JUDGMENT - P.D. DESAI, C.J.:---The appeal is directed against the common judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge on 20th June 1992 in two writ petitions, namely, Writ Petition No. 1040 of 1992 and Writ Petition No. 1072 of 1992, which were directed against the Award dated 26th November 1991 of the Presiding Officer of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1 at Bombay (hereinafter called "the Tribunal") in Reference No. CGIT 16 of 1989. The Reference was made to the Tribunal by the Central Government for determination of the dispute which had arisen between the appellants and the 1st respondent (hereinafter called "the respondent"). The dispute referred to the Tribunal for adjudication was as follows: "Whether the action of the management of M/s. International Airport Authority of India, Bombay, in relation to its Electrical Maintenance Div. I, at Bombay, in terminating the services of Shri Viru Muthu Sukhlingam, Khalasi (Assistant Fitter), w.e.f. 14-8-1982 vide Office Order No. AAB/Admm/125/37/19883 dated 10/14-12-1982 served on him on 5-10-1984 is justified. If not, what relief is the workman concerned entitled to." 2. Briefly stated, the facts are that the respondent was employed as Khalasi at the Sahar Airport on and from 5th May 1978. In the month of July 1982 he applied for and was granted leave which expired on 13th August 1982. Upon expiry of the leave, he did not report for duty. According to him, he had sent an intimation in writing to his superior explaining the circumstances under which he was unable to join duty. The appellants, however, deny the receipt of any such communication. According to the appellants, they issued a notice to the respondent on 20th October 1982 at his Bombay as well as Tamil Nadu address by registered post (acknowledgement due) calling upon him to return to duty immediately and intimating that if he failed to report for duty his employment would be terminated. Since the respondent did not resume duty, the termination order was passed on 14th December 1982 and it was also sent to the respondent at his Bombay and Tamil Nadu address by registered post (acknowledgement due). Ultimately, on 5th October 1984, according to the appellants, the respondent appeared and requested that he may be permitted to resume duty. He was, however, informed that his services stood terminated on 14th December 1982 and he was served with a copy of the termination order. Ultimately, on 5th October 1984, according to the appellants, the respondent appeared and requested that he may be permitted to resume duty. He was, however, informed that his services stood terminated on 14th December 1982 and he was served with a copy of the termination order. Correspondence ensued between the parties thereafter. During the course of the correspondence the respondent called upon the appellants to permit him to join duty. A formal demand in that respect was finally made on 17th August 1987. After conciliation efforts failed, the reference came to be made some time in 1989. 3. Statement of claim in the said proceedings was filed by the respondent on 26th June 1989. On 11th September 1989 the appellants filed their Written Statement. According to them, since this was a case of abandonment and no enquiry was necessary, they did not seek an opportunity to lead evidence to justify the termination before the Tribunal. A supplementary Written Statement was filed on 12th February 1990 alongwith an application for amendment of the original Written Statement. Even at that stage, however, an opportunity to lead evidence to justify the impugned action was not sought. On 18th June 1990, the Tribunal framed a preliminary issue to determine whether it was obligatory for the appellants to hold a domestic enquiry before passing the order of termination and the case was posted for hearing on preliminary issue on 24th July 1990. 4. Before the hearing on the preliminary issue started on 24th July 1990, the appellants moved an application before the Tribunal seeking permission to lead evidence to justify the termination in case the preliminary issue came to be decided against them. The Tribunal decided to hear the said application alongwith the preliminary issue. 5. On 26th November 1991 the Tribunal, after hearing the parties, passed the Award which was impugned before the learned Single Judge. In the Award, the Tribunal raised the following five points for determination and gave its findings on each of them separately : "1. Whether it was obligatory on the Management to hold a domestic inquiry before passing the impugned order? 2. Should the Management's application for liberty to adduce evidence on the merits of the charges be allowed? 3. Is the workman entitled to reinstatement? 4. Is he entitled to backwages. How much? 5. Relief and costs." 6. Whether it was obligatory on the Management to hold a domestic inquiry before passing the impugned order? 2. Should the Management's application for liberty to adduce evidence on the merits of the charges be allowed? 3. Is the workman entitled to reinstatement? 4. Is he entitled to backwages. How much? 5. Relief and costs." 6. The Tribunal held that it was obligatory on the management to hold a domestic inquiry before passing the impugned order and that the appellants could not be given liberty to adduce evidence on merits to justify the termination. The Tribunal further held that the order of termination was void and directed reinstatement without any break of service and with full backwages from 5th October 1984. The period between 13th August 1982 and 5th October 1984 was directed to be regularised by grant of leave (with or without wages) under the relevant Rules and Regulations. 7. The Award gave rise to two Writ Petitions. Writ Petition No. 1072 of 1992 was preferred by the appellants challenging the said Award. This appeal arises out of the said writ petition. Writ Petition No. 1040 of 1992 was filed by the respondent seeking publication and implementation of the Award. Appeal No. 606 of 1992 arises out of the said writ petition. The learned Single Judge disposed of both the writ petitions by a common judgment. Writ Petition No. 1072 of 1992 was rejected and Writ Petition No. 1040 of 1992 was allowed. 8. The following points were urged for our consideration : 1. The Tribunal failed to answer the question referred to it by confining its inquiry to the question whether domestic enquiry was obligatory before terminating the workman's service; the Tribunal was required to answer not merely the preliminary issue but also the question whether or not the termination was justified on merits. 2. In view of Regulation 31(2)(vi) of the I.A.A.I. (General Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1980, it was not necessary to hold an enquiry before the termination was ordered in view of the continuous and unexplained absence. 3. Even if an enquiry was obligatory, the appellants were entitled to lead evidence to justify the termination since an opportunity therefor was asked for while proceedings were pending and prior to the hearing of the preliminary issue and this opportunity was wrongly denied. 3. Even if an enquiry was obligatory, the appellants were entitled to lead evidence to justify the termination since an opportunity therefor was asked for while proceedings were pending and prior to the hearing of the preliminary issue and this opportunity was wrongly denied. Regarding Point No. 1 : The Tribunal has given clear findings to the effect : (a) that the order of termination was passed on account of the alleged misconduct of the respondent arising out of his overstaying the sanctioned leave without sufficient cause, (b) that, as such, domestic inquiry was obligatory and the appellants had no right to terminate the services of the respondent without holding such inquiry, and (c) that the appellants could not be given liberty to adduce evidence to prove the alleged misconduct of the respondent with a view to justifying the termination of his services. Under such circumstances, we are unable to appreciate the submission that the Tribunal erred in law in not considering whether or not the termination was justified on merits. The termination having been found otherwise invalid and there being no evidence on record to justify the termination on merits, in our opinion, there was no question of the Tribunal going into the said issue. Regarding Point No. 2 : The Tribunal and the learned Single Judge have both dealt with this aspect in detail and there is really nothing we can usefully add. The reliance placed upon Regulation 31(2)(vi) in support of the submission that it was not necessary to hold an enquiry before ordering termination is not justified. Section 37 of the International Airports Authority Act, 1971 empowers the appellants to make regulations not inconsistent with the Act and the rules made thereunder to provide for all matters for which provision is necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the said Act. Without prejudice to the generality of the powers accordingly conferred, such regulations may provide for the conditions of service and the remuneration of officers and other employees appointed by the appellants. Without prejudice to the generality of the powers accordingly conferred, such regulations may provide for the conditions of service and the remuneration of officers and other employees appointed by the appellants. Section 38 enacts as follows : "(1) Any regulation which may be made by the Authority under this Act may be made by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette without one year of the constitution of the Authority and any regulation so made may be altered or rescinded by the Authority by means of a regulation made by it under this Act. (2) No regulation made by the Authority under this Act shall have effect until it has been approved by the Central Government and published in the Official Gazette." It will be seen that the power to make regulations is subject to certain conditions. One of the condition is that no regulation made by the Authority under the Act shall have effect until it has been approved by the Central Government and published in the Official Gazette. It is not in dispute that the regulations in question have not received the approval of the Central Government and, consequently, there is no publication in the Official Gazette. The regulations have been submitted to the Central Government for their approval and are pending consideration with them. Under these circumstances, in our opinion, the regulations have no effect in the eye of law. They or any of them cannot be relied upon for the purpose of justifying the termination without notice. We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge on this point and reject the submission. 9. Apart from the consideration aforementioned, even assuming that the regulation in question could be relied upon for the purpose of justifying the submission that no domestic enquiry was necessary, the language in which the regulation is couched and the consequences which ensue therefrom make it abundantly clear that an opportunity has to be given to the workman to show cause before taking the extreme step of terminating his employment. Regulation 31 reads as follows : "31. Treatment of unauthorised absence :---(1) An employee, who is absent from duty without any authority, shall not be entitled to the pay and allowances during the period of such absence. Regulation 31 reads as follows : "31. Treatment of unauthorised absence :---(1) An employee, who is absent from duty without any authority, shall not be entitled to the pay and allowances during the period of such absence. The unauthorised absence of this kind, apart from resulting in loss of pay and allowances for the period of such absence, would also constitute a break in service, entailing forfeiture of past service, unless the break itself is condoned and treated as dies non. If the break is condoned and treated as dies non by the competent authority, the service rendered prior to unauthorised absence will be counted for all purposes, but the period of break itself will not count for any purpose. (2) The consequence of unauthorised absence from duty which is not condoned in any manner would be as follows : (i) Pay and allowances : No pay and allowances are admissible during the period of unauthorised absence. (ii) Increment : The period of such an unauthorised absence would not count for increment. (iii) Leave : The period of unauthorised absence would not count for earning leave. (iv) CPF Gratuity : The period of unauthorised absence would be ignored for the purpose of entitlement of CPF benefits. The interruption in service caused by unauthorised absence would entail forfeiture of past service for purpose of entitlement to gratuity. (v) The unauthorised absence of an employee would result in the lapse of the previous service for service benefits like L.T.C. etc. to which employees are entitled to only after they put in a specified length of continuous service or certain amount of minimum continuous service. Due to unauthorised absence an employee shall be required to put in the minimum of specified length of continuous service after the unauthorised absence for entitlement of such concessions. to which employees are entitled to only after they put in a specified length of continuous service or certain amount of minimum continuous service. Due to unauthorised absence an employee shall be required to put in the minimum of specified length of continuous service after the unauthorised absence for entitlement of such concessions. (vi) If an employee remains absent without any intimation/prior permission for a period of two months he will be deemed to have abandoned his job and his services will be terminated without any notice." Under Regulation 31(1) the consequence which follows as a result of unauthorised absence from duty is forfeiture of pay and allowances during the period of such absence and also break in service entailing forfeiture of past service, "unless the break itself is condoned and treated as dies non." If the break is condoned and treated as dies non, the service rendered prior to unauthorised absence is required to be counted for all purposes, but the period of break itself will not count for any purpose. Clause (1), therefore, does not by itself entail break of service. The Competent Authority is empowered to condone break in service and to treat the said period as dies non, in which event the service rendered prior to unauthorised absence will count for all purposes. For the exercise of power of condonation, unless an opportunity is given to the concerned workman to place all the relevant facts, it would not be reasonably possible for the Competent Authority to arrive at a just decision. Implicit in the grant of power of condonation is the duty to afford an opportunity to show cause to the workman concerned. Clause (2) of Regulation 31 lays down the consequences of unauthorised absence from duty which is not condoned. These consequences also do not follow automatically; they ensue only if the unauthorised absence is not condoned. Under Clause (2), therefore, the question of condonation of unauthorised absence must be considered first and decided in accordance with law. The power accordingly conferred is coupled with the duty to exercise the same having regard to the numerous consequences which would ensue if there is no condonation. Unless an opportunity is given to the concerned workman to apprise the Competent Authority of all the relevant facts, the exercise of power in that behalf would be an empty formality and a futile exercise. Unless an opportunity is given to the concerned workman to apprise the Competent Authority of all the relevant facts, the exercise of power in that behalf would be an empty formality and a futile exercise. Indeed, it would be impossible for the Competent Authority to arrive at a fair decision unless such an opportunity is afforded. Sub-clause (vi) of clause (2), which contains a deeming provision as to the abandonment of job in case an employee remains absent without any intimation/prior permission for a period of two months and which entails the consequence of termination of service without any notice, would be attracted only if unauthorised absence is not condoned. In other words, the fiction will have its full play only after the question as to the condonation of unauthorised absence is first considered and decided against the concerned workman. In this connection it is pertinent to bear in mind the settled rule of construction that in order to arrive at the true meaning of any particular phrase of clause in a statutory instrument, that particular phrase or clause is not to be viewed detached from the context. Every phrase or clause in a statutory instrument must be construed with reference to the subject and context; it has to be read along with other phrases or clauses occuring in such instrument. This rule applies with greater force when a part of a section, rule or regulation falls for construction; the said part must necessarily be construed with reference to the other parts to make a consistent whole. It is thus clear that sub-clause (vi) of Clause (2) of Regulation 31 is required to be construed with reference to the context and collocation and in the setting in which it occurs and, when construed accordingly, the fiction therein contained would not operate divorced from the opening words of the said Clause (2), that is, till unauthorised absence is not condoned. The period of such absence, although a relevant factor while considering the question of condonation, does not preclude or prohibit the exercise of that power by virtue of the presence of sub-clause (vi). 10. The period of such absence, although a relevant factor while considering the question of condonation, does not preclude or prohibit the exercise of that power by virtue of the presence of sub-clause (vi). 10. In light of the foregoing discussion it is clear that, even assuming without deciding that no domestic enquiry was necessary, an opportunity was required to be given to the respondent to place before the Competent Authority all the facts and circumstances of the case to enable the question of condonation of unauthorised absence being considered in accordance with law. Since no such opportunity was afforded, granting without deciding that Regulation 31 was applicable, the impugned termination is not in conformity with the provisions of the said Regulation and hence it is unsustainable. Be it noted in this connection that the case of the appellants that they had tried to serve a notice on the respondent at the Bombay and Tamil Nadu address prior to his termination, but to no avail, was not accepted by the Tribunal. Regarding Point No. 3: The facts pertaining to this point have been set out in the earlier part of the judgment. The Reference was made some time in 1989. Statement of claim was filed on 26th June 1989. The first Written Statement was filed on 11th September 1989 and supplementary Written Statement was filed on 12th February 1990. In none of these Written Statements an opportunity to lead evidence to justify the termination was sought for. The case was thrice adjourned meanwhile and even in the application for extensive amendment of the Written Statement filed on 12th February 1990, that is, the day on which the supplementary Written Statement was filed, no request was made to permit evidence being led to justify the termination. The application for amendment was granted on 3rd April 1990 and even thereafter the case was adjourned twice before an application seeking an opportunity to lead evidence was made on 24th July 1990. It is pertinent to note that on that day the hearing of the preliminary issue, which was raised on 18th June 1990, was fixed. The Tribunal held, in light of the well settled legal position, that the appellants having failed to make a request in this behalf at the appropriate stage, no such permission could be granted. It is pertinent to note that on that day the hearing of the preliminary issue, which was raised on 18th June 1990, was fixed. The Tribunal held, in light of the well settled legal position, that the appellants having failed to make a request in this behalf at the appropriate stage, no such permission could be granted. In any case, according to the Tribunal, there was absolutely no justification for not making an application in that regard for as many as ten and half months after the first Written Statement was filed and no reason whatever was set out in the application for not seeking permission earlier. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the appellants were not entitled to make a request to permit them to lead evidence in justification of the termination, especially when a period of about nine years had passed since the termination took effect. The learned Single Judge, in the course of his judgment, dealt with this aspect in considerable detail and held that the Tribunal did not err in rejecting the application made by the appellants. The following observations in his judgment highlight the correct legal position : "...The management has a right to establish the misconduct of the workman by an independent endeavour before the Tribunal. The conduct of the management in the exercise of that right is also something to be subjected to careful scrutiny. A management availing of such a right should demonstrate its diligence and vigilance in the exercise of that right. When the workman pointedly raises the plea about absence of a domestic enquiry or about an infirmity therein, it is time enough for the management to wake up; it is already alerted, and vigorously too. It cannot afford to lose much time thereafter, in buckling up for a fight on merits. The management shall seek that opportunity and use it effectively." We see no flaw in the reasoning and conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge on this aspect of the matter and find no justification to interfere with the Award of the Tribunal or with the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge. 11. The management shall seek that opportunity and use it effectively." We see no flaw in the reasoning and conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge on this aspect of the matter and find no justification to interfere with the Award of the Tribunal or with the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge. 11. It was faintly urged that there was failure on the part of the Tribunal and that of the learned Single Judge to appreciate the true legal position enunciated in the various judgments of the Apex Court cited before them as regards the right of the Management to justify the termination on merits and that this has resulted in the denial of an opportunity sought by the appellants to lead evidence on merits and, consequently, in miscarriage of justice. Both, the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge, have dealt with this issue and we concur in their reasoning and conclusion. No useful purpose will be served by reiterating the same view point. 12. These were the only points urged before us and since there is no merit in any of them, the Appeal fails and it is summarily dismissed. Application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is rejected. Certified copy of this judgment, if applied for on the payment of requisite charges, to be supplied within a period of one week of the case papers reaching the Department. Appeal dismissed. *****