Judgment :- An anomalous situation has arisen in this Original Petition, which is filed by the tenants/ petitioners against whom art order of eviction has been passed. Tenants have filed this Original Petition in challenge of the order which was confirmed by the Appellate Authority and the revisional court. For the purpose of disposal of this Original Petition, it is unnecessary to mention the grounds on which the order of eviction has been granted. 2. Challenging the order passed by the Rent Control Court, an appeal was preferred by the tenants before the Appellate Authority at a time when appellate powers under S.18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short 'the Act') could have been exercised by the Sub Court. By Exl.P2 judgment, the Sub Court, being the Appellate Authority, allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Rent Control Court. It was on 29-8-1989 that the Sub Court, as Appellate Authority, passed Ext.P2 judgment. But Government issued a notification dated 31-8-1989, which was published in the official gazette on 26-9-1989 conferring the powers of the Appellate Authorities for the purposes of the Act on District Judges, in super session of all previous notifications on the subject. Landlord moved the District Court in revision under S.20 of the Act. On 8-4-1992, the District Court allowed the revision and remanded the case to the Appellate Authority, as per Exl.P3 order. Parties approached the Sub Court on the assumption that the Sub Judge was slil! Hie Appellate Authority. Sub Judge also thought like that and heard the appeal and dismissed the same confirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court. Ext.P4 is the said judgment dated 21-1-91. Tenants challenged Ext.P4 in revision before the District Court. Learned District Judge dismissed the revision by Ext.P5 order. This Original Petition is in challenge of the original order passed by the Rent Control Court as well as Exts.P3, P4 and P5. 3. The first and main point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that after remand, Sub Court should not havcaclcd as the Appellate Authority under the Act, since the Sub Court was denuded of its jurisdiction through the notification published on 26-9-1989. 3. The first and main point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that after remand, Sub Court should not havcaclcd as the Appellate Authority under the Act, since the Sub Court was denuded of its jurisdiction through the notification published on 26-9-1989. But a decision of the learned single judge of this Court reported in Chandramathi v. District Judge (1991 (1) KLT 84) has been cited wherein it is pointed out that when the revisional court remands the case to the Appellate Authority the appellate powers could be exercised by the Sub Court notwithstanding the notification dated 26-9-89. If I have to go by the single judge's decision, I have to hold that Ext.P4 judgment was passed by an authority having jurisdiction in the matter. 4. However, both sides conceded before me that subsequent to 26-9-1989 the Sub Court has no appellate powers under S.18 of the Act. I doubt whether the concession made by both sides in a case would be sufficient to denude a court of its jurisdiction or to clothe another court with jurisdiction. Be that as it may, the decision in Chandramathi v. District Judge (1991 (1) KLT 84) runs totally counter to the principle laid down by a Division Bench in Vasu v. Pathooty Umrna (1990 (1) KLT 670). The Division Bench considered in extenso the implication of the notification published in the gazette on 26-9-1989. What the Division Bench has held can be extracted be Fow: "Where at any point of time, jurisdiction of appellate court is altered, the litigant who had approached the trial court earlier may have a right of appeal to the appellate court as per the law existing at the time of institution of suit, unless there is a specific provision to the contrary in the new law or amendment or a contrary implication necessarily arises. This principle cannot apply to a case like the present one which does not deal with jurisdiction of appellate court in the existing hierarchy of the courts, but deals with powers of officers on which specific appellate power is conferred as persona designata by a notification under S.18 of the Act. It is open to the Government to take away that power. It is open to the Government to take away that power. Once that power is taken away, the officer, though he does not cease to be a judge presiding over the Subordinate Judge's Court, ceases to be appellate authority for the purpose of S.18 of the Act. Thereby he loses his jurisdiction, competency and power to function as appellate authority. As long as the notification dated 31-8-89 stands, Subordinate Judge cannot be asked to hear and dispose of an appeal filed before him at a time when he had the power of appellate authority; nor can he entertain any appeal against an order passed by Rent Controller in a petition filed before 31-8-89. If the Subordinate Judge proceeds to entertain or dispose of such an appeal after he is denied of the power of appellate authority by virtue of the notification dated 31-8-1989 he will be doing an act without authority." (emphasis supplied) 5. In view of the explicit and unambiguous finding entered by the Division bench regarding the authority of the Sub Court to deal with an appeal after the publication of the notification, there is no scope for doubting that the Sub Judge had no powers to deal with the appeal notwithstanding the fact that the appeal reached him through a remand order. 6. Then the question is whether there is any need to refer this case to a Division Bench in view of the decision in Chandramathi's case. Learned counsel for the landlord submitted that a reference to a larger Bench may be avoided as he unreservedly concedes to the contention raised by the learned counsel for the tenant (petitioner) that the ratio in Chandramathi s case is irretrievably inconsistent with the principle clearly laid down by the Division Bench in Vasu v. Pathooty Umma (1990 (1) KLT 670). The plea of landlord's counsel is also for the purpose of saving time which a reference to the Division Bench may involve. Over and above the aforesaid concession made at the Bar, I too feel that a reference to Division Bench is not necessary, since the Division Bench has once spoken about the principle in clear terms. In the result, I quash Ext.P4 judgment as well as Ext.P5 order. I direct the District Court, Thalassery, to take up the appeal and dispose i I of afresh. In the result, I quash Ext.P4 judgment as well as Ext.P5 order. I direct the District Court, Thalassery, to take up the appeal and dispose i I of afresh. It is only proper to direct that presiding officers who rendered Exts.P2 and P4 judgments shall avoid to hear this appeal again. I further direct that the appeal shall be disposed of within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Original Petition is disposed of in the above terms. A photocopy of this judgment will be sent to the District Court, Thalassery, forthwith.