JUDGMENT 1. - Smt. Aneesa, divorced wife of the petitioner moved an application for grant of maintenance on behalf of her two minor sons Shahid Ali and Sadiq Ali. On this application, an order was passed on 19th July, 1990 for grant of interim maintenance of Rs. 150/- per month to each of the son. This amount was payable from 1lth April, 1990. Rs. 500/- were allowed by way of costs and the payment was adjustable according to the final decision. The petitioner filed a Misc. Petition against this interim order and on 4th September, 1990, the petitioner was directed to deposit Rs. 550/- by way of costs of expenses and the petitioner was further directed to deposit Rs. 200/-per month out of which Rs. 75/- were to be adjusted towards the past arrears. This petition was consigned to record on 21st November, 1991 when no one appeared. 2. On 11th October, 1991 the application for maintenance was finally decided by Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Tonk and each of the minor son was allowed maintenance @ Rs. 200/- per month and this final order has been challenged by the father, petitioner in a petition Under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code. 3. The first preliminary objection of the learned Counsel for the respondents is that a revision against the impugned order is maintainable but the petitioner has not chosen that remedy and this Court should not interfere under its inherent powers. There is no doubt that the matter before the trial Court has been finally decided and the petitioner could be challenged the same Under Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code However, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the order has been passed in-violation of statute hence, he has approached this Court Under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code in Municipal Corporation Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others, AIR 1983 Supreme Court 67 , it was observed that Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code has a different paramater and is a provision independent of Section 397(2) Criminal Procedure Code and Section 397(2) Criminal Procedure Code and clearly bars the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of the interlocutory orders passed in appeal, enquiry or other proceedings. In this case, the matter related to quashing of complaint and it was held that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are if no offence is made out then the High Court is justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of powers Under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code The learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Mithya and Others v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 1987 (1) R.L.R. 145 , wherein even after the expiry of the six months of notice, proceedings under Sections 107 and 108 Criminal Procedure Code were continued. Proceedings before High Court Under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code were only for exemption of attendance but the High Court suo moto exercising the powers Under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code issued orders for dropping proceedings as a whole. 4. In the present case, the petitioner has approached this Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code against a final decision of the application Under Section 125 Criminal Procedure Code By no stretch of imagination it can be said that the order of the learned Magistrate was an interlocutory order or interim order so as to bar a revision Under Section 397(2) Criminal Procedure Code Violation of statute can be looked into in revision also and inherent powers of this Court Under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code are not meant for purpose of looking into legal questions alone. They are to be normally exercised where no remedy is available to a party only then the same are to be exercised for the reasons which have been mentioned under this Section In my view, a petition Under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code is not maintainable and in view of this, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has contended that this matter may be treated as a revision. Without going into the controversy as to whether the petitioner should have approached the Sessions Judge, this matter is being disposed on merits and arguments on merits have been heard. 5. In this case, there is no dispute about the grant of maintenance to the divorced wife. She was divorced on 11th November, 1988 and thereafter only for the period of Iddat she was entitled to receive maintenance. The question in dispute is about the maintenance which is to be granted to the two children. 5. In this case, there is no dispute about the grant of maintenance to the divorced wife. She was divorced on 11th November, 1988 and thereafter only for the period of Iddat she was entitled to receive maintenance. The question in dispute is about the maintenance which is to be granted to the two children. Referring to Section 3(1)(b) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on divorce) Act, 1986, it has been pointed out that a divorced woman is entitled to maintenance for her children, where she maintains the children, a reasonable and fair provision of maintenance to be paid by her former husband for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of such children. According to this, the wife can get maintenance for her children only for two years and not thereafter. In the present case, the children were 5 years and 2 years of age in the year 1988 when the application was moved. According to the petitioner, the wife was not entitled to claim any maintenance for them. It has also been contended that the petitioner has moved an application for obtaining the custody of the two minor children as he himself wants to maintain them. 6. The learned Counsel for the respondents has contended that the children would be entitled to maintenance till such time as they are living away from the father and the application for guardianship is not decided. According to him, this matter has been discussed and decided in the case of Jamaluddin v. Moti Ali, 1988 RCC 441. In this case it has been held that there is no prohibition under the Muslim Personal and Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on divorce), Act, 1986 that children who are in the inherent on lawful custody of the divorced muslim wife are not entitled to claim any maintenance from their father. The provisions of the Act, 1986 and the Muslim Personal Law were discussed in upholding the order of the Magistrate by which maintenance to two children out of which the daughter was about 12 years of age and the son was about 10 years of age was granted. This case applies on all force with the present case and I adopt the reasons taken in this case and it need not to be repeated. This case applies on all force with the present case and I adopt the reasons taken in this case and it need not to be repeated. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the distinction is that in the present case the petitioner is ready to keep the children with him and moved an application for the guardianship of the minor sons. However, the moving of the application alone will not be a conclusive matter. It is only when the Court decided that the father is entitled to get the custody of the children then the wife would become disentitled to claim maintenance for her minor sons. 7. Lastly, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the amount of maintenance awarded is excessive. According to him, there are six members in his family which includes is parents, second wife and children, and a sum of Rs. 400/- per month out of Rs. 900/-, which he is getting is excessive. The petitioner is a class-IVth employee in Tonk Municipality. In 1988 he gave out his income as Rs. 900/- per month. However, even if this salary is taken to be correct then he must have earned increments and additional instalments of D.A. during the last four years. Rs. 200/- per each child who are of school going age cannot be said to be excessive. In such matters this Court would not interfere under its inherent powers. 8. There is no force in this petition and it is, therefore, dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******