JUDGMENT - Dudhat M.L., J.:—This Criminal Application is filed against the order dated 28th July, 1992 passed by the Special Judge for Greater Bombay in N.D.P.S. Bail Application No. 388 of 1992 in R.A. No. 113 of 1992. 2. It is the case of the respondent that the petitioner together with two more persons when apprehended during the course of raid on 25-6-1992. were found in possession of 500 grams of Brown-sugar. The present petitioner who was at the time of the offence 16½ years of age filed application for grant of bail before the Special Judge for Greater Bombay. It was contended on behalf of the present petitioner that the petitioner being minor Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 is applicable and, therefore, is entitled for the grant of bail. However, the trial Court after taking into consideration the School Leaving Certificate came to the conclusion that on the date of the offence i.e. on 25-6-1992 the petitioner was of 161/2 years of age while under section 2(h) which defined Juvenile in relation to a boy who has not attained the age of 16 years, in view of this the trial Court came to the conclusion that Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 is not applicable to the present petitioner. This particular finding given by the trial Court is not assailed by Mr. Lalla, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the present petitioner. However, Mr. Lalla, strongly contended that since the petitioner was 16½ years of age, the petitioner is still entitled to the bail application under N.D.P.S. Act, more particularly taking into consideration section 33 of the N.D.P.S. Act. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that section 33 which is as under:— “Section 33 :­ Application of section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958:— Nothing contained in section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973 (2 of 1974) or in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958) shall apply to a person convicted of an offence under this Act unless such person is under eighteen years of age or that the offence for which such person is convicted is punishable under section 26 or section 27.' 3. 1973 (2 of 1974) or in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958) shall apply to a person convicted of an offence under this Act unless such person is under eighteen years of age or that the offence for which such person is convicted is punishable under section 26 or section 27.' 3. After going through the aforesaid provision section 33, it is clear that the provision of section 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 and section 6 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 are applicable to the persons convicted of an offence under N.D.P.S. Act and this being the position it was contended that the petitioner will be entitled to the grant of bail even within the meaning of section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act. It is an admitted position that for the grant of bail under N.D.P.S. Act relevant provision is section 37 which is as under:— Section 37 : Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless— (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to opposes the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor oppose the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in Clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973(2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. 4. In the present case what one has to see is as to whether within the meaning of Clause (2) of sub-clause (b) of section 37, the petitioner being 16½ years of age, entitled to the grant of bail only on the ground being the minor. As per the aforesaid provision the bail can be granted if this Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner is not guilty of offence. As per the aforesaid provision the bail can be granted if this Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner is not guilty of offence. So the first important question here in this case is that after going through the facts and circumstances of the case can this Court come to a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner is not guilty of an offence. Once the finding is yes on this ground then the Court has to see as to whether the petitioner is likely to commit an offence while on bail. It is an admitted position that there is sufficient evidence on record to go to show that the petitioner has committed the offence. That there is reasonable ground to come to a conclusion that the petitioner has committed offence under N.D.P.S. Act. However, Mr. Lalla, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the present petitioner contended that after taking into consideration the applicability of section 360 of Criminal Procedure Code and after taking into consideration the applicability of section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act in this case since the petitioner was only 16½ years of age at the time of commission of offence the petitioner cannot be sentence unless formalities under section 6 of Probation of Offenders Act are complied with. And even after going through the formalities if the Court comes to the conclusion that having regard to the circumstances of this case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender it is not desirable to deal with, with applicant under sections 3 and 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act and the Court passes any sentence of the imprisonment to the offender. It shall record its reason for doing so. In view of this provision and also in view of the provisions of section 360 of Criminal Procedure Code. It is contended by Mr. Lalla, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the present petitioner that the petitioner should be enlarged on bail even after fair reading of sect ion 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act. 5. Before coming to my findings on the aforesaid argument. It is contended by Mr. Lalla, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the present petitioner that the petitioner should be enlarged on bail even after fair reading of sect ion 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act. 5. Before coming to my findings on the aforesaid argument. It is also desirable to go through section 360 of the Criminal procedure Code which is as under:— “Order to release on probation of good conduct or after admonition:— (1) When any person not under twenty-one years of age is convicted of an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less, or when any person under twenty-one years of age or any woman is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and no previous conviction is proved against the offender, if it appears to the Court before which he is convicted regard being had to the age character or antecedents of the offender, and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed that it is expedient that the Offender should be released on probation of good conduct the Court may instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond with or without sureties to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period (not exceeding three years) as the Court may direct and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour: Provided that, where any first offender is convicted by a Magistrate of the Second Class not specially empowered by the High Court, and the Magistrate is of opinion that the powers conferred by this section should be exercised, he shall record his opinion to that effect and submit the proceedings to a Magistrate of the first class, forwarding the accused to, or taking bail for his appearance before such Magistrate who shall dispose of the case in the manner provided by sub-section (2). (2) Where proceedings are submitted to a Magistrate of the first class as provided by sub-section (1), such Magistrate may thereupon pass such sentence or make such order as he might have passed or made if the case had originally been heard by him, and, if he thinks further inquiry and additional evidence on any point to be necessary he may make such inquiry or take such evidence himself or direct such inquiry or evidence to be made or taken. (3) In any case in which a person is convicted of theft, theft in a building, dishonest misappropriation, cheating or any offence under the Indian Penal Code punishable with not more than two years imprisonment or any offence punishable with fine only and no previous conviction is proved against him, the Court before which he is so convicted may, if it thinks fit, laying regard to the age, character, antecedents or physical or mental condition of the offender and to the trivial nature of the offence or any extenuating circumstances under which the offence was committed, instead of sentencing him to any punishment, release him after due admonition. (4) An order under this section may be made by the Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session when exercising its power of revision. (5) When an order has been made under this section in respect of any offender, the High Court or Court of Session may, on appeal when there is a right of appeal to such Court, or when exercising its powers of revision, set aside, such order, and in lieu thereof pass sentence on such offender according to law: Provided that the High Court or Court of Session shall not under this sub-section inflict a greater punishment than might have been inflicted by the Court by which the offender was convicted. (6) The provisions of sections 121, 124 and 373 shall, so far as may be apply in the case of sureties offered in pursuance of the provisions of this section. (7) The Court before directing the release of an offender under sub-section (1) shall be satisfied that an offender or his surety (if any) has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place for which the Court acts or in which the offender is likely to live during the period named for the observance of the conditions. (7) The Court before directing the release of an offender under sub-section (1) shall be satisfied that an offender or his surety (if any) has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place for which the Court acts or in which the offender is likely to live during the period named for the observance of the conditions. (8) If the Court which convicted the offender, or a Court which could have dealt with the offender in respect of his original offence, is satisfied that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of his recognizance it may issue a warrant for his apprehension. (9) An offender, when apprehended on any such warrant shall be brought forthwith before the Court issuing the warrant, and such Court may either remand him in custody until the case is heard or admit him to bail with a sufficient surety conditioned on his appearing for sentence and such Court may, after hearing the case pass sentence. (10) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958) or the Children Act, 1960 (16 of 1960), or any other law for the time being in force for the treatment, training or rehabilitation of youthful offenders.” 6. As per the aforesaid provision when any person under the age of 21 years or women is convicted of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and no previous conviction is proved against the offender and if it appears to the Court before which he or she is convicted regard have had to the age, character and antecendents of the offender and the circumstances in which the offence was committed, if the Court comes to the conclusion that offender should be released on Probation of good conduct, the Court may instead of sentencing the offender at once without any punishment direct that he may be released on his entering into bond with or without surety. 7. According to Mr. Lalla, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the present petitioner even as per the aforesaid provision of section 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code, benefit can be availed by the present accused as at the time of commission of offence admittedly accused person was 16½ years of age. 8. As against the aforesaid arguments Mr. 7. According to Mr. Lalla, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the present petitioner even as per the aforesaid provision of section 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code, benefit can be availed by the present accused as at the time of commission of offence admittedly accused person was 16½ years of age. 8. As against the aforesaid arguments Mr. Lambay the learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the State contended that by strict interpretation of section 37, bail cannot be granted in case of the present petitioner. Mr. Lambay, in his argument contended that the Court has got power to grant bail under the N.D.P.S. Act, only when the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner is not guilty of the offence. However, Mr. Lambay, contended that in view of the fact that there is ample evidence on record to show that the petitioner was found in possession of Brown-sugar, section 37 more particularly sub-section (2)(b) is applicable in the present case. Further, it is contended on behalf of the State that recourse to section 33 can only be taken at the time when Court convicts the accused, and section 33 cannot be made application at the interim stage, while granting the bail application. On these grounds Mr. Lambay, the learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the State, strenuously contended that the petitioner is not entitled to the grant of bail. 9. After hearing the arguments of both the sides, I am of the opinion that section 33 of the N.D.P.S. Act, prima facie is not applicable for the purpose of grant or refusal of the bail. Fair reading of section 33 clearly shows that the said section is to be made applicable by the trial Court only at the time trial Court convicts the accused person under the N.D.P.S. Act whose age at the time of commission of offence was less than 18 years. 10. Secondly by fair reading of section 7, it is clear that the same provision of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is to be made applicable when the Judge convicts the accused who is under the age of 21 years. 10. Secondly by fair reading of section 7, it is clear that the same provision of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is to be made applicable when the Judge convicts the accused who is under the age of 21 years. It is only in these circumstances, the Court has to get himself satisfied on the basis of report that having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with the said offender under sections 3 and 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. Similarly section 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code, also refers to the powers of the Court to release the offender after conviction on probation of good conduct or after admonition if the offender is under the age of 21 years. In view of the fact that both these provisions namely section 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code and section 6 of Probation of Offenders Act are to be made applicable only at the time when the Judge convicts accused person who is less than 21 years (in the present case in view of section 33 of N.D.P.S. Act, less than 18 years of age). According to me the benefit of the said provisions cannot be given to the present petitioner at the interim stage, at time of grant or refusal of the bail. 11. Under these circumstances in order to grant the bail to the present petitioner, his case must come within section 37(2)(b) of the N.D.P.S. Act as pointed out earlier. In this case, there is sufficient evidence on record to show that prima facie the petitioner was in possession of Narcotic Drugs and therefore, the trial Court was right in rejecting the application for grant of bail preferred by the petitioner. In view of this, the Criminal Application filed by the present petitioner is rejected. 12. In view of the fact that the petitioner is of a tender age, I direct the Special Judge for Greater Bombay to dispose of the case bearing Special Case No. 233 of 1992 as expeditiously as possible and in any case within six months from today. Application rejected. -----