Judgment R. N. Sahay, J. 1. This appeal is by the tenant-defendants against the judgment and decree of the second Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi dated 10-12-1990 whereby he confirmed the judgment and decree of the munsif, Ranchi dated 2-3-1990 decreeing the plaintiffs suit for eviction of the appellant from the suit premises which is a shop situated in J. J. Road, upper Bazar, Ranchi. 2. The property in suit belonged to one Kishun Lal Poddar (father of plaintiff-respondent No.2) and his co-sharers. The appellant No.1 Hari krishna Josi and his deceased brother Babu Lal Josi were inducted as joint months to months tenants in the suit premises long ago in which they carried on business of Attahakki. The rent is used to be collected by the aforesaid kishun Lal. The rent was payable according to Sambat Calander months. 3. In the year 1971, the ownership of the suit property vested upon plaintiff No.2 Subbas Chandra Poddar. After the death of his brother, babulal Joshi the appellant No.2 Shya asundar Josi became co-tenant along with appellant No.1. In the year 1987. Respondent No.2 Subash Chandra poddar gifted the suit property to respondent No.1 Arun Kumar and respondent no.3 Amrit Kumar by registered deed of gift dated 2-9-1987. Respondent No.3 is the son of respondent No 2, while respondent No.1 is his nephew. After the death of his father, Kishun Lal, respondent No 2 began to realise the rent of the suit property as owner and landlord and was granting rent receipts in such capacity. The contractual rent was Rs.250 per month. According to the case of the plaintiff-respondent, the defendants had paid rent up to Asadbadi 15 of Sambat 2042 corresponding to 18-2-1985 and thereafter payment of rent was stopped. After the transfer of ownership of the suit property by respondent No.2 by gift, both the defendants-appellants notified not only about the transfer but also about the fact that the plaintiff No.2 as landlord shall continue to receive rent and give receipts to the appellants. Respondent No.3 is the son of respondent No.2 was a minor, under the guardianship of his father, respondent No.2. 4. The plaintiff-respondent sought a decree for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent, and breach of terms of tenancy and sub-leting the suit premises. 5. Respondent No.3 is the son of respondent No.2 was a minor, under the guardianship of his father, respondent No.2. 4. The plaintiff-respondent sought a decree for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent, and breach of terms of tenancy and sub-leting the suit premises. 5. The appellants by his written statements denied the allegations that they had defaulted in payment of rent as well as the allegations of breach of terms of the tenancy and sul-leting the suit premises. According to the appellants, the rent of the suit premises were only Rs 200 per month and there was clear stipulation and understanding between the parties, the rent could be paid for several months together according to the convenience of the landlord and the former landlord Kishun Lai used to collect rent accordingly it was denied that the defendant No.2 was realising rent and granting receipts The appellants asserted that they had paid rent up to March, 1988 but not granted any receipt. They have also denied that the plaintiff-respondent No.2 had transferred the suit property by way of gift to the other two plaintiffs. No intimation regarding transfer of ownership was given to the tenant. Respondent No 2 having refused to accept the rent, the appellants remitted the rent by money order from 29-6-1988 but the same was refused. Thereafter rent for the subsequent months was remitted by money older which was also refused. 6. The learned Munsif found that the appellant committed default in payment of rent as contemplated under Sec.11 (l) (d) of the Bihar buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act and hence they were liable to a decree for eviction. The case of the appellant that they had paid rs 8500 in one lump-sum was not accepted by the learned Munsif because no such plea was made in the written statement. The learned Munsif further held that the appellant had committed breach of terms of tenancy by making permanent partition during the suit property into two parts and made a new construction thereon. The case of sub-tenancy, however, was not accepted. The suit was accordingly decreed.- 7. The learned Additional Judicial Commissioner had held the case of the appellant that the rent used to be paid several months together at the convenience for the landlord was not acceptable as no witness except defendant No.1 was examined on this point. The case of sub-tenancy, however, was not accepted. The suit was accordingly decreed.- 7. The learned Additional Judicial Commissioner had held the case of the appellant that the rent used to be paid several months together at the convenience for the landlord was not acceptable as no witness except defendant No.1 was examined on this point. He further held that this plea was falsified by rent receipts Ext. C and counterfoil Ext.4 series. The learned Additional Judicial Commissioner has examined the evidence in detail in Paragraphs 19 to 23 of his judgment and after having referred to various authorities cited by the appellant, held that the (appellants had defaulted in payment of rent. The other finding regarding breach of terms for tenancy was also upheld. The decks passed by the learned Munsif was confirmed by the appellate court. 8. The only substantial question of law which was decided in this appeal is : "whether in view of the fact that the different portions of the tenanted premises were gifted to plaintiff Nos.1 and 3 separately, the one suit for eviction was maintainable at their instance. " 9. According to the case of the defendant-appellant in his written statement, it was denied that the plaintiff-respondent No.2 had transferred the suit property by way of gift to other two plaintiffs. The appellant insisted to pay the rent to respondent No.2 and not to the respondent Nos.1 and 3 to whom the transfer had been made by way of gift. But the rent was remitted by money order to respondent No.2. It is the case of the plaintiff that after the transfer of the ownership of the said property by respondent No.2, the appellants were intimated that respondent No.2 at landlord shall continue to receive rent and give rent receipts to the appellant. The learned courts below have found that the defendant No.1 was informed of the gift by Ext.16. 10. Shri N. K. Prasad, the learned counsel for the appellant has argued that in view of the plaintiffs case that since the date of execution of deed of gift (Ext.8) the plaintiff Nos. land 3 became owners, the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs without specifying and indicating specifically as to who would be entitled to get delivery of possession in the suit premises, the decree was in-executable. 11. land 3 became owners, the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs without specifying and indicating specifically as to who would be entitled to get delivery of possession in the suit premises, the decree was in-executable. 11. The learned counsel has placed reliance on Ramtahal Modi V/s. Ratan Lal, 1988 BBCJ 950 (Division Bench ). In this case, it has been held that having regard to the provisions as contained in Sections 8 and 109 of the transfer of Property Act, 1882, a transferee pendente lite cannot take advantage of the default committed by the tenant to the original owner who had filed the suit for eviction, on the arrears of rent also since the right of the transferee commences with the assignment. He, therefore, cannot maintain the suit for eviction on the ground of default committed prior to the assignment. 12. In my opinion, this case is clearly distinguishable on facts Here, the suit was instituted after the transfer and not during the pendency of the suit. The original landlord namely respondent No.1 is himself one of the plalntiffs. He is father and natural guardian of respondent No.3 who was a minor. The definition of "landlord" in Sec.2 (d) is couched in a very wide language and includes the person who he time being receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building whe aer on his own account or on behalf of other or as an agent, transferee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian. There cannot be doubt that the respondent No.2 who was admittedly receiving the rent prior to the transfer was entitled to institute a suit in his own capacity as also guardian of respondent No.3. The finding of the trial court was that they were liable to pay the rent only to respondent no, 2 and not to respondent Nos.1 and 3. 13. Shri Prasad further submitted that a combined suit by plalntiff nos 1 and 3 in respect of two tenancy was not maintainable. The finding of the trial court was that they were liable to pay the rent only to respondent no, 2 and not to respondent Nos.1 and 3. 13. Shri Prasad further submitted that a combined suit by plalntiff nos 1 and 3 in respect of two tenancy was not maintainable. Shri Prasad referred to Sec.109 of the Transfer of property Act which reads as follows: "if the lessor transfers the property seased, or any part thereof, or any of his interest therein, the transferee, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights, and, if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long as he is the owner of it ; but the lessor shall not, by reason only of such transfer, cease to be subject to any of the liabilities imposed upon him by the lease, unless the lessee elects to treat the transferee as the person liable to him. " 14. Shri Prasad has placed strong reliance on the single Judge decision of M. P. High Court in Subash Chandra V/s. Radhaballav, AIR 1972 MP 206 in the aforesaid case certain property was transferred to different persons by the owners. Only one of the transferees served notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was held by Bhave, J, that notice was not invalid since a lease always becomes severed protanto on transfer of part of the properties Bhave, J, relied on the following decision of Madras Hish court in Kannyan V/s. Alikutti, AIR 1920 Mad 838 (F,b.) : "where several items of property are comprised in a lease, the lessor is not entitled to eject the tenant from a part only of the holding but the assignee of the reversion in part of the demised premises is entitled to eject for due cause from such part on payment of the value of the improvements to that part. " Bhave J held : "i am inclined to follow the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in AIR 3920 Mad 838 (Full Bench) (Supra) relied on by Shri Agarwal, and also the other two decisions, cited by me. " Bhave J held : "i am inclined to follow the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in AIR 3920 Mad 838 (Full Bench) (Supra) relied on by Shri Agarwal, and also the other two decisions, cited by me. In my opinion, when joint owners give any property on lease, the terms of the lease cannot be varied so long as the property is held by them jointly ; but the grant of lease must always be presumed to the subject to the condition that the joint owners may separate their interests by partition and in that case the partition would have the effect of severing the tenancy also pro tanto. Similarly, even if one owner leases out the property, the lease must always be held to be subject to the condition that on transfer of the part of the property the lease shall stand severed pratanto. " 15. This decision was also of no relevance to this case because both the transferees have instituted the suit jointly. This does not follow from the decision that both the transferees were obliged to institute two separate suits for ejectment of the tenant from respective portion transferred to them as contended by Shri Prasad. 16. The contention of Shri Prasad that the combined suit by respondent nos.1 and 3 who became respective owners of his specified portion of the suit property transferred to them by gift is not maintainable is without merit Shri Prasads argument ignores the provisions in Order I, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides. All persons may be joined in one suit as plalntiffs where,- (a) any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of the same act or transaction or series or acts or transactions as alleged to exist in such persons, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative : and (b) if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise. It is not at all necessary for the application of this rule that every plalntiff should be interested in entire subject matter of the suit. 17. A somewhat identical question was raised and decided in M. S. Hariramfatan Das V/s. Lanhailal, AIR 1975 Raj 23 . In that case, the owner of clot of land had let-out the land on rent to several defendants. 17. A somewhat identical question was raised and decided in M. S. Hariramfatan Das V/s. Lanhailal, AIR 1975 Raj 23 . In that case, the owner of clot of land had let-out the land on rent to several defendants. The owner sold four different portions of the plots to four plalntiffs by four separate sale deeds The four purchasers brought a joint suit for eviction of the tenant The defendants raised a number of please, on of which was a plea relating to mis-joinder of parties and causes of action. P. N. Singhal, J, held that the joint suit by all the purchasers was perfectly maintainable by applying rule 1 Order I of the Civil Procedure Code. 18. This very question was considered by Shambhoo Dayal V/s. Chand Kali devi AIR 1964 All 350 . The facts of that case were these. A house was owned by three brothers. The house was let-out to one tenant. The three brothers devided the house into three separate portions. The. transfer of each portion was made by separate sale deed. The three purchasers after obtaining permission of the Rent Controller filed a suit for eviction of the tenant A plea of non-maintainability of the suit on the ground of misjoinder was raised by the tenant-defendant. The plea was dismissed by s. S Dhawan. J, by applying Sec.99 of the Code ofci vil Procedure, which provides that "no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any misjoinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceeding in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court. " as Lald down by their Lordships by the Privy Council in Maharaja Mahasur singh V/s. Baboo Harakh Naraln Singh, AIR 1937 PC 233 : "the law that an error or irregularity cannot be raised as a ground of appeal only refers to errors, defects or irregularities of procedure, not to rules of law or condition which affect the substantive rights of the parties". A non-compliance of every rule or procedure does not ipso facto destroy the validity of the whole proceeding. " The rules of procedures made to subserve the ends of justice and not to defeat them. A non-compliance of every rule or procedure does not ipso facto destroy the validity of the whole proceeding. " The rules of procedures made to subserve the ends of justice and not to defeat them. 19 Shri Prasad submitted that the decision of Allahabad High Court and Rajasthan High Court does not lay correct law as Sec.37 of the transfer of Property Act was not considered by their Lordships of the Allaahbad high Court and Rajasthan High Court in the decision cited above. In my opinion, Sec.37 of the Transfer of Property Act is hardly applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 20. In the present case, the court below have found when the deed of gift became effective, the donees informed the tenant-appellant that the respondent (donor) who used to collect rent prior to the institution of the suit shall continue to receive rent prior to the institution of the suit, the appellant sent money-order to plalntiff-respondent No.2. In M. S. Refrigerators (India) Pvt. Ltd. V/s. Patna Electric Works, AIR 1975 pat 97 (DB), the owner of the suit premises executed lease in favour of one of the lessee. The other portion of the suit premises was in occupation of the defendants. An intimation was given to the tenants-defendants by the owners as well as the new lessees that the rent should be paid to the lessee. The tenant refused to to pay rent to the lessee and insisted paying rent to the owners of the property. It was held by Utwalia, C. J. (as his Lordships then was) that on the execution of the concurrence lease, the lessee became entitled to get rent from the appellant-tenant, the appellant having not tendered rent to the lessee as directed by the owner became defaulter and was hence liable to ejectment. 21. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal ought to fail and is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. The appellant is granted three months time to vacate the suit premises, failing which the decree-holder will be entitled to execute the decree. Appeal dismissed.