Judgment :- Varghese Kalliath, J. These kinds of cases are rare. Appellants before us are the mahouts of an elephant by name Sectharaman. The animal belongs to Cochin Devaswom Board. On 29-5-1986, at about 7-30 a.m., the wife of the first plaintiff late Rajeswari Thampuran, the mother of the other plaintiffs who was a devotee of Sri Poornathrayeesa Temple, Tripunithura, went to the temple to offer prayers. She entered the temple from the western gopuram of the temple. While returning from the temple, she saw the elephant standing on the northern side of the Dcepasthambam. She asked defendants 2 and 3 - appellants before us - whether she could proceed further. The mahouts made affirmative gesture and so she moved. The elephant suddenly approached her violently, knocked down and thrust its tusk in her body on the right side of her abdomen. It caused fatal and severe injuries on her. She was taken to the hospital where she succumbed to the injury. 2. Admittedly, the elephant belongs to the first defendant Devaswom and c'cl jndants 2 and 3 are the mahouts. The mahouts are keeping the elephant and they are the immediate keepers of the animal-elephant - while Devaswom the owner of the elephant is the mediate keeper of the animal. 3. Though several contentions have been raised by defendants, the court below repelled all these con ten lions and found that both the Devaswom and the mahouts of the elephant are jointly and severally liable to pay damages. The court below assessed the dumaics on the evidence placed before it and found that the reasonable compensation under the circumstances of the case can be put at Rs.One Lakh. As such, a decree making the defendants jointly and severally liable to pay an amount of Rs.One Lakh was passed. 4. The first defendant-Devaswom has not filed an appeal. Defendants 2 and 3 one have filed this appeal. They have no serious contention regarding the facts which led to the tragic death of the wife of the first plaintiff, the mother of other plaintiffs, and also the reasonableness of the quantum of compensation determined by the court below. Perhaps, considering the entire facts and circumstances, the first defendant thought that the decree passed by the court below is unassailable and so, being a public body, the Devaswom did not file an appeal. Perhaps, considering the entire facts and circumstances, the first defendant thought that the decree passed by the court below is unassailable and so, being a public body, the Devaswom did not file an appeal. In these circumstances, the only question that remains to be considered by this court is as to the liability of defendants 2 and 3 - the appellants before us. The appellants also did not question the reasonableness of the quantum of compensation. 5. As regards the question of general liability, the English Law is well settled. The English Law has been adopted and applied by the High Court of Madras as well as by the High Court of Travancore. In 1LR 35 Mad. 708 (Vedapiiratti v. Koppan Nair), a Division Bench of the Madras High Court considered the extent of liability for damages done by an elephant. In this decision, the court found Hit the elephant belongs to that class of animals included in ferae nature (dangerous class of animals ). It is staled in the judgment that it can be laid down as a rule of law that in India elephant belongs to a dangerous class of animals. 6. Under the English Law, the keeper of an animal is strictly liable, independently of negligence, for damage done by the animal if (a) the animal was ferae naturae (i.e. belonged to a dangerous species) (b) the animal was mansuetae naturae (i.e. did not belong to a dangerous species) and he knew of its vicious characteristics. This principle has been adopted as the law that has to be followed in India also. A dangerous species is defined as a species which is not commonly domesticated in the British Islands and whose fully grown animals normally have such characteristic that they are likely, unless restrained, to cause severe damage or that any damage they may cause is likely to be severe. In Halsbury'sLawsof England, Vol.1, page 377, it is noted That nothing can be more natural to an elephant at large than to trespass on a sugar cane plantation and eat the sugar cane. 7. In Halsbury'sLawsof England, Vol.1, page 377, it is noted That nothing can be more natural to an elephant at large than to trespass on a sugar cane plantation and eat the sugar cane. 7. In Filburn v. People's Palace and Aquarium Company (1890) 25 Q.B.D, 258, Lord Esher, M.R. has laid down the law as follows: "The I^iw of England recognises two distinct classes of animals; and as to one of those classes, it cannot be doubted that a person who keeps an animal belonging to that class must prevent it from doing injury, and it is immaterial whether he knows it to be dangerous or not. As to another class, the law assumes that animals belonging to it are not of a dangerous nature, and anyone who keeps an animal of this kind is not liable for the damage it may do, unless he knew it was dangerous." 8. We need not go into such questions elaborately in this case, since in ILR 35 Mad. 708, it has been said very clearly that elephant belongs to that class of animals which is grouped as dangerous class of animals. Further, it has been held in that case that the liability of a person for any harm done by his animal independently of any intent or negligence on his part does not depend on the manner or extent to which such animals are employed, but upon the nature of the class to which such animal belongs or the particular kind of mischief committed. The learned judges have quoted the decision of Lord Eshcr M.R. and also other English decisions to support their conclusions. 9. The court below also has referred to those decisions and came to the right conclusion that the defendants are liable to pay damages to the plaintiffs for the great tragedy caused to the plaintiffs by the loss of life of late Rajeswari Thampuran a loving wife to the 1st plaintiff and an affectionate mother to the other plaintiffs, in an horrendous circumstance by the attack of a ferocious animal kepi by the defendants. As we said earlier, there is no dispute at all as regards the quantum of damages. The appellants submitted that their appeal confines to their liability. In ILR 35 Mad. As we said earlier, there is no dispute at all as regards the quantum of damages. The appellants submitted that their appeal confines to their liability. In ILR 35 Mad. 708, it has been said very clearly that owner as well as the person in possession of the animal, which according to us means the person who is in custody or immediate possession of the animal, is liable to pay compensation to the victims. The Madras High Court when said that the owner as well as the person in possession, it has to be understood that the person in possession is the person who has got immediate control over the animal at the time when the mischief took place. In this respect, we have no hesitation to hold that the defendants are also liable to pay compensation. 10. The question whether the first defendant Devaswom is entitled to recover the amount to which they are made liable by the decree from the other defendants (appellants herein) is a question which cannot be considered in this appeal. But, in the circumstances, while we confirm the decree we feel that it is only just and proper that we should give a direction that the plaintiffs must first seek execution against the Devaswom and if they fail to recover from the Devaswom then alone they need resort execution against defendants 2 and 3 - appellants herein. With this observation, appeal is dismissed. No costs.