On The Death of the Sole Suranjan Deb, His Heirs Smti Sushama Rani Dey and Others v. Mustt Hamida Khatun Choudhury and Others
1992-03-13
D.N.BARUAH
body1992
DigiLaw.ai
This revision petition is directed against the appellate judgment and decree dated 29.3.85, passed by the Assistant District Judge, Karimganj, in Title Appeal No. 48 of 1983 dismissing the appeal and affirming the judgment and decree dated 10.3.88 passed by the Munsiff No. 1, Karimganj in Title Suit No 134 of 1980. The Munsiff decreed the suit. 2. Suranjan Deb - the predecessors-in-interest of the present petitioners was the first defendant in the trial court. The first to third Opposite Party as plaintiff brought a suit in the court of the Munsiff No. 1, against said Suranjan Deb and fourth to sixth Opposite Party and Rajat Das, as defendants for their eviction from the suit property and also for recovery of Rs. 600/- from the first defendant with interest. The defendants appeared in the suit. Suranjan Deb as first defendant filed written statement denying the allegations. The second to fourth defendant filed written statement. Issues were framed by the trial court. During the trial, the plaintiffs examined one witness and first defendant also examined one witness on his behalf. After conclusion of the trial, the Munsiff decreed the suit on contest. 3. The first defendant preferred appeal (TA No. 48/83) in the Court of the learned Assistant District Judge, Karimganj. The Assistant District Judge also dismissed the appeal on contest and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. Hence, the first defendant filed this revision petition before this Court. 4. During the pendency of this petition, the sole petitioner Suranjan Deb - the first defendant (hereinafter referred to "deceased petitioner) died leaving behind his widow, sons and daughters. This Court by order dated 8.4.91 allowed the prayer for substitution and accordingly, the names of the present petitioners 1 to 7 were substituted in place of the deceased petitioner Suranjan Deb. The name of the seventh Opp. party was struck off laicron. 5. The petitioners' case, inter alia, is that first to third Opposite party filed the title suit No 134/80, for eviction and for recovery of arrear rent and compensation against deceased petitioner and others, slating that the deceased petitioner was a tenant under them in respect of the suit premises on an arrangement to pay rent of Rs. 80/- per month and he paid rent up to As win 1386 B.S. and, therefore, did not pay the rent and became a defaulter.
80/- per month and he paid rent up to As win 1386 B.S. and, therefore, did not pay the rent and became a defaulter. He also in violation of the terms of the tenancy, sublet different rooms to the fourth to sixth Opposite Party and Rajat Das. Besides, in the said suit, the plaintiffs also staled that the houses were in a dilapidated condition. Notices were served on the defendants to vacate the house. The defendants filed written statement and contested the suit. It was averred that Surendra nath Deb, the father of the deceased petitioner was the original tenant under Fayaz Ali - the Vendor of (he first 10 third Opposite Party and Abdul Musabir Choudhury and he constructed two houses on the land with the permission of Fayaz Ali - the original owner. The suit property was thereafter purchased by the plaintiffs and Abdul Musabir Choudhury. Surendra Nath Deb - the father of the deceased petitioner became the tenant under the purchasers in respect of the demised house. He was the absolute owner of two houses thus constructed by him. After his death, the deceased petitioner along with his mother, brothers and sisters became owners of the said two houses and lemans in respects of demised house, let-out to Surendra Nath Deb. In the written statement, the deceased petitioner look the ground that the suit was bad for non-joinder of Abdul Musabir Choudhury, one of the co-owners of the land and house and also for non joinder of the mother, brothers and sisters of the deceased petitioner. On the death of the original tenant, i.e. Surendra Nath Deb, the right, title and interest in respect of the house con-strutted by him devolved upon the deceased petitioner and his mother, brothers and sailors. The lease hold right in respect of the demise premise also devolved upon them. 6. The Exhibit - A was the copy of the sale deed. By that sale deed the Opposite party and said Abdul Musabir Choudhury purchased the land and house and thus became the owner. However, Abdul Musabir Choudhury was not a party in the suit. In the sale deed, Exhibit -A, it was specifically mentioned that the father of the deceased petitioner constructed the two houses on the remaining portion of the land of the demise premises with the permission of the original owners. 7.
However, Abdul Musabir Choudhury was not a party in the suit. In the sale deed, Exhibit -A, it was specifically mentioned that the father of the deceased petitioner constructed the two houses on the remaining portion of the land of the demise premises with the permission of the original owners. 7. Even though, all these points were raised, the Munsilf decreed the suit without considering these points. The Munsiff also failed to consider the material facts that after the death of Surendra Nath Deb, the right, title and interest of the said two houses constructed by him devolved upon his heirs, viz; deceased petitioner and his mother, brothers and sisters. Similarly, the lease hold right of the demise house also devolved upon them. The legal heirs of his father having not been made party in the suit, and the suit filed by the first to third Opposite party only, was bad for nonjoinder of necessary party and the Munsiff had no jurisdiction to grant decree without impleading the necessary parties. Similarly, the first to third Opposite party alone did not have the right to sue in view of the fad that one of the co-purchasers -Abdul Musabir Choudhury, was not party. The first to third Opposite Party tried to show that said Abdul Musabir Choudhury orally made a gift to the first to third Opposite party in respect of his share of the said property but there was no such proof. The learned Munsiff had no jurisdiction to grant decree as prayed for without impleading those necessary parties. The right, title and interest over the subject mailer of the suit being indivisible, suit could be decreed in the present form. 8. The deceased petitioner preferred an appeal (Title Appeal No. 48/83) before the Assistant District Judge, Karimganj, who also dismissed the appeal by judgment dated 29.3.85. Hence this present revision petition. 9. I have heard both sides. Mr. N.M. Lahiri, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Courts below acted illegally and with malarial irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction by not taking into consideration the facts that the original tenant, Surendra Nath Deb constructed houses on the remaining portion of the land of the demise premises with the permission and consent of the original landlord, Faiz Ali, and therefore, there was a separate tenancy in respect of the land on which the construction were made.
The Courts below also failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by not considering the Exhibit-A, proved by the plaintiff's own witness. In this Exhibit -A it was specifically mentioned that the father of the deceased petitioner constructed two houses behind the house let out to him by the original owner, Fayaz Ali, with his consent, and on his death, the right, little and interest of the said properly devolved upon his heirs, viz; deceased petitioner, his widow mother, brothers and sisters on the death of father. Therefore, the courts had no jurisdiction to grant decree for eviction without impleading the said heirs of the original tenant. Mr. Lahiri has also submitted that Abdul Musabir Choudhury was one of the co-purchasers of the suit property. Suit brought by the first to third Opposite party without impleading him was not maintainable. 10. Mr. C.R. De, learned counsel for the first to third Opposite party has submitted that the findings of the Courts below are concluded by findings of the facts and that this Court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction may not interfere with such finding. He has further submitted that the lease deed, Ext-1, executed by the deceased petitioner and with the execution of the deed of lease, Ext-1, fresh relationship of the landlord and tenant was created between them, and, therefore, he was estopped from questioning the title of the landlord. Regarding non-joinder also, Mr. De has submitted that the objection regarding the non-joinder of necessary parties was not available to him in as much as he himself executed the deed, Ext-1, and after having executed the said deed, he has no claim whatsoever, to raise the ground of non-joinder to necessary parties. 11. In reply, Mr. Lahiri has submitted that even after execution of the lease deed, the receipts were granted by the landlord in the name of the deceased petitioner and his brothers, and, therefore, it cannot be said that he executed the deed on his own behalf and excluded other heirs. 12. In the light of the above submissions, let me discuss whether the findings arrived at by the first appellate court is sustainable in law or not, and whether the first appellate court failed to exercise his jurisdiction vested in it in passing the impugned judgment.
12. In the light of the above submissions, let me discuss whether the findings arrived at by the first appellate court is sustainable in law or not, and whether the first appellate court failed to exercise his jurisdiction vested in it in passing the impugned judgment. The admitted fact is that the land and the tenanted house originally belonged to Fayaz Ali, who sold it to four persons, viz, first to third Opposite party and Abdul Musabir Choudhury. The suit was brought by three out of four purchasers against the deceased petitioner and fourth to sixth Opposite party and Rajat Das. It is also evident from the record that the original tenant, i.e. the father of the deceased petitioner died leaving behind the deceased petitioner, his widow mother, and his brothers and sisters. 13. It is an esiablished principle of law that on the death of a tenant, the lease hold rights devolve upon his legal heirs. From the Ext-A also it appears that some houses behind me tenanted house, were constructed by the father of the deceased petitioner with the consent of original owner, Fayaz Ali. This documents was executed by the original owner in favour of the purchasers including the plaintiffs (first to third Opposite Party). 14. The first to third Opposite party claimed that deceased petitioner executed a fresh deed of lease. Now it is to be seen whether the deceased petitioner alone could execute a fresh deed of lease to the exclusion of the other heirs of the original tenant Surendranath Deb. Admittedly, the lease hold right of the demise house, devolved upon all the legal heirs of the original tenant and thus they became tenants in respect of that tenanted house. Whether such rights acquired by the heirs of Surendranath Deb could be extinguished by merely executing fresh deed of lease. In my opinion, it cannot be so done. 15. Mr. Lahiri, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of Textile Association (India) Bombay Unit v. Balmohan Gopal Kurup, (1990) 4 SCC 700 . In this case, the premises in question was under occupation of one Gopal Kurup as tenant. He left behind his widow, two sons and daughters.
15. Mr. Lahiri, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of Textile Association (India) Bombay Unit v. Balmohan Gopal Kurup, (1990) 4 SCC 700 . In this case, the premises in question was under occupation of one Gopal Kurup as tenant. He left behind his widow, two sons and daughters. After death of Gopal Kurup the landlord filed an eviction petition only against mother and brother i.e. wife and son were impleaded as party and a son was left out in the said petition. The Supreme Court held that without impleading all the heirs the eviction petitioner was not maintainable. Following the decision of the Apex Court, I hold that all the heirs of Surendranath Deb having interest over the demise house, a suit against the deceased petitioner is not maintainable in view of the fact that interest on the demise house is indivisible, and, therefore, all the heirs are necessary party. 16. As regard the houses constructed by the father of the deceased petitioner with the consent and permission of the original owner as it will appear from the Exhibit-A, certainly the other heirs of the original owner had equal interest on the said houses and without impleading those persons, order of eviction would be illegal and without jurisdiction. In this regard the lower appellate court held as follows: ".. I must find and hold mat the defendant No. 1 was the only tenant in respect of the suit premises and the heirs of late Surendra Kumar Deb cannot be regarded as tenant in respect of the suit premises ..." In arriving to that finding the learned court below misdirected himself to the provisions of law and totally overlooked the fact of constructions of houses by the original tenant. Those other houses constructed by the father of the deceased petitioners, there was no question of executing the deed of lease in as much as the said houses did not belong to the landlord. Besides, the deceased petitioner alone had no right and authority over those houses, as the other heirs of the father of the deceased petitioner had also similar right, title and interest over the said houses. 18. Next point raised by Mr. Lahiri is that out of four purchasers only three filed the suit as plaintiff.
Besides, the deceased petitioner alone had no right and authority over those houses, as the other heirs of the father of the deceased petitioner had also similar right, title and interest over the said houses. 18. Next point raised by Mr. Lahiri is that out of four purchasers only three filed the suit as plaintiff. The fourth purchaser, viz, Abdul Musabir Choudhury was not a party in the suit, and, therefore, the suit was not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. In discussing this point the Courts below held that Abdul Musabir Choudhury made a gift in favour of first to third Opposite party, and, therefore, the first to third Opposite party alone was maintainable. The trial court held that Abdul Musabir Choudhury made a gift orally and such oral gift was valid under the Mohammadan law. The first appellate court without examining this point simply concurred with the findings of the trial court by observing as follows : ".. learned Munsiff believed the plaintiff's version that Abdul Musabir Choudhury gifted his share to the present plaintiffs. I also do not find any material on record to disagree with the findings of the learned Munsiff on this point". The first appellate court did not make any endeavour to find out whether there was any material to come to the finding that Abdul Musabir Choudhury actually made the gift. The story of gift was not even pleaded in the pleadings of the plaintiffs (first to third Opposite party). Mr. De, the learned counsel for the first to third Opposite party also could not show that it was pleaded in the plaint nor was there any evidence adduced to that effect. The impugned judgment is also silent in this regard. 19. In a suit for ejectment, all the owners are necessary party, inasmuch as an effective decree for ejectment cannot be granted without impleading all the owners. 1 find sufficient force on the submission of Mr. Lahiri on this point. I, therefore, hold that the suit filed by first to third Opposite Party without impleading the co-purchaser, Abdul Musabir Choudhury, is bad for non-joinder of necessary party. 20. In respect of the houses constructed by the father of the deceased petitioner, admittedly, there was a separate arrangement in as much as the said houses were constructed after the commencement of the tenancy of the demise house.
20. In respect of the houses constructed by the father of the deceased petitioner, admittedly, there was a separate arrangement in as much as the said houses were constructed after the commencement of the tenancy of the demise house. There is no evidence on record to show that on what arrangement such houses were constructed. Pleading is silent in that respect also. 21. Now the question is that in case of a separate and independent arrangement in respect of the houses constructed by the father of the deceased petitioner, whether the cause of action arose in respect of the said two houses can be joined in the same suit. The nature of occupation in respect of the demise house and in respect of the houses constructed by the father of the deceased petitioner are different. The status of the deceased petitioner and other heirs of his father in respect of the demise house and the houses constructed by the original tenant are not the same and similar. The cause of action also in respect of the said demise house and the said houses arose at a different point of time. Under the above circumstances, I am of the opinion that the suit for eviction of the demise house along with the houses constructed by the original tenant is not maintainable. 22. For what have been stated above, I find that the Courts below completely failed to look into those important aspects of the matter, and, therefore, granting of the decree, in my opinion, was illegal and without jurisdiction. I accordingly allow the petition an set aside the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below. In the result, the petition is allowed, however, no order as to costs.