R. C. LAHOTI, J. ( 1 ) THE defendant / appellant has come up in appeal aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court issuing permanent preventive injunction against the defendant/ appellants restraining them from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff/ respondent over 9 mahua trees, in reversal of the decree of the trial Court which had dismissed the suit. ( 2 ) THE trees are situated on the border of two villages namely village Chukni and village Dhakni, both of Tahsil Manasa. Land S. No. 410 situated within village Chukni is owned and possessed by the plaintiff/ respondent. Lands S. Nos. 82,83 and 84 are owned and possessed by the defendant/ appellants and are situated within village Dhakni. The Govt. land lying in between two villages is known as kankad. This Kankad situated between village Chukni and Dhakni is designated S. No. 411. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff/ respondent filed the suit alleging that the 9 trees were situated over land S. No. 410 but the defendants were causing interference with the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff. He prayed for a declaration of title over land S. No. 410 and the 9 Mahua trees standing thereon followed by an injunction preventing the defendant/ appellants from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the land and trees by the plaintiff. ( 4 ) THE defendant/appellants in their written-statement denied knowledge about the ownership and possession of the plaintiff over S. No. 410 but submitted that the 9 Mahua trees were situated not in S. No. 410 but in the land belonging to the defendants wherein the plaintiff had no right, title interest of possession. ( 5 ) THE pleadings of the parties show that the real dispute between them was not about the land but as to the ownership and possession of the 9 Mahua trees. The crux of the controversy clustered around the finding on the question as to whether the trees stood over S. No. 410 or not. ( 6 ) WHAT happened at the trial Court is interesting to note. Though the issues were framed and put to trial, on 18-6-1976, as the order-sheet of the trial Court shows, the parties moved a joint application for appointment of Superintendent, Land Records, Mandsaur as Commissioner to make a local investigation and report the location of the trees. ( 6 ) WHAT happened at the trial Court is interesting to note. Though the issues were framed and put to trial, on 18-6-1976, as the order-sheet of the trial Court shows, the parties moved a joint application for appointment of Superintendent, Land Records, Mandsaur as Commissioner to make a local investigation and report the location of the trees. The parties further agreed that the report of the Commissioner would be acceptable to both of them; that the Court would be free to decide the matter solely on the report of the commissioner; and that the Court may proceed to pronounce on the merits of the case by placing reliance on the report of the commissioner. The commissioner was appointed and executed bi-parte having conducted the local investigation, the Commissioner found vide his report Ex. C/9 that out of the 9 trees, three were situated within the boundaries of S. No. 82 village Dhakni, three were situated on the boundary line of the two villages and the remaining three were situated on S. No. 411, the Kankad. As none of the trees was found to be situated within the boundary of S. No. 410 village Chukni as alleged by the plaintiff, the suit was directed to be dismissed. It may be stated that the report of the commissioner was objected to whereupon the Court examined the Commissioner as a Court witness affording both the parties an opportunity of cross-examination. ( 7 ) THE plaintiff filed an appeal. Upon an application made by the plaintiff/ appellant, the learned Judge presiding over the lower appellate Court himself proceeded to inspect the spot on 20-4-1978, whereafter he heard the counsel for the parties and disposed of the appeal. Paras 5 to 9 of the judgment of the lower appellate Court show that the entire judgment is based on the impressions formed by the learned appellate Judge at the time of spot inspection and some of the information collected during the course of spot inspection has been utilised for reversing the finding of the trial Court without disclosing the source from which the information was gathered. The learned Judge also proceeded to make a few observations against the commissioner appointed by the trial Court, certifying a copy of judgment to the collector for taking suitable action against the commissioner. The learned Judge also proceeded to make a few observations against the commissioner appointed by the trial Court, certifying a copy of judgment to the collector for taking suitable action against the commissioner. The lower appellate Court has held that the 9 Mahua trees were in possession of the plaintiff/ appellant though his ownership on the trees was not proved. Consequently allowing the appeal, the lower appellate Court has maintained the dismissal of the suit in so far as the relief of declaration is concerned but partly set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and issued an injunction in favour of the plaintiff/respondent restraining the defendant/appellants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff/ respondent on the trees. ( 8 ) ON 27-9-78, this Court admitted the appeal for hearing parties on the following substantial question of law: "whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the lower appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the judgment of the trial Court on the basis of the inspection of spot carried out by the lower appellate Court?" ( 9 ) IT may be stated at the very outset that in so far as the ownership of the plaintiff/ respondent over S. No. 410 is concerned, it is not disputed by the defendant / appellants. As already noticed, the dispute relates to the trees, the plea of the defendants being that the trees are not situated over S. No. 410 in village Chukni owned by the plaintiff/ respondent. ( 10 ) THE facts stated hereinabove go to show that the parties had agreed to the appointment of the commissioner, for the report of the commissioner to be read in evidence in supersession of all other evidence adduced by the parties and to bind the Court, the parties too, for deciding the dispute. ( 11 ) IN Rosily Mathew v. Joseph, AIR 1987 Kerala 42, in more or less similar circumstances, the High Court of Kerala has held :-"courts can adopt a procedure to settle the dispute 'extra cursus curiae' provided the parties to the dispute have either consented to the said course or have acquiesced in the said procedure. A party thereto thereafter cannot turn round and say that the Court alone is to be blamed for adopting the said procedure. This is based on the doctrine of estoppel. A party thereto thereafter cannot turn round and say that the Court alone is to be blamed for adopting the said procedure. This is based on the doctrine of estoppel. But that does not mean that the Court by deviating from the usual procedure (cursus curiae) can assume jurisdiction which it does not possess. It is equally well established that if the Court with the consent of the parties or with their acquiescence departs from the usual course of procedure (governing the case) and decides a question of fact, the said decision is neither appealable nor reviewable. The parties are bound by the order which in the circumstances of the case, partakes of the character of a consent decree. " ( 12 ) I find myself in respectful agreement with the view taken in Rosily Mathew's case (supra ). The lower appellate Court committed a serious error of law in permitting the plaintiff (appellant before it) to make a departure from the stand taken by him before the trial Court and in getting rid of the result of a procedure adopted and acquiesced in by him for settling the dispute. ( 13 ) THERE was a dispute as to the demarcation of the properties of the parties situated contiguously. In Durgaprasad v. Mst. Praveen, 1975 JLJ 440, a Division Bench of this Court has emphasised the necessity of appointment of a commissioner under O. 26, R. 9, C. P. C. when there is a dispute as to the boundary limits, which cannot be determined in the absence of an agreed map. The High Court of Orissa in Mahendranath v. Purnananda, AIR 1988 Orissa 248, has emphasised the necessity of local investigation being done at an early stage of the litigation when the controversy is as to identification, location or measurement of the land or premises or object. ( 14 ) THE trial Court, therefore, had rightly proceeded in appointing the commissioner for local investigation. Even if the prayer for such appointment would not have come from the parties, the trial Court itself would have been justified to make that order under O. 26, R. 9, CPC. Several documents submitted by the Commissioner and his detailed report along with field books prepared by him, leave no manner of doubt that the commission was executed painstakingly and satisfactorily. Several documents submitted by the Commissioner and his detailed report along with field books prepared by him, leave no manner of doubt that the commission was executed painstakingly and satisfactorily. Nothing was brought out in the cross-examination conducted by either party that the commissioner had done anything or had omitted to do something which would have the result of detracting from the weight of his conclusions. In Chandan Mull v. Chaimanlal, AIR 1940 PC 3, their Lordships have held (at page 6) :- "interference with the result of a long and careful local investigation except upon clearly defined and sufficient grounds is to be deprecated. It is not safe for a Court to act as an expert and to overrule the elaborate report of a Commissioner whose integrity and carefulness are unquestioned, whose careful and laborious execution of his task was proved by his report, and who had not blindly adopted the assertions of either party. " ( 15 ) IN the opinion of this Court, the lower appellate Court was unjustified in interfering with the decree of the trial Court based on the report of the Commissioner. It committed a serious error of law, rather of jurisdiction in basing its decision on the impressions formed and information gathered by conducting a spot inspection by itself. In Nilkhanth v. Gopaldas, AIR 1963 MP 230 , this Court has held (at page 232) :- "it is well-known law that a site inspection note serves the Court merely for the appraisal of the situation and for a better understanding of the evidence of the parties in which the site may be referred to. It can never the basis of a judgment. " in Bilaspur Municipality v. Wamanrao, AIR 1941 Nagpur 292, also it was observed that the opinion of the Judge formed on spot inspection cannot take the place of evidence. ( 16 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, this Court is unhesitatingly of the opinion that the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are wholly unsustainable in law. They are set aside. The judgment and decree of the trial Court are restored. It is made clear that the title of the plaintiff/respondent over S. No. 410 village Chukni remains intact. No order as to the costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed. .