Judgment :- The net was spread wide by a landlord to catch his tenant at least on one of the many grounds set on it. Ultimately the tenant was caught on one ground. which was upheld by the authorities under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 1965 (for short 'the Act'). Of course that one ground is enough to get an order of eviction. Rent Control Court.and the Appellate Authority found concurrently that the tenant ceased to occupy the building for more than six months without reasonable cause. Revisional authority did not interfere with the finding. Consequently. the tenant now faces threat of imminent eviction. Hence he filed this original petition under Article 227 of the Constitution in challenge of the said order of eviction. 2. Tenant was conducting a hotel business in the building. Landlord alleged that the tenant kept the building closed for about one year preceding the date of application. Tenant disputed the allegation and contended that he was conducting business in the building all through. Landlord took out a commission to inspect the shop and the commissioner who went to the place found the shop remaining closed and also observed certain features such as spider webs and collection of dust on some portion of the room. Commissioner. on those features. reported that no human activity would have been carried on in the room at least for some months. 3. Landlord got himself examined as a witness besides examining one neighboring shopkeeper. Both of them testified that the room remained closed for a longtime. more than the period envisaged in S.11(4)(v) of the Act. Tenant and one witness said that hotel business was being conducted in the shop room even till the previous evening of Commissioner's visit. Rent Control Court as well as Appellate Authority believed the evidence of the landlord and declined to believe the evidence adduced by the tenant. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner/ tenant contended that Commissioner. who visited the shop room on a second occasion. did not give any prior notice to the tenant and hence Commission report does not have the imprimatur provided in Order XXVI Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But. the. Commissioner was examined as a witness and then he deposed that since the tenant declined to open the room during his first visit even in spite of his request. But. the. Commissioner was examined as a witness and then he deposed that since the tenant declined to open the room during his first visit even in spite of his request. he had to go there on the next day and that the tenant did not turn up then and hence the commissioner had to peep through some holes to observe the details. When the landlord examined the Commissioner as a witness. his deposition became evidence. Hence whatever drawback the commission report acquired on account of commissioner's failure to give intimation regarding the second visit. would not render his testimony in court vitiated. Commissioner's testimony in court has to be. considered like any other evidence. of any other witness. As the fact-finding courts placed reliance on his evidence. the revisional court rightly refrained from upsetting the finding. 5. Learned counsel alternatively contended that Rent Control Court went wrong in holding that burden of proof is on the tenant to prove that he was in occupation for some time. The basis for the said contention is the observation made by the Rent Control Court that "in the circumstances the presumption is that the tenant has ceased to occupy the building for fix months continuously without reasonable cause. it is for the tenant to show that it was not unoccupied for six months continuously". But a reading of the entire paragraph in the order (of the Rent Control Court) shows that what the Rent Control Court meant is that the burden of proving reasonable cause for non-occupation of the building is on the tenant. 6. No doubt. a tenant is not liable 10 be evicted on the ground of cessation of occupation unless cessation stretched over at least a period of six months. In other words. even if a tenant did not occupy the building for five months and twentynine days. it would not snowball in to aground of eviction. However. if a landlord succeeds in proving that his tenant did not occupy the building almost near the period fixed in Section 11(4)(v) of the Act it may help the court to presume that there could have been cessation of occupation for the statutory period. Such backward presumption is not an alhematic to the law of evidence. (vide Saleem v. Rajeswary (1990(2) K.L.T. 388). The following observations can be usefully quoted here. Such backward presumption is not an alhematic to the law of evidence. (vide Saleem v. Rajeswary (1990(2) K.L.T. 388). The following observations can be usefully quoted here. "Presumption of fact is usually drawn by court when it has the assurance of its existence of the fact or thing is in issue. prior existence of it. in human experience is inferable from proof of its existence at a particular point of time. in the way as its continued existence for some length of time. But the degree of proximity of this prior existence as well as continuity depends on facts and circumstances of each case". 7. Be that as it may. burden is on the landlord to prove that the tenant ceased to occupy the building for six months. But it is hard to expect a landlord to prove the precise period during which his tenant ceased to occupy the building. However. if the court is satisfied on the evidence and/or with the aid of presumptions that the tenant did not occupy the building for such length of time as would cover the statutory period. then the burden would shift to the tenant to show that he had reasonable cause for such non-occupation. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner/ tenant. relying on the observation made by the Commissioner that some utensils were found in the room. contended that when there is evidence of possession of the tenant. it is sufficient to displace any presumption of non-occupation. even if there is any such presumption. 9. Section 11(4)(v) of the Act uses the expression "ceases to occupy the building". The word "Occupation" has not been defined in the Act though such word had been employed in other places of the Act also. eg:-Section 11(3) of the Act contains the word 'occupation" in relation to the ground of bona fide need of the landlord. S.11(2) of the Act says that when a landlord obtained possession of the building pursuant to an order under sub-section (3) "does not occupy it without reasonable cause ". This would indicate that in the context possession is not precisely the same as occupation. Even if one is in possession of a place or a building. he need not necessary occupy the same. Of course. occupation includes possession as a primary ingredient. for; there can be no occupation without possession. Supreme Court observed in R.P. Mehta v. LA. This would indicate that in the context possession is not precisely the same as occupation. Even if one is in possession of a place or a building. he need not necessary occupy the same. Of course. occupation includes possession as a primary ingredient. for; there can be no occupation without possession. Supreme Court observed in R.P. Mehta v. LA. Sheth (AIR 1964 S.C.1676) that "it is obvious that one cannot occupy unless one is able to possess". But. possession must combine with something more to make it occupation. Legal possession does not by itself constitute occupation. 10. In ascertaining the meaning of the word occupation. it has to be seen in what context the word is being used. For that purpose. the object of the provision can also be looked into. The word "occupation" is of indefinite import and no universal test can be laid down for determining whether an activity amounts to occupation. In R.P.Mehta's case Raghubir Dayal. J. speaking for the bench said that the word occupation when used in Rent Control statutes must be understood in the particular context in which it is used. Looking at the context in S.11(4)(v) of the Act it is doubtless that the word occupation is used to denote the tenant's actual physical use of the building either by himself or through his agents or employees. Hence the tenant cannot upset the presumption of non- occupation by merely pointing out features of his legal possession of the premises. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred me to the decision of a larger bench (five judges) of Allahabad High Court (Ram Man/ Dew v. R.C. & E. Officer 1976 R.C.R.173) where the expression "ceasing to occupy" was understood also as abandoning accommmodation with an intention not to return. The bench in that case was considering the expression used in S.7(1) of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent Eviction Act. 1947. Sub-section (1) contains the words "every landlord shall within seven days after an accommodation becomes vacant by his ceasing to occupy it ". It is evident That the interpretation placed by the larger bench of Allahabad High Court was on an entirely different context. It is not advisable to import the said interpretation in the context of Section 11(4) of the Kerala Act. 12. George Vadakkel. It is evident That the interpretation placed by the larger bench of Allahabad High Court was on an entirely different context. It is not advisable to import the said interpretation in the context of Section 11(4) of the Kerala Act. 12. George Vadakkel. J. has stated in Ananthasubramania Iyer v. Sarada Amma (1978 K.L.T. 338) that under S.11(4)(v) of the Act the tenant removing his physical presence from the building during intermittent periods less than six months in duration will not rouse the presumption of cessation of his occupation and law does not accept the tenant to be under the roof of his rented building all the 24 hours of the day and all the 365 days in the year. He proceeded to observe further thus: "However. his physical absence there from continuously for six months will arouse the presumption that he has ceased to occupy the building and that he has abandoned it. Once this presumption arises. the onus is on the tenant to dislodge the same by establishing his Defector intention to possess it for the purpose for which it is let to him". I am in Respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations which lend support to the scope of the phrase "ceases to occupy" understood by me in the context of the provision. Thus. the contentions urged before me are insufficient to interfere. Accordingly original petition is dismissed.