JUDGMENT P. P. Naolckar, J. --1. Plaintiff/appellant filed a suit for ejectment of the respondent from House No.526 Kabirdas Ward Chhindwara on the allegations that suit premises was let out to Munnalal about 20 years back, and after his death the respondent have become tenants of the premises on the monthly rent of Rs.20/-. It is alleged that the suit accommodation is used for residential and non-residential purposes. The respondents have also opened a shop manufacturing Ice Candi. That the accommodation is required for residence and for opening a shop of her son San jay Kumar, who is residing in a tenanted house and carrying on his business from a shop taken on lease. The landiady does not have any other suitable accommodation in the city of Chhindwara for the purpose, the ejectment is sought for. 2. The respondents denied the need as alleged in the plaint. It is alleged that suit accommodation is used for residential purpose of the respondents only and not for non-residential purpose. The House No. 526 has also Northern and Southern block on the ground no or and a block on the first floor having 10 room accommodation; it is further alleged that need of the landlady is not genuine and bona fide. Time and again the plaintiff was trying to displace and eject the defendants from suit premises and made repeated attempts, more than 6 times, on various grounds since the year 1967-68, and having filed, the present proceeding is one more attempt in that direction. Occupation of plaintiff's son in residential and non-residential occupation as tenant is denied. 3. Trial Court recorded the finding that suit accommodation was given on rent for composite purpose of residence and non-residence, that although the need of the plaintiff for residential purpose is not proved, but bona fide need for business purpose is proved and the plaintiff does not have reasonably suitable accommodation for the purpose in city of Chhindwara, on the above findings, a decree for ejectment was granted under section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the Act). 4. 4. Judgment of the trial Court was set aside by the appeal Court on the grounds that accommodation was not let out for composite purpose of residence and business but was given on rent only for residential purpose, the plaintiff has failed to prove residential as well as need for business purpose, and consequently dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 5. The finding recorded by the trial Court and then appeal Court assumed importance in the light of question of law framed by the Court and the arguments advanced by the parties on that basis. The question of law framed by the Court is: "Whether the lower appellate Court was right in reversing the finding of facts arrived at by a trial Court in relation to the bona fide need of the appellant for the suit accommodation." 6. "Both the Courts below are of the unanimous opinion regarding the finding of bona fide need of residence under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act. According to the Courts below, the landlord does not require the suit accommodation for his residence. However, the trial Court was of the view that the landlord needs the accommodation for business purpose, which is proved. The said finding was reversed by the lower appellate Court and it is held that the bona fide need for the landlord for business is not established. Thus, there is a reversal of the finding of fact of bona fide need of landlord for business. The question of law, as it is framed, it is open for this Court to consider only, whether the need of the landlord is genuine for business purpose and if so whether a decree could be passed under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. 7. The scheme of the Act as it is, is to the affect, that on the grounds mentioned in section 12 only, the landlord is entitled for the eviction of a tenant from the premises let out to him, Section 12 (1)(e) provides that the accommodation let for residential purposes if required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any members of his family, then the landlord is entitled to have a decree under that section. It is clear that to get a decree under section 12 (1)(e) of the Act, the accommodation let out should be for residential purpose. It is clear that to get a decree under section 12 (1)(e) of the Act, the accommodation let out should be for residential purpose. Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act reads as under :- 12 (1)(f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughter if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. From a bare reading of section 12 (1)(f) of the Act it is clear that the accommodation let out for non-residential purposes could be vacated by the landlord for continuing or starting his business, i.e. for a non-residential purpose. Therefore, to obtain a decree under section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, it is necessary that the accommodation let out should have been for business purpose and the tenant was inducted for that purpose only. There is another aspect, as held by a Division Bench of this Court in Jagjit Kumar v. Jageeshchandra-1 : 1. 1982JLJ 319 = AIR 1982MP 144. It is thus clear that even though it is established that a landlord requires a part of an accommodation let out and that the requirement is for the purpose for which the accommodation was let out, a landlord becomes entitled to seek evolution from the entire accommodation provided the other conditions specified in Cl. (e) or (f) of section 12 (1) of the Act are satisfied. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, it emerges that when a landlord has made out a case for eviction from a part of the premises let out, a decree for eviction from the extra premises can be passed. Our answer to the question referred to us is that in the case of a composite tenancy, if it is established that the landlord required the non-residential part of the accommodation or residential part of the accommodation, a decree for eviction of the tenant from the entire premises can be passed." 8. Our answer to the question referred to us is that in the case of a composite tenancy, if it is established that the landlord required the non-residential part of the accommodation or residential part of the accommodation, a decree for eviction of the tenant from the entire premises can be passed." 8. In view of the aforesaid decision it is also possible for a landlord to get the accommodation vacated, if it is let out for a composite, i.e. for business and residence, if the need is proved for composite purpose and also for partial residential or non-residential need, the landlord is entitled to get a decree for eviction of the tenant from the entire premises. 9. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it is necessary for landlord, to get a decree under section 12(1)(f) of the Act to prove that the accommodation in question was let out for non-residential purposes or for a composite purpose, i.e for residential and non-residential. The lower appellate Court has arrived at a finding that the accommodation let out was not for business purposes or for composite purposes but for residential purposes. In view of this specific finding arrived at by the lower appellate Court and in the absence of the question of law framed by this Court as to the nature of accommodation let out, whether any useful purpose would be served in deciding the question of law as framed by this Court because the question of law so framed should be a substantial question of law which effectively decides the case one way or the other. The Supreme Court laid down the test for determining as to what is the substantial question of law in Sir Chunilal v. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. The Centrury Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd-2., and it has been held that the proper test would be whether the question of law "is of general public importance or whether .it directly or substantially affects the rights of the parties, and if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Councilor by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views." 2. AIR 1962 SC 1314 . 10. Section 100 C.P.C. was amended by Amanding Act No. 104 of 1976. AIR 1962 SC 1314 . 10. Section 100 C.P.C. was amended by Amanding Act No. 104 of 1976. The object and reasons for the introduction of the new section are as under Section 100 of the Code provides that a second appeal may lie to the High Court from a decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court on any of the following grounds namely-. (a) The decision being contrary to law or some usage having the force of the law. (b) The decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the "force of law; and (c) A substantial error or defect in procedure provided by the Code or any other law for the time being in force, which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 100 are very wide in effect and clauses (b) and (c) have led to plethora of conflicting judgments. In dealing with second appeals, the Court have devised and successfully adopted, several concepts such as, a mixed question of fact and law, a legal inference to be drawn from facts proved, and even the point that the case has not been properly approached by the Courts below. This has created confusion in the minds of the public as to the legitimate scope of second appeal under S. 100 and has burdened the High Courts with an unnecessarily large number of second appeals. Section 100 is, therefore, being amended to provide that the right of second appeal should be confined to cases where a question of law is involved and such question of law is a substantial one." 11. The grounds specified in section 100 might be changed from time to time by the legislature, having regard to the legislative policy relating to the second appeals. It will be pertinent to note that the aims and objects make it apparently clear that section 100 has been made very stringent. By virtue of the amendment introduced in section 100, the High Court's jurisdiction is restricted only to a consideration of a question of law framed. A further right has been conferred on the respondent to show that no such question has arisen in the case. By virtue of the amendment introduced in section 100, the High Court's jurisdiction is restricted only to a consideration of a question of law framed. A further right has been conferred on the respondent to show that no such question has arisen in the case. Sub-section (3) of section 100 C.P.C. requires that in an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and under sub-section (4) the High Court, if it is satisfied, that a substantial question of law is involved in the case, shall formulate that question and thereafter the appeal shall be heard on the question of law so formulated. No doubt, the proviso to sub-section (5) gives power to the Court to hear an appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, if the High Court is satisfied that such a substantial question is involved. But before doing so, the High Court is required to record reasons for permitting the appellant to argue on such questions which have not been formulated by the Court at the time of admission of the appeal. Proviso to sub-section (5) of section 100 is an exception to the general rule and before the proviso could come into operation, it must be established that the questions of law sought to be raised are capable of being raised as substantial question of law. It is only in rare cases, where substantial question of law is patent on the face of the record and grave injustice is likely to be caused because of the Court's failure to formulate such question at the sk1ge of admission, then only this proviso can be resorted to. 12. Taking recourse to the proviso to sub-section (5) of section 100, an application has been moved by the appellant in this Court raising additional Substantial questions of law whereby the appellant wants to challenge the finding arrived at by the lower appellate Court in respect of the composite nature of the accommodation let out and for grant of a decree on composite need. It would be pertinent to note that no such question was framed in the memorandum of appeal filed by the appellant on 28.2.1989 nor was pressed before the Court at the time of admission, apart from this the question sought to be framed by this Court is a mixed question of fact and law and by itself is not a substantial question of law. The application filed by the appellant under proviso to sub-section (5) of section 100 C.P.C for framing of additional substantial question of law is, therefore, dismissed. 13. In the absence of a substantial question of law framed challenging the finding of the lower appellate Court that the accommodation was let out for residential purpose, and not for composite purpose, the question of law as it is framed, does not require any determination because the business need of the landlord cannot be considered for a accommodation, which was let out for residential purposes. 14. For the reasons recorded above, the appeal is devoid of any merit and it is dismissed with costs. Counsel fee as per schedule, if certified.