JUDGMENT 1. - Recruitment to the Rajasthan Administrative Service is to be made, according to rule 7 of the Rajasthan Administrative Service Rules, 1954 (for short "the Rules"), by direct recruitment through combined competitive examination and by promotion of Tehsildars in such a manner that the persons appointed to the Service by direct recruitment do not at any time exceed 75% and by promotion 25% of the total cadre strength as sanctioned from time to time. Government can in special circumstances consider recruiting persons by special selection not exceeding 5% of the total promotion quota posts in ordinary scale or the Service in any particular year. 2. By an order No. F. 1 (35) Perss/A-4/87 dated Feb. 26, 88, the State Government in Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms (A-4) keeping in view the provisions contained in rule 3 of the Rajasthan Services (Recruitment by promotion of vacant posts of earlier years), 1972 made officiating promotions of various persons working as Tahsildar's and Devasthan Inspectors to vacant posts pertaining to the years 1982-83, 1983-84, 1984-85, 1985-86 and 1986-87 in the Junior Scale of Rajasthan Administrative Service (for short, "R. A. S.") on the basis of merit and on the basis of seniority-cum-merit within the prescribed proportion. Shambhu Singh Meena, petitioner in D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5047/91, was promoted to the Service on the basis of merit as against the vacancies in promotion quota of the year 1984-85 and he was confirmed in tile cadre of the Service by order dated 2-1-1969. He was further promoted in the Senior Scale of the Service by an order dated 30-9-89 on regular basis on the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee. Madho Lal Bhatt, petitioner in D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5048/91, was promoted to the Service in the Junior Scale on the basis of merit as against the vacancies in promotion quota of the year 1981-82 by Order No. F. 1 (25) Pers./A-4/82 dated 26-2-88 and he was confirmed in the cadre of the Service by an order dated 2-1-89. Jagdish Chandra Bishnoi, petitioner in D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5049/91, was promoted to the Service in Junior Scale on the basis of merit as against the vacancies of 1983-84 by the Review Departmental Promotion Committee, although he states that earlier, he was promoted as member of R. A. S. (Junior Scale) against the quota of 1981. Jagdish Chandra Bishnoi, petitioner in D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5049/91, was promoted to the Service in Junior Scale on the basis of merit as against the vacancies of 1983-84 by the Review Departmental Promotion Committee, although he states that earlier, he was promoted as member of R. A. S. (Junior Scale) against the quota of 1981. Safdare Alam, petitioner in D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5050/91, alleges that he was appointed on the basis of Review Departmental Promotion Committee of 1981 on officiating basis in the cadre of R. A. S. (Ordinary Scale) by an order dated 14-3-1984 and was later on selected on the recommendations of the DPC on the basis of merit against the quota of 1982-83 by an order dated 26-2-1988. Jagannath Agrawal, petitioner in D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5989/ 91, was promoted on regular basis on merit basis against the promotion quota of 1982-83 and was confirmed in the cadre of R. A. S. (Junior Scale) by order dated 2-1-1989. 3. Soon after the above two promotion orders of the petitioners promoting them to R A. S. (Junior Scale) were passed on 26-2-1988, respondents Nos. 2 to 12 filled appeals before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur (for short, hereinafter, "the Tribunal") against the two promotion orders dated 26-2-1988 which were decided by the Tribunal on 30-7-1991 by a common order. The Tribunal allowed 11 appeals filed before it by its order dated 30-7-91 and quashed the two orders dated 26-2-1988 whereby promotions were given to the petitioners to the Junior Scale of R. A. S. as against the. promotion quota of various years on the basis of merit. This order of the Tribunal dated 30-7-1991 has been challenged by the petitioner by filing the present writ petitions in this Court on various grounds.In the appeals filed by respondents Nos. 2 to 12 before the Tribunal, following points arose for determination, namely : (1) Whether the vacancies of the years 1972 to 1980 were clubbed and there was not proper determination of vacancies ? (2) Whether the Departmental Promotion Committee for the years 1981-82 and 1982-83 was not properly constituted ? (3) Whether the orders dated 28-1-83 and 26-6-84 had not been quashed by the Tribunal ? (2) Whether the Departmental Promotion Committee for the years 1981-82 and 1982-83 was not properly constituted ? (3) Whether the orders dated 28-1-83 and 26-6-84 had not been quashed by the Tribunal ? (4) Whether the private respondents promoted on merit basis, could not be promoted in view of Explanation below sub-rule (11) of Rule 28-B of the. Rules ? 4. On point No. 1, the Tribunal held that only 15 promotees were working in the cadre of R.A.S. against 121 posts which ought to have been manned by the promotees. Thus 106 vacancies were to be filled in from amongst the members of Rajasthan Tehsildar Service. It held that on the basis of vague averment, it could not be found that there was wrong determination of the vacancies for the year 1981-82 or that there was clubbing of the vacancies of the previous years. As regards the plea of wrong determination of the vacancies for the years 1983-84 or 1984 raised by Yagaya Narain Sin;h, it was observed that no particulars had been given. The cadre strength as on 1.4.1984 was 707 and the DPC, keeping in view the cadre strength, was held and as such there was no fault in determination of vacancies in these two years also. On point No. 2, the Tribunal held that : "Admittedly Shri Govindji Misra was not the senior-most Secretary to the Government when the Committee was constituted and there were Secretaries senior to Shri Mishra at that time. It has, therefore, to be held that the constitution of the DPC for the year 1982-83 was not in conformity with rule 28, rather it was in its contravention. The promotion orders based on the recommendations of the improperly constituted Committee, are not maintainable in law." 5. Point No. 3 was decided by the Tribunal against the appellants before them (i. e. against Respondents Nos. 2 to 12 in these writ petitions). 6. As regards point No. 4, it was urged on behalf of Respondents Nos. 2 to 12 that Teshildars who had been given promotion on merit basis could not be promoted to R.A.S. (Junior Scale) on that basis as their service record was not "Outstanding" or "Consistently very good" as required by Explanation to sub rule (ii) of Rule 28-B of the Rules. 2 to 12 that Teshildars who had been given promotion on merit basis could not be promoted to R.A.S. (Junior Scale) on that basis as their service record was not "Outstanding" or "Consistently very good" as required by Explanation to sub rule (ii) of Rule 28-B of the Rules. Reliance in this connection was p1 iced upon the decisions of this Court in Mahesh Prashad Mathur v. State, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 359 of 1985 decided on 18.7.1985 , Randheer Singh v. State, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3273/87 decided on 9 4.1990 and O.P. Srivastava v. State of Rajasthan, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2173/1990 decided on 31-10-1990 . The Tribunal held that it was well with in its jurisdiction to go into the service record of the respondents before it to examine the correctness or otherwise of the recommendations made by the D.P.C. It also held that service record of the eligible persons of the preceding seven years should be looked in to by the DPC while adjudging the suitability for promotion on the basis of seniority-cum-merit or on the basis of merit. Relying upon the decisions of this Court in Randheer Singh v. State of Rajasthan and O.P. Srivastava v. State of Rajasthan (supra), the Tribunal held that only such Government servants could be given promotion on merit basis whose service record had either been -Outstanding" or 'Very good" during the preceding seven years. After perusal of the APARs of various Tehsildars promoted to RAS on the basis of merit by orders dated 26.2.1988, the Tribunal found in relation to Jagannath Agarwal petitioner that in the APAR of the year 1979-80, he was rated only as "Average" officer. So far as Madho Lai Bhatt petitioner was concerned, in the APAR of the year 1975-76, he was rated as an average officer. For Safoare Alam petitioner, it was observed that his APARs of the years 1978-79, 1979-80 and 1981-82 revealed that he did not possess "Outstanding" or-Very good" service record to his credit. In the APAR for the year 1978-79 in the overall assessment, it was reported that his work was "satisfactory". Perusal of the APAR of Shambhu Singh Meena for the year 1979-80 showed that he was only an -average officer". In the APAR for the year 1978-79 in the overall assessment, it was reported that his work was "satisfactory". Perusal of the APAR of Shambhu Singh Meena for the year 1979-80 showed that he was only an -average officer". Most of the tick marks had been placed in the boxes of the column of "average" and in over all assessment, it had been reported that his work was ' satisfactory". As regards, Jagdish Chandra Bishnoi petitioner, it was found that his APARs for the year 1974-75 and the year 1978-79 revealed that be was categorised as an "average" officer. In the APAR for the year 1978-79, tick marks had been put on entries of column 5 i. e. "Average" and in the over all assessment, his performance was assessed to be "satisfactory". In the APAR for the year 1974-75, his performance was reported as "Good"/"Satisfactory". It was held that thus none of these officials could be placed in the category of "Outstanding" or 'Very good". The Tribunal concluded : "In sum:- 1. The orders dated 28.1.83 and 20.6.1984 did not survive in view of the orders passed by this Tribunal in the Appeal of Shri Noor Mohammed on 25.4.1986 and Appeal of Bachhraj on 11.7.1986. 2. The Constitution of the D. P. C. for the year 1982-83 was not in accordance with Rules and the order based on the recommendations of that Committee cannot be upheld. 3. The promotions on merit basis of : (i) Sarvashri Narabodeshwar Misra, Jagdish Chandra Bishnoi, Farooq Ahned, Bachh Raj Pareek, Noor Mohammed, Jag Mohan Srivastava and Madho Lal Bhatt (SC) against the vacancies of the year 1981-82; (ii) Sarvashri Safdare Alam, Jagannath Agrawal, Doongar Singh Rajpurohit and Durga Dan against the vacancies of the year 1982-83; (iii) Shri Atma Prakash Pareek against the vacancy of the year 1983-84; (iv) Sarvashri Prabhudan Charan, Niranjan Kumar Khinchi, Mangilal Gehlot, Rajesh Kumar Goel, Jagdish Prashad Swarankar and Shambhu Singh Meena against the vacancies of the year 1985-86, cannot be maintained in view of the Explanation below sub-rule (I11 of rule 28-B of the Rules and the judgments of Honble High Court, referred to above. The result, therefore, is that we allow all these I I appeals in part. We hereby quash the final order dated 26.2.1988 in so far as it relates to the promotions on merit basis for the vacancies of the year 1981- 82............ The result, therefore, is that we allow all these I I appeals in part. We hereby quash the final order dated 26.2.1988 in so far as it relates to the promotions on merit basis for the vacancies of the year 1981- 82............ We also hereby quash the second order dated 26.2.1988 in so far as the promotions on merit basis ..........for the year 1982-83............ for the year 1983-84 ................ for the vacancies of the year 1984-85 are concerned." 7. Explanation to sub-rule (11) of rule 28-B of the Rules reads as under:- Explanation:-For purposes of selection on the basis of merit officers with Outstanding" or consistently 'Very good" record shall only be selected and their names arranged in the order of seniority." 8. In Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1910 , Ramaswami, J., speaking for the Court, observed : "In our opinion, the respondents are right in their contention that the ranking or position in the Gradation List does not confer any right on the petitioner to be promoted to selection post and that it is a well-established rule that promotion to selection grades or selection posts is to be based primarily on merit alone and not on seniority alone. The principle is that when the claims of officers to selection posts is under consideration, seniority should not be regarded, except where the merit of the officers is judged to be equal and no other criterion is, therefore, available.................... In this connection, Leonard D. White has stated as follows : 'The principal object of a promotion system is to secure the best possible incumbents for the higher positions, while maintaining the morale of the whole organisation. The main interest to be served is the public interest, not the personal interest of members of the official 'group concerned. The public interest is best secured when reasonable opportunities for promotion exist for all qualified employees, when really superior civil servants are enabled to move as rapidly up the promotion ladder as their merits deserve and as vacancies occur, and when selection for promotion is made on the sole basis of merit. For the merit system ought to apply as specifically in making promotions or in original recruitment ................................................ Employees often prefer the rule of seniority, by which the eligible longest in service is automatically awarded the promotion. For the merit system ought to apply as specifically in making promotions or in original recruitment ................................................ Employees often prefer the rule of seniority, by which the eligible longest in service is automatically awarded the promotion. Within limits, seniority is entitled to consideration as one criterion of selection. It tends to eliminate favouritism or the suspicion thereof; and experience is certainly a factor in the making of a successful employee. Seniority is given most weight in promotions from the lowest to other subordinate positions. As employees move up the ladder of responsibility, it is entitled to less and less weight. When seniority is made the sole determining factor, at any level, it is a dangerous guide. It does not follow that the employee longest in service in a particular grade is best suited for promotion to a higher grade, the very opposite may be true." (Introduction to the study of Public Administration, 4th Edn., PP. 380, 383)." 9. In Guman Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1971) 2 SCC 452 , Vaidialingam, J., observed at page 468 in para 35 that : "No doubt the term "merit" is not capable of an easy definition, but it can be safely said that the merit is a sum total of various qualities and attributes of an employee such as his academic qualifications, his distinction in the University, his character. integrity, devotion to duty and the manner in which he discharges his official duties. Allied to this may be various other matters or factors such as his punctuality in work, quality and out turn of work done by him and the manner of his dealings with his superiors and subordinate officers and the general public and his rank in service. We are only indicating some of the broad aspects that may be taken into account in assessing the merits of an officer. In this connection, it may be stated that the various particulars in the annual confidential reports of an officer, if carefully and properly noted, will also give a very broad and general indication regarding the merit of an officer ............Such an evaluation of merit has been left under the rules to a Committee consisting of responsible, senior and experienced officers of the State. ..............They can be trusted to evaluate the merits of a particular officer." Beg, J.. ..............They can be trusted to evaluate the merits of a particular officer." Beg, J.. observed in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Kapoor and others, (1973) 2 SCC 836 : "Merit is certainly an elusive factor capable of being judged very differently from different angles, or, by applications of varying tests of it by different persons or, by the same persons, at different times........ We fail to see why administrative machinery which secures for the most meritorious chances of superseding their seniors, in promotion to higher posts, should have an adverse and not beneficial effects upon the morale of members of State services or upon incentives for better work and efficiency. No doubt care has to be taken that it is so operated as to really secure the choice of the most meritorious by honest and rigorous applications of correct and proper tests. It is true that, where merit, which is difficult to judge, is laid down as the sole test for promotion, the powers of selection become wider, and, they can be assumed with less difficulty. But, the machinery provided for preparation of select lists for promotion to All India Services, so as to ensure in impartiality, cannot be assumed to so operate as to produce unjust results. The wider the powers entrusted to an administrative authority, the more should be the consciousness of responsibility on its part for their due discharge fairly and impartially. The presumption is -that the authority concerned with discharge its obligations with full realisation of its implications and honestly." 10. In Union of India v. Mohan Lal Kapoor, AIR 1974 SC 87 , the Supreme Court quashed the Select List of various years for promotion to the Indian Administrative Service on the ground that the Select Committee had failed to record reasons in superseding senior officers. The Union of India felt that it was difficult to record reasons in the prescribed manner as laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohan Lal Kapoor's case and the question was considered by a conference of Chief Secretaries in May, 1976 and was further considered. The Committee recommended that the system of categorisation of officers for promotion to the higher post should be followed in case of All India Services also and, thereafter, the categorisation was introduced in amended Regulation 5(4) and (5) of the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955. The Committee recommended that the system of categorisation of officers for promotion to the higher post should be followed in case of All India Services also and, thereafter, the categorisation was introduced in amended Regulation 5(4) and (5) of the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955. The amended Regulation 5(4) and (5) read as under : "5(4) The Selection Committee shall classify eligible officers as Outstanding", "Very good" "Good" or "Unfit", as the case may be, on an over all relative assessment of their service record." "5 (5) The list shall be prepared by including the required number of names, first from amongst officers finally classified as ,Outstanding", then from amongst those similarly classified as "Very Good" thereafter from amongst those similarly classified as "Good" and the order of the names inter see within each category shall be, in the order of their seniority in the State Civil Service." 11. Before the Supreme Court, in R.S. Dass v. Union of India & others, AIR 1987 SC 593 , the appellants/petitioners urged that the select lists were vitiated on the ground that select committee did not record any reasons in superseding the appellants/petitioners in excluding their names and including the names of junior officers in the select list. That the amendment of the Regulation 5(7) was violative of Articles 14 & 16, that the select list was vitiated for non-compliance of Regn. 6 (iii) as no reasons were forwarded by the State Committee to the Commission, that the principles of natural justice were violated and that the select list prepared for the year 1978-79 was vitiated on account of the unauthorised participation of Shri I. C. Puri as a member of the Selection Committee. Rejecting the contentions, His Lordship K.N. Singh, J., made the following observations:- "The amended provisions of Regn. 5 have curtailed and restricted the role of seniority in the process of selection as it has given primacy to merit. Now the Committee is required to categorise the eligible officers in four different categories, namely "Outstanding", "Very Good", `Good" and -Unfit" on overall relative assessment of their service records .................. ........................In this process a junior officer if categorised "Outstanding" or "Very Good" would supersede his seniors. This cannot be helped. Now the Committee is required to categorise the eligible officers in four different categories, namely "Outstanding", "Very Good", `Good" and -Unfit" on overall relative assessment of their service records .................. ........................In this process a junior officer if categorised "Outstanding" or "Very Good" would supersede his seniors. This cannot be helped. Where selection is made on merit alone for promotion to a higher service, selection of an officer though junior in service in preference to his senior does not strictly amount to supersession." 12. Usefully, reference may be made to the observations made by his Lordship K. N. Singh, J., in para 28 of the reported judgment at page 606 and they are extracted below:- "In order to judge the merit the regulations provide for categorisation of eligible members of the State Civil Service on the basis of their service records which are scrutinised by the Committee consisting of high ranking officers of the State Govt. and the Central Govt. The service records of all eligible officers whose names are included in the proposed select list and the records of even those who are not selected are again scrutinised by the State Govt. and the Union Public Service Commission and only thereafter final shape is given to the selection list. There are, therefore, adequate checks and safeguards at different stages by different authorities. But if any dispute arises with regard to the arbitrary exclusion of a senior member to the State Service the matter can always be investigated by perusing his service records and comparing the same with the service record of officers who may have been preferred and that would certainly disclose the reasons for the supersession of the senior officer. It is true that where merit is the sole basis for promotion, the power of selection becomes wide and liable to be abused with less difficulty. But that does not justify presumption regarding arbitrary exercise of power. The machinery designed for preparation of select list under the regulations for promotion to All India Service, ensures objective and impartial selection.. The Selection Committee is constituted by high ranking responsible officers presided over by Chairman or a Member of the Union Public Service Commission. But that does not justify presumption regarding arbitrary exercise of power. The machinery designed for preparation of select list under the regulations for promotion to All India Service, ensures objective and impartial selection.. The Selection Committee is constituted by high ranking responsible officers presided over by Chairman or a Member of the Union Public Service Commission. There is no reason to hold that they would not act in fair and impartial manner in making selection ................................................The selection committee and the Commission both include persons having requisite knowledge, experience, and expertise to assess the service records and liability to adjudge the suitability of officers. In this view we find no good reasons to hold that in the absence of reasons the selection would be made arbitrarily. Where power is vested in high authority there is a presumption that the same would be exercised in a reasonable manner and if the selection is made on extraneous considerations in arbitrary manner the Courts have ample power to strike down the same and that is an adequate safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of power." 13. The decision in Union Public Service Commission v. Hiranyalal Dev, AIR 1988 S.C. 1069 may also be referred to. The mattes had come before the Supreme Court through appeals by special leave against the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati. The facts in that case were that in a meeting of the Selection Committee for preparing a select list for promotion to the joint IPS cadre of Assam and Meghalaya, two officers junior to Hiranyalal Dev, respondent No. 1 were selected and included in the select list while the name of Respondent No. 1 was not included in the select list. The Central Administrative Tribunal came to the conclusion that certain adverse remarks in the confidential character rolls (C. C. Rolls), of Respondent No. 1 had not been communicated to him till the date of meeting and on their being communicated the Respondent No. I made a representation to the State Government which was allowed, with the result that even the adverse remarks subsequently expunged were taken into consideration by the Selection Committee. On this view, the Tribunal held that Respondent No. I should be deemed to have been included in the impugned select list, at least in the place in the order of his seniority and appointed to Indian Police Service on the date on which his immediate junior, namely, Shri Sardar Pradeep Kar was appointed. After taking this view, the Tribunal went a step further and directed Respondent No. I to be appointed to the Indian Police Service with effect from the date on which Shri Sardar Pradeep Kar had been appointed and allowed all the benefits on that basis. The Tribunal had passed the following order : "Accordingly, we held that the applicant should be deemed to have been included in the impugned select list prepared in 1983, at least, in the place in the order of his seniority and appointed to Indian Police Service on the date on which his immediate junior, namely, respondent No. 11 Shri Sardar Pradeep Kar was appointed. Accordingly, we direct that the applicant be appointed to the Indian Police Service with effect from the date on which respondent No. 11 Shri Sardar Pradeep Kar was appointed to the Indian Police Service and allowed all the benefits on that basis." In the appeals, the main question which had been posed for consideration before the Supreme Court was as to whether the Tribunal could have lawfully passed the above operative cider which it had on reaching the conclusion that the Selection Committee had committed an error in taking into account the adverse remarks made against Respondent No. I during a particular year, which remarks had not been communicated to him till the date of selection end which adverse remarks were subsequently set aside by the State Government upon a representation made by Respondent No. I against the adverse remarks. It would be useful to extract the observations made by his Lordship Ojha J., speaking for the Court. His Lordship observed : "However, the fact that the Selection Committee erred in this behalf does not necessarily mean that the Respondent No. 1 should have been categorized or considered as "Very Good" vis. a vis. others who were also in the field of choice. His Lordship observed : "However, the fact that the Selection Committee erred in this behalf does not necessarily mean that the Respondent No. 1 should have been categorized or considered as "Very Good" vis. a vis. others who were also in the field of choice. How to categorize in the light of the relevant records and what norms to apply in making the assessment are exclusively the functions of the Selection Committee ................The jurisdiction to make the selection vested in the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee had to make the selection by applying the yardstick and norm as regards the rating to be given to the officials, who were in the field of choice by categorising the concerned officials as "outstanding", 'Very Good", -Good" etc. This function had also to be discharged by the Selection Committee by applying the same norm and tests and the selection was also to be made by the Selection Committee as per the relevant rules ............................................ This in our opinion could not authorise the Tribunal to assume the role of the Selection Committee in making the selection or that of the State Govt. in making appointment by promotion. We are accordingly of the opinion that the Tribunal should have directed that the Selection Committee should reconsider the matter on the footing that there was no adverse remarks against Respondent No. I and make a proper categorisation on the basis of the records, by applying the same standard and test adopted by it and make the categorisation "outstanding", -Very Good", "Good" etc. as deemed appropriate in the light of the norms devised by it and to decide as to whether on doing so Respondent No. I would have been selected. The Tribunal has also assumed that on the basis of the rating made on the C. C. Rolls, the petitioner was entitled to the categorisation 'Very Good". This was a matter which had to be determined by the Selection Committee by applying the same test as was applied in the case of others by taking into consideration the rating made in the C.C. Rolls by applying the same criteria devised by the Selection Committee. The Tribunal has made recourse to conjectures in undertaking this function as discussed in the passage extracted from paragraph No. 16, which it should not have undertaken at all. The Tribunal has made recourse to conjectures in undertaking this function as discussed in the passage extracted from paragraph No. 16, which it should not have undertaken at all. "We also notice from the C. C. Rolls taken together that the categorisation done by the State Government are (a) Outstanding (to be awarded in very rare cases), (b) above average, (c) average and (d) below average. Thus the categorisation "above average" is taken as equivalent to the grading as -very good" as referred to in Regulation 5(4) of the Promotion Regulation. This also follows on an examination of the C. C. Roll of the applicant, which is produced before us contains entries from the year 1973-74 onwards. In all these years 1973-74 to October, 1979 he was on each occasion graded "above average" which is equivalent to -very good". The general description of his performance during these years also confirm that he was held to be very good. In the report for the period 17-10-79 to 31-3-1980 he has been graded "average" but after the expunction of the adverse remarks, therefore, the perform finance as depicted report for the period is to be graded as -very good". Same is the case with the two other reports containing the adverse remarks............" This the Tribunal should not have done." The Supreme Court, in place of the final order of the Tribunal, substituted the order in the following terms, viz:- "The Selection Committee shall reconsider the impugned select list prepared in 1983 as if it was deciding the matter on the date of the selection on the footing that the adverse remarks made against respondent No. 1 which was subsequently set aside did not exist in the records and consider the question as to whether he would have been appointed or Respondent No. i1 Shri Sardar Pradeep kar would have been appointed on the basis of the categorisation to which each of them vikas entitled having regard to the C. C. Rolls (ignoring the adverse remarks against Respondent No. I which was subsequently quashed) and pass appointment orders in the light of the decision taken on this point. If the Respondent No. 1st claim is accepted upon reconsideration in the light of the aforesaid exercise, the order of appointment should provide for his appointment with effect from the date on which he would have been appointed if he was selected when the original selection was made in 1983 and he should be given all the benefits." 14. It may be stated that the provisions contained in Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations 1955 applicable in the above case were in pail materia with the provisions of Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955 which have already been reproduced above and where under it was for the Selection Committee to classify or categorize eligible officers as "outstanding", "Very Good", "Good" or "Unfit" as the case may be, on an overall relative assessment of their service record and not for the Tribunal or Court, 15. In Ex Naib Subedar Kartar Singh v. Union of India and others, AIR 1990, S.C. 17 , the criteria for promotion to the post of Risaldar/Subedar was as under:- "For promotion to the rank of Ris/Sub : (i) Three out of the last five reports rendered on an individual should be "High Average" out of which At least two should be on regimental duty or as an Instructor in an Army School of Instruction in the rank of Nb Ris/Nb Sub. (ii) No report should be less than "Average" in the last three reports. (iii) Should have been recommended for promotion in the last three reports." To verify the correctness of the entries in the confidential reports, the Supreme Court called for the original confidential reports and perused the same for the years 1974 to 1978. On perusal of the confidential reports, it was found that the grading in the years 1976 and 1977 was "average". The grading in the year 1974 was "B" which according to the appellant meant -high average" while according to the respondent, it was merely equal to average. The gradings in the year 1975 and 1978 was respectively "above average" and '-high average". Thus if the grading in 1974 which was shown to be "B" was taken to be -high average" and not merely "average", the appellant would have satisfied the requirement of three out of the last five reports showing high average. The gradings in the year 1975 and 1978 was respectively "above average" and '-high average". Thus if the grading in 1974 which was shown to be "B" was taken to be -high average" and not merely "average", the appellant would have satisfied the requirement of three out of the last five reports showing high average. The Supreme Court held that : "In the C.R. forms the grading "B" is shown to be average. If it were not so the notes at the foot of paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b) were unnecessary. It seems clear to us that grading B" is equivalent to average and not high average as contended on behalf of the appellant. The appellant, therefore, did not satisfy the first criterion of high average grading in three out of the last five reports. That being so, the Selection Board was justified in refusing to enter the name of the appellant in the list of Naib Subedars found fit for promotion as Subedars". 16. We have already extracted Explanation to sub-rule (11) of Rule 28-B of the Rules. This Explanation lays down the basis on which merit of an eligible officer for promotion on the basis of merit will be judged. The word "only" used in the Explanation gives to it a mandatory character. The words "Outstanding" or `consistently very good" record gives objectivity in the assessment of merit which otherwise is an elusive factor capable of being judged very differently from different angles, or by applications of varying tests of it by different persons or, by the same persons, at different times. The format of Annual Performance Appraisal as was applicable up to the year 198h covered in it varied factors so as to make an all round and vide range assessment of an officer's qualities, personal traits and performance during the year. If even gave opportunity to the concerned officer to make his own appraisal of his performance, in terms of the norms/targets prescribed by the department (See para 12 of the format). The various factors on which assessment is made are personality, initiative, creativity, capacity to handle people, discipline temperament, job performance, output, quality and dependability of work,ability to communicate orally and in writing, relations with citizens and their representatives, health etc. It also records regarding reprimand or disciplinary action taken against the officer during the year. The various factors on which assessment is made are personality, initiative, creativity, capacity to handle people, discipline temperament, job performance, output, quality and dependability of work,ability to communicate orally and in writing, relations with citizens and their representatives, health etc. It also records regarding reprimand or disciplinary action taken against the officer during the year. Comments in relation to each of these items are made by the Reporting Officer who is at least Head of Office. The report is submitted to reviewing officer/authority who gives his overall general remarks on the assessment made by the Reporting Officer, with specific reference to his remarks on the outstanding work of.the officer. 17. Mr. Ajay Rastogi, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the format of Annual Performance Appraisal (Annex. 71, which was available before the year 1987 contained four columns against various factors, namely,"outstanding", "above average", '`average", and ` below average". It did not contain any column of "very good" in it. Thus the categorisation in APAR format G. A. 38-Ill (Annex.7) did not correspond with the requirements of Explanation to sub-rule (11) of Rule 28-B of the Rules. It was only in the format made available in 1987 and thereafter that categorisation in relation to various factors were required to be made as "outstanding", -very good", "good", "satisfactory" and "unsatisfactory". It was urged that since the recommendations which were made by the DPC of the petitioners on the basis of merit were in relation to the quota of 1981-82, 1982-83 and 1983-84 before the availability of the new format of APAP (Annex. 8), there could have been no question of there being any entry categorising the petitioners as `very good". 18. As has already been mentioned, the Tribunal, after perusal of the APARs of the petitioners, found that in relation to some years or the other during the preceding seven years, the petitioners were rated as "average" officers and in the column of over-all assessment the word "good" or "satisfactory" was mentioned. Expression "average" means ordinary and does not at all mean extremely suitable or extremely competent. In dictionary meaning "average" as adjective means "mean, prevailing, ordinary". The expression "very good" means "truly, precisely or extremely commendable, suitable or competent". An officer rated as -ordinary" (i. e. average) cannot be held to have been rated as truly, precisely or extremely commendable, suitable or competent (i. e. "very good") officer. In dictionary meaning "average" as adjective means "mean, prevailing, ordinary". The expression "very good" means "truly, precisely or extremely commendable, suitable or competent". An officer rated as -ordinary" (i. e. average) cannot be held to have been rated as truly, precisely or extremely commendable, suitable or competent (i. e. "very good") officer. Thus the expression "average" can by no stretch be equated with "very good". If that stretching cannot be made, it is immaterial that the APAR format prior to 1987 did not contain the categorisation "very good". At least a -very good" officer will have to be "above average". It has been found on perusal of the APARs of the petitioners by the Tribunal that in one or the other year during the preceding seven years, their rating was only as an "ordinary or average officer" and not as "very good" officer. 19. In Mahesh Prasad Mathur v. The State of Rajasthan and others, S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 359 of 1985 decided on July 18, 1985 it was observed by this Court that : "It is true that the said circular does not in terms apply to regular promotion on the basis of merit. But the said circular does afford aquidance in the matter of fixing the period for which the confidential reports should be taken into consideration for assessing the merit of a candidate. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Tribunal has committed any error or has acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in taking the view that ACRs/ APARs for last seven years must be taken into consideration while assessing the merit for the purpose of promotion on the basis of merit." In Randhir Singh v. State of Rajasthan and others, D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3273 of 1987 , the Division Bench of this Court had held that : "The Explanation has also used the word `only" while it says that officers with -outstanding" or consistently "very good" record shall only be selected. No deviation can be made from the Explanation. A person whose service record is not "outstanding" or consistently "very good" cannot be selected on the basis of merit. He has to be considered on the basis of seniority-cum-merit as per proviso to Rule 28-A (6)". No deviation can be made from the Explanation. A person whose service record is not "outstanding" or consistently "very good" cannot be selected on the basis of merit. He has to be considered on the basis of seniority-cum-merit as per proviso to Rule 28-A (6)". These decisions were followed by another Division Bench of this Court in O. P. Srivastava & 2 others v. State of Rajasthan and others, D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2173 of 1990 decided on October 31, 1990 . 20. Mr. Ajay Rastogi, learned counsel for the petitioners, next urged that if Rule 28-B (11) is read alongwith the Explanation, it was clear that it was not the APARs alone which are to be considered by the DPC but it was the record of the incumbent who fell within the lone of consideration which were to be considered and the -record" includes APARs, service dossiers, commendation certificates, cash certificates/awards, punishments and warnings etc. It was contended that the Tribunal had considered and confined their findings only by examining the APARs. Suffice it to state that there are columns in APAR formats meant to record about "outstanding work of the officer", his special characteristics and/or any outstanding merit or ability, instances of outstanding work and any reprimand or disciplinary action taken against the officer during the year under review. The scope of these columns are wide enough to record the matters urged by the learned counsel and they are part of the APARs. 21. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Tribunal at its own came to the conclusion that it was seven years record preceding the year of selection which had been considered by the DPC. It was urged that it could be verified only from the proceedings of the DPC whether in fact, it had considered seven years record of service of the incumbents who were considered for the respective years. In the absence of facts, the assumption of the Tribunal only on the basis of the judgments of this Court was an error apparently committed by the Tribunal. This is an argument in despair. As a matter of fact, perusal of seven years record preceding the year of selection, has been laid down by this Court in curtailment of the wide sway of the Explanation below sub-rule (11) of Rule 28-B of the Rules. This is an argument in despair. As a matter of fact, perusal of seven years record preceding the year of selection, has been laid down by this Court in curtailment of the wide sway of the Explanation below sub-rule (11) of Rule 28-B of the Rules. If the Explanation would have been allowed to have its full playa then for the purpose of selection for promotion on the basis of merit, their entire past record of their tenure of service ought to have been "outstanding" or consistently -very good". If even seven years preceding record would not ever have been considered, the selection on the basis of merit would become bad on that ground alone. The minimum requirement as per judgments of this Court was peruse] of seven years record preceding the year of selection. 22. Mr. Ajay Rastogi next urged that the Tribunal could not sit over the assessment and recommendations of the DPC as it was beyond the scope of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1976. It was submitted that the DPC is a high p( war committee duly constituted under the Rules and is composed of sensor officials like Chairman of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Senior LA S. Officer, Special Secretary, Department of Personal and other senior officers and they recommend the incumbents after going through their complete record of service preceding to the year of selection as they ultimately decide and, therefore, unless mala fides are alleged or contrary material is placed on record, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to interfere in the recommendations made by the DPC. 23. The Tribunal was constituted under the Act of 1976 on suggestions made from time to time by the Law Commission as well as other eminent authorities. In view of the need for satisfactory and early final decision and to stop a flood of litigation in the civil courts, the State Govt. decided to constitute Administrative Tribunal, to decide appeals from the order of competent Authority and to be bar the jurisdiction of the civil courts in Service matters." "Service Matter" includes questions of seniority, promotion, confirmation, fixation of pay ect. relating to a Government Servant. The Tribunal hears appeal against the order passed by any officer or authority on any service matter affecting a Government servant in his personal capacity. relating to a Government Servant. The Tribunal hears appeal against the order passed by any officer or authority on any service matter affecting a Government servant in his personal capacity. The Tribunal has power to confirm, vary or reverse the order against which the appeal is preferred or to remand the matter for fresh decision in accordance with the directions given by it. The Tribunal, for the purpose of disposal of the appeal, has powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to summon and enforce the attendance of any person, to require the discovery and production of any document and to issue commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents. The Government as well as the affected parties have right to the represented before the Tribunal through an Advocate. The jurisdiction of civil court to entertain any suit or other proceedings with respect to any matter arising under or provided for by the Act is barred. Such a statutory Tribunal is entitled to scrutinise in appeal the order passed by any officer or authority on any service matter or matters affecting a Government servant in his personal capacity not only on ground of malafides but also on grounds of violation of statutory rules and constitutional provisions. The only limitation is that the Tribunal has no Jurisdiction to hear the matters challenging the vices of the Act of 1976 itself or of the statutory rules. We are of the opinion that in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction the Tribunal had the jurisdiction and competence to examine whether in ad judging the merit, the DPC or the Appointing Authority had violated the in statutory rules or not and is doing so, it could examine whether the record of an incumbent was "outstanding" and consistently "very good" or not because only on this basis an incumbent could be promoted on the basis of merit. In R. S. Dass v. Union of India & others (supra), his lordship K. N. Singh J., had clearly stated that "if any dispute arises with regard to the arbitrary exclusion of a senior member of the State Service the matter can always be investigated by perusing his service records and comparing the same with the service record of officers who may have been preferred". In Ex Naib Subedar Katar Singh v. Union of India and others (supra), the Supreme Court, in order to verify the correctness of the entries in the confidential reports, had called for the original confidential reports and perused the same for the years 1974 to 1978. In relation to the Indian Administrative Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955 and the Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955, it may pertinently be noted that the statutory regulations had entirely left it upon the selection committee itself to classify eligible officers as -outstanding", "very good", "good" or "unfit" on an overall relative assessment of their service record. In Explanation to sub-rule (11) of Rule 28-B of the Rules in question, it is not left upon the DPC itself to make any classification, categorisation or rating itself, but, on the other hand, a statutory duty has been enjoined upon the DPC and the Appointing Authority to select on the basis of merit only those officers who have "outstanding" or eonsistently "very good" record. The matter is also concluded by the Division Bench decisions of this Court in Randhir Singh v. State of Rajasthan and others and O.P. Srivastava & 2 others v. State of Rajasthan & others (supra) and was do not find, any cogent reasons, to take a different view and to refer the question to Full Bench. The decisions in State of Mysore v. C.R. Seshadri and others, AIR 1974 S.C. 460 and B. S. Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute and others, (1983) 4, SCC 582 are clearly distinguishable and can have no application to the present case where a mandatory statutory rule exists for the purpose of assessment of merit of an officer. 24. Mr. Ajay Rastogi also urged that it was nowhere pleaded by the appellants before the Tribunal that any illegality had been committed by the DPC in considering the seven years record while considering the case of the petitioners for selection on the basis of merit. It appears from the impugned order of the Tribunal that it had been contended by the appellants before the Tribunal that the officers who had been given promotion on merit basis could not be so promoted as their service record was not meritorious consistently for seven years and attention had also been drawn to the Explanation to Rule 28-B (11) of the Rules. The Tribunal had also gone through the APARs of the concerned persons(i. e. of the respondents before the Tribunal) for seven preceding years. The petitioners have not produced certified copies of the appeals which had been filed by respondents Nos. 2 to 12 before the Tribunal in order to show that the respondents had not taken the necessary plea in their appeals. The petitioners have, therefore, failed factually to prove their version. 25. The Tribunal has also held that the constitution of DPC for promotion quota vacancies of the year 1982-83 was in contravention of rule 28 as it then existed because Shri Govind ji Mishra I. A. S. was not the senior most Secretary to the Government in the super time scale of [AS. It is an admitted fact that the then existing rule 28 of the rules was substituted by new rule 28 by notification dated 30-6-88 and at item No. 4 of rule 28 was one of the members of the DPC was "senior-most Secretary to the Government in Super time scale of IAS as may be nominated by the Chief Secretary". However, the word -most" in between the word "senior" and the word "secretary" was deleted by notification of DOP dated 31-8-82. The Tribunal was of the view that various provision of the Rules made it clear that DPC should be held as per the rules existing on l,t Day of April of the year of vacancy. Reference. in this regard was made to rules 9 to 27 of the rules. According to the Tribunal as on 1-4-82, the word "most" existed in rule 28 in between the word "senior" and the word "Secretary" and, therefore, in relation to the promotion quota vacancies of the year 1982-83, D. P. C. should have been so constituted that one of its member was senior most Secretary to the Government in Super-time scale which Shri Govind ji Mishra nominated by the Chief Secretary was not. It was, therefore. held that the constitution of DPC in relation to the year 1982-81 was not in conformity with rule 28 as it existed during the period 30-6-81 to 31-8-82. 26. It was, therefore. held that the constitution of DPC in relation to the year 1982-81 was not in conformity with rule 28 as it existed during the period 30-6-81 to 31-8-82. 26. In our view, the Tribunal was wrong in holding on the basis of the provisions contained in rules 9 to 27 of the Rules that DPC should be held by a committee as was provided for in the rules as they stood on 1st day of April of the year of vacancy. Rule 9 simply deals with the determination of vacancies by the Appointing Authority on 1st April of every year, occurring during the financial year and it has no bearing whatsoever on the constitution of the DPC. Rule 27 of the rules only provides that only those Administrative Subordinates would be eligible for consideration for promotion, selection and special selection who were eligible under the provisions of the rules on the first day of the month of April of the year of selection and this rule as well has no hearing whatsoever on the composition of the DPC. Provision contained in Rule 28 of the Rules is a procedural provision and it would apply with reference to , he date the DPC is convened and meets irrespective of the fact that the DPC is convened and meets to consider promotions of earlier years. The DPC in relation to vacancies of the year 1982-83 had admittedly met in the year 1987 or 1988, rule 28 of the Rules as it stood on the date of convening and meeting of DPC would apply and not the rule as it stood on the date when the vacancies for the earlier year i.e. 1982-83 were determined. On the day the meeting of the DPC was convened and on the date it met, the word -most" did not exist between the word "senior" and the word "Secretary" in rule 28 of the Rules. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal was wrong in holding that DPC in relation to the vacancies of the year 1982-83 was illegally constituted and on this point, differing from the Tribunal, we hold that the DPC in relation to the said year was validly constituted. 27. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal was wrong in holding that DPC in relation to the vacancies of the year 1982-83 was illegally constituted and on this point, differing from the Tribunal, we hold that the DPC in relation to the said year was validly constituted. 27. The Tribunal, was, however, right in quashing the promotions of the petitioners as the same were made in violation of the mandatory provisions contained in Explanation below sub-rule (11) of Rule 28-B of the Rules and in directing the reconvening the DPC to recommend promotions in relation to the vacancies of the years 1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-84 and 1984-85 as detailed in the Tribunal's impugned order. 28. Resultantly, these petitions fail, and are hereby dismissed. Costs would be easy.Writ petition dismissed. *******