JUDGMENT - SALDANHA M.F., J.:---This appeal along with the companion 13 appeals, challenge orders of acquittal passed in favour of the respondents by the learned J.M.F.C., Pune on 31-5-1985. The octroi authorities attached to the Pune Municipal Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the P.M.C., have, after obtaining leave from this Court, challenged the correctness of those orders. 2. The facts and the issues involved in all these appeals are more or less identical and I, therefore, propose to deal with the contentions raised by the learned Counsel on both the sides in the present judgment. I need to prefix this judgment by pointing out that both Mr. Ketkar who represents the P.M.C. and Mr. Jamdar who appears on behalf of the respondents, have done an admirable job in expounding their respective cases and in particular, while dealing with the points of law that arise for determination in this set of appeals. I appreciate the assistance rendered by the two learned Counsel as also by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor because the facts apart, the points canvassed in these appeals are of some significance in a large number of similar cases that arise from time to time. It is essential, therefore, to start with a brief recital of the facts. 3. The prosecution alleges that on 30-1-1981, a tempo bearing No. MHQ 9168 which belongs to original accused No. 2 and is part of his fleet, because accused No. 2 was, at the relevant time, a transport contractor, was being driven by accused No. 1. It is alleged that this tempo entered the city from the Katraj side and it sped past the octroi naka without stopping. When the tempo was at Bhikardas Maruti Chowk, a group of persons who claim to be activities of the Shiv Sena are alleged to have intercepted the tempo and they are alleged to have questioned the driver as to whether the octroi on the goods which were in that tempo had been paid or not. Their impertinence does not stop there but they are, thereafter, supposed to have called their party boss and this group of vigilantes claim that they had brought the tempo to the P.M.C. Building and that they started raising political slogans at that place. Their impertinence does not stop there but they are, thereafter, supposed to have called their party boss and this group of vigilantes claim that they had brought the tempo to the P.M.C. Building and that they started raising political slogans at that place. This commotion brought the officers of the Corporation out and they are thereafter, alleged to have taken charge of the vehicle and brought it to the octroi office. At that place, they claim that since the receipts in respect of the payment of octroi were not forthcoming, that the vehicle and the goods had to be seized. In the meanwhile, accused No. 2 had come there and the prosecution alleges, that he was not in a position to produce the relevant documents nor did he pay up the octroi of about Rs. 3,200/- which was due on the consignment and for this reason, the officers seized the entire lot of goods under a 'hadap' notice. Thereafter, the accused No. 2 alleges that in spite of repeated requests from him to the authorities, that they have refused to release the goods which did not belong to him but which belonged to different parties and which he was liable for and in spite of oral requests followed by a written application on 12-3-1981, since the goods were not released, accused No. 2 was constrained to file a suit before the Civil Court at Pune. He applied for interim relief and the Court finally directed that the goods be released to him on deposit of an amount of Rs. 10,000/-. This interim order was passed after hearing the P.M.C. on 10-4-1981. After the order was passed, the P.M.C. authorities released the goods on 13-4-1981, the tempo having early been released on 30-1-1981 itself. I am informed at the bar that since the goods had been released and since the accused No. 2 was not interested in prosecuting any further litigation, he agreed to the adjustment of the octroi amount that was demanded out of the amount deposited by him and the suit came to be disposed of at some later point of time. 4. The P.M.C. authorities, on 1-7-1981, instituted as many as 14 prosecutions before the Court of the learned J.M.F.C. at Pune, alleging therein that an offence under section 398 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 had been committed. 4. The P.M.C. authorities, on 1-7-1981, instituted as many as 14 prosecutions before the Court of the learned J.M.F.C. at Pune, alleging therein that an offence under section 398 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 had been committed. The authorities had, on the basis of the ownership of the goods, instituted different prosecutions against different sets of accused because, admittedly, the consignment that was seized from the tempo consisted of packages which were meant for different parties. Regardless of this fact, however, considering that the seizure had taken place on 30-1-1981 and that the charge was common, the trial Court disposed of the matter through a common judgment. The Court Cases Nos. 4757 of 1981 to 4770 of 1981 were all heard together and the learned Magistrate by his judgment and order dated 31-5-1985 acquitted the accused in all the cases. The P.M.C. authorities have preferred the present set of 14 appeals which assail the correctness of those acquittal orders. 5. Mr. Ketkar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has, in the first instance, submitted that the goods in question were imported into Pune City without the payment of octroi. For this propose, he has relied on the evidence of P.W. 3 Satish Dhamdhere. This witness has stated that he belongs to the Shiv Sena Party and that on the day in question, he along with some of his friends who are party members were returning to Pune via the highway from Katraj side. He states that the matador in question overtook the fiat car in which they were travelling at a very fast speed and that his car tried to catch up with the matador. He states that the matador sped through the octroi naka without stopping, that it entered the city and that, ultimately, when it reached Bhikardas Maruti Chowk, they were able to intercept the matador. There was some argument with the driver in the course of which they questioned him as to why he had not paid the octroi while bringing the vehicle into the city. According to this witness, he immediately telephoned one Jagannath Pardeshi who came to that spot along with 7 or 8 other persons. They forcibly took the matador to the P.M.C. building and started raising slogans there as a result of which officers came out. According to this witness, he immediately telephoned one Jagannath Pardeshi who came to that spot along with 7 or 8 other persons. They forcibly took the matador to the P.M.C. building and started raising slogans there as a result of which officers came out. According to this witness, the octroi officers found that no payment of octroi had been made and, therefore, they were required to seize the consignment. Mr. Ketkar submits, that this witness has been cross-examined a considerable length but that nothing has been brought out on the basis of which it can be concluded that he is speaking falsehoods. He relies on the evidence of this witness in support of the fact that the consignment was imported into the city in that vehicle or in other words, imported without payment of octroi. 6. I need to mention here that this aspect is of some importance because, it is the defence of the accused No. 2 who is a transport contractor, that he has a godown near Apsara Talkies, that he is a transport contractor and that from this godown, he is required to carry the goods and consignments and distribute them to various parties. According to him, the goods had been loaded in the tempo, necessary documents had been handed over to the driver and the driver had been instructed to make the deliveries. He states that Pardeshi, admittedly, is also in the transport business and that he is not well disposed towards accused No. 2 which was why, because of trade rivalry, his party had attempted to get the accused involved in a false case. He states that towards this end, the tempo was unnecessarily seized and that the documents were destroyed in order to get the P.M.C. authorities to seize the consignment on the ground that octroi was not paid. It is his further grievance that he had come to the spot on being informed of the seizure and that he offered to pay the overall octroi amount of Rs. 3,200/- under protest. He points out that the authorities who were ill-disposed towards him had, on an earlier occasion, seized his vehicle along with the goods and illegally detained it and that in the subsequent litigation, the P.M.C. had been ordered to compensate him to the extent of Rs. 34,000/-. 3,200/- under protest. He points out that the authorities who were ill-disposed towards him had, on an earlier occasion, seized his vehicle along with the goods and illegally detained it and that in the subsequent litigation, the P.M.C. had been ordered to compensate him to the extent of Rs. 34,000/-. He states that the P.M.C. authorities were smarting because of this matter and that they were hell-bent on hitting back at him and foisting false cases. He contends that it was for this reason that they refused to accept the octroi amount and that the entire consignment was seized. 7. It did appear strange to me that in this particular case, the tempo in question was not only intercepted but virtually seized by persons belonging to the Shiv Sena Party. To a question from me to Mr. Ketkar as to what business these persons have to interfere with the members of the public and to take upon themselves the authority that is vested only in public servants. Mr. Ketkar was only able to defend the action by stating that the P.M.C. had never asked these persons or authorised them to do any such act but since they had brought the vehicle to the P.M.C. office and raised slogans, once it came to the notice of the authorities that the octroi had not been paid and in fact had been evaded, that they thereafter took action. Mr. Ketkar states that he does not defend the correctness of the activities of P.W. 3 Satish Dhamdhere and his associates and that this aspect of the matter is subsidiary to the main charge. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Jamdar has, in the strongest terms condemned the action in question. He states, that his client is a transport operator of some repute and that, unfortunately, certain disputes in relation to payment of octroi had taken a bad turn and that his client cannot be blamed if he legitimately fought for his rights and won his case. This, however, cannot under any circumstances justify persons belonging to a particular political party taking the law into their own hands and going to the extent of seizing vehicles and destroying documents. He states that it was because of the action of these persons, that the accused are wrongly involved in the present litigation. Mr. This, however, cannot under any circumstances justify persons belonging to a particular political party taking the law into their own hands and going to the extent of seizing vehicles and destroying documents. He states that it was because of the action of these persons, that the accused are wrongly involved in the present litigation. Mr. Jamdar is certainly right in his grievance and to the extent to which he has taken serious objection to persons other than public servants acting in this fashion. However militant or well motivated those persons may be, the law does not empower them to indulge in activities of this type and to this extent, their action will have to be deprecated in the strongest terms. There was no warrant even if these persons desired to bring the commission of an offence to the notice of the authorities concerned, for them to have abrogated to themselves powers that do not vest in them. Such activities would have dangerous consequences because one would not know as to how and in what manner these persons would go about their job. In this case, they allege that the vehicle and the consignments were brought intact to the P.M.C. authorities but the accused No. 2 alleges that in the process, his documents were destroyed. There is no means of ascertaining the truth though Mr. Ketkar did point out to me that the defence regarding destruction of the documents is, according to him, an afterthought. For this purpose, he relies on the fact that no such case has been put in cross-examination to P.W. 3 and he is perhaps justified when he states that if at all the documents had been destroyed by the mob, that P.W. 3 who was their leader would have been asked about it and this case would have been certainly put to him. Secondly, Mr. Ketkar points out and, perhaps, again with justification, that if the documents related to the octroi receipts in respect of that consignment, there would have been a record of the point of entry and of the date on which the consignments came in and that, consequently, there would have been no difficulty whatsoever in being able to trace out copies of the octroi receipts even if the same were destroyed. I do not need to labour on this point because, even though accused No. 2 has made this statement under section 313, Criminal Procedure Code, the important aspect of the matter is that the documents evidencing payment of octroi were not forthcoming either on 30-1-1981 when the consignment came to be seized or for that matter, at any point of time thereafter. I need also to take notice of the fact that when accused No. 2 challenged the seizure of the consignment before the Civil Court and he was asked to deposit a sum of Rs. 10,000/- which he did, he did not contend even before the Civil Court that octroi was in fact paid and, therefore, the amount of Rs. 3,200/- ought not to be adjusted. Under these circumstances, to my mind, the submission canvassed by Mr. Ketkar that the evidence of P.W. 3 conclusively establishes that the goods had been imported only on 30-1-1981 and that the octroi on the same had not been paid requires to be upheld. 9. Mr. Jamdar has vehemently submitted, that the prosecution has not examined Jagannath Pardeshi who is the real person or leader who handed over the tempo to the P.M.C. authorities. P.W. 1 refers to him and, therefore, according to Mr. Jamdar, the non-examination of this person is fatal to the prosecution. I need to only make a note here that it was unnecessary to examine Pardeshi because, admittedly, he came on the scene only after P.W. 3 telephoned him pursuant to the apprehending of the tempo and the driver and, therefore, the witness who is in the knowledge of the manner in which the vehicle came into the city was not Pardeshi but P.W. 3. The non-examination of Pardeshi, therefore, would be inconsequential. Mr. Jamdar also drew my attention to the cross-examination of the witnesses in which it is established that there does not appear to be any record of the fact that the vehicle in question has crossed any of the octroi nakas without stopping. He relies on the admissions in the cross-examination of P.Ws. 1 and 2 whereby it has been established that not only is there no such record but furthermore, that no such report had been submitted by the octroi naka authorities to the effect that the vehicle had not stopped. The reasons for this appear to be quite obvious. He relies on the admissions in the cross-examination of P.Ws. 1 and 2 whereby it has been established that not only is there no such record but furthermore, that no such report had been submitted by the octroi naka authorities to the effect that the vehicle had not stopped. The reasons for this appear to be quite obvious. P.W. 3 has indicated that the vehicle was being driven at a high speed. This must have been true if a fiat car was not in a position to catch up with the tempo and overtake it. If the tempo went through the naka at this speed, there is every possibility that it was not noticed by the staff there or even if they saw it speed through, that they were not in a position to note down the number. The fact that they did not make a grievance of the non-stoppage or did not file a report could not, to my mind be of much consequence. In the present case, a scrutiny of the 313 statement of accused No. 2 clearly indicates that he has admitted that the goods in question were imported into the city and that, according to him, the octroi on them was not paid. Undoubtedly, he does not admit that they were imported into the city on that day or in that vehicle or in the matter as indicated by P.W. 3 but the fact remains that having admitted that the goods have been imported and that octroi is leviable, it was essential for him to have produced material on the basis of which the Court could have concluded that he was telling the truth. Since the documents evidencing the payment of octroi are not forthcoming, Mr. Ketkar contends that the offence of evasion of octroi under section 398 of the B.P.M.C. Act stands established. To this extent, he relies on Rules 4 and 8 of the Octroi Rules wherein not only is a liability cast on the importer of the goods to pay the octroi but there is a further provision to the effect that a declaration is required to be filed by the party concerned at the octroi naka so that the octroi can be assessed and demanded and there is a further obligation on the part of the importer to pay the octroi before carrying the goods into the city. It is Mr. It is Mr. Ketkar's contention, therefore, that in the absence of any evidence of the accused having complied with the requisite provisions of law and in the absence of the accused being able to produce any evidence of the payment of octroi on the goods in question, since the seizure has taken place within the city limits, the inevitable conclusion is that the goods were brought in without the payment of octroi and the offence under section 398 is established. In this connection, Mr. Ketkar has submitted that the Standing Orders are further explicit, casting upon the driver of the vehicle a duty to stop at the naka and to comply with the formalities as indicated in those Standing Orders. In sum and substance, he contends that where the accused is unable to establish to the satisfaction of the Court that he has complied with the requirements of law and where the goods have been imposed, admittedly without payment of the requisite octroi, that the Court must read into the action an intention to defraud the P.M.C. authorities of the revenue that had to be legitimately paid to them and that the requisites of an offence under section 398 are made out. 10. Mr. Jamdar has seriously contested the above petition. In the first instance, he contends that as pointed out by the earlier, the evidence of P.W. 3 is false, unreliable and in the absence of any documentary evidence to support what P.W. 3 contends, that the Court should not accept that material for purposes of holding that the goods had been imported in the vehicle MHQ 9618 on 30-1-1981. It is his contention, that the Court will have to start from the position that the goods were seized from the vehicle within the city limits. According to him, the position that emerges is that even if persons hostile to the accused had destroyed the documents, that the Court must look at the broad probabilities of the case and accept the position that the accused would never have allowed the goods to be seized because the goods were worth very much more than the amount of Rs. 3,200/- which was the octroi payable thereon. Mr. 3,200/- which was the octroi payable thereon. Mr. Jamdar, therefore, submits that in this view of the matter, the Court must accept, particularly in the background which he has referred to repeatedly, that at the time of seizure of the goods, when accused No. 2 came there, that he had in fact offered to pay the octroi that was due on those goods. 11. Towards this end, Mr. Jamdar submits, that this is not merely an act of courtesy which should have been extended to his clients but that it is a legal requirement under Rule 13, which the officers of the P.M.C. were obliged to comply with. He has drawn my attention to the fact that if it is brought to the notice of the P.M.C. that the octroi in respect of certain goods has not been paid, that the authorities are not empowered to straightway seize those goods. All that they are entitled to do is to demand the amount of octroi that is payable thereon and if the same is not paid, they are entitled to seize only that much of the consignment which is sufficient to satisfy the payment of octroi. Mr. Jamdar, therefore, points out to me, that in the first instance, the prosecution has been unable to produce the notice of demand for payment of the octroi on the consignment. Secondly, he points out that if no such notice or opportunity was afforded to the accused to pay the amount and if the amount was refused even when he offered it, only because of the past hostility, that the officers have acted vindictively, that they have acted maliciously, particularly in seizing the entire consignment and, therefore, this Court must come down strongly on that action. 12. With regard to what transpired on 30-1-1981 at the time when the consignment was seized, Mr. Jamdar is right when he points out that there is contradictory evidence between P.W. 1 and P.W. 2. One of the witnesses states that the procedure was followed whereas the other one effectively admits that it was not. The prosecution in this case has produced the Hadap notice which specifically states that on the accused having failed to pay octroi as demanded, that the goods have been seized and that they will be auctioned within a period of five days if the amount in question is not paid. The prosecution in this case has produced the Hadap notice which specifically states that on the accused having failed to pay octroi as demanded, that the goods have been seized and that they will be auctioned within a period of five days if the amount in question is not paid. Admittedly, as pointed out by Mr. Jamdar, the notice demanding the octroi that ought to have been given to accused No. 2 to pay the amount before seizure, does not appear to be on record. It does appear from the material before the Court that the authorities did not either demand it from accused No. 2 or that no such notice was served. It also appears that the authorities seized the entire consignment worth very much more than the amount of octroi that was required to be paid and that they also seized the vehicle which was subsequently released. Mr. Jamdar has drawn my attention to the fact that his client had made several oral requests and followed them up by a written application on 12-3-1981 asking for release of the consignment all of which were turned down and that, ultimately he was required to move the Civil Court. Mr. Ketkar has rallied to the defence of his clients by pointing out to me that if the P.M.C. desired to act vindictively, that they could have easily auctioned the goods on the expiry of 5 days which they did not do right upto 31-3-1981 which was a good two months after the date of seizure and further, that immediately on the accused depositing the octroi amount in the trial Court, that the goods were released. He counters the charge that the P.M.C. authorities were acting vindictively by pointing out to me that in fact, this is unjustified. He contends that the accused was obviously incensed by what had happened and therefore, that he could not have offered to pay the octroi amount because had he done so and if it had been refused, he would have certainly lodged not only a written complaint but would have made a grievance but the fact is that neither had been done. To my mind, even assuming that the authorities did not afford accused No. 2 the opportunity of tendering the octroi amount, all that would follow from that is that the detention of the goods and the seizure thereof may be questionable. To my mind, even assuming that the authorities did not afford accused No. 2 the opportunity of tendering the octroi amount, all that would follow from that is that the detention of the goods and the seizure thereof may be questionable. In this prosecution, all that we are concerned with is the act of evasion of octroi and it has been submitted by Mr. Ketkar that the evidence in relation to this relates to the point of time when the consignment passed through the octroi naka and not with regard to anything that happened thereafter. He submits that the offence was complete when the vehicle went through the naka without payment of octroi and even if the accused had paid the amount on the vehicle being intercepted, that the authorities were entitled to prosecute for evasion and that they were fully justified in doing so. It is his submission that because instances of evasion of octroi are difficult to detect and that consequently if and when in a series of transactions such as the present one, it is disclosed that offences have taken place, that the P.M.C. authorities as of necessity must prosecute. 13. I need to only mention here that Mr. Jamdar made a serious grievance of the fact that even though the Civil Court had directed the deposit of the amount and even though the octroi amount had been deposited and the goods had been released, that the P.M.C. vindictively launched the present prosecutions as late as on 1st July, 1981. He contends that this act bristles with mala fides as there was no warrant or reason or justification for the prosecutions. To my mind, the discretion as to whether to prosecute or not is entirely that of the P.M.C. authorities and if for whatever reason they took such a decision that this was a fit case in which they must prosecute, no grievance can be made out on that score. 14. Mr. Jamdar, learned Counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 6 relied on a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of (Municipal Council, Pandhurna v. R.P. Dube and another)1, A.I.R. 1969 M.P. 1, wherein the Full Bench had occasion to consider a parallel provision under the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act in relation to the term "brought within the limits of the Municipality". Mr. 1 to 6 relied on a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of (Municipal Council, Pandhurna v. R.P. Dube and another)1, A.I.R. 1969 M.P. 1, wherein the Full Bench had occasion to consider a parallel provision under the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act in relation to the term "brought within the limits of the Municipality". Mr. Jamdar, in this context, places reliance on the definition of the term "octroi" as appears in section 2, sub-clause (42) of the BPMC Act which defines octroi as a cess on the entry of goods. It is his basic submission that, admittedly, P.Ws. 1 and 2 who are officers of the P.M.C. have no documentary record with them on the basis of which they could establish that the consignments had been imported into the city from outside the city limits. In essence, Mr. Jamdar submits that the act of importation is a sine qua non for the incidence of octroi and that this cannot be left to conjecture nor can it be left to presumption. He refutes the contention raised by Mr. Ketkar that the wording of section 147 of the Act whereby there is a presumption in respect of goods that are imported into the city and are not for immediate exportation, by pointing out that the presumption in that section is circumscribed to goods that are virtually in transit. On facts, Mr. Jamdar's case is that P.W. 3 and his party colleagues intercepted the vehicle and that the officers seized the goods at the highest, on suspicion. He states that the tenor of P.W. 3's evidence is such that it should not and cannot be believed in the absence of support from the records of the octroi naka and in the absence of the prosecution examining Pardeshi. 15. In this regard, it will have to be noted that the condition of the goods is of some consequence in so far as they were bales which were intact with the markings of the consignors. Secondly, the argument advanced by Mr. Jamdar which might have warranted some consideration would have to be rejected principally because of the admission by accused No. 2 himself in his 313 statement, that the goods were imported and that the octroi had not been paid thereon. In the light of this position, to my mind, the submissions canvassed under this head would not avail Mr. Jamdar which might have warranted some consideration would have to be rejected principally because of the admission by accused No. 2 himself in his 313 statement, that the goods were imported and that the octroi had not been paid thereon. In the light of this position, to my mind, the submissions canvassed under this head would not avail Mr. Jamdar's clients. 16. Mr. Jamdar thereafter placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of (Emperor v. Visram Valji)2, reported in 37 Bom.L.R. 102. This decision is cited in support of Mr. Jamdar's proposition that it would be permissible to prosecute and to sustain a conviction under section 398 only if it is established that there was intention to defraud which, in other words, means that there must be evidence to establish that the intention of the importer was to cheat the Corporation of the revenue to which it was legitimately entitled. The case referred to supra on which Mr. Jamdar places reliance dealt with a situation whereby the accused person had not paid octroi because he was under the bona fide belief that the point of consumption where he was constructing the bridge was outside the Municipal limits and, therefore, merely because the consignment passed through the railway station which was located within the municipal limits, that there was no liability to pay octroi. The Court held that on the facts of that case, there was sufficient ground to uphold the defence that there was no intention to defraud. In the present case, unfortunately, that decision will not be of much avail because the evidence that has come before the Court indicates that the vehicle did not stop at the octroi check post. Where the law casts a specific obligation on the importer to file a declaration in respect of the goods and to offer the goods for inspection or assessment at the check post, to my mind, if these requisite formalities are not complied with, there can be no other intention inferred other than the desire to evade the octroi. If the desire is to evade the octroi, it is obvious that it is an intention to defraud because the law requires payment and the party has embarked on a course of action effectively to avoid such payment. If the desire is to evade the octroi, it is obvious that it is an intention to defraud because the law requires payment and the party has embarked on a course of action effectively to avoid such payment. Under these circumstances, to my mind, the Court would be justified in drawing a conclusion from the facts that are on record and I am unable to uphold Mr. Jamdar's submission that the witnesses must specifically depose to the fact that there was an intention on the part of the accused to defraud. 17. Dealing with another aspect of the case, Mr. Jamdar pointed out to me that an admission on the part of the driver who is accused No. 1 whose statement was recorded by the officers, to the effect that the vehicle had not stopped at the octroi naka and that it was driven through, has not been put as a circumstance to accused No. 2 and, therefore, this ought not to be used against him. Mr. Jamdar has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Aher Rama Gova v. State of Gujarat)3, reported in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1566, which reiterates the well-known proposition that a circumstance which is not specifically put to an accused either because of error or for any other reason, cannot be held against him. While Mr. Jamdar may be perfectly justified in this submission, unfortunately as indicated by me above, even if one were to exclude this circumstance, there is enough material in the present case for purposes of sustaining a conclusion that an offence under section 398 has been made out. 18. Mr. Jamdar thereafter contended that in the present case, the learned Magistrate has evaluated the evidence that was placed before him and that on a consideration of that material, he has come to the conclusion that the accused are liable to be acquitted. He submitted that it is now well settled law that where a Court, in the first instance and more so a trial Court records an order of acquittal after having had the benefit of assessing the demeanour of the witnesses and all other relevant facts, that it is neither proper nor permissible in law to disturb that order merely because another conclusion may be possible on different reasoning. Mr. Mr. Jamdar places reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 135, in the case of (Ganesh Bhavan Patel and another v. State of Maharashtra)4, and in particular, on the passage from that judgment wherein the Supreme Court has observed that if the order of acquittal is reasonable and plausible, that it should not be entirely and effectively dislodged or demolished by the High Court. The Supreme Court was following the leading decision on the point in the case of (Sheo Swarup v. Emperor)5, reported in A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 227. 19. It is true that it is well settled law, that the scope for interference with an order of acquittal is necessarily limited and that, it is to be exercised sparingly and only in cases where it can be demonstrated that the order of the trial Court is manifestly wrong and that it has resulted in miscarriage of justice. In the present case, I am constrained to observe that the order of the trial Court bypasses the main provisions of law and that, the trial Court has taken an entirely one-sided view of the evidence and that, in the result, in a set of cases relating to evasion of octroi, orders of acquittal have been passed which are certainly not in the public interest. It is under these circumstances alone that this Court is required to interfere for the reasons that have been spelt out in this judgment. 20. Mr. Jamdar thereafter advanced another submission whereby he pointed out that a scrutiny of all the material that was before the trial Court would conclusively indicate that none of the witnesses has so much as even referred to the remaining persons who have been shown as accused viz. the various traders to whom the consignments belonged. He advances a submission, that the Court will have to take a realistic and practical view of the matter and that merely because certain persons' names appear on the bales of the consignments, ipso facto, they cannot be made accused persons in a criminal trial regardless of whatever may be the civil liability because it is Mr. Jamdar's submission that these persons who had entrusted the agency of transporting the goods to accused Nos. Jamdar's submission that these persons who had entrusted the agency of transporting the goods to accused Nos. 1 and 2, in the absence of any other evidence, cannot be said to have been either in the knowledge of or to have abetted or taken part in an act of evasion of octroi. 21. Mr. Ketkar answers this submission by pointing out that the definition of "importer" as appears in sub-clause (12) of Rule 2 of the Octroi Rules defines an importer as a person who is shown as an importer in the import bill and shall also include a person who is to be deemed to be an importer according to the provisions contained in the Standing Orders. Relying on the fact that admittedly, the goods were consigned to the remaining accused, that they have admitted that the goods belonged to them and in the absence of any contention taken up by them on the basis of which they could have satisfied the Court that they had taken due care and caution to ensure that all necessary formalities in relation to those goods were completed, by virtue of the deeming provision, it will have to be held that the owners or consignees of the goods are also rightly made accused persons in the present case. The argument canvassed by Mr. Jamdar would, perhaps, have been applicable in a case where a particular accused demonstrates to the satisfaction of the trial Court that the offence has taken place inspite of his having taken necessary precautions or having issued instructions to comply with all the requirements of law. 22. With regard to the cases of the remaining accused persons viz. the traders, Mr. Jamdar has relied on the answer given to question No. 3 in the 313 statement by each of these accused who had denied that the goods in question were imported by their firm. He, therefore, contends that it would be incorrect to state that there is an admission on their part. I need to clarify that the form in which the question was put was that the firm had imported the goods and the answer is "it is false" or "I do not know". He, therefore, contends that it would be incorrect to state that there is an admission on their part. I need to clarify that the form in which the question was put was that the firm had imported the goods and the answer is "it is false" or "I do not know". It is true that there is no specific admission but this Court will have to take note of two factors; the first of them is the fact that the names of these persons or their firms appear as consignees and secondly of the fact that there is no express denial in the course of the trial whereby any of the consignees has stated that their names or the names of their firms were wrongly shown on those goods and that, they have nothing to do with them. In the light of this position, to my mind, the inclusion of the remaining accused as importers in the present case is justified. 23. Lastly, Mr. Jamdar drew my attention to the fact that all the cases had been consolidated and heard together. They have also been disposed of by a common judgment and, therefore, Mr. Jamdar submitted that even if this Court comes to the conclusion that the fine is leviable, that it should not be on the basis of each case or each accused. It is his submission, that the Court would be justified in imposing a consolidated fine because even if the minimum fine were to be imposed in respect of each accused in each case, that the penalty would amount to very much more than what even the octroi involved was. As far as this argument is concerned, the main difficulty in Mr. Jamdar's way is that under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is a requirement of law that inspite of each separate charge or in respect of each separate transaction, there has to be a separate complaint. This is the reason why 14 complaints were required to be filed before the trial Court. Section 220 of the Criminal Procedure Code only permits a Court to avoid burdening the record by having to prepare separate sets of the same in identical cases but there is no provision whereby if an adverse order results, that the sentences or fines can be consolidated. Section 220 of the Criminal Procedure Code only permits a Court to avoid burdening the record by having to prepare separate sets of the same in identical cases but there is no provision whereby if an adverse order results, that the sentences or fines can be consolidated. Under these circumstances, even though there are several factors very much in support of Mr. Jamdar's clients, it would not be legally permissible to follow such a course of action. 24. On the quantum of penalty, Mr. Ketkar has submitted that the law envisages rigorous penalties in cases of evasion because, admittedly, instances where such evasion is detected and punished are extremely few and far little. He submits that it is for this reason that section 398 envisages a fine of Rs. 250/- or 10 times the amount of octroi evaded whichever is higher. It is his submission that the object of making this provision is in order to ensure that it works as a deterrent and in order to convey the message without any ambiguity in loud and clear terms that the consequences of evasion will be serious and that it will also be uneconomical. He, therefore, insists that the maximum provided by the section viz. 10 times the amount of octroi evaded must be awarded. 25. As against this position, Mr. Jamdar has submitted, that these cases are more than a decade old and secondly, that the whole operation is an unfortunate one, having regard to the background that has been pointed out by him. He makes a strong plea to the Court to consider whether at all accused No. 2 would have invited litigation, penalties and trouble to himself by having refused to tender the amount of octroi even at the stage when the goods were seized, if at all officers' were willing to take it from him. In his submission, this is a vindictive exercise and he has, therefore, pointed out that even if a technical breach is held against his clients, that the minimum penalty should be awarded. 26. There are certain unsavoury aspects that have come to light in this proceeding and I have already held that some of the actions required to be deprecated. In his submission, this is a vindictive exercise and he has, therefore, pointed out that even if a technical breach is held against his clients, that the minimum penalty should be awarded. 26. There are certain unsavoury aspects that have come to light in this proceeding and I have already held that some of the actions required to be deprecated. Having regard to the overall complexion of the case, I am of the view that it would be most appropriate and in the interest of justice to impose only the minimum fine that is prescribed for the offences in question. 27. The appeal accordingly succeeds. The order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court is set aside. The accused stand convicted of having committed offences punishable under section 398 of the BPMC Act and it is directed that they shall pay a fine of Rs. 250/- each in default S.I. for 15 days. The accused are granted six weeks time to deposit the fine amount in the lower Court. On expiry of the period of six weeks, the bail bond of the accused to stand cancelled. 28. Appeal allowed accordingly. Appeal allowed. -----