JUDGMENT S. B. Sinha, J. This writ application is directed against the office order contained in Memo. No. 1898 dated 20.8.1992 whereby in terms of a decision held in the meeting dated 22nd June of 1992, the services of the 'petitioner had been terminated. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 3. The petitioner was engaged as a IVth grade employee on daily wages in March, 1983. He, thereafter was appointed on a temporary basis as a peon by the District Education Officer, Patna in terms of Memo No. 865 dated 7.4.1990 and was posted in Fauzdar Singh High School, Athmalgola. 4. The petitioner was later on deputed to the office of the District Education Officer, Patna. He thereafter was transferred to a Nationalised High school situated at Paliganj in the district of Patna. He was again deputed to the office of the District Education Officer, Patna. 5. By reason of the impugned order dated 20th August 1992 the service of the petitioner had been terminated pursuant to the decision taken in the meeting of the officers of the Education Department held on 22nd of June, 1992. The said order is contained in Annexure-6 to the writ application. 6. According to the petitioner, he having been appointed on a regular has is, Clause 3 of t he minutes of the meeting as contained in AnIlcxure-3 thereto has no application in his case. 7. Mr. Ganesh Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the procedures laid down in the circulars issued by the Personnel and Administrative Department cannot have any application whatsoever and in any event as the petitioner had been working on daily wages since 1983, the petitioner's services have to be regularised. From a persual of the offer of appointment issued lot he petitioner by reason of Memo No. 864 dated 6.4.1990 as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ application, it appears that the petitioner was appointed on a temporary basis by the District Education Officer in Fauzdar Singh High School Athmalgola. 8. The petitioner was, therefore, evidently appointed in Nationalised High School by the District Education Officer. It is also evident that prior to the said appointment, neither any advertisement was issued nor the employment exchange was notified. Further as would be noticed here-in-before, even the provisions of statutory rules were not followed. 9. 8. The petitioner was, therefore, evidently appointed in Nationalised High School by the District Education Officer. It is also evident that prior to the said appointment, neither any advertisement was issued nor the employment exchange was notified. Further as would be noticed here-in-before, even the provisions of statutory rules were not followed. 9. The State of Bihar in exercise of its power conferred upon it under the Bihar Non-Government Secondary School (Taking Over of Management and Control) Act has framed rules known as Bihar Nationalised Secondary School (Service conditions) Rules, 1983. The said 1983 rules were amended in the year 1988. The aforementioned 1983 rules inter alia provide for the procedure of appointment of teaching and non-teaching stall in the nationalised schools. 10. The vires of the said 1983 Rules was considered by a Full Bench of this court in Ram Odar Jha vs. the State of Bihar reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 722 and it has been held therein that the said rules are intra-vires. Mr. Cianesh Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has relied upon an unreported decision of this court in Madan Giri and others vs. Union of India and others in CWJC No.2870 of 1980 Disposed of on 3rd January, 1981 and a recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others vs. Piara Singh and others reported in JT 1992 (5) S.C. 179. The learned counsel further submitted that in any event in the facts and circumstances of the case the principles of natural justice have to be complied with. 11. The appointment of the petitioner thus being governed by the statutory rules, the provisions thereof could not have been totally ignored by the authorities of the State of Bihar in the mailer of his appointment. 12. In terms of the aforementioned Rules, appointment to a Class IV posts has to be made by a Committee as is evident from Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 8 thereof. The said rules further provide that while making appointment of Class IV employees, the procedures laid down in circular latter No. 1466 dated :3.11.1980 issued by the Personnel and Administrative Department in the matter of appointment has to be followed, in terms whereor inter alia a panel has to be prepared at the district level upon following the procedures laid down therein. The appointing authority in terms of the aforementioned Rules is the Headmaster of the concerned School and not the District Education officer. There cannot therefore be any doubt that the petitioner's appointment being wholly illegal, he did not derive any legal right to continue in the said posts. 13. In Madan Giri's case (Supra) a division Bench or this court observed : "I must point out that an order or cancellation stands on a footing different from that of an order or termination or service. And, it is well setted that if an order of appointment is cancelled on the ground that the appointment was irregular, the principles of natural justice have to be complied with by giving the persons, whose appointment is being cancelled, an opportunity or showing cause against the said order." 14. Evidently, therefore, in that case the appointment or the petitioner thereof was sought to be cancelled on the ground that the same was irregular. However, In this case, as noticed here-in-before, the appointment or the petitioner is not only illegal but the same is a nullity having been made in violation or the provisions or the statutory rules and by a person who had no jurisdiction in this regard. 15. In Raj Kishore Kumar Sinha vs. State of Bihar reported in 1992 (2) PLJR 625 upon which also a strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Singh, the Full Bench did not decide any question whatsoever. No reasons has also been assigned by Full Bench nor did it consider the effect of various other Supreme Court decisions. In that case the Full Bench itself held: "It is not necessary for us to go into the larger issue as to whether the principle of natural justice would apply where the initial appointment has been made in violation of Article 16 of the Constitution of India for the simple reason that in the present upto now there has been no formal order of termination of service." 16. it is relevant to note that recently S.N. Jha, J, speaking for the division bench in Teja Prasad vs. Sate of Bihar reported in 1992 (2) PLJR 568 has held that the principles of natural justice arc not required to be complied wit h when the appointment had been made in violation of the provisions or the statute, although His Lordship was a party to the Full Bench in Rajkishore Sinha's case. 17. In M.L. Gupta vs. Instrumentation Ltd and ors. reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 137 upon taking into consideration various decision or the Supreme Court and this court it has been held : "Article 16 or the Constitution of India provides that all citizens or India are entitled to get equal opportunity for the puropose of obtaining employment in State Service. In order to fulfill such a condition, it is necessary to consider the case of all citizens who arc eligible to be appointed. For that purpose, it is not only necessary to call for the names from the Employment Exchange, but the same in some cases also requires due advertisement of posts in newspapers by notifying the vacancies and the requisite qualifications therefor so that all eligible candidates may apply for their appointment in the said posts. It was further observed : "From the decisions or the Supreme Court as also or this court, as referred to hereinbefore, it will thus be evident that any appointment which was made be a person having no authority to do so or the appointments which have been made without following the mandatory provisions of the Recruitment Rules and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, such appointment should be held to be a nullity. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, this court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot direct regularisation of the services of the employees when the same would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution." 18. The principle of natural justice as is well known is based upon two basic principles viz. Audi Alteram Partem and Nemo Debito Esses Judex in Propriea Causa.. The principles of natural justice have been developed by the apex court from time to time adding new concepts therein. The principle of natural justice as is well known is based upon two basic principles viz. Audi Alteram Partem and Nemo Debito Esses Judex in Propriea Causa.. The principles of natural justice have been developed by the apex court from time to time adding new concepts therein. In some decisions the Apex court has gone to the extent of holding that the principles of natural justice are embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 19. In Union of India vs. Tulsi Ram Patel, reported in AIR 1985 S.C. 1416 , the Supreme Court of India held "Principles of natural justice are not creation of Articles 14 of the Constitution of India but merely they are constitutional guardian. The principles of natural justice can be traced their ancestry to ancient civilizations and long past history." 20. The Supreme Court in that case traced the history or the principles of natural justice in paragraph 72 to 80 of the judgment and thereafter, discussed various principles involved therein in paragraphs 81 to 83 thereof. The Supreme Court held: "The principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognised as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this court to the concept of equality which is the subject mailer of that Article." Shortly; put the syallogism runs thus: violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination, where discrimination is the result of State action, it is a violalion of Article 14. Article 14 however is not the sole repository of the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or State action violating them will be struck down. The principles of natural justice, however apply not only to legislation and State action but also where any tribunal, authority or body of men, not coming within the definition of "State" in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case, the principle of natural justice required that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially." 21. In Tulsi Ram Patel's case (Supra) the Supreme Court thereafter held that a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication may exclude application of the principle of natural justice. In such a case, the principle of natural justice required that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially." 21. In Tulsi Ram Patel's case (Supra) the Supreme Court thereafter held that a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication may exclude application of the principle of natural justice. The Supreme Court therefore, concluded that the principle of natural justice not only can be modified but also it can be excluded. 22. In Union of India vs. J.N. Sinha reported in AIR 1971 S.C. 40 it has been held: "But if on the other hand, a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the rules of principle of natural justice then t he court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred, and the effect of exercise of that power." 23. Reference in t his connection may also he made to R.S. Has versus Union of India reported in AIR 1987 S.C. 593 . 24. Further, it is well known that there are certain exceptions to the principles of natural justice. In case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education vs. K. S. Gandhi and others reported in 1991 (2) S.C.C. 716 it has been held: "From this perspective, the question is whether omission to record reasons vitiates the impugned order or is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The omnipresence and omniscience (SIC) of the principles of natural justice acts as deterrance to arrive at arbitrary decision in flagrant infraction of fair play. But the applicability of the principles of natural justice is not a rule of thumb or a strait-jacket formula as an abstract proposition of law. It depends on the facts of the case, nature of the inquiry and the effect of the order decision on the rights of the person and attendant circumstances." 25. In National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences VS. It depends on the facts of the case, nature of the inquiry and the effect of the order decision on the rights of the person and attendant circumstances." 25. In National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences VS. K. K. Raman reported in 1992 S.C. 1860 it has been held that for selection or non--selection of a person in absence of a statutory requirement, the authority is under no legal obligation to record reason in support of its decision and even the principles of natural justice have no application in such a case. 26. The Supreme Court in the case Dr. Suresh Chandra Verma and others versus The Chancellor, Nagpur University and others reported in 1990 (4) S.C.C. 55 held as follows: "When, therefore, the services of the appellants are to be terminated in 'view of the change in the position of law and not on account of the demerits of mis-demeanour of individual candidates, it is not necessary to hear the individual as before their services arc terminated. The rule or audi alteram partem docs not apply in such cases and, therefore, there is no breach of the principles of natural justice. In the result, we are of the view that there is no merit in this case. The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs." 27. II is, therefore dear that in a case where the services of the employee is terminated owing to any mis-demeanour on his part or his demerits, the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. 28. Recently, the Supreme court in Raikuntlm Nath Das and another versus Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and another reported in 1992 (2) S.C.C. 299 has held that before passing the order of compulsory retirement principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with nor even adverse remarks against the concerned employee arc required to be communicated. The Supreme Court held : "Before parting with the case, we must refer to an agrument urged by Sri R.K. Garg. He stressed what is called, the new concept of Article 14 as adumbrated in Maneka Gandhi and submitted on that any and every arbitrary action is open to judicial scrutiny. The general principle evolved in the said decision is not in issue here. He stressed what is called, the new concept of Article 14 as adumbrated in Maneka Gandhi and submitted on that any and every arbitrary action is open to judicial scrutiny. The general principle evolved in the said decision is not in issue here. We are concerned mainly with the question whether a facet of principle of natural justice audi alteram partem is attracted in the case of compulsory retirement. In other words the question is whether acting upon undisclosed material is a ground for quashing the order of compulsory retirement. Since we have held that the nature of the function is not quasi-judicial in nature and because the action has to be taken on the subjective satisfaction of the Government, there is no room for importing the said facts of natural justice in such a case, more particularly when an order of compulsory retirement, is not a punishment nor does it involve any stigma." 29. In Bijay Bharti vs. State of Bihar reported in 1983 PLJR 530 a Full Bench of this court held : "Before considering the argument that the right of some of the petitioners to future appointment has been affected, it would be proper to consider as to what is the effect of saying that the appointment is irregular. Reference in this connection may be made to two cases decided by Mathew J, as a Judge of the Kerala High Court, the first case is that of P. Unnikrishna V. State of Kerala (15). There on facts it was found that the petitioner was ineligible for being appointed to the service. The impugned order was, therefore, held to mean that it was a termination of an appointment which was itself void. In O.P. No. 973 of 1968 the same learned Judge pointed out the order in question only declared that the petitioner was not validly appointed to the post and that he should be reverted. The learned Judge observed: "It was not an order cancelling a valid or even a voidable order; it was merely a declaration that there has been no appointment of the petitioner to the post. In the circumstances I do not think that natural justice required that the petitioner should have been given an opportunity of being heard by the 1st to the 2nd respondent. In the circumstances I do not think that natural justice required that the petitioner should have been given an opportunity of being heard by the 1st to the 2nd respondent. I also do not think that in the circumstances there was any manifest injustice so that interference under Article 260 required." In U. P. Junior Doctors Action Committee vs. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani and others reported in 1991 S.C 909 : 1992 (2) PLJR 16(SC), it has been held that principle of natural justice arc not required to be complied with in a case where a candidate had secured admission on the basis of forged certificate. 30. It has further been held by the Supreme Court that natural justice should be viewed in circumstantial flexibility ( 1991 (4) S.C.C. 584 . It is also well known that the principle of natural justice need not be complied with when it would result in futility. It is also a settled law that an appointment made in violation of Article 16 of the Constitution of India or made by a person having no jurisdiction would be a nullity. 31. The Supreme Court in a recent decision in Ex. Capt. K. Balasubraminian & other's versus State of Tamil Nadu and another reported in 1991 (2) S.C.C. 708 has held ." ... This High Court has, in our opinion rightly held that the direction contained in orders dated 16th June, 1976 and June, 15, 1977 were invalid being contrary to the provisions contained in rule 35 of the General Rules. Since the said orders were invalid the petitioner would not claim any right on the basis of said orders and therefore, no question of affording them an opportunity of hearing before passing the order dated 3rd March, 1980." 32. In Ram Krishna Verma vs. State of U.P. reported in 1992 (2) S.C.C. 620 , it has been held that a party would not be entitled to his right of natural justice if undue advantage is obtained by protracting a proceeding somehow and nullifying the objective. 33. In Ram Krishna Verma vs. State of U.P. reported in 1992 (2) S.C.C. 620 , it has been held that a party would not be entitled to his right of natural justice if undue advantage is obtained by protracting a proceeding somehow and nullifying the objective. 33. In S. L. Kapoor versus Jagmohan and others ( AIR 1981 S.C. 136 ) it has been held that although non-observance of the principles of natural justice is itself prejudicial but in that case also it has been observed : "Linked with this question is the question whether the failure to observe natural justice does at all matter if the observance of natural justice would have made no difference, the admitted or indisputable facts speaking for themselves. Where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it approved the non-observance of natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs." 34. There is another aspect of the matter which also requires consideration. The issuance of writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy. The court may not issue a writ only because it is lawful to do so. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction quashing the illegal order, if it is found that thereby another illegal order shall revive. In such an event, the court may also quash both the orders. 35 In Pramod Kumar & others versus the State of Bihar & other ( 1988 PLJR 923 ) it has been held as follows : "It is now settled by the various decisions of this court and the Supreme court of India that issuance of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy. In this conection reference may be made to the case of Gudde Yenkateshwara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others (AIR 1966 SC 628) Abdul Majid and others v. The Stale Transport Appellate Authority, Bihar and others (AIR 1960 Patna 333); Devendra Pd. Gupta v. The State of Bihar and others 1977 BBCJ 543 : 1977 PUR 576); Hari Prasad Mandal v. Additional Collector ( 1978 BBCJ 575 : 1978 PLJR 136); Banwari Lal Newatia v. Under Secy. to Govt. Gupta v. The State of Bihar and others 1977 BBCJ 543 : 1977 PUR 576); Hari Prasad Mandal v. Additional Collector ( 1978 BBCJ 575 : 1978 PLJR 136); Banwari Lal Newatia v. Under Secy. to Govt. of India and others (1982 BLT 311) and 1988 (I) S.C.C. page 40. The aforementioned decisions are authorities for the proposition that writ jurisdiction of a High Court only provides for discretionary remedy and it would not he exercised for quashing an order which might give rise Lo another illegal order if substantial justice has been done to the parties. In this connection, reference may he made to recent decision of mine in the case of Jal Bharat Co. v. Central Coal Fields Ltd. reported in 1988 BLT (rep) at page In wherein it was held that a High Court would he justified in a given case to refuse to interfere with illegal order if it is inequitable so to do or if the same would he against public interest." 36. In my opinion, therefore, there cannot be any doubt that if the orders of promotion arc illegal being violative of Article 16 of the Constitution of India and/or the Recruitment Rules framed under a statute or Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the principles of natural justice need not he complied with inasmuch as in such an event the concerned employee had not derived any right to hold or continue in the said post. However, before doing so the foundational facts have to be found at by the Competent Authority. Reference in this connect ion may he made to Satyendra Prasad versus State of Bihar 1991 (2) PLJR 460 , Kamal Kumar Sinha versus Indira Gandhi Institute of Medical Sciences and others 1900 (2) PLJR 465), M. L. Gupta versus Instrumentality ( 1992 (1) PLJR 137 ), Union of India and ors. versus Tejram Parashramji Bombhate ( AIR 1992 S.C. 570 ). 37. In the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner it appears that neither any reason has been assigned nor there is any discussion about the points at issue. If is also well known that a decision is not an authority on the point which was not convassed at the Bar. See Good Year Ltd. versus State of Harayana reported in 1990 (2) S.C.C. 71 . 38. If is also well known that a decision is not an authority on the point which was not convassed at the Bar. See Good Year Ltd. versus State of Harayana reported in 1990 (2) S.C.C. 71 . 38. Yet recently the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others versus Surinder Kumar and others reported in 1992 (1) S.C.C. 489 held as follows : ''A decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law. The respondents are, therefore not entitled to rely upon an order of this court which directs a temporary employee to be regularised in his service without assigning reasons." 39. The question which now arises for consideration in this application is as to whether the services of the petitioner could have been regularized. The learned counsel in this connection has relied upon a recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and other etc. vs. Piara Singh and other reported in .JT 1992 (5) S.C. 179. 40. In M. L. Gupta's case (Supra) I had the occasion to extensively deal with various decisions of the Supreme Court of India as also of this court. In that case it was noticed that the Supreme Court in its recent decisions did not take into consideration its earlier decisions which were binding upon it. It was held: "Unfortunately, however in none of the aforementioned cases, the Supreme Court considered its earlier binding precedents on the quest inn of manner of regularization, that is Stale of Mysore vs. S.V. Narayanappa, (1967) 1 SCR 128 and R. N. Nanjudappa vs. T. Thimmiah reported in (1972) 2 SCR 799 . The aforementioned judgments of the Supreme Court was followed by a three Judge bench of the Supreme Court in B. N. Nagarjan and others vs. Stale of Karnataka reported in AIR 1979 S.C. 1676 . In R. N. Nanjudappa (supra), the Supreme Court held that if an appointment is made in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, such appointments being illegal, the same cannot be regularised. It was further held that ratification or regularisation is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been some- non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. It was further held that ratification or regularisation is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been some- non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. It held : Regularisation cannot he said to be a mode of' recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would he to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules." (Underlining is mine for emphasis) The Supreme Court in that case negatived the contention that regularisation in employment is possible by taking recourse to Article 162 of the Constitution of India in the following words: "In the present case, the contention on behalf of the respondents that the regularisation was itself a mode of appointment under Article 162 of the Constitution is unsound. The Rules came into existence in the present case in 1964. The regularisation was made with effect from 1958. Therefore:, the Rules became applicable. The regularisation in the: present ease was also had because even without specific methods of recruitment appointments could he made only by selection or promotion or transfer from equivalent grade. The method of recruitment and qualification for each State Civil Service was to be set forth in the rules of recruitment of such service specially made in that behalf." The Supreme Court held that Article 162 does not confer power to regularise nor docs it confer power on the Government to make rules for recruitment or conditions of service. It was further held : ''All that the public service commission did was to regularise the appointment to the post of the principal. The regularisation by the State of the appointment is with effect from 1958. This regularisalion is bad for following reasons. First regularisation is not itself a mode of appointment. Secondly, the modes of appointments are direct recruitment or selection or promotion or appointing for reasons to be recorded in writing an officer holding a post of an equivalent grade by transfer from any other service of the State. This regularisalion is bad for following reasons. First regularisation is not itself a mode of appointment. Secondly, the modes of appointments are direct recruitment or selection or promotion or appointing for reasons to be recorded in writing an officer holding a post of an equivalent grade by transfer from any other service of the State. In B.N. Nagarjan and others vs. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 1979 S.C. 1676 it was held: It was argued that the regularisation of promotion gave it the colour of permanence and the appointments of the promotees as Assistant Engineers must therefore be deemed to have been made substantively right from the 1st November, 1956. The argument however is unacceptable to us for two reasons. Firstly, the words 'regular' or 'regularisalion' do not connote rermanence. They arc terms calculationed to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure only such defeels as are attributable to the methodology followed in making the appointments. They cannot be construed so as to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of the appointments. (Underlining is mine for emphasis) In none of the cased referred to by the learned counsel I'm the petitioner, the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements or the Supreme Court which have defined the term 'regular' and 'regularisation' were taken into consideration. The decisions or the Supreme Court, referred to on behalf of the petitioners, therefore, will have to he considered from that angle. Thus, regularisation of casual labourers do not mean that they can he permanently absorbed in the State service irrespective of the fact that there exists any vacancy or not. It has been held that respondent No.1 is a State. It therefore, is hound to give equal opportunity of employment to all the candidates eligihle therefore in terms of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Permanent absorption of casual employees in the State service, in absence of any statutory provision or a policy decision, is thus, impermissible. In a given situation, it may be permissible for the Supreme Court to lay down a scheme or direct a scheme for permanent absorption of its employees be made by the State. Permanent absorption of casual employees in the State service, in absence of any statutory provision or a policy decision, is thus, impermissible. In a given situation, it may be permissible for the Supreme Court to lay down a scheme or direct a scheme for permanent absorption of its employees be made by the State. Such a power exists in the Supreme Court by reason of Article 142 of the Constitution of India as it may pass a decree or order for giving complete justice to the parties and such decree or order would be binding upon the State." 41. In M. L. Gupta's case this court also took into consideration the decision of this court in Mahender Ram vs. Dy. Commissioner, Palamau reported in 1989 BLT 27, Satish Kumat v. The State of Bihar reported in 1990 (1) PLJR 219 , Udai Kumar Sharma vs. Register. Co-operative Societies reported in 1989 PLJR 952 , Dijendra Singh v. State of Sikkim, reported in 1990 Labour and Industrial Cases 43, Rakesh Ranjan Verma and others vs. State of Bihar and other reported in 1991 (1) PLJR 398 , Jain Jaiyendra Kumar Singh and others vs. the Bihar State Electricity Board and others reported in 1991 (1) PLJR 406 , Lalan Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (L.P.A. 66/90 (R)) disposed of on 18th September, 1990, Kamal Kumar Sinha v. Indira Gandhi Institute of Medical Science, Shaikhpura, Patna reported in 1991 (1) Bihar Law Judgments 129 : 1990 (2) PLJR 465 , Satyanarayan Sharma and others v. National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. and others reported in 1990 (4) SCC 163 : AIR 1990 SC 2054 , as also a full Bench Decision of this Court in Nand Kishore Raut and ors. V. The State of Bihar and others reported in 1991 BBCJ 139 : 19941 (2) PLJR 42 42. Reference in this connection may also be made to Teja Prasad v. State of Bihar reported in 1992 (2) PLJR 568 . 43. Yet recently in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi and other’s (1992 (I) Judgment Today 394), it has been observed : "We may take note of the pernicious consequences to which the direction of regularization of workmen on the only ground that they have put in works for 240 or more days, has been leading. 43. Yet recently in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi and other’s (1992 (I) Judgment Today 394), it has been observed : "We may take note of the pernicious consequences to which the direction of regularization of workmen on the only ground that they have put in works for 240 or more days, has been leading. Although there is Employment Exchange Act which requires recruitment on the basis of registration in Employment Exchange, it has become a common practice to ignore the employment exchange and the person registered in the employment exchange, and to employ and get employed directly those who are either not registered or arc lower in the long waiting list in the employment Register. The court can take judicial notice of the fact that such employment is sought and given directly for various illegal consideration including money. The employment is given for temporary periods with technical breaks to circumvent the relevant rules, and is continued for 240 or more days with a view to give the benefit of regularisation knowing the judicial trend that those who have completed 240 or more days are directed to be automatically regularised. A good deal of illegal employment market has developed resulting in a new source of corruption and frustration of those who arc waiting at the Employment Exchange for years. Not all those who gain such back-door entry in the employment are in need of the particular jobs. Though already employed elsewhere, they join the job for better and secured prospects. That is why most of the cases which come to the courts are of employment in Government Departments, Public Undertaking or Agencies. Ultimately it is the people who bear the heavy burden of the surplus -labour. The other equally injurious effect of indiscriminate regularization has been that many of the agencies have slopped undertaking casual or temporary works though they arc urgent and essential for fear that those who are employed on such works arc required to be continued for 240 or more days have to be absorbed as regular employees although the works arc time bound and there is no need of the workmen beyond the completion of the works undertaken. The public interests an thus jeopardised on both counts." In Karanataka State Private Colleges Stop – Gap Lecturers Association v. State of Karnataka & ors., (1992) 2 S.C.C. 29 , the Supreme Court again held : "Ad hoc appointments, a convenient way of entry usually from backdoor, at times even in disregard of rules and regulations, are comparatively recent innovation to the service jurisprudence. They are individual problems to begin with, become a family problem in court of law. It is unjust and unfair to those who are lesser fortunate in society with little or no approach even though letter qualified more meritorious and well deserving. The infection is widespread in Govt. or semi-government departments or State financed institutions. It arises either because the appointing authority resorts to it deliberately as a favour or to accommodate someone or for any extraneous reason ignoring the regular procedure provided for recruitment as a pretext under emergency measure or to avoid loss of work etc. or the Rules or circulars issued by the department itself empower the authority to do so as a slop-gap arrangement. The former is an abuse of power. It is unpardonable. Even if it is found to have been resorted to as a genuine emergency measure the courts should be reluctant to grant indulgence. Latter gives rise to equities which have hot he red courts every now and then." 44. In State of Punjab and others vs. Surinder Kumar and others reported in 1992 (1) SCC 489 , it has been held : "There is still another reason way the High court cannot be equated with this court. The Constitution has, by Article 142, empowered the Supreme Court to make such orders as may be necessary "for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it", which authority the High Court does not enjoy. The jurisdiction of the High Court, while dealing with a writ petition, is circumscribed by the limitations discussed and declared by the judicial decisions, and it cannot transgress the limits on the basis of whims or subjective sense of justice varying from Judge to Judge." In Sandeep Kumar v. State of U.P. reported in 1992 SC 713 the Supreme Court held: "From the facts placed before us, it appears that the scheme under which the petitioners arc working is of a very specific nature. There is no permanent need for the work and since it is a project for a particular purpose, it will not be possible to direct that the petitioner may be regularised in service." The Supreme Court again reiterated its aforementioned view in Karnataka State Private College stop-gal) Lecturers reported in J.T. 1992 (1) S.C. 373. 45. In Piara Singh's case (Supra), the Supreme Court was considering the regularisation of Adhoc employees who were continuing for several years only pursuant to the aforementioned policy decision only a number of person who satisfy the conditions prescribed therein, the order issued by the aforementioned judgment were regularised. However, some employees although were not regularised they were allowed to continue and those employees approached the High Court. The High Court gave certain directions in the aforementioned writ applications. 46. The Supreme Court in that case however upon consideration of the schemes framed by it in the matter of regularisation of service in its earlier decisions found that if the judgment of the High Court is implemented various problems would arise. The Supreme Court observed : "This is not a case, we must reiterate, where the Governments have failed to take any steps for regularisation of their adhoc employees working over the years. Every few years they have been issuing orders providing for regularisation. In such a case, there is no occasion for the court to issue any directions for regularising such employees more particularly when none of the conditions prescribed in the said orders can be said to be either unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory. The court cannot obviously help those who cannot get regularised under these orders for their failure to satisfy the condition prescribed therein. Issuing general declaration of indulgence is no part of our jurisdiction. In case of such persons we can only observe that it is for the respective Governments to consider the feasibility of giving them appropriate relief, particularly in cases where persons have been continuing over a long number of years, and were eligible and qualified on the date of their at/hoc appointment and furl her whose record of service is satisfactory." 47. The Supreme Court thereafter proceeded to hold : "The normal rule, of course, is regular recruitment through the prescribed agency but exigencies of administration may sometimes call for an athoc or temporary appointment to be made. The Supreme Court thereafter proceeded to hold : "The normal rule, of course, is regular recruitment through the prescribed agency but exigencies of administration may sometimes call for an athoc or temporary appointment to be made. In such a situation effort should always be to replace such an adhoc temporary employee by regularly selected employee as early as possible. Such a temporary employee may also compete along with others for such regular selection/appointment. If he gets selected, well and good, but if he docs nut, he must give way to the regularly selected candidate. The appointment of the regularly selected candidate cannot he with held or kept in abeyance for the sake of such an adhoc/temporary employee. Secondly, an adhoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another adhoc or temporary employee; he must be replaced only by a regularly selected employee. This is necessary to avoid arbitrary action un the part of the appointing authority. Thirdly, even where an adhoc or temporary employment is necessiated on account of the exigencies of administration, he should ordinarily be drawn from the employment exchange unless it cannot brook delay in which case the pressing cause must be stated on the file. If no candidate is available or is not sponsored by the employment exchange, some appropriate method consistent with the requirements of Article 16 should be allowed. In other words, there must be a notice published in the appropriate manner calling for applications and all those who apply in response thereto should be considered fairly. An unqualified person ought to be appointed only when qualified persons arc not available through the above processes. Of to any reason, an adhoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must consider his case for regularisation provided he is eligible and qualified according to rules 'and his service record is sat is factory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the State. The proper course would be that each State prepared scheme, if one is not already in vogue, for regularisation of such employees consistent with its reservation policy and if a scheme is already framed, the same may be made consistent with our observations herein so as to reduce avoidable litigation in this behalf. The proper course would be that each State prepared scheme, if one is not already in vogue, for regularisation of such employees consistent with its reservation policy and if a scheme is already framed, the same may be made consistent with our observations herein so as to reduce avoidable litigation in this behalf. If and when such person is regularised he should be placed immediately below the last regularly appointed employee in that category, class or service, as the may be." 48. In Director. Institute of Management Development vs. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava reported in 1962 S.C. 2070, the Supreme Court upon distinguishing the case of Jacob Vs. Kuala Water Authority (1990 S.C. 2228) held : "In the instant case, there is no such rule. The appointment was purely adhoc and on a contractual basis for a limited period. Therefore, by expiry of the period of six months, the right to remain on the post comes to an end. 49. It is therefore, clear that the Supreme Court itself held that even in the matter of appointment of lit/hoc and temporary employees, provisions of Articles 16 of the Constitution of India arc required to he complied with. 50. As noticed hereinbefore, in that case the Supreme Court considered its earlier decisions with regard to regularisation of employees. 51. There cannot be any doubt that in absence of statute or statutory rules, the State may formulate Scheme and/or adopt policy decisions for regularization of its adhoc employees if they had continued for a number of years subject to the criteria laid down therefor and reservation policy of the State. Such is not the position here. 52. No policy decision of the State of Bihar in this regard has been brought to our not ice. The petitioner has accepted his appointment in the year 1900 as a temporary employee without any demur whatsoever. As indicated here-in-before in the year 1900 when the petitioner was appointed the 1983 Rules had already come into force and thus the petitioner could have been appointed only upon observance of the mandatory requirements thereof The petitioner on his own showing was appointed without following the procedure’s laid down under the 1983 Rules or the provisions of Article 16. 53. In this view of the matter, the decision-of the Supreme Court in Piara Singh instead of advancing the case of the petitioner militates against his contention. 54. 53. In this view of the matter, the decision-of the Supreme Court in Piara Singh instead of advancing the case of the petitioner militates against his contention. 54. As the petitioner has not derived any legal right to continue in service and thus he is not entitled to any writ of mandamus from this court as has been prayed by him. This application is, therefore, dismissed hut without any order as to costs.