Judgement JAGANNADHA RAO, C.J.:- This ref­erence to a Full Bench raises important questions under Sections 94, 95(1)(b) and its two provisos and under S. 95(2)(b) and also under Sections 110-A and 110-AA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The appeal itself arises out of a claim allowed under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 in which the competent authority made the owner of the vehicle as well as the Insurance Company liable in a sum of Rs. 51,256.20. The appeal is preferred by the Insurance Company under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 read with S. 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The re­spondents-claimants before us are the legal representatives of the workman as also the owner of the vehicle. 2. The facts of the case briefly are that the deceased, one John Mathew fell from the top of a stag carriage bus belonging to the respondent-vehicle owner while the vehicle was stationed at the Municipal Bus Stand at Palai. He fell down at 5 a.m. on. 13-12-1984 and was removed to the hospital where he died at 8.30 p.m. on the same day. The claimants are the widow and two children. They are also respondents before us. They moved the Commissioner under the Work­men's Compensation Act claiming a sum of Rs. 51,256.20. They contended that the de­ceased was employed by the vehicle owner as a cleaner and that the accident occurred out of and in the course of employment. According to them, the deceased was doing the work of cleaning, repairing, changing of tyres, etc. The bus in question does number of trips every day between Palai-Kondungoor. They claimed that the deceased was getting a salary of Rs. 600/- per month and that he was aged 27 years at the time of death. 3. The defence of the bus owner was that the deceased was not at all working under him as a cleaner, that the deceased was attending to the work not only in relation to his bus but also in relation to other buses at the same bus-stand. In other words, he contended that there was no relationship between employer and employee and, therefore, the Workmen's Compensation Act was not applicable. Alternatively, he contended that even if he was liable, the Insurance Policy taken out by him would make the Insurance Company liable. 4. In other words, he contended that there was no relationship between employer and employee and, therefore, the Workmen's Compensation Act was not applicable. Alternatively, he contended that even if he was liable, the Insurance Policy taken out by him would make the Insurance Company liable. 4. The Insurance Company filed a state­ment contending that the deceased was not employed by the bus owner and, therefore, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not apply. In any event, the age and wages as mentioned in the Claim Application were not true. The Insurance Company was not liable. 5. The Commissioner under the Work­men's Compensation Act conducted an in­quiry, marked Exts. A1 and A2 and examined the widow of the deceased as A.W. 1 and another witness as A.W. 2. On the other hand, the bus owner examined himself as R.W. 1 and two other witnesses as R.Ws 2 and 3. The Commissioner, on a consideration of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the deceased was a workman of the bus owner and was employed as a cleaner on a monthly salary of Rs. 600/-. He, therefore, held that the Workmen's Compensation Act applied to the facts of the case. On the merits, he passed an award for Rs. 51,256.20 by multiplying the age factor with 40% of the wages (213.57 X 240) and awarded costs of Rs. 400/-. The Commissioner made the Insurance Company liable for the entire award amount of Rs. 51,256.20. The Insurance Company has filed this appeal questioning the award passed against it. 6. In this appeal, it is contended by Sri S. B. Premachandra Prabhu for the Insu­rance Company that the deceased was not employed by the bus owner at all much less as a cleaner and that, therefore, Workmen's Compensation Act did not apply. He also contended that under Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Insur­ance Company was only liable in the case of insolvency of the bus owner or other special situations contemplated by Section 14. Ac­cording to him, the liability of the Insurance Company, to the extent specified in S. 95(2)(b) could arise only under S. 110-AA of the Motor Vehicles Act. Under that Section, there must be a valid claim arising both under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 as well as the Motor Vehicles Act. Ac­cording to him, the liability of the Insurance Company, to the extent specified in S. 95(2)(b) could arise only under S. 110-AA of the Motor Vehicles Act. Under that Section, there must be a valid claim arising both under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 as well as the Motor Vehicles Act. Merely because the claim arises only under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the In­surance Company cannot be made liable under Section 95(2)(b). In such situations, the liability of the Insurance Company will be only confined to Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. So far as the liability under Motor Vehicles Act is concerned, apart from Section 92-A relating to 'no fault liabi­lity', there is no other liability unless negli­gence on the part of the vehicle owner or his servants is established. Unless the vehicle owner is made liable, the Insurance Company cannot be made liable as an indemnifier. There is no liability arising out of breach of statutory duty or of Section 94 read with S. 95(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act. In any event, even assuming that the Motor Vehicles Act applied and even if there is a liability without negligence, no breach of statutory duty has been established in this case inas­much as the vehicle owner had taken out a policy covering the liability under S. 95(1)(b). It is alternatively contended that so far as workmen are concerned, who could claim also under the provisions of the Motor Vehi­cles Act, they have to come under the first proviso to S. 95(1)(b) e.g., driver, conductor, ticket-examiner or those being carried in a goods vehicle. That provision is exhaustive so far as workmen are concerned to whom the Workmen's Compensation Act applies. If a person is a workmen not falling under the above first proviso, he could not be brought under the second proviso to S. 95(1)(b) treat­ing him as a person who is being carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. Employees of the vehicle owner come only under the first proviso to S. 95(1)(b) and cannot come under the second proviso. In any event, passengers carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment fall under Section 95(2)(b)(ii) and the liability of the Insurance Company is only Rs. 15,000/-. Such persons cannot fall under Section 95(2)(b)(i) wherein the Insu­rance Company could be made liable for Rs. 50,000/-. In any event, passengers carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment fall under Section 95(2)(b)(ii) and the liability of the Insurance Company is only Rs. 15,000/-. Such persons cannot fall under Section 95(2)(b)(i) wherein the Insu­rance Company could be made liable for Rs. 50,000/-. S. 92A is also not attracted. 7. On the other hand, it is contended by Sri Gopalakrishna Kurup, learned counsel for the claimants, that apart from liability under the law of negligence and also 'no fault liability' under S. 92-A, an owner can be made liable for breach of statutory duty under S. 94 read with S. 95(1)(b). For establishing liabi­lity for breach of statutory duties, no negli­gence need be established on the part of the vehicle owner or his servants. This is clear from the judgement of the Supreme Court in Guru Govekar v. Filomena F. Lobo, AIR 1988 SC 1332. On the facts of the present case, there is a breach of statutory duty on the part of the vehicle owner and, therefore, apart from negligence and no fault liability, the vehicle owner is liable. Even assuming that the vehicle owner who is an employee is liable only under the workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the liability of the Insurance Com­pany is not restricted to the situations men­tioned in Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Insurance Company could be made liable under Section 95(5) for its statutory liability under Section 95(2) because of the option given by the claimants under Section 110-AA of the Motor Vehicles Act. In the present case, the cleaner was an employee of the bus owner and he was moving in the bus and attending to cleaning, repairing, changing of tyres etc. and was going in the bus in all the trips everyday. He was, there­fore, also in the position of a passenger. The provisions of the first proviso to S. 95(1)(b) are not exhaustive so far as workmen covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act are concerned. So far as the other workmen who do not fall within the categories of driver, conductor, ticket examiner or passenger in a goods vehicle they can legitimately fall under the second proviso to S. 95(1)(b) as passeng­ers carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. If they are passeng­ers so carried, the compensation payable by the Insurance Company is not Rs. If they are passeng­ers so carried, the compensation payable by the Insurance Company is not Rs. 15,000/- ­under Section 95(2)(b)(ii), but is Rs. 50,000/- ­under Section 95(2)(b)(i). This is because of the fact that the words in S. 5(2)(b)(i) apply to all persons other than passengers carried for hire or reward and the word 'passengers' in Section 95(2)(b)(ii) has to be restricted to pas­sengers carried for hire or reward, who are excluded from Section 95(2)(b)(i). In any event, the insurer is liable for the amount covered by Section 92-A. 8. These being the various contentions raised by learned counsel on either side, the following points arise for consideration: (1) Whether the deceased was a workman work­ing as a cleaner and employed by the bus owner and whether the accident occurred by reason of and in pursuance of a contract of employment so as to attract the liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923? (2) Where the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act, ­1923 is availed, whether the insurer can be made liable for the liability under S. 95(2) or 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 only if, on the facts, a claim could arise under both the statutes? (3) Whether for purposes of liability under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 apart from cases of : (a) negligence of the vehicle owner or of his servants, and (b) no fault liability under Section 92-A, there is a third category; breach of statutory duty (without proof of negligence), in the context of Section 94 and 95(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act? (4) Whether, on the facts of the case, there is breach of statutory duty established under Sections 94 and 95(1)(b) of the Motor Vehi­cles Act, 1939? (5) Assuming that there is breach of statu­tory duty as stated under Point No. (4), whether the first proviso to Section 95(1)(b) is exhaustive in cases of all workmen and if not, whether the deceased even though a work­man, can still be a passenger carried by virtue of or pursuant to a contract of employment within the second proviso to S. 95(1)(b)? (6) Assuming that the vehicle owner was liable, whether, for purposes of quantum of statutory liability of the Insurance Company, Section 95(2)(b)(i) applied to a passenger car­ried by reason of or pursuant to a contract of employment so as to make the Company liable for Rs. (6) Assuming that the vehicle owner was liable, whether, for purposes of quantum of statutory liability of the Insurance Company, Section 95(2)(b)(i) applied to a passenger car­ried by reason of or pursuant to a contract of employment so as to make the Company liable for Rs. 50,000/- or whether all pas­sengers, whether carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment fell within Section 95(2)(b)(ii) to make the Insurance Company liable only in a sum of Rs. 15,000/-? 9. Point No. 1:- This point does not present much difficulty. In our view, the Commissioner was right in accepting the evidence of AW 1, the widow of the deceased, and of AW 2, and in arriving at the conclusion that the deceased was employed as a cleaner to go on the passenger vehicle for attending to cleaning, repairs, change of tyres, etc. and was employed on a monthly wage of Rs. 600/-. We are unable to accept the evidence of RWs. 1 to 3. In our view, the deceased was cleaning the passenger vehicle of the respon­dent-owner at the bus-stand and was also traveling in it for the aforesaid purposes. The accident occurred in the course of employ­ment while the deceased was making the vehicle ready for its daily trips between Palai and Kodungur. Hence the claimants could move the Commissioner under the Work­men's Compensation Act. Point No. 1 is found in favour of the claimants. 10. Point No. 2:- This point raises a question of the insurer's liability in certain situations. Broadly speaking, an injured workman or those who claim compensation on his death, have two remedies. Primarily, they have a remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, if the injury or the death resulting from the injury, is caused to the workman by accident arising out of and in the course of hiss employment. If the injury or death was on account of use of a motor­-vehicle of the employer, the workman would also have a remedy under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as specified in that Act. If both the remedies are available, in a given case, the workman or those who claim compensation on his death, have the option either to pursue the remedy under either of these Acts, as stated in Section 110-AA of the Motor Vehi­cles Act, 1939. That Section reads : "S. 110-AA. If both the remedies are available, in a given case, the workman or those who claim compensation on his death, have the option either to pursue the remedy under either of these Acts, as stated in Section 110-AA of the Motor Vehi­cles Act, 1939. That Section reads : "S. 110-AA. Option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases.- Notwith­standing anything contained in the Work­men's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), where the death of or bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim or compensation under this Act and also under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), the person entitled to compensation, may with­out prejudice to the provisions of Chap­ter VII-A, claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both." Now, if a claim arises under both the Acts, there is no doubt that the liability of the insurer is wider and not restricted to cases of insolvency, etc., mentioned in Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. When a claimant's case arises under both Acts, but he files a claim before the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the Commissioner can, because of Section 110-AA read with Section 95(5) make the insurer liable even in situa­tions not covered by Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. We shall go a little deeper into these aspects. 11. We shall here separate our discussion into various parts : Cases of workmen falling under the first proviso to Section 95(1)(b) and the cases of workmen falling under the second proviso to Section 95(1)(b). Of course, for the present, (before coming to Point No. 5), we are assuming that cases of certain workman can fall under the second proviso to Section 95(1)(b), and that the first proviso to S.95(1)(b) is not exhaustive of all cases of workmen. 12. First proviso to S. 95(1)(b) :- So far as the cases of workmen falling under both Acts and also the first proviso to S. 95(1)(b) and who opt for a claim before the Commis­sioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, we are governed by the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in United India Fire and General Insurance Co. v. Vasu­devan, (1989) 1 Ker LT 366 : 1989 (1) ACJ 405 : (AIR 1989 Kerala 140). v. Vasu­devan, (1989) 1 Ker LT 366 : 1989 (1) ACJ 405 : (AIR 1989 Kerala 140). The insurer will be liable for "the liability under the Work­men's Compensation Act, 1923" as stated in the first proviso. There could, of course, be a contention for the claimants that the insurer will be liable for the entire amount awarded by the Commissioner and not merely to the extent covered by Section 95(2) in case the award has exceeded the limits in S.95(2). There could also be a contention for the insurer, that because of the "opening words of Section 95(1)(b)", the 'liability' of the in­surance company in the first proviso to S. 95(1)(b) is restricted to the extent covered by S. 95(2). We do not want to go into this question, as we are not here concerned with the first proviso to Section 95(1)(b). We shall leave the cases under the first proviso there, to be governed by Vusudeans case (supra). That case was, in fact, of a cleaner of a goods vehicle coming under the first proviso to S. 95(1)(b). 13. Coming to claims which fail under both Acts, and the first proviso to Section 95(1)(b) and to a claim made under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, if there is 'liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923" established, the insurer will be liable. Here again, we do not want to go into the question whether the 'liability' of the insurer is the entire liability up to the liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, or only to the extent covered by S. 95(2) because of the opening words of S. 95(1)(b). We leave this question open because it does not arise here. 14. Second proviso to S. 9S(1)(b):- In the case of a workman falling under both Acts (we are assuming that a workman could fall under the second proviso to S. 95(1)(b), subject to our decision on Point No. 5), and a claim is filed before the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, he can, because of S. 110-AA, avail of S. 96(1) and give relief to the claimants who are not parties to the contract of insurance, against the insurer. But Section 96(1) declares that this could be done only to cover 'any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 95 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy). Section 95(1)(b), because of its opening words "to the extent specified in Sub-Section (2)", limits the insurer's liability to the limits specified in Section 95(2). There­fore, in cases not falling under S. 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, and in a case where the liability arises under both Acts and the claim is preferred before the Commissioner, the Commissioner can assess liability under that Act but can make the insurer liable only up to the limits in Section 95(2), unless the case falls under Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. 15. The position cannot obviously be dif­ferent even if the claim is filed before the Claims Tribunal, in a claim again falling under both Acts, where the case of the workman falls under the second proviso to Section 95(1)(b). Here too, the Tribunal, after assessing the liability under the Motor Vehi­cles Act, 1939 can make the insurer liable only up to the limits in Section 95(2) and not for the whole award. 16. Liability under Section 92-A;- ­(Workman falling under both Acts or under Motor Vehicles Act only). This liability does not present much difficulty, for here, Section 92-A applies to cases falling under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and it is also made part of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. If the claim of the workman arises under the Motor Vehicles Act, the insurer can be made liable for the liability in view of S. 92-E, Section 93(ba) read with S. 95(5), and the Explanation to Section 110, the proviso to sub-clause (2) of S. 110-A, Section 110-AA and proviso to S. 110-B. Therefore, whether an option is exercised under one or the other Act, where both Acts are applicable, the Insurance Company will be liable at least for Sec. 92-A liability, even in cases not falling under Section 14 of the Workmen's Com­pensation Act or Section 101 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 17. Liability under S. 92-A (Workman's case where there is no proof of negligence for invoking Motor Vehicles Act but the case falls under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923). 17. Liability under S. 92-A (Workman's case where there is no proof of negligence for invoking Motor Vehicles Act but the case falls under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923). This aspect arises where the employer is liable only under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and no negligence is established against the employer or his servants for purposes of liability under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1923. The question is whether the In­surance Company is liable, apart from Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 or Section 101 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 18. As it is not a case of negligence, the party will obviously file a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The Commissioner can pass an award against the employer and if there is an insurance policy, he can make the insurer liable to the third party within the scope of Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 for the Section 92-A liability in view of Section 92-D. If, however, he has to make the insurer liable outside Section 14, the provisions of S. 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act alone can help the third party to make a direct claim against the insurer. That will depend upon whether the liability under Section 95 (1)(b)' which is required to be discharged, under S. 96(1) by insurer directly to the third party, includes liability under Section 92-A. This aspect presents no difficulty because of the new definition of the new 'liability' introduced by Section 93(ba) which obviously qualifies the word 'liability' occurring in S. 95 (1)(b). Therefore, because of Section 93(ba), the no-fault liability under S. 92-A is required to be covered under Sections 95(1)(b) and 92-D, E and 93(ba) read with Section 96(1) furnish a direct action against the insurer by the third party outside Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, even if there is no negligence of the employer proved but pro­vided there is liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. 19. We, accordingly, hold that in this type of case where the employer comes only under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, there is no liability under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Commissioner could pass an award against the insurer to the extent of no-fault liability under S. 92-A in view of Ss. 92-D, 93(ba) and Section. 19. We, accordingly, hold that in this type of case where the employer comes only under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, there is no liability under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Commissioner could pass an award against the insurer to the extent of no-fault liability under S. 92-A in view of Ss. 92-D, 93(ba) and Section. 95 and the non obstante clause in Section 92-E and Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. We hold accordingly on Point No. 2. 20. Point No. 3:- Liability under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 can arise (a) if negligence of the vehicle owner or of his servant is established; or, (b) if there is no negligence, to the extent covered by S. 92-A. The question is whether there is a third category, breach of statutory duty without negligence being established? 21. The submission for the claimants is that there is, in law, such a third category and that the decision of the Supreme Court in Guru Govekar v. Filomena P. Lobo, AIR 1968 SC 1332 is an authority for the proposi­tion that there can be an award for compensa­tion for breach of statutory duty. The Supreme Court case, it is stated, related to be a breach of statutory duty covered by Section 94 read with Section 95(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and the vehicle owner was made liable for compensation and consequently, the insurer was also made liable, obviously because of Section 96(1). As we shall point out presently, the cases falling under the head of 'breach of statutory duty' belong to a very limited class of cases. 22. Before adverting to the Supreme Court case, it is necessary to refer to Section 94(1) which corresponds to S. 35(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 in England. It deals with the statutory duty of the person and reads as follows : "94. Necessity for insurance against third party risk :- (1) Mo person shall use except as a passenger or cause or allow any other person to use a motor vehicle in a public place, unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, a policy of insurance complying with the requirements of this Chapter." Section 95(1)(b) provides for the compulsory insurance to be taken out by the person. In other words, the policy taken out by the person must cover the liability as stated in Section 95(1)(b) to the extent of the limits stated in Section 95(2). If there is at all a policy taken out, it will have to cover Section 95(1)(b) liability to the extent of Section 95(2) limits, and is called the 'Act only' policy. In fact, policies today state that they shall cover the liability of the assured to the extent required by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and are called 'Act only' policies and are required to cover the liability in S. 96(1)(b) to the extent covered by Section 95(2). 23. The scope and extent of the statutory liability under Section 94 will be to cover the liability as specified in Section 95(1)(b) and Section 95(2). If no such insurance coverage is covered in the policy which is, in fact, taken out by a person, he shall be liable for breach and has to pay compensation to the claimant-­victim and his insurer shall have to bear the said statutory liability. 24. In Guru Govekar v. Filomena F. Lobo, AIR 1988 SC 1332, the car owner gave the car to a repairing company for repairs and the workman of the said repairer drove the vehicle and injured the claimant-respondent. It was held by the Supreme Court that when the vehicle owner had taken a policy and when he allowed the repairer or the latter's workman to use the vehicle, the car owner was guilty of breach of statutory duty under Sections 94 and 95 inasmuch as the vehicle owner allowed the use of the vehicle by a repairer and his workman who had not taken out insurance policy to protect their own liabilities towards others, as required by Section 94(1). Though an argument was put forth that the repairer was an independent contrac­tor, and his negligence could not, under normal law of tort, make the vehicle owner liable, it was held that the vehicle owner was liable under an independent tort relating to breach of statutory duties as provided in Ss. 94 and 95. The Insurance Company was also consequently made liable directly to the third party in view of Section 96(1) of the Act as there was a breach of statutory duty specified in S. 94(1). 94 and 95. The Insurance Company was also consequently made liable directly to the third party in view of Section 96(1) of the Act as there was a breach of statutory duty specified in S. 94(1). The Supreme Court followed two decisions of the Court of Ap­peal, namely, Monk v. Warbey, (1935) 1 KB 75 (CA) and of the House of Lords in McLeod (or Houston) v. Buchanan (1940) 2 All ER 179 (HL). In Monk v. Warbey (supra), the Court of Appeal accepted the principles laid down in Groves v. Lord Wimborne, (1898) 2 QB 402. Both Monk's case as well as Mc­Leod's case relate to breaches of statutory duty as provided in Section 35(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 in England. That Section corresponds to S. 94(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The facts in Monk's case and McLeod's case followed by the Supreme Court, are similar to the facts in the Supreme Court case. 25. The aforesaid decision of the Sup­reme Court in Guru Govekar's case (AIR 1988 SC 1332) (supra) would, no doubt show, that breach of statutory duty covered by Sections 94 and 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, damages could be awarded without proof of a negligence on the part of the owner of the vehicle or his servants and the Insurance Company could be made liable as provided in Section 95(1) and to the extent provided in Section 95(2). This is because of Section 96(1) which makes the Insurance Company liable to discharge the liability of the insured per­sons. Guru Govekar's case decided by the Supreme Court arose in the context of Section 94 read with Section 95(1)(b)(i) of the Act. 26. We shall presently state why the principle of damages for breach of statutory duty should be handled with care and kept within the limits of the rare types of cases as Guru Govekar. But, before doing so, we shall refer to two other rulings of the Supreme Court. In Ramdas Shenoy v. Udipi Munici­pality, AIR 1974 SC 2177, the Supreme Court observed that in order to succeed in an action for damages for breach of statutory duty, the plaintiff must establish a breach of statutory obligation which, on the proper construction of the statute was intended to be a ground of civil liability to a class of persons of whom he is one. He must establish an injury or damage of a kind against which the statute was designed to give protection. The question had also arisen earlier in another case in 1977 in Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna AIR 1977 SC 1248. In that case, the Supreme Court held that for purposes of Section 95(1)(b)(i), proof of negligence was absolutely necessary in view of the words 'incur' used in Section 95(1)(b)(i) and that breach of statutory duty could not by itself furnish a cause of action. (The Court observed (see para 23, p. 1256) that position under Section 95(1)(b)(ii) may be different). The entire discussion in the above case was held, in G.S.R.T. Corpn., Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai, AIR 1967 SC 1690, to be obiter and incorrect. Therefore, it appears to us that, as stated in Guru Govekar's case (AIR 1988 SC 1332), there is, no doubt, a small area where, apart from liability based on negli­gence or for no-fault under Section 92-A, and a vehicle owner could be made liable for such breach of the statutory duty specified in Section 94 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 read with Section 95(1)(b). 27. Before parting with this point, we have to sound a note of caution. Guru Govekar's case (AIR 1988 SC 1332) cannot be treated as a case enabling com­pensation to be awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in every case where there is no negligence or proof of negligence on the part of the vehicle owner or of his servants. That case does not, in any manner, affect or displace the well-known cause of action based on the law of torts. It merely provides another cause of action based on breach of statutory duty mentioned in Sections 94 and 93(1)(b) in a very limited class of cases, such as the one in Guru Govekar's case. Further, if there is no insurance policy at all taken out by the vehicle owner then even though there is a breach of Sections 94 and 95(1)(b), we do not see how anyone of the four nationalised insurance companies can be made liable. In our country, we do not have a body like the Motor Insurer's Bureau of England to cover cases where there is no insurance policy at all. We hold on point No. 2 accordingly. 28. In our country, we do not have a body like the Motor Insurer's Bureau of England to cover cases where there is no insurance policy at all. We hold on point No. 2 accordingly. 28. Point No. 4:- On the facts of this case, no negligence is pleaded nor proved against the owner of the passenger-vehicle. So there can be no liability based on the tort of negligence. So far as liability for breach of statutory duty under Sections 94 and 95(1)(b) is concerned, we are unable to hold that there is any such liability established. This is a case where the vehicle-owner has taken out a policy of insurance which, it is not denied, is an 'Act Policy' in the sense that it covers all third­-party liability required to be covered under S.95(1)(b). This is not a case like Guru Govekar's case (AIR 1988 SC 1332) decided by the Supreme Court where even though the vehicle owner had taken out a policy, he allowed the use of the vehicle by a repairer who, in his turn, did not have coverage for his negligence or the negligence of his servants. In the present case, the deceased is an employee of the vehicle-owner and the use of the vehicle by him as a cleaner was covered under the Act Policy and there is no breach of the statutory duty envisaged by Section 94 read with Section 95(1)(b). In such a situation, unless negli­gence is alleged and proved against the vehicle owner, there can, in our view, be no liability against the insured. Unless liability against the insured is established, there can be no liability against the insurer, who is only an indemnifier. 29. It has, however, been contended by the learned counsel for the respondent-claim­ants that even if there is nonegligence of breach of statutory liability, the award under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 it­self is a 'liability' which falls under Section 95(1)(b). In our view, such a contention cannot be accepted. If the claimants have only an award under the Workmen's Compensa­tion Act, 1923 and there is no liability by way of negligence or for breach of statutory duty mentioned in Section 94 read with Section 95(1)(b), the liability remains a liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and the insurer cannot be made liable directly to the claimants except under Section 14 of that Act. Unless liability is established under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 also either by way of negligence or breach of statutory duty stated in Section 94 (apart from Section 92-A cases), the provisions of Section 96(1) do not come into play so as to make the insurer directly liable to the third-party claimants. It is needless to say that the case of no-fault liability stands, (as stated under Point No. 2) on a different footing inasmuch as it comes under both Acts as required by Section 110-­AA. It comes under the Workmen's Com­pensation Act, 1923 because of Section 92-D of the Motor Vehicles Act and it is a 'liability' under Chapter VIII of the Act because of Section 93(ba) and thereby it attracts Section 96(1). But, there is no similar provision in Chapter VIII which makes a liability incurred only under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 to be also a liability under Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939. Such a benefit is given only to Section 92-A cases and to the limited class of awards passed by the Commissioner falling under the first proviso to Section 95(1)(b), as explained in Point No. 1. Such a benefit is not available to cover the liabilities under awards passed by the Commissioner in cases to which the second proviso applies where neither negli­gence nor breach of statutory duty of the employer of vehicle owner is established. 30. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that, on the facts of the case, there is no breach of statutory duty established under Sections 94 and 95(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Point No. 4 is decided accordingly. 31. Point No. 5 :- We are dealing with Point No. 5 on the assumption that there is breach of statutory duty under Section 94 read with Section 95(1)(b), for it is admittedly a case where negligence of the vehicle owner or of his servants is not even alleged. 32. Point No. 4 is decided accordingly. 31. Point No. 5 :- We are dealing with Point No. 5 on the assumption that there is breach of statutory duty under Section 94 read with Section 95(1)(b), for it is admittedly a case where negligence of the vehicle owner or of his servants is not even alleged. 32. So far as the first proviso to Section 95(1)(b) is concerned, the liability of a driver, conductor, ticket examiner or of workmen carried in a goods vehicle, is cover­ed by the Act Policy, if there is an award passed by the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and provided there is either negligence of the vehicle owner (employer) or a breach of statutory duty by him, and the claimants have opted to avail of their remedies before the Commissioner in view of Section 110-AA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as discussed in Point No. 2. 33. The question is whether other emplo­yees like a cleaner in a passenger vehicle who do not come under the first proviso to claim coverage, can come under the second proviso. We shall first refer to the second proviso to Section 95(1)(b). In our view, cases of other employees of the owner of the passenger vehicle can still come under the second pro­viso to Section 95(1)(b). (We are not here concerned with employees carried in a goods vehicle). Section 95, in so far as it is relevant, reads as followed : "S. 95(1). In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be policy which­- (a) .…. (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in Sub-Section (2). (i) .…… (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a. public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place : Provided that a policy shall not be required (i) .…… (ii) except where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment.... (iii) ............." (Emphasis supplied) 34. The second proviso to S. 95(1)(b) is capable of giving rise to various problems. (iii) ............." (Emphasis supplied) 34. The second proviso to S. 95(1)(b) is capable of giving rise to various problems. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company contends that the second proviso is in two parts, the first part referring to "a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward" and the second part referring to "a vehicle in which passengers are carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment" and that when we are here considering the case of stage carriage which comes in the first part, the statutory coverage is only for a passenger carried for hire or reward and not to a cleaner as he is only an employee. It is alternatively argued that if we go by the fact that the cleaner is an employee coming within the second part, the same cannot apply because, it is argued, the second part does not deal with a stage carriage but deals with a contract carriage. It is argued that therefore, the case of an employee such as a cleaner traveling in a stage carriage does not fit into either of the two parts of the second proviso to Section 95(1)(b). It is argued that basically the second proviso is a description of the vehicle and not of the persons. Of course, it must be made clear here, that we are not dealing with a goods vehicle. 35. In our view, the above contention for the Insurance Company cannot be accepted. It is true that on the facts of the case before us, we cannot say that the cleaner who is in the employ of the vehicle-owner is a passenger for hire or reward. Therefore, we agree that the first part of the second proviso cannot cover the deceased. Coming then to the second part of the second proviso, the question is whether it is a case of a "vehicle in which passengers are carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment". 36. The above expression which occurs in the second part of the second proviso to S. 95(1)(b) also occurs in S. 36(1)(b)(ii) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 in England. Constru­ing the above words, the House of Lords in Izzard v. Universal Insurance Co. Ltd., 1937 AC 773 (HL) (as summarised by Mac Gillivray, Insurance Law, 4th Edn. 36. The above expression which occurs in the second part of the second proviso to S. 95(1)(b) also occurs in S. 36(1)(b)(ii) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 in England. Constru­ing the above words, the House of Lords in Izzard v. Universal Insurance Co. Ltd., 1937 AC 773 (HL) (as summarised by Mac Gillivray, Insurance Law, 4th Edn. (1958) held : (1) the provision requires that claims in respect of death or bodily injury suffered by all passengers who are in the insured vehicle in pursuance of a contract of employment whether with the assured (owner of the vehicle) or anyone else (e.g. who has hired the vehicle), shall be covered by the insurance, (2) A person is carried "in pursuance of" a contract of employment if it is a term of the contract of his employment that he shall be so carried; a person is carried 'by reason' of a contract of employment if, for instance, he is directed by his employer to travel in a vehicle, and the employer is able to give that order because of the relationship of employer and employee. Izzard's case was, in fact, a case which goes farther than the case before us in that the passenger who was injured was a workman not of the vehicle owner but of a builder who had hired the goods vehicle and the workman was to be carried to and from his house by his employer (the hirer of the vehicle). The question was about the com­pulsory liability of the insurer of the vehicle owner to the employee of the hirer of the vehicle. While holding that even the workman of the hirer of the goods vehicle was "a person carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment" within the meaning of the said words in the second part of the second proviso to S. 36(1)(b) (corresponding to the second part of the second proviso in S. 95(1)(b)), it was observed that the employee of the owner of the vehicle is a person also covered by the second part of the second proviso. Lord Wright observes : "But there is no sufficient ground for holding that this criterion should be limited to employees of the insured person. Lord Wright observes : "But there is no sufficient ground for holding that this criterion should be limited to employees of the insured person. Such employees, if injured or killed, would ordinarily fall under exception (i) though I am not prepared to say that there might not be, in certain events, an employee of the assured who could claim as a passenger." (Emphasis supplied) Then, after holding that the employees of the hirer who travel with the goods of their employer (the hirer) are "passengers who are carried by reason of or in pursuance of their contract of employment" with the hirer, and as falling within the second part of the second proviso, Lord Wright refers to the employees of the vehicle owner who could, in certain situations, be "passengers who are carried by reason of or in pursuance of their contract of employment" with the vehicle owner. Lord Wright observed : "I see every practical reason for construing the phrase 'contract of employment's as including a contract with a third party." i.e., contract of employment between a workman and a third party which has hired the goods vehicle from its owner. "This does not exclude a contract with the insured person. The words used are apt to include both cases. As a matter of words, I think the plain meaning is the true meaning. The words of the statute are general and unlimited. To insert the words 'with the insured person' would be to insert words of specific limitation beyond what can be infer­red from the general tenor of the Act or Policy." Emphasis supplied) It can, therefore, be accepted that the words in the second part of the second proviso to S. 95(1)(b) "vehicle in which passengers are carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment" have been held to include not only the employees of a hirer of the goods vehicle traveling a passengers in the said vehicle but that the said words also include employees of the vehicle owner. The fact that some employees of the owner may fall within the first proviso to S. 95(1)(b) can make no difference. 37. It must be noted here that the words "contract of employment" were not treated as an employment of the vehicle. The fact that some employees of the owner may fall within the first proviso to S. 95(1)(b) can make no difference. 37. It must be noted here that the words "contract of employment" were not treated as an employment of the vehicle. Lord Wright only observed that employment of the passenger could be by the vehicle owner or by any other person who has hired the vehicle. 38. Thereafter, Izzard's case (1937 AC 773) was applied to cases of employees of the vehicle owner who were treated as passengers. In Baker v. Provident Accident and White Cross Ins. Co. Ltd. (1939) (2) All ER 690, an employee for whom arrangements were made by his employer (the vehicle owner) that he should be carried to and from a particular point on his journeys from and to work and who sustained injury from an accident hap­pening to the employers vehicle, was held covered by this clause. While holding that the principle in Izzard's case was appliable, it was held on facts, that inasmuch as the accident occurred at a point outside the two termini between which the employee was to be carried, the insurer was not liable. In Vandyke v. Fender, (1970) 2 QB 292 (CA), Lord Denning, while dealing with the identical S. 203(4)(b) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960 (corresponding to S. 36(1)(b) of the 1930 Act) observed that an employee injured when being carried in a car provided by the employers (vehicle owners) to bring men from and to work, were covered by the Act which used the words "employed by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment". These words were wider than the words which were used in the policy, namely, "in the course of his employment". The latter words in the policy which were narrow would have requir­ed an 'obligation' on the part of the workman to travel in the vehicle. But the former words in the Road Traffic Act, did not require any such obligation to travel. It was sufficient if travel was an incident of the service. Lord Denning observed : "A private car is not usually compelled to be insured against liability to passengers. But it is so compelled if it is a vehicle in which passengers are carried 'by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment'. It was sufficient if travel was an incident of the service. Lord Denning observed : "A private car is not usually compelled to be insured against liability to passengers. But it is so compelled if it is a vehicle in which passengers are carried 'by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment'. See the proviso to S. 203(4) of the Road Traffic Act, 1960. Those words are much wider than the words 'in the course of his employment'. I think that passengers are carried in a vehicle 'by reason of' a contract of employment whenever such a contract is the cause, or one of the causes, of their being carried. If they are carried in it habitually or as a matter of practice, the vehicle must be covered in respect of them : See Connell v. Motor Insurer's Bureau, (1969) 2 QB 494. This car undoubtedly falls within this description. It was regularly used to carry these men to and from their work. There should, therefore, have been an insurance policy in existence covering the owner and the driver against liability to passengers. "In the same case, Sacha, J. referred to and applied Izzard's case, 1937 AC 773. 39. The question again arose before the Privy Council in Tan Keng Hong v. New India Assurance (1978) 2 All ER 380 (PC). The Privy Council referred to and applied the principle in Izzard's case. There the driver of a vehicle, owned by a timber dealer, while driving the lorry, gave a lift and allowed a forester of the Forestry Department to travel and the forester was killed. While applying the principle in Izzard's case, it was pointed on facts, that he forester was not traveling in the vehicle 'by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment' with the vehicle owner. He was not also the employee of any person who hired the vehicle. Nor was it a condition of his service in government that he could travel in the vehicle of the businessman dealing with timber which he was entitled to inspect. It was not, on facts, a case of a person being carried "by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment". 40. Nor was it a condition of his service in government that he could travel in the vehicle of the businessman dealing with timber which he was entitled to inspect. It was not, on facts, a case of a person being carried "by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment". 40. Thus, it will be seen that Izzard's case is an authority for the view that the employees of the vehicle owner have to be covered under the Act Policy by virtue of the second part of the second proviso to S. 95(1)(b) and they can be treated as 'passengers' in the employer's vehicle if, as an incident of their contract of service with the vehicle owner, they are entitled to travel in the vehicle. The words "by reason of or in pursuance of their contract of employment' are wider than the words 'arising out of'. The latter words, if they stood alone, may require an obligation on the part of the workman to travel in the owner's vehicle but the former words are wider and do not require any such obligation. It is sufficient if the workman was entitled to travel or if such travel was an incident of his service, he will be a passenger. If such an employee is killed or injured, the insurer is liable to indemnify the vehicle owner if the accident occurs on account of any negligence on the part of the vehicle owner or of his servants or if there is breach of any statutory duty on the part of the vehicle owner as stated earlier. 41. A Division Bench of this Court in State Insurance Department v. Sosamma, 1978 Ker LT 634 : (AIR 1979 Kerala 15) followed the Izzard's case (1937 AC 773), and held that the insurer was liable under the Act Policy for the death of an employee of the owner of the goods which was being carried in a goods vehicle. In Nasema v. Sebastian, (1987) 1 Ker LT 370, another Division Bench of this Court held that insurer liable upon the death of an employee loading timber in a goods vehicle. In yet another case in New India Assurance Co. In Nasema v. Sebastian, (1987) 1 Ker LT 370, another Division Bench of this Court held that insurer liable upon the death of an employee loading timber in a goods vehicle. In yet another case in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Jose, (1989) 2 Ker LT 783 another Division Bench on this Court applied the above principle even to the case of the owner of the goods who was traveling in a goods vehicle and who was injured. Of course, in the case before us, we are dealing with an employee of the owner of a passenger vehicle, who was killed, and we are not dealing with a person traveling in a goods vehicle. But, even so, we have referred to the above decisions of this Court only to show that the principle in Izzard's case has been followed consistently and the same has been applied either to the employees of the person whose goods are transported or to the employees of the owner of the goods vehicle. That is based upon the principle that the words 'carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment' refer both to those traveling as passengers by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment either with the owner of the vehicle or with a person whose goods are carried. Therefore, there can be no difficulty in applying the principle in Izzard's case to the case of the employee of the owner of the passenger vehicle such as a cleaner who is also to travel in the said vehicle while so working as a cleaner. 42. In the present case, another question is whether a cleaner can be said to have been 'carried' in the said vehicle at the time of the accident. We may here point out that the cleaner got to the too of the bus at 5 a.m. and was preparing the bus for its movement soon thereafter by cleaning, washing, etc. For the purpose of treating a vehicle under 'use' it is not necessary that the vehicle should be on the move. This is clear from the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Padmana­bhan Nair v. Narayanakutty, 1988 Ace CJ 58 (Ker.)) wherein the decision in Elliott v. Gray, (1959) 3 All ER 733 was followed. For the purpose of treating a vehicle under 'use' it is not necessary that the vehicle should be on the move. This is clear from the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Padmana­bhan Nair v. Narayanakutty, 1988 Ace CJ 58 (Ker.)) wherein the decision in Elliott v. Gray, (1959) 3 All ER 733 was followed. For the purpose of S. 94, it was held that the word 'use' of the vehicle does not necessarily mean that the vehicle should be on the move. If the vehicle could be moved, although not driven at the relevant point of time, it was held to be sufficient. The decision of the Bombay High Court in British India Genl. Ins. Co. v. Sabanna, 1967 ACJ 165 : (AIR 1967 Bom 416) is distinguishable inasmuch as in that case the injured person was loading a truck with stones and the accident occurred when a stone flew off from the quarry, where the process of blasting was going on and hit his leg. It was in those circumstances held that the person was not being carried. In the present case, admittedly the deceased was at the top of the bus at the time when he was preparing the bus for its movement. It cannot, therefore, be said that the vehicle was not under use nor that the deceased was not being carried in the vehicle. 43. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that, assuming that there is breach of statutory duty and our decision on Point No. 4 is not correct, the deceased can be treated as a passenger being carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employ­ment within the second proviso to S. 95(1)(b). We also hold that the first proviso to S. 95(1)(b) is not exhaustive of all the cases of workmen. Point No. 5 is found accordingly. 44. Point No. 6 :- This point is whether, if a liability under S. 95(1)(b) is made out in the case of a person traveling as a passenger by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, the insurance company will be liable up to the statutory limit of Rs. 50,000/­- under S. 95(2)(b)(i) in case the damages awarded exceeded the said figure, or only to Rs. 15,000/- under S. 95(2)(b)(ii). 50,000/­- under S. 95(2)(b)(i) in case the damages awarded exceeded the said figure, or only to Rs. 15,000/- under S. 95(2)(b)(ii). This would depend upon whether S. 95(2)(b)(i) would apply, or, whether S. 95(2)(b)(ii) would apply to such a case, S. 95(2)(b) reads as follows : "Subject to the proviso to Sub-Sec. (1) a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident up to the following limits, namely -­ (a) .................... (b) where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, - (i) in respect of persons other than pas­sengers carried for hire or rewards, a limit of fifty thousand rupees in all; (ii) in respect of passengers, a limit of fifteen thousand rupees for each individual passenger; ......................." It will be noticed that under S. 95(2)(b)(i) a sum of Rs. 50,000/- is payable if the pas­sengers carried are 'other than the passengers carried fur hire or reward'. The word 'pas­sengers' in sub-clause (ii) would, in our opinion, necessarily include also passengers carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. In our view, S. 95 (2)(b)(ii) should not be treated as applicable to all passengers whether they are passengers carried for hire or reward or whether they are passengers carried by reason of or in pursu­ance of a contract of employment, thereby limiting S. 95(2)(b)(i) to persons outside the vehicle, or to third parties. It may be noted that the legislature, if it thought that the cases of 'passengers carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment', should not come within S. 95(2)(b)(i), the legislature would have expressly excluded the said categories of persons also from the purview of S. 95(2)(b)(i). When the language of the statute is clear, it will not, in our view, be permissible to treat the word 'persons' in S. 95(2)(b)(i) as confined to third parties alone. Passengers in stage carriage vehicles may be more in number and that perhaps is the reason why the liability of the insurer to an individual passenger in a vehicle in which he is carried for hire or reward is kept at Rs. 15,000/-. Passengers in stage carriage vehicles may be more in number and that perhaps is the reason why the liability of the insurer to an individual passenger in a vehicle in which he is carried for hire or reward is kept at Rs. 15,000/-. In our opinion, while passengers carried for hire or reward would come within S. 95(2)(b)(ii), passengers carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment would come within Section 95(2)(b)(i), and the statutory liability of the insurer in the latter case would be Rupees 50,000/-. We do not agree that the decisions! of the Division Bench of this Court in Christian Welfare Center v. Sebastian, (1988) 2 Ker LT 153, as also in Benny v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1991) 1 Acc CJ 182, in so far as they state that passengers carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment can only come u/S. 95(2)(b)(ii), and the said decisions are accordingly over­ruled. 45. Finally, on the facts of this case, the position is as follows (a) the deceased work­men was an employee of the vehicle-owner who owned the stage carriage. The accident occurred in the course of employment. The employer was therefore liable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 for Rs. 51,256.20. Under S. 14 of that Act, the insurer was liable only if S. 14 of that Act applied; (b) the insurer could be made liable directly to the claimants outside S. 14, if S. 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 applied, up to the statutory limits in Section 95 (2)(b). But this would be so if the insured was liable either for his negligence or of his servants or there was breach of statutory duty mentioned in S. 94(1). In that case, the cleaner's case would fall within the second part of the second proviso to S. 95(1)(b) as he would be a person carried in the vehicle as a passenger by reason of or in pursuance of al contract of employment with the vehicle- owner and the statutory limit of the insurer's liability would have been up to Rs. 50,000/- under S. 95(2)(b)(i). But as neither negligence nor breach of statutory duty under S. 94 is proved, there can be no remedy against the insurance company under S. 95(2)(b) up to Rs. 50,000/-. Even so, the claimants can recover Rs. 50,000/- under S. 95(2)(b)(i). But as neither negligence nor breach of statutory duty under S. 94 is proved, there can be no remedy against the insurance company under S. 95(2)(b) up to Rs. 50,000/-. Even so, the claimants can recover Rs. 15,000/- towards the no fault liability under S. 92-A from the insurer, even if there is no occasion to apply S. 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. This is because, S. 92-A liability is a liability which is required to be covered under Ss. 94 and 95(1)(b) because of S. 93(ba) and therefore the claimants can proceed against the insurer directly under S. 96(1) to the extent of Rs. 15,000/-, with interest at 12% thereon from the date of the petition. We assess the costs against the insurance company before the Commissioner and here at Rs. 1500/-. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed modifying the decree against the appellant­insurance company to a sum of Rs. 15,000/- ­with interest at 12% from the date of Petition before the Commissioner, and to costs in a sum of Rs. 1500/- being the costs payable by the insurance company both in the trial court as well as in this appeal. The rest of the award against the insurance-company is vacated. The remaining amount in the award can be recovered from the employer. Appeal partly allowed.