether the teachers were validly appointed and they had joined their respective school or not. The Supreme Court in that situation held: "in the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the appellants should have been given an opportunity of hearing before cancelling their appointments. The Supreme Court in that situation held: "in the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the view that the appellants should have been given an opportunity of hearing before cancelling their appointments. It is, therefore, clear that shrawan Kumar Jhas case was decided in the facts and circumstances thereof and the said decision is not an authority for the proposition that even if it is to be held that the appointment/ promotion of the petitioners were absolutely illegal having been issued in contravention of the Recruitment Rules and/or Article 16 of the Constitution of India, still an opportunity of hearing would be necessary. It is now well settled that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. Shrawan Kumar Jhas case has, this no application is the facts and circumstances of this case. 9. The Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Suresh Chandra Verma and others V/s. The Chancellor, Nagpur University and other reported in 1990 (4)SCC 55 held as follows :- "when therefore, the services of the appellants are to be terminated in view of the change in the position of law and not on account of the demerits of misdemeanour of individual candidates, it is not necessary to hear the individual before their services are terminated. The rule of audi alterem partem does not apply in such cases and, therefore, there is no breach of the principles of natural justice. In the result we are of the view that there is no merit in this case. The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed in the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. " 10. It is, therefore, clear that only in a case where the services of the employee is terminated owing to any misdemeanour on his part or his demerits, the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. 11. Recently, the Supreme Court in Baikuntha Nath Dos and another v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and another reported in 1992 (2)SCC 299 has held that before passing the order of compulsory retirement principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with nor the adverse remarks against the concerned employee are required to be communicated The Supreme Court held: "before parting with the case, we must refer to an argument urged by Sri R. K. Garg. He stressed what is called, the new concept of Article 14 as adumbrated in Maneka Gandhi and submitted on that basis that any and every arbitrary action is open to judicial scrutiny. The general principle evolved in the said decision is not in issue here. We are concerned mainly with the question whether a facet of principle of natural justice audi alteram partem is attracted in the case of compulsory retirement. In other words, the question is whether acting upon undisclosed material is a ground for quashing the order of compulsory retirement. Since we have held that the nature of the function is not quasi-judicial in nature and because the action has to be taken on the subjective satisfaction of the government, there is no room for importing the said facet of natural justice in such a case, more particularly when an order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment nor does it involve any stigma. " 12. In my opinion, therefore, there cannot be any doubt that if the offer of appointment is illegal being vioiative of Article 16 of the Constitution of India and/or the Recruitment Rules framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of ndia, the principles of natural justice need not be complied with inasmuch as in such an event the concerned employee had not derived any right to hold or continue in the said post This aspect of the matter has also been considered by various Division Benches of this court and the Supreme Court. Reference in rhis connection may be to Satyendra prasad V/s. State of Bihar, 1991 (2) PLJR, 460, Kamal Kumar Sinha V/s. Indira gandhi Institute of Medical Sciences and others, 1990 (2) PLJR 465, M. L. Gupta v Instrumentation Ltd. , 1992 (1) PLJR 137, Union of India and others V/s. Tejram Parashramji Bombhate, AIR 1992 SC 570 . This aspect of the matter has also recently been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Teja Prasad V/s. The State of Bihar reported in 1992 (2) PLJR page 568 13. Further the Supreme Court in various decisions have held that under certain situatious. Principles of natural justice can be excluded and/ or varied Reference in this connection may be made to Union of India V/s. J. N. Sinha and another, AIR 1971 SC 40 and R. S Das V/s. . Further the Supreme Court in various decisions have held that under certain situatious. Principles of natural justice can be excluded and/ or varied Reference in this connection may be made to Union of India V/s. J. N. Sinha and another, AIR 1971 SC 40 and R. S Das V/s. . Union of India and other, AIR 1987 SC 593 . 14. It has further been held by the Supreme Court that natural justice should be viewed in circumstantial flexibility ( 1991 (4) SCC 584 ). 15. It is also well known that the principles of natural justice need not be complied with when it would result in futility. It is also a settled law that any appointment made in violation of Article 16 of the Constitution or made by a person having no jurisdiction would be a nullity. 16. The Supreme Court in a recent decision in Ex-Capt. K. Bala-subramaniam and others V/s. State of Tamil Nadu and another (1991) 2 SCC 708 has held - ". . . . . . . . This High Court has, in our opinion, rightly held that the directions contained in orders dated 16th June, 1976 and 15th june, 1977 were invalid being contrary to the provisions contained in rule 35 of the General Rules Since the said orders were invalid the petitioners could not claim any right on the basis of said orders and there was, therefore, no question of affording them an opportunity of hearing before passing the order dated 3rd March, 1980. " 17. Therefore (sic) is another aspect of the matter which also requires consideration. The issuance of writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy. The court may not issue a writ only because it is lawful to do so. The high Court in exercise of its jurisdiction may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in quashing the illegal order, if it is found that thereby another illegal order shall revive. In such an event, the Court may also quash both the orders. 18. In Pramod Kumar and others V/s. The State of Bihar and others, 1988 pljr 923, it has been held as follows :- "it is now well settled by the various decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court of India that issuance of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy. 18. In Pramod Kumar and others V/s. The State of Bihar and others, 1988 pljr 923, it has been held as follows :- "it is now well settled by the various decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court of India that issuance of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy. In this connection reference may be made in the case of Godde Venkateshwara Rao V/s. Government of andhra Pradesh and others, ( AIR 1966 SC 828 ), Abdul Majid and others V/s. The State Transport Appellate Authority, Bihar and orissa ( AIR 1960 Pat 333 ), Devendra Prasad Gupta V/s. The State of Bihar and others ( 1977 BBCJ 543 : 1977 PLJR 576), Hari prasad Mandal V/s. Additional Collector (1978) BBCJ 575 : 1978 pljr 636), Lal Newatia V/s. Under-Secretory of Government of India and others (1982 BLT 312) and 1988 (1) Supreme Court Cases page 40 the aforementioned decisions are authorities for the proposition that writ jurisdiction of a High Court only provides for discretionary remedy and it should not be exercised for quashing an order which might give rise to another illegal order or if substantial justice has been done to the parties. In this connection, reference may be made to recent decisions of mine in the case of Jai Bharat Co V/s. Central Coal Field Ltd. reported in 1988 BLT (Rep) at page 192, wherein it was held that a High Court would be justified in a given case to refuse to interfere with illegal ord er if it is inequitable so to do or if the same would be against public interest. " Reference in this connection may also be made to Suku Mahto and another v The State of Bihar, (1992 (2) PLJR 134 ). 19 In S. L. Kapoor V/s. Jagmohan and others ( AIR 1981 SC 136 ) it has been held that although non-observance of the principles of natural justice is itself justice is itself prejudicial but in that case also it has been observed : "linked with this question is the question whether the failure to observe natural justice does at all matter of the observance of natural justice would have made no difference, the admitted or indisputable facts speaking for themselves. Where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only on penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it approved the non-observance of natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs. " 20. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that in such an event this court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction, even if it is held that technically the Rules of natural justice were required to be complied with. For these reasons too in my opinion the ratio of Shrawan Kumar Jhas case (supra) cannot be applied in the facts and circumstances of this case. 21. It is also well known that a decision is not an authority on the point which not canvassed at the Bar. (See Good Year Ltd. V/s. State of haryana, reported in 1990 (2) SCC 71 .) 22. Yet recently the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and other V/s. Surindra Kumar and others, reported In 1992 (1) SCC, 489 held as follows: "a decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law The respondents are, therefore, not entitled to rely upon an order of this Court which directs a temporary employee to be regularised in his service without assigning reasons. " 23. In a decision reported in AIR 1991 SC 909 (U. P. Junior Doctors action Committee V/s. Dr. B Sheetal Nandwani and others), it has been held that where a candidate has obtained admission in an institution on the basis of a forged certificate, he is not entitled to an opportunity of hearing before an order of cancellation is passed. 24. In Bijoy Kumar Bhartis case (supra) upon which strong reliance has been placed by Mrs. Chatterjee, it has been held as follows : "before considering the argument that the right of some of the petitioners to future appointment has been affected, it would be proper to consider as to what is the effect of saying that the appointment is irregular. Reference in this connection may be made to two cases decided by Mathew J. as a Judge of the kerala High Court. The first case is that of P. Kunhikrishnan v State of Kerala. There on facts it was found that the petitioner was ineligible for being appointed to the service. Reference in this connection may be made to two cases decided by Mathew J. as a Judge of the kerala High Court. The first case is that of P. Kunhikrishnan v State of Kerala. There on facts it was found that the petitioner was ineligible for being appointed to the service. The impugned order was, therefore, held to mean that it was a termination of an appointment which was itself void. " In O P No 973 of 1968 the same learned Judge pointed out that the order in question only declared that the petitioner was not validly appointed to the post and that he should be reverted. The learned Judge observed: "it was not an order cancelling a valid or even a voidable order. It was merely a declaration that there has been no appointment of the petitioner to the post. In the circumstances, I do not think that natural justice required that the petitioner should have been given an opportunity of being heard by the 1st or the 2nd respondent. I also do not think that in the circumstances, there was any manifest in justice so that inference under Article 226 is required. This view as concurred to by a Bench of the Kerala High Court in k N Gopalan v The Managing Director and another. In my view the effect of the impugned orders, where the termination is on the ground of illegality or irregularity in the initial appointment is to declare that from the beginning there was no valid appointment. Counter affidavits explains that the appointments were made in the teeth of binding Government Instructions. Such appointment, as between the appointing authority and the appointees, must be deemed to be invalid in the eye of law. " 25. In Awadhesh Kumar Choudhary and others V/s. State of Bihar, reported in 1987 PLJR 1074 , A Full Bench of this Court relied upon Vijay Bhartis case (supra) and held:- "the Full Bench decision in the case of Bijay Kumar Bharti (supra)was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of diwakarpd. Yadav V/s. State of Bihar, (1986 PLJR 873 ). Yadav V/s. State of Bihar, (1986 PLJR 873 ). In this dtcision B. P. Sinha, J. , speaking for the Bench observed that where the termination was on the ground of illegality or irregularity in the initial appointment it was only to declare that from the beginning there was no valid appointment and in such a situation, the petitioners were not entitled to any show cause and no question of violation of natural justice could arise. The judgment was concluded with the observation that the petitioners of the writ application having not been validly appointed, they could not challenge the impugned orders of termination on the ground of alleged violation of the principle of natural justice.1 find myself in full agreement with the views expressed in these two decisions on this point " This view also finds support from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of University of Kashmir and Ors. V/s. Dr Md. Yasin and Ors , AIR 1974 SC 238 , in which the appointment wbich was made contrary to the statutory provision, even though by the authority as high as the Vice-Chancellor of an University, was held to be non-est and no theory of factum valet was allowed to be countenanced. It was observed by his Lordship that:- "8. The ground urged successfully, as it were before the High court, of an Implied engagement cannot in our view, be sustained. When a statute creates a body and vests it with authority and circumstances its powers by specifying limitation, the doctrine of implied engagement de hors the provisions and powers under the Act would be subversive of the statutory scheme regarding appointments of officers and cannot be countenanced by the court. Power in this case has been vested in the University only and the manner of its exercise has been carefully, regulated. Therefore, the appointment of the respondent could be made only by the Council and only in the mode prescribed by the statute If a Vice Chancellor by administrative drift allows such employment it cannot be validated on any theory of factum valet We cannot contensnce the alleged continuance of the respondent in the University campus as tantamount to regular service under the University with the sanction of law in short, the respondent has no presentable case against the direction to quit. " It was further observed that :- ". . . . . " It was further observed that :- ". . . . . . No case of statutory termination of service is called for, the basis of statutory employment being absent. The ad hoc arrangement by which he remained to teach did not acquire legal validity merely because the Vice-Chancellor went through the irregular exercises of extending his probation, etc. we have to hold that the certain fell in the office held by the respondent when, at the end of 60 days after the Act, the sands (sic) of time ran out. " In this case although their Lordships declared the termination order as void, but still they declared that the petitioner had no right to continue in service and the order of the High Court of reinstatement in his favour was quashed. Evidently, this decision supports the view that if the appointment itself is invalid, there can be no necessity of following the statutory rule for termination of service by giving notice and an opportunity of being heard to the person affected, as he had no right to continue on the post at all. In the present case also the services of the petitioners were terminated as appointments were invalid. As said above, nothing has been said in the termination orders against the petitioners and the termination orders are prospective in effect Whatever has been said therein has been said against the officers who had issued the appointment letters and nothing against the petitioners. It has been stated in the counter affidavit that Bhola Ram, who had issued the appointment letters of the petitioners, has been prosecuted on various charges of forgery, cheating, etc. The ratio of the Full Bench case in Bijay Kumar Bharti (supra) is, therefore, fully applicable to the present case and the termination orders cannot be challenged on the ground that they were not given notice to show cause and no opportunity of being heard the principle of natural justice cannot be invoked when no stigma has been attached and no allegation whatsoever has been made against the petitioners and they have not been visited by any civil consequence. " 26 Yet in another Full Bench decision of this Court in Rita Mishra and others V/s. Director, Primary Education, Bihar reported in 1987 P. L. J. R S. , 1090, it was held that where an appointment has been obtained on the basis of a forged letter, the appointee would not get any benefit in relation thereof. The Full Bench in Rita Mishras case again reiterated that where the appointment is flagrantly viloative of statutory procedure, the decision will not be materially different. 27. For the reasons aforementioned, although, we cannot grant any relief to the petitioner in this application, we may observe that there appears to be some controversy as to whether the petitioner was appointed on the basis of forged letter or not. According to the petitioner, the letter annexure 7 was wrongly addressed although it reached the office of the district Education Officer, Sitamarhi. 28. Further if the petitioners contention in his reply to the counter-affidavit is correct, the said matter may be taken into consideration and the authority may consider the desirability of paying bis salary for the period he has actually worked in school in question subject of course to the condition that it would be at liberty to realise the same from the erring officers including the Headmaster of the school in accordance with law. The Director of Secondary Education is also hereby directed to see that no such appointment in future is made. We can take judicial notice of the fact that several writ applications are filed on the basis of offer of appointment made by a competent authority without following the procedures laid down by law and without complying with the requirement of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. The Officers who may be found guilty in such matters should be dealt with severely and all efforts should be made to put an end to appoint teachers on extraneous or monetary consideration. In appropriate case, the State should also initiate suitable proceeding against such officers and other persons connected therewith including initiation of a criminal proceeding. 29. This application is, therefore, disposed of with the observations/ directions made hereinbefore but without any order as to costs. Application allowed.