JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was delivered by G. T. NANAVATI, J. - Petition No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as "the petitioner") is a manufacturer of welding electrodes and is using wire rods as raw materials. It is also a dealer registered under the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969. It is the case of the petitioner that relying upon the sales tax incentive scheme declared by the Government by its resolutions dated November 22, 1997 and August 27, 1980, it established the new industrial unit in September, 1980, in a backward area. For that purpose, it had obtained a plot in the industrial estate of the G.I.D.C. at Umbergaon and took possession thereof on April 21, 1981. It also placed orders for purchase of machinery and by December 22, 1982, it had invested Rs. 20,50,000, and it started commercial production on December 22, 1982. On may 13, 1983, it applied to the Deputy Commissioner of Industries, respondent No. 2, for an eligibility certificate. On September 19, 1983, the 2nd respondent granted such a certificate, sanctioning payment of cash subsidy of Rs. 3,07,500, but did not grant the eligibility certificate necessary for obtaining the benefit of sales tax deferment. Respondent No. 2 then obtained from the petitioner details regarding the investments in fixed assets made by the petitioner up to January 7, 1982, for establishing the new industry and then on May 22, 1987, issued the eligibility certificate mentioning therein Rs. 2,79,255 as the limit of sales tax deferment benefit. Thought the said eligibility certificate was granted on May 22, 1987, it was stated to be effective from December 22, 1982, the date on which the petitioner had started commercial production. It is the petitioner's case that he was entitled to a larger benefit of sales tax deferment as it had invested, in all Rs. 20,50,000 and as it was entitled to the benefit to the extent of 35 per cent. of the total investment made by it and as the new industrial unit was located in C Grade Growth Centre. As the respondent No. 2 has not considered the petitioner's application for suitably amending the eligibility certificate and as the respondents are not permitting the petitioner to avail of the larger benefit, to which it is entitled, it has filed this petition. As the respondent No. 2 has not considered the petitioner's application for suitably amending the eligibility certificate and as the respondents are not permitting the petitioner to avail of the larger benefit, to which it is entitled, it has filed this petition. The fact that the petitioner established a new industrial unit in September, 1980, in a C Grade Centre is not in dispute. The fact that by January 7, 1982, the petitioner had invested Rs. 7,97,874 is also not in dispute. The point in dispute is whether the investment made in fixed assets between January 7, 1982 and December 22, 1982, was also required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of working out the benefit of sales tax deferment available to the petitioner. This question arises, because on January 7, 1982, the Government passed another resolution and made some more industries ineligible for any of the incentives declared by the Government in that behalf by the relevant Government resolutions and circulars. In the list contained in that resolution, "the industry of wire drawing of steel and items requiring wire rods as essential raw materials" was made ineligible for incentives contained in the relevant Government resolutions and circulars. The stands taken by the respondents is that as the petitioner's industry became ineligible for any incentive after January 7, 1982, whatever investment in fixed assets made by the petitioner thereafter was not to be considered for the purpose of working out the benefit to which it had become entitled under the scheme. February 6, 1992 : What is contended by the learned advocate for the petitioner is that the petitioner has established its factory in a backward area, relying upon the promise made by the Government. It is the petitioner's case that, it has not only spent Rs. 7,97,874 by January 7, 1982, but it had made firm commitments and landed itself in a position, from where it was not possible to retrieve itself and, therefore, the respondents should not now be permitted to go back upon the promise of sales tax incentive benefit merely because on January 7, 1982, the Government decided to excluded the industry of wire drawing of steel and items requiring wire rods as essential raw materials from the incentive schemes declared by it till that date. The petitioner submits that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is clearly applicable to the facts of this case and, therefore, this Court should declare that the petitioner is entitled to the full benefits of the promise, on which the petitioner relied upon and the respondents be directed to extent the benefits to it. The only answer of the respondents is that as the industry engaged in wire drawing of steel and items requiring wire rods as essential raw materials is excluded from the purview of the scheme with effect from January 7, 1982, no more benefit under the scheme could be made available to such an industry. Promissory estoppel, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1979] 44 STC 42; AIR 1979 SC 621 , is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice. The true principle is that, where one party has, by his words or conduct, made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise, which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party, to whom the promise is made and it is, in fact, so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings, which have taken place between the parties. It being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires and in such cases, the court may not grant relief to the promisee even though he has acted upon the promise and altered his position. It being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires and in such cases, the court may not grant relief to the promisee even though he has acted upon the promise and altered his position. In Special Civil Application No. 5108 of 1984 (See Tata Metals and Strips Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [1992] 87 STC 447.), this Court had an occasion to consider the same scheme and rejected the contention raised on behalf of the Government that the promise, which was made by the Government, was conditional and that the only assurance, which the Government had held out, was that the new industrial unit was to continue to get the benefit under the scheme so long as it was an industry, which was not included in the list of industries excluded from the purview of the scheme. It was held that by the resolution of 1980, the Government did give a promise to the entrepreneurs that if a new unit or project was set up by them on the basis of the assurance held out under the scheme, then it was entitled to the benefits available under the scheme, if the other conditions, on fulfilment of which the benefits were to be extended, were fulfilled. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Motilal Padampat's case [1979] 44 STC 42; AIR 1979 SC 621 and the decision of this Court referred to above, and also in view of the undisputed acts of this case, it will have to be held that the petitioner is entitled to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel, even though the industry, which it had set up relying upon the assurance made by the Government, was subsequently excluded from the benefits of the scheme. Such exclusion would apply to the new industrial units set up thereafter and it would be inequitable to deprive the new industrial unit of the benefits declared under the scheme on the ground of such subsequent exclusion. There is no dispute in this case that, relying upon the scheme, the petitioner had decided to set up a new industry in a backward area in September, 1980 and had purchased a piece of land, constructed a building over it and had obtained some machinery also before January 7, 1982. There is no dispute in this case that, relying upon the scheme, the petitioner had decided to set up a new industry in a backward area in September, 1980 and had purchased a piece of land, constructed a building over it and had obtained some machinery also before January 7, 1982. Thus, the petitioner had altered its position, relying upon the promise made by the Government, by making substantial investment, though it had started commercial production after that date. Under the circumstances, it would be inequitable if the Government is permitted to go back upon its promise and if the petitioner is denied the benefits available under the scheme. The Industries Commissioner and the sales tax authorities were, therefore, wrong in determining the extent of benefit available to the petitioner by taking into consideration the investment in fixed assets made only up to January 7, 1982. As we do not have material to show how much investment in fixed assets was made by the petitioner till December 20, 1982, relying upon the promise made by the Government, it is not possible to grant any other relief except the declaration that if it is shown by the petitioner that further investment up to December 20, 1982, was made by it pursuant to the assurance given by the Government, then the Industries Commissioner and the sales tax authorities are bound to consider that investment also for the purpose of determining the extent of benefit available to the petitioner under the scheme. In the result, this petition is partly allowed. Respondent No. 2 is directed to suitably amend the eligibility certificate granted by it and respondent No. 3 is directed to suitably amend the deferment certificate and the respondents are directed to extent the benefits available to the petitioner under the scheme and in terms of the amended certificate. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.