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1992 DIGILAW 462 (MP)

Dilip Singh v. Sobhnadevi

1992-07-31

R.D.SHUKLA

body1992
JUDGMENT The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently attacked the procedure adopted by the District Judge, in taking the evidence on those issues referred above in the appellate Court itself and submitted that the trial Court aught to have been asked to take evidence and give a finding on it. Since the finding has been given by the First Appellate Court, the appellant lost the opportunity of attacking the finding of fact. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondent has supported the procedure and submitted that the appellant took part in the evidence and never raised this objection at that stage. Ss. 107 of the C.P.C. deals with the power of the appellate Court, which reads as follows: (1) To take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. (2) Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. On perusal of the First Appellate Court's record of evidence, it is evident that the appellant took part in the proceedings, cross examined the witnesses and himself appeared in the witness box, in support of his case. No objection was taken that the trial Court be asked to remit finding after recording the evidence. Now, under these circumstances, the appellant cannot be permitted to attack the procedure. He has waived his right of putting that objection and therefore this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. The rooms in possession of plaintiff is not sufficient to accommodate them. It is apparent that the plaintiff would require at least one room for herself and for her husband and the other room would be required for her adult son Rajesh. The plaintiff does require one separate room for lodging the daughter and son- in-law, whenever they come. Even otherwise, looking to the size and number of other relations including the father in-law, brother in-law, the plaintiff requires a separate guest room for lodging them and therefore, the finding regarding the need appears to be justified. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted on the basis of a case. Even otherwise, looking to the size and number of other relations including the father in-law, brother in-law, the plaintiff requires a separate guest room for lodging them and therefore, the finding regarding the need appears to be justified. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted on the basis of a case. reported in 1977 JLJP 207 that the need of the father in-law cannot be considered as he does not come within the purview of the definition of family as defined in S 2(e) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, and the bonafide requirement of the plaintiff for accommodating the father -in -law cannot be accepted. In the case referred above, it was not pleaded that widowed daughter-in-law and grand children are dependent on plaintiff and therefore, the plaintiff's contention of bonafide requirement was negatived. In this case there is an evidence that father-in-law of the plaintiff was suffering from cardiac Asthma. He is often required to come to Ujjain for check up and treatment. The fact has been proved by Dr. P.K. Ravat (P.W.2) though it is true that the father-in-law does not come in the definition of family as defined in S. 2 (e) referred to above. But the plaintiff would require at least one guest room for her relations including father-in-law, whenever they visit her. For the purpose of accommodating the father-in-law even for a temporary period, the ground floor would be more suitable. Hence, the finding of the first appellate Court cannot be said to be perverse or based on no evidence. 1977 JLJ 207 distinguished. Appeal dismissed.