Judgment : The jurisdictional or foundational facts giving rise to these petitions, as culled out from the materials available on record, may succinctly be stated to resolve in the best of fashion possible, the moot and naughty questions arising for consideration. 2. S.Thirunavukkarasu was the Hon’ble Minister for Housing, Government of Tamil Nadu, during the period 1986-87 in the Cabinet headed by the late lamented Dr.M.G.Ramachandran the then Hon’ble Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. B.Bharathi was attached as his Personal Assistant. In April, 1989, the Government appeared to have received a spate of petitions from the public alleging that the then Minister for Housing, S.Thirunavukkarasu had indulged in corrupt practices in the sanctioning of plans for the construction of buildings in the Madras Metropolitan area either by flouting or relaxing the Development Control Rules without assigning any reasons. The Government directed the Inspector General of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D., Madras to conduct a preliminary inquiry and find out whether any corrupt or other malpractices have been committed in the sanction of planning permission during the relevant period. The Inspector General of Police, Crime Branch, was said to have submitted a report in August, 1989 revealing that the preliminary inquiry conducted by him disclosed a prima facie case of rceipt of illegal gratification by S.Thirunavukkarasu. The Inspector General of Police was stated to have taken up further inquiry in October, 1989 and on his being reminded, a detailed inquiry report had been forwarded to the Government in June, 1992. 3. The enquiry report was stated to have realed certain startling factors. S.Thirunavukkarasu was stated to have passed exemption orders in over 150 cases, out of which exemption orders in 29 particular cases were stated to have been issued between 212. 1987, the date on which the then Hon’ble Chief Minister passed away and 31.121987, the date on which the new Government was formed. All these exemption orders have to be construed as illegal and/or otherwise in abuse of his powers done for the pecuniary advantage of himself and his co-conspirators. The Inspector General of Police would say that these materials would go to show the existence of a prima facie case of criminal conspiracy, attracting the provisions of Sec.l20-B of the Indian Penal Code read with Sec.5(1)(a) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 2 of 1947, hereinafter referred to as ‘the old Act’. The Inspector General of Police would say that these materials would go to show the existence of a prima facie case of criminal conspiracy, attracting the provisions of Sec.l20-B of the Indian Penal Code read with Sec.5(1)(a) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 2 of 1947, hereinafter referred to as ‘the old Act’. The Government, after a careful consideration, decided to accept the enquiry report and lodged a formal complaint. Accordingly, the Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development Department, Madras-9, on 17. 1992 lodged a complaint before the Inspector General of Police, C.B., C.I.D., Madras. After a smooth sail through the Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, the said complaint landed, into the hands of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, on the same day. After scrutiny of the allegations in the complaint, the connected documents and the annexures, a case was registered in Crime No. 16 of 1992 for the alleged offences under Sec.l20-B, I.P.C., read with Sec.5(2) and Sec.5(1)(d) and Sec5(1)(a) of the old Act and Specific Offences under Sec.5(2) read with Secs.5(1)(a) and 5(2) read with Sec.5(1)(d) of the old Act. Further investigation was taken up by the said Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch. 4. On 17. 1992 at about 6 a.m., the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch..C.I.D., was said to have gone to the residence of S.Thirunavukkarasu along with a team of police officers. S.Thirunavukkarasu was stated to be asleep. At about 7 am S.Thirunavukkarasu met the Deputy Superintendent of Police who explained to the former, the nature of accusations made against him. He was allowed to contact his counsel, as requested. Thereafter, the Deputy Superintendent of Police arrested him, at 8 a.m. The counsel Mr.P.H.Pandian came at 8.30 a.m. and had discussion with S.Thirunavukkarasu. Thereafter, at about 10 a.m. he was brought to the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, situated in the office of the I.G. of Police, Crimes, Madras-4. In the meanwhile, the residence of S.Thirunavukkarasu was also searched in accordance with law but no incriminating document was found. After completion of the necessary formalities S.Thirunavukkarasu and B.Bharathi were produced at 2.30 p.m. before the Court of Session (Special Judge), Madras, with the necessary papers and along with a requisition for remanding them to judicial custody. In the meanwhile, the residence of S.Thirunavukkarasu was also searched in accordance with law but no incriminating document was found. After completion of the necessary formalities S.Thirunavukkarasu and B.Bharathi were produced at 2.30 p.m. before the Court of Session (Special Judge), Madras, with the necessary papers and along with a requisition for remanding them to judicial custody. Mr.P.H.Pandian, learned counsel for S.Thirunavukkarasu and B.Bharathi, appeared before the Special Judge and vehemently contended that the registration of the case on 17. 1992 under the provisions of the old Act for the acts said to have been committed during the currency of the said enactment, is not permissible legally, inasmuch as no action had been taken under the provisions of the said enactment therefor, before its repeal on 9. 1988. He would stress that since no offence had been committed by these persons under the present Act (Prevention of Corruption Act 49 of 1988) and by no stretch of imagination they can be construed to have committed any offence, the Court should not order for remand. The said argument was countered by the learned Public Prosecutor who contended that the old Act had been repealed and in its place a new enactment (Act 49 of 1988) had been passed with a saving provision under Sec.30(2) according to which it is legally permissible for the initiation of prosecution of any person accused of offences under the old Act, notwithstanding the fact that the case as respects those offences had been registered subsequent to repeal and, in this view of the matter there is no other go for the Court except to remand these persons and allow further investigation to proceed according to law. Learned Special Judge affixing his seal of approval to the projection of the argument of Mr.P.H.Pandian, rejected the request for remand. 5. Aggrieved, the State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.B., C.I.D., Madras-4 has filed Crl.O.P.No.9283 of 1992 impleading S.Thirunavukkarasu and B.Bharathi as respondents, for setting aside the order. The same had been admitted and notice ordered on 27. 1992. Both S.Thirunavukkarasu and B.Bharathi entered appearance through a counsel of their choice. S.Thirunavukkarasu filed an elaborate counter alleging among other things, mala fides against the prosecution agency and the present Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. The same had been admitted and notice ordered on 27. 1992. Both S.Thirunavukkarasu and B.Bharathi entered appearance through a counsel of their choice. S.Thirunavukkarasu filed an elaborate counter alleging among other things, mala fides against the prosecution agency and the present Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. The Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development Department, Madras-9, has filed a detailed affidavit denying mala fides and stating, among other things, that the only issue arising for consideration in Crl.O.P.No.9283 of 1992 is whether the refusal of learned Special Judge in rejecting the request for remand is in accordance with law or not, and the question of mala fides cannot at all be gone into. During the course of proceedings, realising the fact that the arguments relating to want of jurisdiction on the part of the Investigating Agency to investigate the case, as a consequence of nondisclosure of any cognizable offence by the averments incorporated in the first information report, and the question of mala fides cannot at all be pressed into service, S.Thirunavukkarasu resorted to file two petitions in Crl.O.P.Nos.10860 of 1992 and 10904of 1992; the former for quashing of the first information report on the ground of non-disclosure of any cognisable offence and the latter for quashing the investigation commenced on the basis of the first information report mainly on the ground of mala fides. When arguments were heard on these petitions on different dates and orders were reserved on 9. 1992. B.Bharathi filed Crl.O.P.No. 11683 of 1992 on 9. 1992 for quashing the first information report and the further investigation in Crime No.16 of 1992 as against him. Arguments of either side on this petition as well were heard. 6. The arguments-factual and legal-advanced in an elaborate fashion by either side to set aside the order of the learned Special Judge and to quash the proceedings initiated, in pith and substance, will give rise to the following three moot questions for discussion and decision: .(i) Whether the impugned order of refusal to remand by the Special Judge is sustainable in law in the facts and circumstances of the case? .(ii) Whether there is want of jurisdiction for the investigating agency to commence and continue investigation as a consequence of non-disclosure of cognizable offences by the averments incorporated in the first information report, even taking for granted that what is stated therein is reflecting the truth and nothing but the truth? (iii) Whether malice in law or on facts as alleged against police or civil personnel or the Hon’ble Chief Minister, even if proved, will go to the extent of rendering void any criminal proceedings pending inquiry, investigation or trial? 7. The question as to whether acts done constituting cognizable offences during the currency of a repaled enactment, that is the old Act, are prosecutable subsequent to repeal by the registration of a case and consequent commencement of investigation for the collection of material in a bid for the formation of opinion to be reflected in the report to be filed under Sec.173(2), Criminal Procedure Code, may fall for consideration in the arena of discussion. It is not as if the old Act had been repealed once and for all, in the sense of there being no replacement by a new enactment. The sordid fact is that in order to curb the social menace of ever-pervading corruption in all walks of life, the old Act had been repealed and in its place a new Act had come into existence which contains rather suitable modifications and stringent provisions with a view to cleanse the public life, free from the evils of corruption. In doing so, sufficient care, caution and circumspection had been taken by incorporating certain saving provision in the new Act, as to what is to happen with regard to certain acts done or purported to be done daring the currency of the old Act, subsequent to repeal. The saving provision, about which I will have the occasion to deal in an elaborate fashion at a subsequent stage, enables institution of prosecution for such acts under certain contingencies. There is no denial of the fact that the old Act had been repealed and in its place a new Act had come into force on and from the date of such repeal, viz. 9. 1988. There is no denial of the fact that the old Act had been repealed and in its place a new Act had come into force on and from the date of such repeal, viz. 9. 1988. Yet another fact about which there is no dispute is that as regards the criminal acts alleged against S.Thirunavukkarasu and B.Bharathi relatable to the period 1986-87, the period during which the old Act was in force, no action had been taken before the repeal of the old Act. The plain fact is that action had been taken for such criminal misconduct by the registration of a case on the basis of the first information report launched by the Secretary, Housing and Urban Development Department, on 17. 1992, preceded by the holding of a preliminary enquiry which also happened subsequent to repeal such launching of a prosecution, as the Special Judge would say, is rather incompetent and such expression of opinion is now under serious challenge by the mounting of a scathing attack on the same by Mr.B.Sriramulu, learned Public Prosecutor. He would say that it is the fundamental canon of criminal jurisprudence that prosecution cannot be launched for certain acts constituting offences as against persons accused of such offences when there is no enactment or legislation constituting such acts as offences at the time when they were said to have been committed, nor was it permissible to subject such persons to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. This sort of canon of criminal jurisprudence, according to him, had been given constitutional recognition by providing a clause therefor in sub-clause (1) of Art.20 of the Constitution of India which prescribes: "No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjcted to a penalty greater man that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence." The Parliament in enacting the new Act, taking cognizance of such a constitutional provision, incorporated a repeal and saving provision in Sec.30 of the new Act which reads as under: "(1) The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 19S2, are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, but without prejudice to the application of Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the Acts so repealed shall, in so for as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provisions of this Act" Omission of certain sections of Act 45 of 1860 had been provided for in Sec.31 of the Act and it is couched in the following terms: "Secs.161 to 165-A (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code shall be omitted, and Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall apply to such omission as if the said sections had been repealed by a Central Act". It is necessary to refer at this juncture to the preamble of the new Act (Act 49 of 1988) which reads: "An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention of corruption and for matters connected therewith." 8. The combined effect of the provisions as engrafted in Secs.30 and 31 and the preamble of the new Act makes it grossly clear that the intention was to consolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention of corruption and for matters connected therewith. This clearly shows that the Legislature was alive to the fact that the provisions under Chapter IX of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, are required to be enacted into one Act with modifications so as to make the provisions more effective in combating corruption among public servants and it was to effectuate that intention that the Act was put on the statute book. Reference in this context may also be made to the effect of repeal as had been provided under Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which reads as under: "Effect of repeal: Where this Actor any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- .(a) revive anything not in.force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or .(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or .(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or .(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or .(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed." 9. In order to highlight the consequence flowing from the effect of repeal of an enactment under various contingencies. Mr.B.Sriramulu, learned Public Prosecutor, drew my attention to certain decisions emerging from superior courts of jurisdiction in India as well as in England, where existed analogous provisions as in the Indian scene. Even though the decisions of English Courts are not binding, they are of some weight specially because the question as to whether a piece of legislation provides merely for a matter of procedure or it gives vested rights is obviously a question of general principle in regard to which the law cannot possibly be different in England and in India. Viewed from this angle, profitable reference may be made to the case in R v. Fisher, (1969)1 All E.R. 100. The facts of that case may succinctly be stated to grasp the principle involved therein. On 210. 1967, the appellant was arrested and was later charged with being an accessory after the fact to larcency under the provisions of Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861 and the Larcency Act, 1861. The enactments were repealed by the Criminal Law Act, 1967 which came into force on 1. 1968. On 1. On 210. 1967, the appellant was arrested and was later charged with being an accessory after the fact to larcency under the provisions of Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861 and the Larcency Act, 1861. The enactments were repealed by the Criminal Law Act, 1967 which came into force on 1. 1968. On 1. 1968 the indictment was signed and the appellant was arraigned on 3. 1968. On the question whether the Criminal Law Act, 1967 showed a contrary intention for purposes of negativing the effect of Sec.38(2) of the Interpretation Act, 1889, it was held: "Sec.12 of the Criminal Law Act, 1967, which contained the transitional procedure provisions, showed no contrary intention and accordingly, since the offence existed at the time to which the proceedings related, the statutory provisions for its indictment and punishment remained in force." 10. In State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, 1955 S.C.J. 25: (1955)1 S.C.R. 893 :1955 M W.N. 672:1955 M.W.N. (Crl.) 176:56 Crl.L.J. 254.A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 84, Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act was dealt with and the Supreme Court, referring to the consequences flowing as a result of the repeal of an enactment, strikingly said thus: "Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. The Court cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Sec.6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of saving clause is by itself not material. Sec.6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law and the mere absence of saving clause is by itself not material. The provisions of Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new enactment Of course, the consequences laid down in Sec.6 of the Act will apply only when a statute or regulation having the force of a statute is actually repealed." 11. In Balliah v. Rangachari, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 701, one of the questions that fell for consideration was whether by reason of the repeal of the Income-tax Act, 1922 by the 1961 Act, the prosecutions in respect of prior proceedings under the 1922 Act were not saved, and whether prosecution under Sec.52 of the 1922 Act was not sustainable. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with this question expressed: "Sec.297(1) of the 1961 Act expressly repeals the 1922 Act Clause (2) Of Sec.297 provides that the matters expressly referred to in Clauses (a) to (m) are saved notwithstanding the repeal of the 1922 Act. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that under Clauses (2)(a) to (m) of Sec.297 of the 1961 Act the prosecution in respect of proceedings pending at the commencement of the 1961 Act was not expressly saved and therefore it must be presumed that Parliament had not intended to save prosecutions in respect of proceedings pending at the commencement of the 1961 Act. In our opinion, there is no justification for this argument. Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act reads as follows: ..... The principle of this section is that unless a different intention appears in the repealing Act, any legal proceeding can be instituted and continued in respect of any matter pending under the repealed Act as if that Act was in force at the time of repeal. In other words, whenever there is a repeal of an enactment the consequences laid down in Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says a different intention appears in the repealing statute. In other words, whenever there is a repeal of an enactment the consequences laid down in Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says a different intention appears in the repealing statute. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The question is not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act therefore will be applicable unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new statute and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. In other words, the provisions of Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is a simultaneous re-enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new statute. Having examined the provisions of Clause (2) of Sec.297 of the 1961 Act we are of the opinion that it is not the intention of Parliament to take away the right of instituting prosecution in respect of proceedings which are pending at the commencement of the Act. It is true that there is no express sub-clause in Sec297(2) of the 1961 Act which provides for ‘ the continuation of such proceedings, but our concluded opinion is that Parliament did not intend Sec.297(2) of the 1961 Act to be completely exhaustive and in regard to such matters as are not expressly saved by Sec.297(2) of the 1961 Act the provisions of Sec.6(e) of the General Clauses Act will apply. It follows therefore in the present case that under Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act a legal proceeding in respect of an offence committed under the 1922 Act may be instituted even after the repeal of the 1922 Act by the 1961 Act and punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed." 12. It follows therefore in the present case that under Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act a legal proceeding in respect of an offence committed under the 1922 Act may be instituted even after the repeal of the 1922 Act by the 1961 Act and punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed." 12. In Tiwari Kanhaiyalal v. I.T.Commissioner, 1975 M.L.J. (Crl.)44:(1975) 2I.TJ.l:1975Crl.L.J. 781:1975 S.C.C. (Crl.) 312: (1975)4 S.C.C. 401: A.I.R 1975 S.C. 902, the question falling for consideration was whether institution of the prosecution under the Income tax Act against the appellant for the alleged commision of offences by him under either the 1961 or the 1992 Act was bad in law as being violative of Sec.28(4) of the 1922 Act, Art.20(1). The Supreme Court, on an elaborate consideration, answered the question thus: "4. Sec297(1) of the 1961 Act repealed the 1922 Act Certain savings were provided in Sub-sec.(2) some of which even without those express provisions could have been covered by Sec6 of the General Causes Act, 1897. But for the sake of precision and certainty those provisions were made. Some of the clauses (a) to (m) in Sub-sec(2) of Sec:297 are such that a different intention appears from them and they override or supplement the provisions contained in Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act. Sec 297(2) provides: Notwithstanding the repeal of the Indian Income Act, 1922 (XI of 1922) hereinafter referred to as the repealed Act)- ....... .(f) any proceeding for the imposition of a penalty in respect of any assessment completed before the 1st day of April, 1962, may be initiated and any such penalty may be imposed as if this Act had not been passed; .(g) any proceeding for the imposition of a penalty in respect of any assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1962, or any earlier year, which is completed on or after the 1st day of April, 1962, may be initiated and any such penalty may be imposed under this Act.’ All the 12 assessments although they related to ‘ the years earlier than the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1962, were completed after coming into force of the 1961 Act. Hence a proceeding for the imposition of penalty in respect of any one of those years had to be and was initiated under the 1961 Act in accordance with Clause (g). Clause (f) did not come into play and no penalty was imposed under Sec.28 of the 1922 Act. That being so as rightly pointed out by the High Court, Sec.28(4) was not a bar to the launching of the prosecution as no such provision is to be found either in Sec.271 or in any other section of the 1961 Act Sec.28(4) says ‘No prosecution for an offence against this Act shall be instituted in respect of the same facts on which a penalty has been imposed under this section.‘ The said provision is not available to the appellant to bar the institution of the prosecution for an offence against either of the two Acts when a penalty has been imposed not under Sec.28(1) of the Act 1922 Act but under Sec.271 (1) of the 1961 Act. 5. Grover, J.delivering the judgment on behalf of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Jain Bros. v. Union of India, (1970)2 S.C.J. 231: (1970)2 I.T.J. 332: (1970)3 S.C.R. 253 .A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 778, has pointed out at p.263 (of S.C.R. at pp.784,785 of A.I.R.): "It is obvious that for the imposition of penalty it is not the assessment year or the date of the filing of the return which is important but it is the satisfaction of the income-tax authorities that a defalut has been committed by the assessee which would attract the provisions relating to penalty. Whatever the stage at which the satisfaction is reached, the scheme of Secs.274(1) and 275 of the Act of 1961 is that the order imposing penalty must be made after the completion of the assessment. The curcial date, therefore, for purposes of penalty is the date, of such completion.’ ...... 6. Even clause (1) of Art.20 of the Constitution does not help the appellant. It is not a post facto legislation which is being pressed into service against him. As pointed out by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Rao shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, 1953 S.C.J. 563: 1953 S.R. 1188:54 Crl.L.J. 480.A.I.R.953 S.C. 394(at p.398): This article in its broad import has been enacted to prohibit convictions and sentences under ex post facto laws. As pointed out by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Rao shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, 1953 S.C.J. 563: 1953 S.R. 1188:54 Crl.L.J. 480.A.I.R.953 S.C. 394(at p.398): This article in its broad import has been enacted to prohibit convictions and sentences under ex post facto laws. The principle underlying such prohibition has been elaborately discussed and pointed out in the very learned judgment of Justice Willes in the well-known case of Phillips v. Eyre, (1870)6 Q.B. 1 at pp. 23 and 25 and also by the Supreme Court of U.S.A. in Colder v. Bull, (1780)3 Dalles 386:1 Law.Ed. 648 at 649. In the English case it is explained that ex post facto laws are laws which voided and punished what had been lawful when done. There can be no doubt as to the paramount importance of the principle that such ex post facto laws, which retrospectively create offences and punish them are bad as being highly inequitable and unjust.’ Art.20(1) also prohibits the subjecting of any person to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. On the facts alleged against the appellant, if found to be true, at the time he made the false statements in the declarations he did commit an offence under Sec.52 of the 1922 Act. Sub-sec,(4) of Sec.28 did not obliterate the factum of the commission of the offence and did not transmute the offence into an innocent act because of the imposition of penalty under Sec.28. Such imposition merely barred the prosecution for the trial and conviction of the commission of the offence. The penalty having been imposed under Sec.271 of the 1961 Act the launching of the prosecution became permissible and was not hit by Art.20 (1) of the Constitution. We are inclined to think that the offence, if any, committed by the appellant was under Sec.52 of the 1922 Act as the allegedly false statements in declarations were made at a time when the said Act was in force. No false statement in any declaration seems to have been made under the 1961 Act to form the basis of a charge against the appellant under Sec.277 of that Act The punishment provided in this section is greater than the one engrafted in Sec.52 of the 1922 Act. No false statement in any declaration seems to have been made under the 1961 Act to form the basis of a charge against the appellant under Sec.277 of that Act The punishment provided in this section is greater than the one engrafted in Sec.52 of the 1922 Act. To that extent only the appellant would be entitled to press into service the second part of clause (1) of Art-20 of the Constitution which says that no person shall: ‘be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law is force at the time of the commission of the offence.‘ 7. It is advisable to discuss and dispose of the new point which arose during the hearing of these appeals. Sub-sec(1) of Sec.297 of the 1961 Act repealed the 1922 Act including Sec.52. In Sub-sec.(2) no saving seems to have been provided for the launching of the prosecution under the repealed Sec.52 of the 1922 Act. It does not seem correct to take recourse to Clause (h) of Sec297(2) to make the offences come under Sec.277 of the 1961 Act as was endeavoured to be done by the respondent in the first 12 complaint petitions. But then from no clause under Sub-sec.(2) a different intern tion appears in this regard from what has been said in Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act. On the facts alleged the criminal liability incurred under Sec.52 of the 1922 Act remains unaffected under Clause (c) of Sec;6 of the General Clauses Act.” 13. In G.RAyyar v. State (Delhi Administration, 1979 Crl.L.J. 587: (1979)2 S.C.C. 593 : (1979) S.C.C. (Crl) 549: (1979)2 S.C.R 816 : A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 602, the question that arose was what was the effect of the repeal of the provision under Sec.5 (3) of the old Act and the Supreme Court answered thus: “...In view of the provisions, of the General Causes Act the operation of all the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act would continue in so far as the offences that were committed when Sec.5(3) was in force. The offences that were committed after the date of the date of the repeal will not come under the provisions of Sec.6(b) of the General Clauses Act. Sec.6(c) also preserves all legal proceedings and consequences of such proceedings as if the repealing Act had not been passed. The offences that were committed after the date of the date of the repeal will not come under the provisions of Sec.6(b) of the General Clauses Act. Sec.6(c) also preserves all legal proceedings and consequences of such proceedings as if the repealing Act had not been passed. In this view, it is clear that whether Act 16 of 1967 had been brought into force on 20th June, 1967 or not the rule of evidence as incorporated in Sec.5(3) would be available regarding offences that were committed during the period before the repeal of Sec5(3)." 14. In R.S.Nayak v. A.R.Antulay, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 684:1984 Crl.L.J. 613: (1984)2 S.C.C. 183 : (1984) S.C.C. (Crl.)172: (1984)1 Serv.L.R. 619: (1984)86 Bom.L.R. 365, the Supreme Court sounded a note of caution that the rule of construction to be adopted in the interpretation of the statements must tend to advance the underlying object of the statutes. The expression in this regard cannot be better said than what the Supreme Court said in paragraph 18: "The 1947 Act was enacted, as its long title shows, to make more effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption. Indisputably, therefore, the provisions of the Act must receive such construction at the hands of the Court as would advance the object and purpose underlying the Act and at any rate not defeat it. If the words of the Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the Court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the Statute would be self-defeating. The Court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the Legislature to remove the ambiguity by construing the provision of the Statute as a whole keeping in view what was mischief when the Statute was enacted and to remove which the Legislature enacted the Statute. This rule of construction is so universally accepted that it need not be supported by precedents. This rule of construction is so universally accepted that it need not be supported by precedents. Adopting the rule of construction, whenever a question of construction arises upon ambiguity or where two views are possible of a provision, it would be the duty of the Court to adopt that construction which would advance the object underlying the Act namely, to make effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption and at any rate not defeat it." 15. Mr.N.Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for S.Thirunavukkarasu, commenced his arguments in repelling the submissions of learned Pubic Prosecutor in a flamboyant style. However, he could not relentlessly pursue his arguments successfully to a logical conclusion, for the obvious reason of the submissions emerging from the other side deriving solidifed and incontrovertible support from the precedents of the apex of the judicial administration of the country. Faced with such a predicament situation, he had to naturally succumb to subscribe to the view that the impugned order of the Special Judge has no legs to stand in the eye of law and he said so admirably but not unwittingly, as an act of saving grace, that it does not mean that the proceeding revived by setting aside of the impugned order can thrive for a moment on the face of the existence of incredible and inbuilt materials available on record, pointing out want of jurisdiction for commencement and continuance of investigation and mala fides as well, not only on the part of civil and police personnel but also oh the part of the Hon’ble Chief Minister, which will have the effect of voiding or nullifying the criminal proceedings. However, the tenability or otherwise of such a submission may fall for consideration shortly hereafter. Mr.V.R.Sridharan, learned counsel for B.Bharathi, left with no other alternative, meekly treaded on the path chosen by Mr.N.Natarajan. 16. However, the tenability or otherwise of such a submission may fall for consideration shortly hereafter. Mr.V.R.Sridharan, learned counsel for B.Bharathi, left with no other alternative, meekly treaded on the path chosen by Mr.N.Natarajan. 16. Thus, on a conspectus of the construction of the provisions adumbrated under Sec.30 of the new Act coupled with the provisions as contained in Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and taking into consideration the object for which those provisions had been enacted, and on the face of the consequences flowing from the repeal of an enactment under different situations; as highlighted by the various decisions referred to supra, it goes without saying that the launching of prosecution under the old Act alone is legally permissible even subsequent to its repeal, as respects offences which were committed during the period when the old Act was in force -no matter when prosecution was launched - as there was no period of limitation prescribed therefor and in this view of the matter, the impugned order of the Special Judge deserves to be set aside as being unsustainable in law. 17. The feat of diving and delving deep into the question as respects want of jurisdiction to commence and continue investigation by the registration of a case on information furnished or otherwise, may now be attempted to be performed in the best of fashion possible with reference to the salient and salutary provisions adumbrated under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Chapter 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short Cr.P.C), deals with information to the police and their powers to investigate. Sec 154, Crl.P.C, relatable to the procedure to be followed as respects information laid in cognizable cases, reads as under: "(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. .(2) A copy of the information as recorded under Sub-sec.(1) shall be given forthwith, tree of cost, to the informant. .(2) A copy of the information as recorded under Sub-sec.(1) shall be given forthwith, tree of cost, to the informant. .(3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in Sub-sec(1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence." The condition which is sine qua non of recording the first information report is that there must be an information and that information must dis-close a cognizable offence. It is therefore clear that if any informal on disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer in charge of a police station, satisfying the requirements of Sec.154(1), the said Officer shall have no other alternative, except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that at is to say, to register a case on the basis of such in formation. Sec.156, Crl.P.C. deals with the powers of Police Officer to investigate into cognizable cases. Sub-sea(1) empowers the Officer in charge of a police station to investigate any cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate. Sub-sec.(2) lays down that no proceeding of a police officer in such a case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. Sub-sec.(3) gives power to the Magistrate under Sec.190 to order such an investigation, as mentioned in Sub-sec(1). Sub-sec.(2) lays down that no proceeding of a police officer in such a case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. Sub-sec.(3) gives power to the Magistrate under Sec.190 to order such an investigation, as mentioned in Sub-sec(1). Sec.157, Crl.P.C.deals with the methodology or procedure for investigation and it requires that, whenever such information is received by an officer-in-charge of a police station that he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered to investigate under Sec.156, he must forthwith send a report of it to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such an offence upon a police report and at the same time he must either proceed in person, or depute one of his subordinate officers to proceed, to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and, if necessary, to take measures for discovery and arrest of the offender. This provision is qualified by a proviso which is in two parts. The first clause of the proviso enables an officer-in-charge of a police station not to proceed to make an investigation on the spot or to depute a subordinate officer for that purpose if the information received is given against a person by name and the case is not of a serious nature. The second clause of the proviso permits the officer-in-charge of a police station not to investigate the case if it appears to him that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation. The report to be sent to the Magistrate under Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.157 requires that in each of the cases where the officer-in-charge of a police station decides to act under the two clauses of the proviso, he must state in his report his reasons for not fully complying with the requirements of Sub-sec.(1) and, in addition, in cases where he decides not to investigate on the ground mentioned in the second clause of the proviso, he is required to notify to the informant the fact that he will" not investigate the case or cause it to be investigated. These provisions are followed by Sec.159,.Crl.P.C. which mentions the power of the Magistrate to direct an investigation on receiving the report under Sec.157 and then states the alternative that, if he thinks fit, he may at once proceed, or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed, to hold a preliminary enquiry into, or otherwise to dispose of the case. On the face of it, the first alternative of directing an investigation cannot arise in a case where the report itself shows that investigation by the police is going on in accordance with Sec.156. It is to be noticed that the second alternative does not give the Magistrate an unqualified power to proceed himself or depute any Magistrate to hold the preliminary enquiry. That power is preceded by the condition that he may do so ‘if he thinks fit’. The use of this expression makes it clear that Sec.159 is primarily meant to give to the Magistrate the power of directing an investigation in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case under the proviso to Sec.157(1), and it is in those cases that, if he thinks fit, he can choose the second alternative. If the expression ‘if he thinks fit’ had not been used, it might have been argued that this section was intended to give in wide terms the power to the Magistrate to adopt any of the two courses of either directing an investigation, or of proceeding himself or deputing any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to hold a preliminary enquiry as the circumstances of the case may require. Without the use of the expression ‘if he thinks fit’, the second alternative could have been held to be independent of the first, but the use of this expression, in my opinion, makes it plain that the power conferred by the second clause of this section is only an alternative to the power given by the first clause and can, therefore, be exercised only in those cases in which the first clause is applicable. It may also be further noticed that, even in Sub-sec. (3) of Sec.156, the only power given to the Magistrate, who can take cognizance of an offence under Sec.190, Crl.P.C. is to order an investigation; there is no mention of any power to stop an investigation by the police. It may also be further noticed that, even in Sub-sec. (3) of Sec.156, the only power given to the Magistrate, who can take cognizance of an offence under Sec.190, Crl.P.C. is to order an investigation; there is no mention of any power to stop an investigation by the police. The scheme of these sections, thus, clearly is that the power of the police to investigate any cognizable offence is uncontrolled by the Magistrate, and it is only in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case that the Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation,orinthealternative, himself proceed or depute a Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to enquire into the case. The power of the police to investigate has been made independent of any control by the Magistrate. The conspectus of the provisions referred to above shows in a clinching fashion that once an investigation commences on receipt of an information either under Sec.154, Crl.P.C, or otherwise as has been provided under Sec.157, Crl.P.C, it is legitimately permissible to continue further investigation to collect the materials and complete the same for the formation of an opinion to be expressed in the report to be filed under Sec.173(2), Crl.P.C 18. The powers of the police to investigate by the registration of a case on an information or otherwise vis-a-vis the powers of the Court to interfere with the course of investigation came up for consideration on many an occasion before the Apex Court of the country and other High Courts. The precedents referred to by both sides may now be considered - seriatim. In Gansa Graon v. King Emperor, A.I.R 1923 Pat. 550:I.L.R (1923)2Pat 517, it was held that an information means something in the nature of a complaint or accusation, or at least information of a crime, given with the object of putting the police in motion. In Emperor v. Khawaja Nazim Ahmed, (1945)1 M.L.J. 86:1945 M.W.N. 49:1945 M.W.N. (Crl) 9: 2171.C. 1: 46 Crl.L.J. 413:47 Bom.L.R. 245: A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 18, it was observed thus: "But, in any case, the receipt and recording of an information report is not a condition precedent to the setting in motion of a criminal investigation. In Emperor v. Khawaja Nazim Ahmed, (1945)1 M.L.J. 86:1945 M.W.N. 49:1945 M.W.N. (Crl) 9: 2171.C. 1: 46 Crl.L.J. 413:47 Bom.L.R. 245: A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 18, it was observed thus: "But, in any case, the receipt and recording of an information report is not a condition precedent to the setting in motion of a criminal investigation. No doubt in the great majority of cases, criminal prosecutions are undertaken as a result of information received and recorded in this way but their Lordships see no reason why the police, if in possession through their own knowledge or by means of credible though informal intelligence which genuinely leads them to the belief that a cognizable offence has been committed, should not of their own motion undertake an investigation into the trust of the matters alleged....." In State of Bombay v. Rusi Mistry, A.I.R 1960 S.C. 391, the Supreme Court observed: "First information report is the information recorded under Sec.154, CrLP.C. It is an information given to a police officer relating to commission of an offence. It is also information given by informant on which the investigation is commenced." In Ponda Narayana v. State of Andhra pradesh, A.I.R 1975 S.G 1252, the Supreme Court, observed thus, "Thus shorn of minutest detail the broad picture presented by the prosecution was undoubtedly revealed in the F.I.R. which was lodged very soon after the occurrence. It is also information given by informant on which the investigation is commenced." In Ponda Narayana v. State of Andhra pradesh, A.I.R 1975 S.G 1252, the Supreme Court, observed thus, "Thus shorn of minutest detail the broad picture presented by the prosecution was undoubtedly revealed in the F.I.R. which was lodged very soon after the occurrence. In our opinion, it is neither customary nor necessary to mention every minute detail in the F.I.R." In Nawratan Mahton v. State of Bihar, A.I.R 1980 N.O.C.1, the Supreme Court observed, "For instance, the Sessions Judge drew an inference adverse to the prosecution from the fact that certain details were not mentioned in the F.I.R. This was not a sound ground for rejecting the prosecution case as the broad details are to be given in the Court and not generalised in the F.I.R.” In State of U.P. v. Ballabh Das, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1384:1985 Crl.L.J. 2009: (1985)3 S.C.C. 703 : (1985) S.C.C. (Crl.) 452, the Supreme Court observed, “It is manifest that a first information report is not intended to be a very detailed document and is meant to give only the substance of the allegations made and, therefore, the absence of the mention of a lathi would not put the prosecution case out of Court.” In Ram Kripal Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1985 Crl.L.J. 1048, a Full Bench of the Patna High Court observed, “It is now well settled beyond cavil that a complaint or a first information report in a criminal case is not to be encyclopaedia of all the facts.” In Suresh Agarwal v. State of Bihar, 1989 Crl.L.J. 1752, the Patna High Court observed thus, “Thus even a first information report which was shorn of facts or minute of details but conveys information about the commission of an,offence can be treated as first information report to set the police in motion and start investigation and absence of the details will not be a ground not to treat it as a report.” 19. The powers of the Court to interfere with police investigation into cognizable offences during the stage of investigation is limited. The powers of the Court to interfere with police investigation into cognizable offences during the stage of investigation is limited. A Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana Court, while dealing with investigation and F.I.R. and powers of Court, in Vinod Kumar Sethi v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1962 P. & H. 372, observed thus, “...the power of investigation so far as it vests exclusively in the police or investigating agency is not to be interfered with by the Courts, and the investigating agency should be left to carry on investigation without any interference. This power, clearly postulates that the investigation so long as it is in accordance with the provisions of law cannot be interfered with and it does not give immunity to investigation which is not in consonance with the relevant provisions of law governing the particular case or is in breach of them.” The Supreme Court considered the law in this respect in State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar, (1982) M.L.J. (Crl.) 358- (1982)1 S.C.J. 351: (1982)1 S.C.C. 561 : (1982) S.C.C. (Crl) 283. A.I.R 1982 S.C. 949. The actual question focussed before the Bench consisting of Y.V.Chandrachud, C.J., A.Varadarajan, J., and Amarendra Nath Sen, J., was whether the first information report lodged by the Commercial Tax Officer, Bureau of Investigation, against the firm and its partners disclosed an offence under Sec3 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act 43 of 1978. Y.V.Chandrachud, C.J., joining with A.Varadarajan, J., rendered a separate and independent judgment, concurring with Amarendra Nath Sen, J., and in the process of doing so, a scintillating and lively discussion had been made on the question posed, with a broad indication of the trend of law emerging on the subject, which gets reflected in Paragraphs 14 to 23 of the judgment, as follows: “14. My learned brother, A.N.Sen, J., has considered exhaustively the various authorities cited at the Bar by both the sides on the question as to the power of the courts to quash an investigation. I fully concur with his careful analysis of those authorities and would content myself with a broad indication of the trend of law bearing on the subject. 15. I fully concur with his careful analysis of those authorities and would content myself with a broad indication of the trend of law bearing on the subject. 15. Shri Ashok Sen and Shri Siddhartha Shankar Ray pressed upon us with considerable insistence the principle reiterated in W.N.King v. Republic of India, 1952 S.C.R 418: A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 156, that a statute which creates an offence and imposes a penalty of fine and imprisonment must be construed strictly in favour of the subject. The principle that no person can be put in peril of his life and liberty on an ambiguity is well-established, but, as - observed in M. V.Joshi v. M. U. Shimpi, (1961) 3 S.C.R. 986 : A.I.R 1961 S.C. 1494 at p. 1497, 1498, when it is said that penal statutes must be construed strictly, what is meant is that the court must see that the thing charged is an offence within the plain meaning of the words used and it must not strain the words: “To put it in other words, the rule of strict construction requires that the language of a statue should be so construed that no case shall be held to fall within it which does not come within the rea-sonable interpretation of the statute”, and that in case of doubt, the construction favourable to the subject should be preferred. But I do not think that this rule of strict interpretation of penal statutes in any way affects the fundamental principle of interpretation, that the primary test which can safely be applied in the language used in the act and, therefore when the words are clear and plain, the court must accept the expressed intention of the legislature. It is unnecessary to pursue this matter any further in view of the fact that the language of Sec.2(c) is, in my opinion, clear and admits of no doubt or difficulty. 16.In R.P.Kapur v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1960 S.C. 866(at pp. It is unnecessary to pursue this matter any further in view of the fact that the language of Sec.2(c) is, in my opinion, clear and admits of no doubt or difficulty. 16.In R.P.Kapur v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1960 S.C. 866(at pp. 868,869): (1960)3 S.C.R 388 at pp.392-393, the question which arose for consideration was whether a first information report can be quashed under Sec561-A of the Crl.P.C The court held on the facts before it that no case for quashing the proceedings was made out but Ganjendragadkar J., speaking for the court observed that though ordinarily, criminal proceedings instituted against an accused must be tried under the provisions of the code, there are some categories of causes where the inherent jurisdiction of the court can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. One such category, according to court, consists of cases where the allegations in the F.I.R. or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases, no question of appreciating evidence arises and it is a matter merely of looking at the F.I.R. or complaint in order to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases said the court, it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused. 17. In S.N.Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari, A.I.R 1970S.C. 786: (1970)3S.C.K 946, a first information report was lodged naming an Additional District Magistrate (Judicial) as the principal accused. His application under Sec 159 of the Crl.P.C asking that the Judicial Magistrate should himself, conduct a preliminary inquiry was dismissed, but the Court observed that though the Crl.P.C. gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases, an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution and that the High Court could issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police from misusing their legal powers. 18. 18. Shri Som Nath Chatterjee has placed great reliance on the decision of this Court in State of West Bengal v. S.N.Basak, 1963M.L.J. (Crl.) 515:A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 447: (1963)1 Crl.L.J. 341: (1963)2 S.C.J. 428: (1963)2 S.C.R. 52 , in which it was held that the statutory powers given to the police under Secs.154 and 156 of the Crl.P.C. to investigate into the circumstances of an alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of powers under Sec.439 or under the inherent power conferred by Sec.561-A of the Code. It must be remembered that no question arose in that case as to whether, the allegations contained in the F.I.R. disclosed any offence at all. The contention of the accused in that case was that the statutory power of investigation given to the police under Chapter XIV of the Code is not available in respect of an offence triable under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949 and that being so, the investigation undertaken by the police was without jurisdiction. That contentions was negatived and therefore, the application filed by the accused under Secs.439 and 561-A of the Code was dismissed. 19. In Jehan Singh v. Delhi Administration, 1974 M.L.J. (Crl.) 502: A.I.R 1974 S.C. 1146: (1974)2 S.C.J. 232: (1974) S.C.C. (Crl.) 538, the application filed by the accused under Sec.561 -A of the Code for quashing the investigation was dismissed as being premature and incompetent, but that was because the court found (per Sarkaria, J., p.797 (of S.C.R.): (at p.1148 of A.I.R.) that prima facie, the allegation in the F.I.R. if taken as correct, disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence by the accused. 20. The only other decision to which I need refer is that of the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, (1945)1 M.L.J. 86: (1944)71 I A. 203: 217 I.C. 1: A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 18, which constitutes, as it were, the charter of the prosecution all over, for saying that no investigation can ever be quashed. 20. The only other decision to which I need refer is that of the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, (1945)1 M.L.J. 86: (1944)71 I A. 203: 217 I.C. 1: A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 18, which constitutes, as it were, the charter of the prosecution all over, for saying that no investigation can ever be quashed. In a passage oft quoted but much-misunderstood, Lord Porter, delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee observed: In their Lordship’s opinion, however, the more serious aspect of the case is to be found in the resultant interference by the court with the duties of the police, just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes on them the duty of inquiry. In India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships thinks, be an unfortunate result if it should be. held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when move under Sec.491 of the Crl.P.C. to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as a present, however, the court’s functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then:" (at pp.212, 213 of I.A.): (at p.22 of A.I.R.). I do not think that this decision supports the wide proposition canvassed before us by Shri Som Nath Chatterjee. In the case before the Privy Council. Similar charges which were levelled against the accused in an earlier prosecution were dismissed. I do not think that this decision supports the wide proposition canvassed before us by Shri Som Nath Chatterjee. In the case before the Privy Council. Similar charges which were levelled against the accused in an earlier prosecution were dismissed. The High Court quashed the investigation into fresh charges after examining the previous record, on the basis of which it came to the conclusion that the evidence against the accused was unacceptable. The question before the Privy Council was to whether the fresh F.I.R. disclosed any offence at all. In fact, immediately after the passage which I have extracted above, the Privy Council qualified its statement by saying: "No doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more, if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation." If anything, therefore, the judgment shows that an investigation can be quashed in no cognizable offence is disclosed by the F.I.R. It shall also have been noticed, which is sometimes overlooked, that the Privy Council took care to qualify its statement of the law by saying that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province. It is surely not within the province of the police to investigate into a Report which does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty of inquiry in such cases. 21. The position which emerges from these decisions and the other decisions which are discussed by Brother A.N.Sen is that the condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under Sec. 157 of the Code is that the F.I.R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under Sec.157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R. prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on and the rule in Khawaja Nazir Ahmed will apply. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on and the rule in Khawaja Nazir Ahmed will apply. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. On the other hand, if the F.I.R. does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the Court would be jusfified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received. 22. There is no such thing like unfettered discretion in the realm of powers defined by statutes and indeed, unlimited discretion in that sphere can become a ruthless destroyer of personal freedom. The power to investigate into cognizable offences must, therefore, be exercised strictly on the condition on which it is granted by the Code. I may, in this behalf, usefully draw attention to the warning uttered by Mathew, J. in his majority judgment in Prabhu Dayal Deorash v. The District Magistrate, Kamrup, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 183.(1974) S.C.C. (Crl.) 18: (1974)1 S.C.C 103 :1974 Crl.L.J. 288 at 299), to the following effect: "We say, and we think it is necessary to repeat, that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen, except in accordance with the procedure established by the constitution and the laws. The history of per-sonal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of procedure. Observance of procedure has been the bastion against wanton assaults on personal liberty over the years. Under our Constitution, the only guarantee of personal liberty for person is that he shall not be deprived of it except in accordance with the procedure established by law." 23. For these reasons, which, frankly, are no different from those given by my learned brother A.N.Sen, I am of the opinion that the investigation which has been commenced upon the First Information Report is without jurisdiction and must, therefore, be quashed. I do accordingly and direct that no further investigation shall take place in pursuance or on the basis of the F.I.R. dated Dec. 13,1980 Lodged by the Commerical Tax Officer, Bureau of Investigation, with the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bureau of Investigation, Madan Street, Calcutta." 20. I do accordingly and direct that no further investigation shall take place in pursuance or on the basis of the F.I.R. dated Dec. 13,1980 Lodged by the Commerical Tax Officer, Bureau of Investigation, with the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bureau of Investigation, Madan Street, Calcutta." 20. In State of U.P. v. R.K.Srivastava, A.I.R 1989 S.C. 2222, two empolyees of the State Bank of India and one of its clients holding Current Account were charged under Secs. 120-B, 420,468 and 471, I.P.C. and Sec.5(2) read with Sec 5(1)(d) of the old Act. On the action resorted to under Sec.482, CrlP.C, the High Court of Allahabad quashed the first information report, resulting in further challenge to the Supreme Court, which upheld the judgment of the High Court in a short but crisp judgment. The relevant portion highlighting the question posed and the discussion made by the Bench consisting of Murari Mohon Dutt, S.Ratnavel Pandian and T.K.Thommen, JJ., as found in paragraphs 4 to 7 of the judgment, is as under: "4. The question is whether the fact disclosed in the F.I.R. constitute the offences with which the accused have been charged. It is manifestly clear from the allegations in the F.I.R. that the respondent or the other accused had no intention whatsoever to make any wrongful gain or to make any wrongful loss to the Bank. They had accepted the said three cheques amounting to Rs.54,600 and sent the same for clearance after debiting the L.O.C. account. The said cheques have been encashed and the money was received by the State Bank of India. It may be that there was some delay in crediting the L.O.C. account or that the money against the three cheques were credited in the accounts of the said Shri Sarwant Singh and his wife, but the allegations made either in the F.I.R. or in the charge-sheet do not show that the respondent and the said P.C.Saxena had acted dishonestly, that is to say, acted with a deliberate intention to cause wrongful gain or wrongful loss. In our opinion the High Court has rightly held that the allegations made in the F:I.R. do not constitute any offence of cheating, nor do they constitute any offence of forgery. In our opinion the High Court has rightly held that the allegations made in the F:I.R. do not constitute any offence of cheating, nor do they constitute any offence of forgery. It is true that it has been alleged that the said sum of Rs.54,600 was withdrawn on the basis of false credit entries made in the books of accounts of the Bank and connected credit and debit vouchers were also prepared and passed by the respondent and the other accused. When the said sum of Rs.54,600 had been allowed to be withdrawn by the said Shri Sarwant Singh and his wife, necessary entries had to be made in the books of accounts, but it is not understandable how these entries can be characterised as false entries. No document has been referred to in the F.I.R. as the outcome of forgery. 5. The High Court has rightly held that as the criminal proceedings have been started against the respondent on the basis of a F.I.R. which does not contain any (definite accusation, it amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court and, as such, is liable to be quashed. We entirely agree with the view expressed by the High Court. 6. The High Court has quashed the proceedings only as against the respondent No., R.K.Srivastava. In our opinion, when the ale-gations in the F.I.R. are the same against all the accused persons, the entire proceedings as against all the accused persons including the said P.C. Saxena and the said Shri Sarwant Singh should be quashed. 7. Accordingly, while we uphold the judgment of the High Court, we quash the entire criminal proceedings being Crime Case No.40 of 1983 also as against the accused P.C. Saxena and Shri Sarwant Singh. The appeals are disposed of as above." 21. 7. Accordingly, while we uphold the judgment of the High Court, we quash the entire criminal proceedings being Crime Case No.40 of 1983 also as against the accused P.C. Saxena and Shri Sarwant Singh. The appeals are disposed of as above." 21. In a recent decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Crl.L.J. 527, the Supreme Court (Ratnavel Pandian, J. and K.Jayachandra Reddy, J.) took into, consideration the relevant authorities on the subject and ultimately concluded as follows: "The sum and substance of the above deliberation results to a conclusion that the investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the police officers whose powers in that field are unfettered so long as the power to investigate into the cognizable offences is legitimately exercised in strict compliance with the provisions falling under Chapter XII of the Code and the Courts are not justified in obliterating the track of investigation when the investigating agencies are well within their legal bounds as aforementioned. Indeed, a noticeable feature of the scheme under Chap-ter XIV of the Code is that a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police investigation but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual investigation or to direct the police how that investigation is to be conducted. But if a police officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly and illegally exercises his investigatory powers in breach of any statutory provision causing serious prejudice to the personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then the Court on being approached by the person aggrieved for the redress of any grievance has to consider the nature and extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders as may be called for without leaving the citizens to the mercy of police echelons since human dignity is a dear value of our Constitution. Needs no emphasis that no one can demand absolute immunity even if he is wrong and claim unquestionable right and unlimited powers exercisable up to unfathomable cosmos. Any recognition of ‘Divine Power’ which no authority on earth can enjoy." 22. Needs no emphasis that no one can demand absolute immunity even if he is wrong and claim unquestionable right and unlimited powers exercisable up to unfathomable cosmos. Any recognition of ‘Divine Power’ which no authority on earth can enjoy." 22. The question as to whether before a public servant, whatever be his statue, is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty, which amounts to serious misdemeanour and the first information is lodged against him, there must be a suitable preliminary enquiry into the allegations by a responsible Officer or by a Commission of Inquiry, may be dealt with now, as it is incidental to the question now under consideration. When the old Act was originally enacted, offences relating to criminal misconduct and corruption were not made cognizable offences and such a policy was obviously as a result of the laudable intention, not to unnecessarily subject the public servants to harassment from any quarter whatever by the hurling of frivolous accusations, thereby making them suffer agony, anguish and humiliation of all sorts. However, in the process of combating corruption under the provisions of that Act, experience gained thereof, impelled the Legislature to make such offences cognizable, of course with certain inbuilt provisions giving necessary protection to the public servant. Such protection emerging in the form of the investigation to be mandatorily undertaken or conducted by an Officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police and in case if any police personnel below the rank of the D.S.P. undertakes investigation, such personnel can do so only after obtaining the necessary and requisite permission from the competent Magistrate. Besides sanction for prosecution had also been provided. These things apart, other safeguards such as preliminary enquiry by a responsible Officer or enquiry by a Commission of Inquiry had not at all been provided, Useful reference may be made in this regard to certain decisions. In State of M.P. v. Mubarak Ali, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 707, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed thus: "The Act was passed, as the preamble indicates, to make more effective provisions for the prevention of bribery and corruption among public servants. It introduced a definition of the offence of criminal misconduct in discharging an official duty and new rules of presumption against accused in the case of the said offence. It introduced a definition of the offence of criminal misconduct in discharging an official duty and new rules of presumption against accused in the case of the said offence. But in the year 1952, by Act 59of 1952, presumably on the basis of the experience gained, Sec.5-A was inserted in the Act to protect the public servants against harassment and victimization. If it was in the interest of the public that corruption should be eradicated, it was equally in the interest of the public that honest public servants should be able to discharge their duties free from false, frivolous and malicious accusation. To achieve this object, Secs.5-A and 6 introduced the following two safeguards: (1) no police officer below the rank - (a) in the presidency towns of Madras and Calcutta, of an Assistant Commissioner of Police, (b) in the Presidency town of Bombay, of a Superintendent of Police and (c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, shall investigate any offence, punishable under Sec.l61,Sec.l65 or Sec.l65-AoftheI.P.C. (45 of 1860) or under Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.5 of the Act, without the order of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make any arrest therefore without a warrant - see Sec.5-A; (2) no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sec.161 or Sec.164 or Sec.165 of the I.P.C. (Act 45 of 1860), or under Sec.5(2) of the Act alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction, of the appropriate Government - see Sec.6. These Statutory safeguards must be strictly complied with, for they were conceived in public interests and were provided as a guarantee against frivolous and vexatious prosecutions. While in the case of an officer of assured status and rank, the legislature was prepared to believe them implicitly, it prescribed an additional guarantee in the case of police officers below that rank namely, the previous order of a presidency magistrate or a magistrate of the first class, as the case may be. The Magistrate’s status gives assurance to the bona fides of the investigation. The Magistrate’s status gives assurance to the bona fides of the investigation. In P.Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, (1971)2 M.L.J. (S.C) 97: (1971)2 An.W.R 97: 1971 Crl.L.J. 523: (1970)3 S.C.R. 951: A.I.R 1971 S.C. 520, the Supreme Court sounded a note of caution and the rule of prudence and emphasised the imperative need for the holding of a preliminary enquiry, notwithstanding the absence of the provisions relatable to such enquiry, and observed, “Before a public servant, whatever be his status, is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty which amount to serious misdemeanour or misconduct of the type alleged in this case and a first information is lodged against him, there must be some suitable preliminary enquiry into the allegations by a responsible officer. The lodging of such a report against a person, specially one who like the appellant occupied the top position in a department, even if baseless, would do incalculable harm not only to the officer in particular but, to the department he belonged to, in general. If the Government had set up a Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department as was done in the State of Madras and the said department was entrusted with enquiries of this kind, no exception can be taken to an enquiry by officers of this department but any such enquiry must proceed in a fair and reason: able manner. The enquiring officer must not act under any preconceived idea of guilt of the person whose conduct was being enquired into or pursue the enquiry in such a manner as to lead to an inference that he was bent upon securing the conviction of the said person by adopting measures which are of doubtful validity or sanction. The means adopted no less than the end to be achieved must be impec-cable. In ordinary departmental proceedings against a Government servant charged with delinquency, the normal practice before the issue of a chargesheet is for someone in authority to take down statements of persons involved in the matter and to examine documents which have a bearing on the issue involved. It is only thereafter that a charge-sheet is submitted and a full-scale enquiry is launched. It is only thereafter that a charge-sheet is submitted and a full-scale enquiry is launched. When the enquiry is to be held for the purpose of finding out whether criminal proceedings are to be resorted to the scope thereof must be limited to the examination of persons who have knowledge of the affairs of the delinquent officer and documents bearing on the same to find out whether there is prima facie evidence of guilt of the officer. Thereafter the ordinary law of the land must take its course and further inquiry be proceeded with in terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure by lodging a first information report.” In Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 877: 1987 Crl.L.J. 793: (1987) S.C.C. (Crl.) 82: (1987)1 S.C.C. 288: (1987)1 S.C.J. 595, Bhagwati, C.J., while considering the absence of an enquiry by a Commission of Enquiry before launching of prosecution, observed at paragraph 18 at p.891 as follows: “The learned counsel on behalf of Dr.Jagannath Misra also contended that the prosecution should” not have been initiated against Dr.Jagannath Mishra without a prior inquiry made through a Commission of Enquiry set up for that purpose. The argument was that both prudence and propriety requires the setting up of a Commission of Enquiry prior to initiation of the prosecution because an inquiry made through the Commission of Enquiry would act as a filter for politically motivated or mala fide prosecution. This argument is also, in our opinion, without any force and cannot be sustained. It is undoubtedly true that in the past there have been cases where a successor Government has set up a Commission of Enquiry to enquire into the conduct of former Chief Minister and other persons connected with the administration during the regime of the former Chief Minister but that does not mean that no prosecution should be launched against a former Chief Minister or a person holding high political office under the earlier regime without first setting up a commission of enquiry for enquiring into his conduct. There is no provision of law which requires such a course of action to be adopted and it cannot be said that if a prosecution is initiated without an inquiry being held by a commission of enquiry set up for that purpose, the prosecution would be bad or that on that ground alone the prosecution could be allowed to be withdrawn. The criminal process in India is quite tardy and slow moving and as it is, it takes considerable time for a prosecution to ultimately come to an end and if a requirement were super imposed that no prosecution shall be launched against a person holding high political office under an earlier regime without first setting up a commission of enquiry and the commission coming to a prima facie conclusion that such person has committed acts which would constitute offences, the entire criminal process would be reduced to a mockery because the commission of enquiry itself might go on for years and after the inquiry is concluded the prosecution will start where the entire evidence will have to be led again and it would be subject to cross-examination followed by lengthy arguments. It would, in our opinion, be perfectly legitimate for the successor government to initiate a prosecution of a former Chief Minister or a person who has held high political office under the earlier regime without first having an inquiry made by a commission of enquiry, provided, of course, the investigation is fair and objective and there is sufficient material to initiate such prosecution. There are, under the existing law, sufficient safeguards for the purpose of ensuring that no public servant is harassed by false and vexatious prosecution or charges of corruption, because no such prosecution can be initiated without sanction under Sec.6 of the prevention of corruption act or Sec.197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. There are, under the existing law, sufficient safeguards for the purpose of ensuring that no public servant is harassed by false and vexatious prosecution or charges of corruption, because no such prosecution can be initiated without sanction under Sec.6 of the prevention of corruption act or Sec.197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. These safeguards cannot be said to be inadequate even if they do not afford adequate protection in any particular case, the magistrate is always there to protect an innocent accused because if in the opinion of the magistrate, there is not sufficient evidence and the charge against the accused appears to be groundless, the magistrate may straightway discharge the accused without taking any evidence.,It would become very difficult, almost possible, to bring to use the words of Krishna Iyer, J., ‘the higher inhabitants of Indian public and political docks’ within the net of the criminal law if an additional requirement is imposed that there should first be an inquiry by the commission of enquiry before any prosecution can be launched against them. This contention urged on behalf of Dr.Jagannath Mishra must also therefore, fail.” 23. In appreciation of the rival submissions revolving on the question as respects want of jurisdiction to register the case, commence and continue investigation, the fact situation relating to the topic uner discussion may be noticed to give a legal fitment in the backdrop of the principles evolved in the decisions cited supra. The fact situation as revealed by the first information report may now be adverted to and the relevant details, which are absolutely necessary for the present purpose as mentioned therein, are expressed herein: “I am the Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development Department, Madras-9. I am bringing to your notice the following facts for necessary action. Thiru S.Thirunavukkarasu, during his tenure as minister was in charge of housing. The materials herewith enclosed disclose that Thiru S.Thirunavukkarasu, Thiru Bharathi along with others appear to have entered into a criminal conspiracy to commit cognizable offences punishable under Sec.l20-B of the I.P.C. read with Sec.5(2) read with Sec.5(1)(d) and Sec.5(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and specific offences under Sec.5(2) read with Sec.5(1)(a) and Sec.5(2) read with Sec.5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. I would therefore request you to scrutinise these materials, register a case and proceed with investigation according to law. I would therefore request you to scrutinise these materials, register a case and proceed with investigation according to law. To provide for planning, development and use of rural and urban land in the State of Tamil Nadu and for purpose connected therewith, the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 was enacted. It provides also for the creation of the metropolitan development authority for the metropolitan area called M.M.D.A The control of development of lands rests with the M.M.D.A The appropriate planning authority is given the right to grant or refuse permission in respect of application made to it. M.M.D. A has the power of revocation and modification of the permission which had been granted. Provision for appeal, revision and review has also been provided for. The development control rules have also been framed for the Madras metropolitan area for Sec. 122 of the Act. During 1986-87 a number of appeal petitions were received by the Government of Tamil Nadu for issue of planning permission for the construction of buildings applied for by them within the Madras Metropolitan Planning Area. In all these instances the constructions were in violation of Rules and M.M.D.A. had rejected planning permission. Officials in the department in the secretariat have put up notes recommending that the appeal petitions may be rejected as no fresh grounds have been raised which merit consideration by the government. In many of the instances, the applicants have constructed additional floors, constructed deviating from the original plan and later sought exercise of the review powers of the government to regulate their unauthorised construction’s. In almost all these cases, Thiru S.Thirunavukkarasu as Minister for Housing, Government of Tamil Nadu and as a public servant and in pursuance of a criminal conspiracy along with his personal assistant Thiru Bharathi and others, passed orders without assigning any reason, allowing the petitions, thereby abusing the extraordinary power to grant exemption under Sec.113 of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971.” Therefore, the first information report cites the instances wherein appeal petitions were received from the parties mentioned therein, in which the officials, and also secretary of the department have put up notes recommending the rejection of the said appeal petitions for valid reasons, but S.Thirunavukkarasu as Minister for housing has allowed the appeal petitions, overruling the objections raised by the department officials. Thereafter, the first information report reads thus: “As aforesaid, during the period 1986-87, Tr.S.Thirunavukkarasu as the Minister for Housing in the Government of Tamil Nadu in pursuance of the criminal conspiracy, with his personal assistant, Tr.Bharathi and others caused pecuniary advantage to the petitioners by allowing their review petitions and thereby permitting them to retain their unauthorised constructions without being demolished as would have been the case otherwise. The exemption orders on these review petitions were passed by Tr.S.Thirunavukkarasu arbitrarily, without assigning any reasons and in some cases on flimsy grounds overruling the objections of the Housing and Urban Development Department obviously with ulterior motives and for consideration. By repeated abuse of the powers under Sec.113 of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 and in a short period and any abusing his official position and by corrupt and illegal, means, Tr.S.Thirunavukkarasu in pursuance of the criminal conspiracy obtained for himself and others substantial pecuniary advantage. .....Thus during 1986-87 in pursuance of the criminal conspiracy with his Personal Assistant Tr.Bharathi and others, Tr.S. Thirunavukkarasu had by corrupt and illegal means to wit by abusing his official position obtained for himself and others substantial pecuniary advantage in the manner set out supra. The pecuniary advantage obtained by these persons amounts to about Rs.21,45,29,000 approximately (Rupees twenty one crores forty five lakhs twenty nine thousand). The pecuniary advantage is calculated by assuming the cost of construction at Rs.200 per sq.ft. The cost of site Rs.200 sq.ft. and the likely selling price at Rs.600 per sq.ft. resulting in gain of Rs.200 per sq.ft. of the building constructed by the beneficiaries in pursuance of the orders passed by the Minister against D.C. Rules. Besides all the instances mentioned earlier, there are many other instances wherein similar orders, overruling the valid objections of the Housing and Urban Development Department have been passed by Tr.S.Thirunavukkarasu. Copies of such orders enclosed.“In the last paragraph of the first information report, it is prayed that action may be taken against the concerned according to law, inasmuch as prima facie offences under Sec.120-B of the I.P.C. read with the relevant provisions of the old Act, as had been indicated in the preamble portion, were made out. 24. It is to be recapitulated at this juncture that prior to the registration of the case on 17. 24. It is to be recapitulated at this juncture that prior to the registration of the case on 17. 1992 on the complaint lodged by Thiru L.N.Vijayaraghavan, I.A.S., Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban Development Department, Madras-9, in his letter No.l036/Secy.Hg./ 92, dated 17. 1992, to Thiru L.N.Venkatesan, I.P.S. Inspector General of Police (Crimes), Madras-4, a preliminary enquiry had been made by no less than a person in the cadre of the Inspector General of Police (Crime Branch), consequent upon the spate of petitions received by the Government alleging corrupt practices in the matter of according of exemption under Sec.113 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1971, and pursuant to the orders of the Government in office then, and subsequently it was followed by a detailed probe by the successor Government, culminating in the filing of a report to the Government in October, 1989, as indicated in the summation of facts, disclosing the existence of a prima facie case of criminal conspiracy, attracting the provisions of Sec. 120-B, I.P.C. read with Secs.5(2), 5(1)(d) and 5(1)(a) of the old Act, and specific offences under Sec.5(2) read with Sec.5 (1)(a) and Sec.5(2) read with Sec.5(1)(d)of the old Act. 25. Before analysing the fact-situation as revealed by the first information report to come to the conclusion as to whether the facts mentioned therein prima facie constitute any of the cognizable offences as had been referred to therein, better it is to consider whether S.Thirunavukkarasu (Minister for Housing, then) can be construced to be a ‘public servant’ within the meaning of the old Act. Sec.2 of the old Act dealing with interpretations, defines a ‘public servant’ by means of an inclusive definition, which reads as under: “For the purposes of this Act, ‘public servant’ means a public servant as defined in Sec.21 of the I.P.C. (45 of 1860).” The twelfth clause of Sec.21, I.P.C. dealing with ‘public servant’ reads as follows: “Every person- (a) in the service or pay of Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government; (b).....” In M.Karunanidhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 898, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court (Y.V.Chandrachud, C.J. P.N.Bhagwati, N.L.Untwalia, S.Murtaza Fazal Ali and R.S.Pathak, JJ.) happened to consider as to whether the Chief Minister of a State is a public servant falling within the definition of Sec.21, I.P.C. While considering that question, the Bench took notice of the relevant decisions on the subject and ultimately held that the Chief Minister is a public servant within the meaning of Clause (12) of Sec.21, I.P.C. in the following words: “Three facts, therefore, have been proved beyond doubt: 1. That a Minister is appointed or dismissed by the Governor and is, therefore, subordinate to him whatever be the nature and staus of his constitutional functions. 2. That a Chief Minister or a Minister gets salary for the public work done or the public duly performed by him. 3. That the said salary is paid to the Chief Minister or the Minister from the Government funds. It is thus incontrovertible, that the holder of a public office such as the Chief Minister is a public servant in respect of whom the Constitution provides that he will get his salary form the Government Treasury so long as he holds his office on account of the public service’ that he discharges“. The salary given to the Chief Minister is counterminous with his,office and is not paid like other constitutional functionaries such as the President and the Speaker. The salary given to the Chief Minister is counterminous with his,office and is not paid like other constitutional functionaries such as the President and the Speaker. These facts, therefore, point to one and only, one conclusion and that is that the Chief Minister is in the pay of the Government and is, therefore, a public servant within the meaning of Sec.21 (12) of the Penal Code.” On the face of the pronouncement of the apex Court, it goes without saying that S. Thirunavukkarasu, while functioning as a Minister, must have to be construed as a ‘public servant’ falling within the definition of Sec.21(12), I.P.C. Coming to B.Bharathi, there cannot be any difficulty in concluding that he being a Government Servant and Personal Assistant attached to a Minister receiving pay and emoluments from the Government, is indisputably a ‘public servant’. 26. The main accusation as revealed by the first information report, Mr.N.Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel, would say-is that S.Thirunavukkarasu in exercise of his powers as the Minister in charge of Housing granted exemption under Sec.113 of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971, without giving any reasons and overriding the departmental note put up recommending rejection of the appeals filed seeking exemption. Passing of such orders, learned Senior Counsel would elaborate further, is not a sin for the Minister to do and he in fact is vested with such powers under Sec.113of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act. 1971, especially when the said provision did not require any reason to be given while exercising such powers. Mr. V.R.Sridharan, learned counsel for B.Bharathi, while adopting the arguments of learned Senior Counsel, would also press into service that the materials available on record did not disclose the existence of any conspiracy. In this connection, learned Senior Counsel placed implicit reliance on the decision of this Court in P.Dwarakanath Reddy v. New India Maritime Agencies, Pvt. Ltd., W.A.Nos.1102 and 1103 of 1990, dated 111. In this connection, learned Senior Counsel placed implicit reliance on the decision of this Court in P.Dwarakanath Reddy v. New India Maritime Agencies, Pvt. Ltd., W.A.Nos.1102 and 1103 of 1990, dated 111. 1990, wherein it was observed as under: “.....Though it is desirable to disclose in express terms in the order itself that the policy and purpose of the Act have weighed with the Government, while granting the exemption, the order will not become illegal or ab initio void for want of such disclosure and it is permissible for the party concerned to show aliunde that the order of exemption has not ignored the policy and purpose of the Act and on the other hand has adhered to it. It would be a different matter if the provision itself enjoins the giving of recitals to that effect in the order. Sec.113 of the Act, does not enjoin the Government to set forth in the order of exemption, the reasons therefor.” Mr.B.Sriramulu, learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand would strenuously contend that the legality or otherwise of the passing of the exemption order is irrelevant and further does not call for a decision, and what he would contend is thai irrespective of the orders passed in granting exemption being illegal or otherwise, the question thai falls for consideration is as to whether those orders had been passed by the absue of his position as Minister by deriving of pecuniary advantage to himself or others pursuant to a conspiracy hatched therefore. To put it otherwise, he would say, it is not unusual for receipt of illegal gratification even for passing lawful orders and, in projection of such’ a submission, placed reliance upon the decision in Som Prakash: State of Delhi, A.I.R 1974S.C. 989: (1974) S.C.C. (Crl.) 215:1974 Crl.L.J. 724: (1974)4 S.C.C. 484, wherein Krishna Iyer, J., expressed thus: “Where the duty had been fully paid and only the signature of the Excise Inspector to the pro forma had to be appended for which the bribe was sought, it cannot be said that if duty had to be paid nothing was gained by giving the bribe to the Inspector. Bribes are paid not only to get unlawful things done, but to get lawful things done promptly since time means money, ‘speed money’ is the key to gelling lawful things done in good lime and ‘operation signature’ be it on a gale pass or a pro forma, can delay the movement of goods, the economics where of induces investment in bribery.” 27. Reverting to the factual position, as reflected by the first information report, can it be said, as vociferously contended by Mr.N.Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel, the facts of this case disclose ex facie no offence whatever, much less a cognizable offence under the relevant provisions of the old Act and the I.P.C. The answer to such a question can be nothing else but an emphatic ‘No’ in the circumstances of the case. It is of signal importance to note that exemption orders in over 150 cases were passed and in particular orders in 29 cases had been passed within a period of one week from the date of death of the late lamented Dr.M.G.Ramachandran, the then Chief Minister, making it possible for the applicants in whose favour exemption orders had been passed to derive pecuniary advantage quantified in a sum of Rs.21,45,29,000) approximately. It is to be emphasised here that the preliminary enquiry, staled to have been held prior to the registration of the first information report,also prima facie points out the receipt of illegal gratification for passing such exemption orders, pursuant to the conspiracy hatched among himself, his P.A. and others. 28. Sec.5(1)(a), Sec.5(1)(d) and Sec.5(2) of the old Act, which are relevant for the present purpose, read as follows: “5. Criminal Misconduct: (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct (a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person, any grantification (other than legal remuneration) as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Sec.161 of the I.P.C. (45 of 1980), or (b)........ (c)..... (c)..... .(d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, or .(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine:” (e)........ The definition of ‘criminal conspiracy’ under Sec.120-A, I.P.C, for which punishment is provided under Sec.120. I.P.C, is couched in the following terms: “120-A Definition of criminal conspiracy: when two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done- .(1) an illegal act, or .(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal Conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.” The crux of the provisions as aforequoted is that illegal gratification, if accepted by a public servant, either for himself or for any other person as a motive or regard or otherwise in abusing his position as a public servant, amounts to criminal misconduct, attracting penal consequences. Mention may also be made here as to the existence or otherwise of the criminal conspiracy as alleged. In a criminal conspiracy, the intention to do a criminal act is itself a crime, unlike in other offences which require not only the intention to do a criminal act but also in addition something committed in execution of the intention. The essence of the conspiracy being bare agreement between the conspirators, the same has to be proved in the manner allowed by law. While accepting the proof of the conspiracy, reality of the situation has to be taken into account. Conspiracy as a whole is brought about in secrecy and the proof of the same, by adduction of evidence direct, is really an impossible feat in most of the cases, though in the rarest of rare occasion, the possibility of obtaining such evidence is there. As such the conspiracy may be proved in most of the cases, by process of inference or induction from relevant proved facts and circumstances. As such the conspiracy may be proved in most of the cases, by process of inference or induction from relevant proved facts and circumstances. In the case on hand, it cannot be said that the materials disclosed in the first information report do not at all prima facie point out the existence of certain relevant facts and circumstances, creating a suspicion of the existence of a conspiracy for the receipt of illegal gratification as alleged, which itself on the basis of the provisions of Sec.157, Crl.P.C gives the requisite power to the Investigating Agency to commence and continue investigation. Once the power inheres in the investigating agency lor the commencement of investigation under Sec. 157, Crl.P.C, such a power cannot at all be cither interfered with or interdicted by the Court till a final report under Sec. 173(2), Crl.P.C, is filed before Court, except in exceptional circumstances warranting interference as in the case of interfering with the personal liberty or freedom of the person against whom prosecution is launched. This is admittedly a case in a nascent stage of investigation, subsequent to the registration of the case on an information lodged and, therefore, it cannot be stated that there was any possibility for the misuse of powers of the Investigating Agency tending to affect the persona liberty or properly of the person prosecuted. No doubt, the powers of the Court would commence co-terminus with the filing of a final report under Sec.173(2), Crl.P.C, in the sense of examining the report and other connected records for giving its opinion as to taking cognizance or otherwise of the case. It is not as if the investigation in this case is not done by an Officer not competent to investigate, inasmuch as the investigation into corruption is by no less a person than a person in the cadre of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D. Further, as already indicated, there was no hurly-burly haste or hurry in launching the first information report straight, without resorting to holding a preliminary enquiry. These things apart, there is also the hurdle of getting sanction for prosecution before ever the final report is filed under Sec. 173(2), Crl.P.C. On the face of the prima facie disclosure of the commission of cognizable offences by the averments in the first information report and other inbuilt safeguards, either observed or to be observed before every filing a final report, it cannot be stated that there is want of jurisdiction for the Investigating Agency to commence the investigation on the basis of the first information report lodged and continue to collect materials for the formation of their opinion to be reflected in the final report to be filed under Sec.l73(2), Crl.P.C. 29. This sort of a finding is however subject to a finding that may be recorded on the other question of mala fides, for the reason, as urged by Mr.N.Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel, that even if in the extreme case of holding that the allegations in the first information report do prima facie disclose a cognizable offence,, taking for granted that such allegations are true, the right to commence and continue investigation in a bid to collect materials for the formation of opinion to be reflected in the report under Sec.173 (2), Crl.P.C, will get snapped, the moment the malice-factual or legal-is either established directly on the materials available on record or is inferred irresistibly from the established facts and circumstances the question so interesting and moot it is about which I may now embark upon a discussion. 30. S.Thirunavukkarasu, would attribute political vendetta on the part of Selvi J.Jayalalitha the Honourable Chief Minister, impleaded as fifth respondent in Crl.O.P.No. 10904 of 1992, for the initiation of criminal proceedings against him, so as to bring him to disrepute in the eyes of the public and wreck his political career, especially at a time when his popularity in soaring high among the masses. Such attribution of vendetta and malice get reflected in his affidavit and the relevant portions are extracted hereunder: "3. Such attribution of vendetta and malice get reflected in his affidavit and the relevant portions are extracted hereunder: "3. While I am advised to state that the present proceeding pending before this Hon’ble Court is one filed by the Slate of Tamil Nadu against an order passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge refusing to accept the remand report submitted by the prosecution, the present proceeding being one calling upon this Hon’ble Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Sec.482 of the Crl.P.C, the full facts of the matter have to be placed before this. Court for the proper adjudication of this matter. This is particularly because, arising out of the refusal to remand me, in the guise of the present petition, the State is constrained to make out a case of legal and constitutional issues. While these legal aspects will be dealt with by my counsel, I shall restrict this present affidavit only for the purpose of bringing to the notice of this Hon’ble Court that the present investigation, including the registration of the FIR against me and the attempts to remand me to custody are all personally motivated by vendetta and revenge on the part of the present Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu Selvi J.Jayalalitha and the entire attempt of the prosecution is to try and discredit me in the eyes of the public by a gross misuse of the police and the Government administration. I respectfully state that this mala fide action on the part of the present Chief Minister and Police Department who are acting on her instructions goes to the root of the complaint. A complaint which has been filed with mala fide intention and an investigation which is likewise motivated by mala fides will not give rise to a commission of any cognizable offence and consequently the State cannot therefore investigate and register a false case motivated by such malice as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of S.N.Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari,A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 786: (1970)3 S.C.R. 946 and the Union of India v. B.N.Ananda Padmanabaian,A.I.R. 1971 S.C.1836:1971 Crl.L.J. 1287, as followed by a Full Bench of this Hon’ble Court in the case of K.Veerasamy v. Union of India, (1979) L.W. (Crl.)63. 4. 4. As the State is seeking to prosecute this petition for the purpose of getting the imprimator of this Hon’ble Court for continuing with the prosecution and the investigation, it would be imperative for this Hon’ble Court to find out whether mala fides motivated this case. 5. I respectfully state that in the instant case the police officials are acting mala fide and,at the intervention of the Chief Minister Selvi J.Jayalalitha. This is further established by the fact that the police officials are attempting to Fabricate documents by contacting various persons and pressing them to give false statements against me, but apparently unsuccessfully, because without a single instance of receipt of money or payment of money having taken place, at the instance of the Chief Minister the complainant (present Housing Secretary) has, without any application of mind, given the instant FIR on the basis of assumptions and presumptions and ex facie rebuttable logic. .6. I respectfully state that another factor which will substantiate my allegations of mala fide in the commencement of the present investigation and the filing of the FIR is the unexplained and inordinate delay in the commencement of the same. Many times in the past, political opponents have made allegations of this nature against me, but even though action could have been instituted if thought fit, three succeeding governments including a long period directly under the President’s Rule and more than one year of the present Rule, have not done anything about the same. I further respectfully state that under norma! circumstances, any filing of an FIR against a present or former public servant which has a tendency to bring such person to disrepute ought to be preceded by some preliminary investigation of a discreet nature. However, in the instant case, there has been no such enquiry disclosed in the complaint and no indication of any such file having presented itself. When such is the case, in this matter, the FIR has been received on the 15th July at 7 p.m. and the arrest is sought to be made at 5 a.m. on the 16th of July. 7. When the alleged offence is said to have been committed by me in the year 1986-87, sufficient cause should be shown by the investigation authorities and the prosecution to explain the delay. This explanation ought to be contained at the first instance in the FIR. 7. When the alleged offence is said to have been committed by me in the year 1986-87, sufficient cause should be shown by the investigation authorities and the prosecution to explain the delay. This explanation ought to be contained at the first instance in the FIR. In the instant case, it is shocking and revealing to note that in Column No.7 where an explanation should be given for the delay if any, in instituting the proceeding and the person responsible for such delay has been conveniently omitted to be filled up leading to the inescapable conclusion that the charge itself having been falsely hoisted, none of the authorities want to commit themselves to explain such delay. This omission on the part of the authorities in even filling up a statutory form of filing an FIR and that too a column requiring vital information further underscores my allegation that the entire investigation and filing of the FIR has been done hastily at the instance and instigation of the present Chief Minister. It may be relevantly stated that even in the body of the complaint there is no explanation why the FIR has come to be lodged after a lapse of over 5 years. .8. I further respectfully state investigations under the Prevention of Corruption Act are taken up by a separate wing of the Government called the “Vigilance and Anti Corruption Cell” under the Direct control of a seniormost Director General of Police. In the instant case, surprisingly, the case has come to be taken up by the Crime Branch, CID and there is no available explanation on record as to why the unusual procedure has been adopted. I respectfully state that this Hon’ble Court ought to call for the records of the Government relating to this investigation and ascertain under what authority the complainant namely the Housing Secretary gave the present complaint to the CBCID instead of forwarding the papers to the authorities specifically constituted for enquiries such as this. Likewise it is to be ascertained under what authority, has the DSP in the CBCID taken up the FIR on fife and sought to make a remand the very next day. Likewise it is to be ascertained under what authority, has the DSP in the CBCID taken up the FIR on fife and sought to make a remand the very next day. I state that this unusual procedure has been adopted to circumvent the usual course of sending the complaint to the Director General of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption because, no facts have been made out in the complaint, to warrant the department to take the actions as undertaken by the CBCID at the instance of the Chief Minister. I reliably understand that the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Cell have in fact refused to entertain the instant complaint and consequently recourse has been taken to adopt the present procedure. 9. The mala fides of the present Chief Minister arises out of a personal animosity she bears against me. Even a few weeks before I was illegally detained. I have been making speeches in public meetings, press conference and other public forum stating that the present Chief Minister has misused her official position in purchasing property from TANSI a State owned body. This was in violation of Government Orders that specify that Ministers and such high ranking executives shall not deal in property belonging to the Government or quasi Governmental authorities. Likewise, she has also misused her official position in contracting with the Tamil Nadu Text Book Society as partner of Jaya Publications and has received huge sums of money amounting to nearly a crore of rupees for printing text books. 10. Since I am also a sitting member of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, having been so elected from the Aranthangi constitutency and being one of the few members of opposition, there was also an imminent threat that in the forthcoming Assembly sessions I will be raising these issues. Therefore, one year after coming into power, realising the imminent threat of the Government’s instability, the present action to somehow keep me in custody and affect my credibility with the public has been taken. 11. My increasing exposure to the public and increasing standing as a political leader in Tamil Nadu has also posed a real threat to the present Government. 11. My increasing exposure to the public and increasing standing as a political leader in Tamil Nadu has also posed a real threat to the present Government. Already there are criminal cases pending against me initiated at the instance of the Chief Minister one of which has been filed by one Thiru Natarajan, Husband of one Sasikala Natarajan who is a close confidante and adviser of the present Chief Minister for alleged defamatory acts. This case is pending before the XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet. There is another civil suit filed against me by the Chief Minister on the Original Side of the Hon’ble Court once again for alleged acts of defamation and subsequent damages. Since the Chief Minister, apart from causing me harassment through all these proceedings, could not prevent me from voicing my opinion and thereby gain popularity is now attempting to interfere with my personal liberty. 12. The present Chief Minister is well aware that as a General Secretary of a registered political party and as a person with a substantial political support in the State, I could cause a lot of embarrassment to her Government by exposing her misdeeds. She has therefore stopped to present action for the purpose of trying to eliminate me politically by making baseless allegations and by gross abuse of State machinery". He of course did not attribute any personal animosity to the civil and police personnel connected with the initiation of criminal proceedings, but would narrate certain facts and circumstances constituting malice in law, in the ever so many grounds taken by him, which in effect is as follows: Deviating from the usual procedure of forwarding the complaint to the department of anti-vigilance and corruption and conducting a discreet enquiry, the registration of this case by the C.B., C.I.D., by means of the first information report in an indecent haste and in a hurly-burly fashion without proper application of mind is obviously at the instigation of Selvi J.Jayalalitha with the oblique motive of bringing him to public disgrace. Notwithstanding the fact that six years had elapsed from the alleged commission of offence in 1986-87, no explanation whatever forthcame for the registration of the case on 17. 1992, after such undue delay which, in the eye of law, has to be construed as a circumstance pointing out the ulterior motive of political vendetta and malice behind it. 31. Notwithstanding the fact that six years had elapsed from the alleged commission of offence in 1986-87, no explanation whatever forthcame for the registration of the case on 17. 1992, after such undue delay which, in the eye of law, has to be construed as a circumstance pointing out the ulterior motive of political vendetta and malice behind it. 31. The Inspector General of Police, Crime, Madras-4 and the Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, CID., Madras-4, impleaded as respondents 2 and 3 in Crl.O.P.No.10904 of 1992, did not opt to file any counter affidavit. However, the Secretary, Housing and Urban Department, Madras-9 and the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D. Headquarters, Madras-4, impleaded as respondents 1 and 4 in Crl.O.P.No. 10904 of 1992, filed counter-affidavits denying malice on the part of civil and police personnel as alleged. 32. Selvi J.Jayalalitha, Chief Minister, has also filed a counter-affidavit assertively denying political vendetta and malice alleged against her. Apart from projection or substantiation of her denial adverting to certain factual matters, she would also plead and state by collecting the relevant precedents emerging from the High Courts and the Apex Court of the country to show neither malice nor political vendetta can ever be a ground for quashing criminal proceedings in case the proceeding so initiated did not suffer from the infirmity of want of disclosure of materials constituting cognizable offences warranting the registration, commencement and continuation of investigation. The relevant portions of the factual matrix in the affidavit are extracted as below: "9. I deny the averments contained in paragraph of the affidavit, while it may be true that the petitioner has been indulging in a mud-slinging campaign against me in recent times, it has had no impact whatsoever in the minds of the general public. I specifically deny the allegation that I have indulgge in any corrupt practice by abusing my official position either in the purchase of land belonging to the TANSI by ‘Jaya Publications’ or for that matter in the contract awarded by the Tamil Nadu Text Book Society. Both these transactions are in conformity with the usual norms and no irregularities or corrupt practices have been committed by me in and by which I had illegally benefited as claimed by the petitioner. I specifically deny the further allegation of the petitioner that as a result of these two transaction, I obtained sustantial pecuniary advantage. 10. Both these transactions are in conformity with the usual norms and no irregularities or corrupt practices have been committed by me in and by which I had illegally benefited as claimed by the petitioner. I specifically deny the further allegation of the petitioner that as a result of these two transaction, I obtained sustantial pecuniary advantage. 10. I deny the allegation contained in paragraph 9 of the affidavit. As adverted to by me supra, the claim of the petitioner that I have become jealous of him as a result of the alleged increasing exposure of the petitioner as a leader of an opposition political party, is fanciful, to say the least. It is also incorrect to suggest that the popularity of the petitioner has percolated into the rank and file of the A.I.A.D.M.K. Party. I reiterate that the members of my party have always been and are loyal to me. 11. I deny the allegations contained in para-. graph 10 of the affidavit. It is not correct to state that the defamation case filed by Thiru M.Natarajan against petitioner herein has been initiated at my instance. In fact, in the past over 2 years I have issued a number of press statements denying my association with Thiru M.Natarajan. It is however true that I have filed a suit for damages in C.S.No.893 of 1990 on the file of the High Court, Madras wherein I have claimed damages against the petitioner and 5 others for certain defamatory utterances made by him against me. It is incorrect to state that the civil suit was filed by me in an endeavour to curb the freedom of expression of the petitioner. As stated hereinbefore, the petitioner is a solitary member of a political party and by no stretch of imagination he can pose any threat to my political career. I specifically deny the allegation that I have been instrumental in harassing the petitioner by the police and other officers of the Government for the past one year as claimed by the petitioner. 12. I specifically deny the allegation that I have been instrumental in harassing the petitioner by the police and other officers of the Government for the past one year as claimed by the petitioner. 12. I am advised not to traverse upon the averments contained in paragraphs 11 to 17 of the affidavit, as I have neither issued instructions to the investigating agency in this-case nor for that matter I am personally aware of the various details set out therein by the petitioner, except to the extent regarding the factual statements concerning the proceedings before the Court. 13. I am advised to state that the contention raised in Ground-A of the affidavit is untenable. It is respectfully submitted that the present prosecution has not been launched as a result of any malice as claimed by the petitioner. I have already adverted to the backdrop of the facts and circumstances culminating in the launching of the F.I.R. by the 1st respondent herein, pursuant to which the investigation has commenced. Even otherwise, I am advised to state that the question of malice is not germane to the determination of the issue as to whether the investigation in a criminal case is liable to be quashed. However, I hasten to add that the various allegations.of mala fides attributed to me by the petitioner are not only false, but made in an endeavour to protract’the investigation and thereby delay justice. 14. I deny the averments contained in Ground-B of the affidavit. As submitted earlier, the investigation in the case has not commenced at my instigation and as such the claim of the petitioner to the contrary is false and untenable. 15....... 16. I deny the allegations contained in Ground-D of the affidavit. As submitted earlier, the police officials are not acting mala fide and at my intervention as claimed by the petitioner. Such an averment has been made solely in an endeavour to prejudice the mind of this Honourable Court in arriving at a just decision of the case. 17. I deny the allegation contained in Ground-E of the affidavit. I am advised to state that the registration of the case, arrest and the production of the petitioner for remand, have all been done by the investigating agency in accordance with law. I have not misused my official posi-tionin theconductof the subject investigation, as alleged by the petitioner. 18...... 19...... 20...... 21. I am advised to state that the registration of the case, arrest and the production of the petitioner for remand, have all been done by the investigating agency in accordance with law. I have not misused my official posi-tionin theconductof the subject investigation, as alleged by the petitioner. 18...... 19...... 20...... 21. I deny the allegations contained in Ground-J of the affidavit. While it is true that the petitioner has been making defamatory speeches against me in a futile endeavour to harm my reputation in the minds of the general public it is respectfully submitted that these utterances are totally false. As submitted earlier, the transactions relating to the purchase of the property from TANSI and the contract awarded by the Tamil Nadu Text Book Society, are effected bona fide and in accordance with the usual norms attendant on such transactions. I once again reiterate that I have no personal animos-ity against the petitioner herein, as a result of which the present prosecution has been initiated against the petitioner. 22. I deny the allegations contained in Ground-K. L and M of the affidavit, As submitted earlier, the petitioner who is the lone representative of the party floated by him, has never posed any serious threat to my political career and his claim to the contrary is but a figment of his imagination. It is futile to contend that the present Government is reeling under any imminent threat as a result of any threat or poser made by the petitioner herein and that I had to resort to unethical measures to impair his alleged credibility with the general public.” 33. The terminology ‘malice’ came to be interpreted and understood by various High Courts and the apex Court of the country and useful reference may be made to some of those decisions. In Ram Chandra v. Secretary to Government of West Bengal, A.I.R-1964 Cal. 265, it was held: “Mala fides does not necessarily involve a malicious intention. The terminology ‘malice’ came to be interpreted and understood by various High Courts and the apex Court of the country and useful reference may be made to some of those decisions. In Ram Chandra v. Secretary to Government of West Bengal, A.I.R-1964 Cal. 265, it was held: “Mala fides does not necessarily involve a malicious intention. It is enough if the aggrieved party establishes: (1) that the authority making the impugned order did not apply its mind at all to the matter in question or (2) that the impugned order was made for a purpose or upon a ground other than what is mentioned on the face of the order.....When an authority is vested with a power but he is required to consult an advisory body before taking its decision, the responsibility for the decision or the final action that emerges is that of the authority who is entrusted with the power. If the authority concerned fails to apply its mind and to exercise its discretion, the order will be vitiated by mala fides....” In State of Madras v. Tirunelveli Municipal Council, (1967)1 M.L.J. 47 , a Division Bench of this Court held, “If the exercise of the power is mala fide, or is a colourable exercise of power for some ulterior purpose, the Court will never hesitate to strike down the exercise of the power. Mala fides would include a colourable exercise of the power, that is, an exercise of power which is ostensible so, but which is really a pretext with the ulterior objective or for achieving some other end. But it is for the party alleging mala fides to establish that element as a reasonable inference, on the facts and probabilities shown to exist; a mere allegation of mala fides, as not entirely improbable, will not do and Courts have to take notice of the increasing trend to allege this, sometimes with little or no evident substance.” In Express Newspapers (P) Limited v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 872: (1986)1 S.C.C. 133, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held: “Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end design. There is a distinction between exercise of power in good faith and misuse in bad faith. There is a distinction between exercise of power in good faith and misuse in bad faith. The former arises when an authority misuses its power in breach of law, say, by taking into account bona fide, and with best of intentions, some extraneous matters or by ignoring relevant matters. That would render the impugned act or order ultra vires. It would be a case of fraud on powers. The misuse in bad faith arises when the power is exercised for an improper motive, say, to satisfy a private or personal grudge or for wreaking vengeance of a Minister.....A power is exercised maliciously if its repository is motivated by personal animosity towards those we are directly affected by its exercise. Use of a power for an ‘alien’ purpose other than the one for which the power is conferred is mala fide use of that power. Same is the position when an order is made for a purpose other than that which finds place in the order. The ulterior or alien purpose clearly speaks of the misuse of the power." 34. The concept of ‘malice’ traceable to its origin in the field of administrative law had been accorded judicial recognition as a potent weapon in protecting the legal rights by the powers-that-be, either by administrative or executive orders, in the sense of those orders having been set at naught, quashed or restrained by the issuance of a writ of certiorari or mandamus or a combination of both. The sphere of its activity had been extended to other fields of law as well particularly criminal law. The extent of its sweep and sway in the field of criminal law cannot be stated to be of such magnitude as to go to the extent of quashing the criminal proceedings, but its sphere of activity in such proceedings can go to such ah extent that, if a police officer illegally exercises his investigating powers in breach of any statutory provision causing serious prejudice to personal liberty and also of property of a citizen, then the Court being approached had to consider the nature and extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders as may be called for without leaving the citizens in the lurch. It may further be stated that malice or vendetta by itself can by no means be stated to serve as a factor resulting in the quashing of criminal proceeding, but such a factor will lead to the quashing of criminal proceedings in case there are no materials disclosing cognizable offence giving jurisdiction to the police to register, commence and continue investigation for a final report to be filed, in the sense, if the registration of such a case and commencement of investigation had been perpetrated with the oblique motive of harassing the party against whom prosecution had been launched or to bring him into disrepute, obviously by means of a colourable exercise of power. This will be evident from the discussion to be followed by deriving solidified support from certain precedents emerging from the apex of the judicial administration of this country. 35. In dea1ing with the mala fide exercise of powers of investigation by police, the Supreme Court (S.M.Sikri, V.Bhargava and C.A.Vaidialingam, JJ.) in S.N.Sharma V. Bipen Kumar Tiwari,A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 786/ (1970) 3 S.C.R. 946 , observed as follows: "It Appears to us that, though the Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers." The view as expressed above was reiterated in State of Bihar v.J.A.Saldhana, A.I.R. l980 S.C.326, wherein the apex Court held that unless extraordinary cases of gross abuse of power by those in charge of the investigation is made out, the Court should be quite loath to interfere at the stage of investigation. It went ahead and further said that mala fide or bias of an informant is of a secondary importance, if at the trial impeccable evidence disclosing the offence has been brought on record. In State of Bihar v. P.P.Sharma, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1260, K.Ramaswamy, J., observed: "The question is whether, the impugned actions would offend Art.21 of the Constitution. Art.21 assures every person right of life and personal liberty. In State of Bihar v. P.P.Sharma, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1260, K.Ramaswamy, J., observed: "The question is whether, the impugned actions would offend Art.21 of the Constitution. Art.21 assures every person right of life and personal liberty. The word personal liberty is of the widest amplitude covering variety of rights which goes to constitute personal liberty of a citizen. Its deprivation shall be only as per procedure prescribed in the Code and the Evidence Act conformable to the mandate of the Supreme Law, the Constitution. The investigator must be alive to the mandate of Art.21 and is not empowered to trample upon the personal liberty arbitrarily, though the Code gives unfettered power to investigate into the suspected cognizable offence imputed to ah accused. The gravity of the evil to the commu"-nity resulting from anti-social activities or commission of the grave crime by itself would not give carte blanche right or power to the investigator to invade the personal liberty of a citizen except in accordance with the procedure established by law and the Constitution; The observance of the procedure, therefore, is an assurance against wanton assaults on personal liberty. 61. An Investigating Officer who is not sensitive to the constitutional mandates may be prone to trample upon the personal liberty of a person when he is actuated by mala fides. But as stated the accused at the earliest should bring to the notice of the Court of the personal bias and his reasonable belief that an objective investigation into the crime would not be had at the hands of the investigator by pleading and proving as of fact with necessary material facts. If he stands by till the charge-sheet was filed, it must be assumed that he.has waived his objection. He cannot turn down after seeing the adverse report to plead the alleged mala fides. If he stands by till the charge-sheet was filed, it must be assumed that he.has waived his objection. He cannot turn down after seeing the adverse report to plead the alleged mala fides. Equally laying the information before the Station House Officer of the commission of cognizable crime merely sets the machinery of the investigation in motion to act in accordance with the procedure established by law." In Sheo Nandan Paswan v. Slate of Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 877: 1987 Crl.L.J. 793: (1987) S.C.C. (Crl.) 82: (1987)1 S.C.C. 288: (1987)1 S.C.J. 595, Bhagwati, C.J., expressed, "It is a well established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise, justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant." The view expressed in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Crl.L.J. 527, by their Lordships of the Supreme Court (S.Ratnavel Pandian and K.Jayachandra Reddy, JJ.) may be referred to as the last one in this regard. The facts of this case may succinctly be stated for the better appreciation of the principles evolved in the best of fashion possible. Chi.Bhajan Lal was a Minister in 1977 when Chi.Devi Lal was. the Chief Minister of Haryana State, and he became the Chief Minister of the State of Haryana in 1982-87. During the initiation of this criminal proceeding against him, he was the Union Minister for Environment and Forests, Government of India. In the general election to the Legislative Assembly of Haryana State in June 1987, Smt.Jasma Devi, wife of Chi.Bhajan Lai, contested from Adampur constituency on being sponsored by the Congress (I) Party as against Mr.Dharam Pal who was a nominee of the Lok Dal. Smt.Jasma Devi won the election and Mr.Dharam Pal presented an election petition challenging her election on a variety of grounds. Chi.Devi Lal also contested on Lok Dal’s ticket in a different constituency and became successful and was the Chief Minister of Haryana State in 1987. It seems that after the election, there were a number of criminal proceedings between the parties one of which was a criminal prosecution against Dharam Pal under Scc.307, I.P.C. registered in Adampur police station. On account of political enmity and institution of number of criminal cases and counter cases, there was bad blood between. Chi.Bhajan Lal and Chi.Devi Lal. While so, on 111. On account of political enmity and institution of number of criminal cases and counter cases, there was bad blood between. Chi.Bhajan Lal and Chi.Devi Lal. While so, on 111. 1987 Mr.Dharam Pal presented a complaint before Chi.Devi Lal, making serious allegations against Chi.Bhajan Lal to the effect that before 1969, Chi.Bhajan Lal was a man of ordinary means, and after he was inducted as a Minister and particularly alter he became Chief Minister, he accumulated huge properties worth several crores of rupees in the names of his family members, relations and persons close to him by misusing his power and position and undervaluing the market price, and Mr.Dharam Pal cited 20 independent allegations, and ultimately prayed that investigation should be directed and appropriate action be taken against Chi.Bhajan Lal. On such complaint, the officer on Special Duty in the Chief Minister’s Secretariat made an endorsement on 111. 1987 in Hindi, the translation of which reads ‘CM. has seen. For appropriate action.‘ and marked the same to the Director General of Police, who in turn made an endorsement on 111. 1987 itself reading, ‘Please look into this; take necessary action and report’, and marked it to the Superintendent of Police, Hissar. The said complaint along with the above endorsements was put up on 211. 1987 before the Superintendent of Police who on that day itself made an endorsement reading, ‘Please register a case and investigate.‘ A case was registered under Secs. 161 and 165, I.P.C. and Sec.5(2) of the old Act and investigation was taken up. W.P.No.8172 of 1987 was filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court for quashing the criminal proceedings on manifold grounds inclusive of want of jurisdiction for the police to commence and continue investigation as a consequence of non-disclosure of cognizable offence on the averments in the first information report and mala fides. The Division Bench of that Court upheld those grounds and quashed the proceedings and directed Mr.Dharam Pal to pay costs to Chi.Bhajan Lal. The matter was further agitated in appeal by the State of Haryana before the apex Court. In the backdrop of such factual position and dealing with the question of mala fides in all its facts, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, held, “109. The matter was further agitated in appeal by the State of Haryana before the apex Court. In the backdrop of such factual position and dealing with the question of mala fides in all its facts, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, held, “109. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not Confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. 110. It may be true, as repeatedly pointed out by Mr.Parasaran, that in a given situation false and vexatious charges of corruption and venality may be maliciously attributed against any person holding a high office and enjoying a respectable status thereby sullying his character, injuring his reputation and exposing him to social ridicule with a view to spite him on account of some personal rancour, predilections and past prejudices of the complainant. In such a piquant situation, the question is what would be the remedy that would redress the grievance of the verily affected party? The answer would be that the person who dishonestly makes such false allegations is liable to be proceeded against under the relevant provisions of the I.P.C. - namely under Sec.182 or 211 or 500 besides becoming liable to be sued for damages. 111. Reverting to the present case, the allegations made in the complaint, in our considered opinion, do clearly constitute a cognizable offence justifying the registration of a case and an investigation thereon and this case does not fall under any one of the categories of cases formulated above calling for the exercise of extra-ordinary or inherent powers of the High Court to quash the F.I.R. itself. 112...... 113...... 114. No doubt, there was no love lost between Chi.Bhajan Lal and Dharam Pal. Based on this strained relationship, it has been then emphatically urged by Mr.K.Parasaran that the entire allegations made in the complaint due to political vendetta are not only scurrilous and scandalous but also tainted with mala fides, vitiating the entire proceedings. 112...... 113...... 114. No doubt, there was no love lost between Chi.Bhajan Lal and Dharam Pal. Based on this strained relationship, it has been then emphatically urged by Mr.K.Parasaran that the entire allegations made in the complaint due to political vendetta are not only scurrilous and scandalous but also tainted with mala fides, vitiating the entire proceedings. After it has been repeatedly pointed out earlier the entire matter is only at a premature stage and the investigation is not yet proceeded with except some preliminary effort taken on the date of the registration of the case, that is, on 211. 1987. The evidence has to be gathered after a thorough investigation and placed before the Court on the basis of which alone the Court can come to a conclusion one way or the other on the plea of mala fides. If the allegations are bereft of truth and made maliciously, we are sure, the investigation will say so. At this stage, when there are only allegations, and recriminations but no evidence, this Court cannot anticipate the result of the investigation and render a finding on the question of mala fides on the materials at present available. Therefore, we are unable to see any force in the contention that the complaint should be thrown overboard on the mere unsubstantiated plea of mala fides. Even assuming that Dharam Pal has laid the complaint only on account of his personnal animosity, that, by itself, will not be a ground to discard the complaint containing serious allegations which have to be tested and weighed after the evidence is collected.” 36. Reverting to the facts of the instant case mala fides and political vendetta, as alleged by S.Thirunavukkarasu, had been emphatically denied by Selvi J.Jayalalitha. From such sesertion and denial an issue has arisen which cannot at all be decided without the adduction of evidence in that regard, which feat if at all is capable of being performed only before the trial Court. 37. Turning to mala fides on the part of the Civil and police personnel connected with the institution of criminal proceedings, as adverted to above. S.Thirunavukkarasu did not attribute the existence of any personal animosity or malice on their part and what he had stated was that malice in law had to be inferred from their action. 37. Turning to mala fides on the part of the Civil and police personnel connected with the institution of criminal proceedings, as adverted to above. S.Thirunavukkarasu did not attribute the existence of any personal animosity or malice on their part and what he had stated was that malice in law had to be inferred from their action. To such a contention, I am unable to be persuaded in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is not as if the Housing Secretary acted in a hurly-burly fashion while lodging the complaint.without any basis whatever. The sordid fact is that, as stated earlier, on account of the receipt of spate of petitions in April, 1989, levelling grave charges of corruption against S.Thirunavukkarasu in the matter of sanctioning plans, granting exemption under Sec.113 of the Town and Country Planning Act, the erstwhile Government ordered a preliminary enquiry by the Inspector General of Police, Crimes.After probing into the matter, the Inspector General of Police submitted a report in August 1989 stating that there were prima facie materials going to the proof of the alleged corrupt practices amounting to criminal misconduct. The matter did not stop there. A further detailed probe was ordered to be made again by the then Inspector General of Police, Crimes, in October, 1989. The further probe revealed startling details of large scale corruption to the tune of over Rs.21 crores. No responsible Government, on coming to know of such revelation, can remain quiet and there is no wonder in the Government, accepting the report, and directing institution of proceedings through the medium of the Secretary, Housing and Urban Development Department, who lodged a complaint before the Inspector General of Police, Crimes. The Secretray, Housing and Urban Development Department, as a loyal Government servant, did his job admirably in laying the complaint by culling out all the relevant materials from the report of the detailed probe. By such act, he cannot be stated to have committed any sin and he had merely discharged his lawful duty, which if not done would amount to gross dereliction of duty. 38. No doubt true it is that there is a Vigilance and Anti-corruption Cell in the State of Tamil Nadu. The failure to refer the spate of petitions to the said cell is of no consequence. The reason is obvious. 38. No doubt true it is that there is a Vigilance and Anti-corruption Cell in the State of Tamil Nadu. The failure to refer the spate of petitions to the said cell is of no consequence. The reason is obvious. The entrustment of investigation is an execu-tive function of the State, as had been proclaimed by various High Courts and the Apex Court (vide: King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, (1945)1 M.L.J. 86: (1944)71 LA. 203:2171.C. 1.A.I.R 1945 P.C.18.) It is, therefore, competent for the Government for the entrustment of probe or investigation to any agency. In this view of the matter, no foul can be smelt or found by the entrustment of the probe to the Inspector General of Police, Crimes. The puzzling factor to be taken note of here is that such entrustment had been made by the Government then in power. There is no wonder that further detailed probe was ordered to be made to the same agency which made the initial probe. It the probe was ordered to be made by a different agency - although the Government was legitimately entitled to do so as a matter of right -then, in such a situation, it could be stated that all was not well with the Government, in the sense of such a course having been resorted to be taken with some ulterior motive. But such is not the situation here. Further, it may be stated here, as observed by the apex Court, that though there is no rule of law requiring a preliminary inquiry in the case of prosecution of public servants for dishonest misdemeanour amounting to criminal misconduct and other related offences, yet rule of predence requires such a probe to be made and that had been superbly done. 39. No period of limitation whatever had been prescribed for launching the prosecution for the Commission of offences under the old Act since they are grave offences committed against the society as such. Therefore, delay caused in launching prosecution is of no consequence. This apart, delay in launching prosecution need not necessarily be explained even at the time of lodging the first information report and it can as well be explained at the lime of filing the final report before Court. 40. Therefore, delay caused in launching prosecution is of no consequence. This apart, delay in launching prosecution need not necessarily be explained even at the time of lodging the first information report and it can as well be explained at the lime of filing the final report before Court. 40. Top of all, the, prima facie materials disclosed by the first information report constituting congiz-able offences falling under the relevant provisions of the I.P.C. and the old Act, were there for the investigating agency to promptly act by the registration of a case. The moment such a report landed in the hands of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D., after a smooth sail through the Inspector General of Police and the Superintendent of Police, C.B., C.I.D., it was incumbent upon him to register the case as mandated by the sanguine provisions adumbrated under Scc.154 Crl.P.C and the registration of the case with all promptitude by him cannot at all be stated to have been done otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of law. 41. Further, the sequence of events that followed right from the lodging of the first information report on 17. 1992 till arrest and production of S.Thirunavukkarasu before the Special Judge, prima facie appear to wear a credible look as respects the treatment given to S.Thirunavukkarasu, befitting his status and dignity as an Ex-Minister and present Member of Legislative Assembly. Suffice for me to say this much and nothing more, without makingany reference to the controversial aspects urged by either side. 42. In such state of affairs, it cannot be stated that there are materials on record to show that the prosecution had been initiated as a result of malice in law on the part of the informant or the investigating agency. 42. In such state of affairs, it cannot be stated that there are materials on record to show that the prosecution had been initiated as a result of malice in law on the part of the informant or the investigating agency. Even assuming for argument sake that what had been stated by S.Thirunavukkarasu as respects mala fides, is true, it cannot at all be stated that the criminal proceedings initiated against him, which is based on the plethora of prima facie materials disclosing commission of cognizable offences of a serious nature, falling under the relevant provisions of the I.P.C. and the old Act, and giving the necessary and requisite power to the Investigating Agency to commence, continue the investigation and collect materials for the formation of opinion to be reflected in the final report to be filed under Sec.l73(2) Crl.P.C, will stand vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta as alleged by S.Thirunavukkarasu. 43. Appropriate it is at this juncture to make a reference to the arguments advanced and comments and conclusion arrived at by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Crl.L.J. 527, as respected the observation made by the learned Judges of the Punjab and Haryana High Court before parting with their conclusion: "138. The learned Judges of the High Court before parting with their conclusions not being ‘able to resist temptation’ of making an observation with a textual passage which is more or less suggestive of an advice have expressed as follows: ‘Besides what has been said and observed above, before parting with this case, we have not been able to resist the temptation of saying that every politician in Haryana may be the Chief Minister or otherwise, should not while holding office act on the maxim, ‘Everything is fair in love and war’ but should be sanguine and careful to mete out to his predecessor, a treat-" ment in the words of Porus, uttered while in chains, on being brought before Alexander the ‘ Great, ‘a treatment which as king should mete out to another king’ because it is often said ‘as you sow, so shall you reap’. 139. 139. Mr.Rajinder Sachar and Mr.R.K.Garg submitted with strong intensity of conviction that the above observation of the learned Judges should not be countenanced because if such observations, especially in the context of this case receive judicial recognition, it will lead only to the catastrophe of our democratic system to the detriment of the welfare of the country and if such observations are accepted then every successor Government should bury its head like an ostrich thereby freely allowing the malfeasance and misfeasance of the former government to go unnoticed, un-rectified and the offenders up-punished. According to them there is absolutely no material for holdig that there was any campaign of vilification for political gain based on personal animus by the successor Government as against the outgoing Government, particularly when the criminal proceedings are initiated by an individual. 140. To buttress their submission, they relied oh the following decisions dealing with similar contentions attacking the institution of criminal proceedings characterising them as the outcome of political vendetta. Those observations being: (1) P.V.Jagannath Rao v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 215) (1968)3 S.C.R. 788, (2) Krishna Ballabh Sahay v. Commissioner of Enquiry, (1969)1 S.C.R. 387 : 1969 Crl.L.J. 520, (3) Sheonand Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1983)1 S.C.C. 438 :1983 Crl.L.J. 348, (4) Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 877:1987 Crl.L.J. 798: (1987) S.C.C. (Crl) 82: (1987)1 S.C.C. 288: (1987)1 S.C.J. 595 and (5) A.R.Antulay v. R.S.Nayak, (1988)2 S.C.C 502:1988 Crl.L.J. 1661. 141. It would be appropriate to refer to the observation made by this Court in two of the above decisions. 142.In Krishna Ballabh Sahay v. Commissioner of Enquiry, (1969)1 S.C.R. 387 : 1969 Crl.L.J. 520 at p. 524, Hidayatullah, C.J. speaking for the Constitutional Bench has pointed out: ‘It hardly needs any authority to state that the inquiry will be ordered not by the Minister against himself but by some one else. When a Ministry goes out of office, its successor may consider any glaring charges and may, if justified, order an inquiry. Otherwise, each Ministry will become a law unto itself and the corrupt conduct of its Ministers will remain beyond scrutiny." 143. When a Ministry goes out of office, its successor may consider any glaring charges and may, if justified, order an inquiry. Otherwise, each Ministry will become a law unto itself and the corrupt conduct of its Ministers will remain beyond scrutiny." 143. In A.R.Antulay v. R.S.Nayak, (1988) 2 S.C.C 602 :1988 Crl.L.J. 1661 at p. 1691, Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) Speaking for himself and two other learned Judges expressed his opinion on a similar issue in the following words: ‘.......we must remind ourselves that purity of public life is one of the cardinal principles which must be upheld as a matter of public policy. Allegations of legal infractions and criminal infractions must be investigated in accorance with law and procedure established under the Constitution. Even if he has been wronged, if he is allowed to be left in doubt that would cause more serious damage to the appellant. Public confidence in public administration should not be eroded any further. One wrong cannot be remedied by another wrong’. 144. We feel that the following observation made by Krishna Iyer, J. in Stare of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 319: (1980)1 S.C.R. 1071 , may be recapitulated in this connection, that being: ‘If the use of the power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.’ 145. In the light of the above decisions of this. Court, we feel that the said observations made in the impugned judgment are unwarranted’ and the historical anecdote is out of context and inappropriate. We are afraid if such a view is to be judicially accepted and approved, then it will tantamount to laying down an alarming proposition that an incoming Government under all circumstances, should put its seal of approval to all the commissions and omissions of the outgoing Government ignoring even glaring lapses and serious misdeeds and the deleterious and destructive consequences that may follow therefrom. Hence we are constrained to express our disapproval since the text, tenor and tone of the above observations leave us with the feeling that such misplaced sympathy indicated therein appears to have considerably weighed with the learned Judges in taking the extremestep in quashing the First Information Report. Hence we are constrained to express our disapproval since the text, tenor and tone of the above observations leave us with the feeling that such misplaced sympathy indicated therein appears to have considerably weighed with the learned Judges in taking the extremestep in quashing the First Information Report. We do not like to make any more comment except saying that as we have pointed out in our exordial note, in our democratic polity where the ‘Rule of Law’ reigns, no one -however highly placed he may be can claim immunity, much less absolute immunity from the law, but he is always under the law." 44. Before inscribing the final epitaph-verdict, I may state that at times popular belief often brought into existence in any manner whatever-means good or otherwise-is belied by judicial pronouncements’ of Courts, for which category the case on hand is a glaring example, for the obvious reason of unbiased judicial gaze and vision and clairvoyant mental eye penetrating and finding out the false presentation of reality and reflecting an opinion revealing the real state of affairs on the materials available on record, in a bid to uphold and maintain the rule of law and not men. 45. For the reasons mentioned above, Crl.P.C. Nos. 10860,10904 and 11683 of 1992 deserve to be dismissed and they are accordingly dismissed. Crl.O.P.NO.9283 of 1992 deserves to succeed and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order of the Special Judge is set aside. The F.I.R. in Crime No.16 of 1992 oh the file of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, C.I.D., Madras-4, is ordered to be restored to the file of the Special Judge. Investigation can commence and continue in a bid to collect materials for the formation of an opinion to be reflected in the final report to be filed in accordance with law.