Judgment :- 1. Tata Tea Ltd., a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 purchased the tea estates of (a) Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. (b) Anglo American Direct Tea Trading Co. Ltd. and (c) Amalgamated Tea Estates Ltd. These thtee companies registered in the United Kingdom are for the sake of brevity, hereinafter referred to as the KDHP, ADT and ATE respectively. In this petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, Tata Tea Ltd. hereinafter referred as the petitioner impugns the validity of various orders made by the Agricultural Income-tax and the Sales-tax Officer, Munnar, whereunder he imposed on the petitioner a total penalty of over seven lakhs rupees for the offences under S.10(a) and 10(d) of the Central Sales Tax Act, alleged to have been committed by the KDHP, ADT and ATE between the years 1967 and 1973. The orders impugned in this petition were made on 5-7-1988, 6-7-1988, 7-7-1988 (in respect of KDHP) 22-9-1988 (in respect of adt) and 10-7-1988 (in respect of ate). 2. The running business of the tea estates as going concerns, of the KDHP, ADT and ATE was purchased by the petitioner herein by three separate deeds of conveyance dated 31-12-1976 (Document No.380/77) 31-12-1976 (Document No.380/77) and 19-4-1977 ( "document No.824 of 1977) respectively. Each of these three business establishments comprised of tea growing estates and factories in which tea was processed. The KDHP, ADT and AET held registration certificates under the Central Sales Tax Act, hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as the C.S.T. Act issued on 1-7-1957. These certificates which covered all goods necessary for the business of tea estates specified that the holders could deal, inter alia, in goods under the head "cultivation" and "crop cultivation" which attracted concessional rate of sales-tax under S.8 of the C.S.T.act. 3. In proceedings numbered as K-1/C the Sales Tax Officer, Devikulam concluded that KDHP was not entitled to buy goods under the head "cultivation" and "crop protection" as they were not necessary for the business of tea estates. By his order dated 25-8-1966 he disallowed these goods for the purpose of S.8 of the C.S.T. Act. The certificate of registration which allowed the purchase of these goods ought to have been taken back from the KDKP and amended to bring it in conformity with this order. This was not done. By his order dated 25-8-1966 he disallowed these goods for the purpose of S.8 of the C.S.T. Act. The certificate of registration which allowed the purchase of these goods ought to have been taken back from the KDKP and amended to bring it in conformity with this order. This was not done. The original certificate continued to remain with the KDHP and was indeed Used subsequent to the aforesaid order. The appeal No.STA/961/66 by the KDHP was allowed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Sales tax on 5-8-1969 and the order dated 25-8-1966 made by the Sales tax Officer. Devikulam, disallowing the goods under the head "cultivation" and "crop protection" was set aside. Thus the original certificate without the deletion of the heads "cultivation" and "crop protection" continued to be operative. However, on 15-7-1970 the Kerala State Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal set aside the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order dated 5-2-1969 and restored the order of the Sales-tax Officer dated 25-6-1966, the decision of the Kerala Sales tax Tribunal was subsequently upheld by the High Court. 4. In the cases of the remaining two companies, ADT and ATE, the Sales tax Officer made similar orders on 23-10-1973 and 10-6-1975 respectively, excluding from the certificates of registration the goods under the heads "crop protection" and "cultivation". 5. The ADT had estates in the State of Tamil Nadu also. The Madras High Court had, meanwhile taken a view opposed to that of t he Kerala High Court. The conflict was eventually settled by the Supreme Court by its judgment delivered on 11-10-1976. The effect of the Supreme Court's judgment is that the goods falling under the heads "crop cultivation" and "cultivation" were not eligible for the concessional rate of sales tax under S.8 the CS.T. Act. The decision of the Sales Tax Officer and the Appellate Authorities and the Kerala High Court on the one hand and the opposite view taken by the Madras High Court kept alive the uncertainty as to the eligibility of the goods for concessional rate of sales tax. The uncertainty of law was terminated by the Supreme Court on 11-10-1976. 6. After 1974, the Sales tax Officer, Devikulam, issued notices to the KDHP, ADT and ATE calling upon them to show cause why penalty should not be imposed under S.10A of the CST Act for violation of Ss.10(b) and 10(d) thereof. The uncertainty of law was terminated by the Supreme Court on 11-10-1976. 6. After 1974, the Sales tax Officer, Devikulam, issued notices to the KDHP, ADT and ATE calling upon them to show cause why penalty should not be imposed under S.10A of the CST Act for violation of Ss.10(b) and 10(d) thereof. The substance of his accusation was this: C forms under the C.S.T. Act were issued by the KDHP, ADT and ATE to the dealers for the purchase of goods not direcllly connected with the production manufacture or processing of tea. The issue of C forms which resulted in the collection of tax at concessional rates was a violation of S.10(b) and 10(d) of the CS.T. Act. Therefore he proposed the penalty of 15% of the purchase value. 7. The alleged violation of the C.S.T. Act by the three companies were in respect of different years. In the case of KDHP notices referred to in the last paragraph related to the goods purchased during 1967-68 to 1972-73. In the case of ADT they related to the periods 1968-69,1971-72 and 1972-73. In the case of ATE the period of the alleged violation was 1967-68 to 1971-72. The Sales-tax Officer, Devikulam, by separate orders made on 15-8-1975 overruled the objections by the KDHP, ADT and ATE and imposed a penalty of 15% on the value of each year's purchase of goods. 8. The orders imposing penalty for the alleged violation of Ss.10(a) and 10(b) of the CST Act were challenged by the KDHP in writ petitions - OP 1147/ 76, 2235/ 76.5300/ 76,1675/ 77 and 2884/ 77. These pelitions were allowed and the orders imposing penalty were quashed by orders of this Court dated 22-1-1979,22-1-1979,30-7-1979,22-1-1979 and 21-12-1979 respectively. The orders directed the Sales Tax Officer to reconsider the cases and pass fresh orders after giving to the companies opportunity of being heard. The ADT challenged the orders imposing penalty in OP.5039/1975 and 3188/1977, which were allowed on 19-12-1977 and 15-1-1980 respectively. The directions were the same as in the case of KDHP. The ATE filed similar O.Ps. 4524/75 and 3189/78, which were allowed on 19-12-1977 and 15-1-1980. Thereafter the Sales Tax Officer made fresh orders, which are impugned in this petition. 9. The ADT challenged the orders imposing penalty in OP.5039/1975 and 3188/1977, which were allowed on 19-12-1977 and 15-1-1980 respectively. The directions were the same as in the case of KDHP. The ATE filed similar O.Ps. 4524/75 and 3189/78, which were allowed on 19-12-1977 and 15-1-1980. Thereafter the Sales Tax Officer made fresh orders, which are impugned in this petition. 9. The orders imposing penalty impugned in this petition were made on 4-7-1988,5-7-1988,6-7-1988,7-7-1988 and 22-9-1988; almost 10 years after the previous petitions were disposed off and 15 years after the offences are alleged to have been committed. 10. 11. Before setting out the points which arise for consideration Iwillskctch a brief outline of the 12. 13. Provisions of law relevant to this case. A dealer, who, in the course of interstate trade or commerce sells to the Government or to a registered dealer other than a Government, any goods, is liable to pay sales tax at the rate of 4% of his turnover. The sale which falls outside this category attracts sales tax at a higher rate. (s.8 of the CS.T.Act) The central sales tax is levied by S Government of India. However such tax is assessed and collected on behalf of the Central Government by the authorities of the concerned State empowered to assess and collect the sales tax of the State under its appropriate General Sales Tax Law (S.9 of CS.T.Act). That is how the respondent herein, the Sales Tax Officer of Kerala State, comes in the picture. Section 10 of the CS.T.Act preeribes penalties for certain offences. In the context of this case two such offences are relevant. They are: (a) Where a registered dealer falsely represents, when purchasing any class of goods, that the goods of such class are covered by the certificate of registration (S.10(b) of C.S.T. Act) or (b) After purchasing any goods for any purpose, specified in the certificate of registration, fails without reasonable excuse, to make use of the goods for any such purpose (S.10(d) of CST Act). These offences attract punishment of six months imprisonment or fine or both (S.10 of C.S.T. Act). Section 10A has the marginal note "Imposition of penalty in lieu of prosecution". These offences attract punishment of six months imprisonment or fine or both (S.10 of C.S.T. Act). Section 10A has the marginal note "Imposition of penalty in lieu of prosecution". If a person is guilty of the offences referred at (a) or (b) above, the authority is empowered to impose upon him a penalty "not exceeding" one and a half times the tax which would have been levied under sub-section (2) of S.B. As already stated, under S.9 of the C.S.T. Act the central tax is levied and collected by the agency of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. S.26 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act provides for recovery of tax when, as in this case, the business is transferred. Where the ownership of business of dealer liable to pay "lax" or "other amounts" payable under the Act is transferred, "any tax" or "olher amounts" payable under the Act and remaining unpaid on the date of transfer, and any "tax" or "other amount" due upto the date of the transfer though unasscssed, may be recovered from the transferee as if he were the dealer liable to pay "lax" or "other amount". 11. On the basis of the facts and the provisions of lawset out in the forgoing paragraphs learned counsel for the petitioner urged the following points: (i) The impugned penally has been imposed in 1988,10-12 years after the earlier petition against similar orders were allowed and 16 years after the offences are alleged to have been committed. Therefore the penally is unreasonable. ii) The essential ingredient of the offence of false representation created by clause (b) of S.10 of the C.S.T. Act is the guilty mental state-mens rea of the offender. This was absent in this case. Therefore no offence was committed by the dealers. (iii) The petitioner is the transferee of the business of the dealers who are alleged to have committed the offences under S.10 of the C.S.T. Act. The transferee cannot be penalised for the offences committed by the transferor. (iv) In the case of KDHP the goods under the head "cultivation" and "crop protection" were disallowed on 25-8-1966. But the certificate of registration was not amended by the authority during 1967-1973. Therefore no offence was committed by KDHP. (v) The impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind by the respondent. 12. The above submissions are 'examined in the following paragraphs. 13. But the certificate of registration was not amended by the authority during 1967-1973. Therefore no offence was committed by KDHP. (v) The impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind by the respondent. 12. The above submissions are 'examined in the following paragraphs. 13. The authorities under the laws relating to taxation are often called upon to initiate action on their own, such as reopening the eeaped lax, imposition of penalty for wrongful acts and so on. The cases in which law preeribes the period of time during which the action may be initiated present no difficulty. The cases in which law preeribes no period of time for initiation or commencement of dieretionary action raise a question as to the time frame within which action which affects the rights of citizens should be initialed. In the context of revision of reopening of completed assessment of taxes there is a consensus of judicial opinion that the power to revise/reopen assessment of income tax should be exercised within reasonable time from the date of the completed assessment. In the case of P.S.B. Paul Pandian (Deputy Commissioner of Agrl. Income-tax v. P.S.B. Paul Pandian (1981) 128 ITR 809), a revision of assignment initiated 10 years after the completed assessment and in the case of Nelliyampathi (M/s. Nelliyam-pathi Tea & Produce Co. Ltd. v. Commr. of Agrl. Income-tax, (1991) KLJ (Tax Cases) 36, the revision proposed after 12 years were held to be unreasonable. In K.P. Narayanappa (K.P. Narayanappa setty & co. v. Commr. of Income-tax, A. P. (1975) 100 ITR 17), 9 years delay was held fatal. I1 has been held (M/s. Nelliyampathi Tea & Produce Co. Ltd. v. Commr. of Agrl.Income tax ( 991) KLJ (Tax Cases) 36) that the power should not only be exercised within reasonable lime but the revenue should demonstrate that the delay was caused by circumstances beyond their control and by insurmountable difficulties. It is thus well settled that the revision of assessment proposed beyond a reasonable period is, unreasonable and (hat in such cases the burden to prove that the delay was justified by circumstances beyond their control is on the authorities. The validity of penalty imposed by tax authorities has also been subject matter of judicial decisions. It is thus well settled that the revision of assessment proposed beyond a reasonable period is, unreasonable and (hat in such cases the burden to prove that the delay was justified by circumstances beyond their control is on the authorities. The validity of penalty imposed by tax authorities has also been subject matter of judicial decisions. The authorities are not bound to impose penalty but have dieretion in the matter, the exercise of which depends upon various factors, which bring out the circumstances relating to the commission of the offences or wrongs. Notice of penalty for which no period of limitation has been preeribed under the Income tax Act, issued 12 years after the assessment, has been held not only unreasonable but an abuse of power. (Income tax Officer, Gonda v. Bisheshwar Lai (1970) ITR 653, Allahabad). 13. The consensus of judicial opinion therefore, makes it clear that dieretionary action of this kind must be initiated within reasonable time. What is reasonable lime naturally depends upon the circumstances of each case. Unless the authority in this case the respondent is able to demonstrate that the delay was occasioned by circumstances beyond their control or by insurmountable difficulties, such delay is fatal to the order-imposing penalty. The respondent has not brought forth such circumstances. 14. The cases of KDHP, ADT and ATE have some special features in the context of the dieretion expected to be exercised by the authorities. In thecae KDHP, the certificate was not amended by the respondent. The respondent acquieeed in its use by the KDHP. Therefore the respondent himself contributed to is wrongful use by not amending it. The penalty is sought to be recovered not from the wrong doer but from a transferee. Even if the tax is recoverable, imposition of penalty on a transferee demanded a beller exercise of dieretion. The explanation of the delay is interesting. By letter dated 24-5-1978 the petitioner requested that the matter be kept pending, as an appeal was pending. The appeal was disposed of on 14-12-1979. There is no explanation of the delay after 14-12-1979. The second explanation seems to be "want of direction". It is not clear as to whence directions were awaited. If it is the resolution of the controversy on the legal position, it was cleared by the Supreme Court's judgment on 14-12-1979. There is thus no explanation of the unreasonable delay in imposing the penally. The second explanation seems to be "want of direction". It is not clear as to whence directions were awaited. If it is the resolution of the controversy on the legal position, it was cleared by the Supreme Court's judgment on 14-12-1979. There is thus no explanation of the unreasonable delay in imposing the penally. 15. It is hazardous to lay down what would be reasonable period of time in such cases. It would depend upon the circumstances of each case. But in this case no reason for the long and unjustified delay is dieernible. No rational explanation has been offered. Therefore the impugned orders have to be quashed. 16. Since the petitioner has been penalised for the offence under clause (b) of S.10 of the C.S.T. Act, it is necessary to know what constitutes the offence under that clause. I refer to the act as offence because S.10 which creates the liability is captioned "Penalties" and S.10 A has the marginal note "Imposition of Penalties in lieu of prosecution". Commission of the acts set out in clause (b) and other clauses attract punishment of imprisonment, which may extend to six months or fine or both. The essential ingredients of clause (b) of S.10 are: (i) The offender is a registered dealer. (ii) the registered dealer when purchasing goods falsely represents. (iii) that the goods are covered by the certificate of registration. In this case the dealers who purchased the goods were KDHP, ADT and ATE and not the petitioner. The words 'false re-presentation' imply that the dealer made the representation that the goods were covered by the certificates, with the knowledge that they were not so covered. There is an element of fraud, deception, and representing something which the dealer did not believe to be true. This deceptive fraudulent representation involves a state of mind of the dealer. The make r of ther representation does no the lieve in its truth. This fraudulent, dishonest deceptive state of mind is different from merely negligent representation of facts. Having regard to the true meaning of falsely represents' used in clause (b) of S.10 of the C.S.T. Act, there is no doubt that the requisite mental state or mens tea is an essential ingredient of the offence under clause (b) of S.10 of the C.S.T.Act (P.K. Varghese & Sons v. Sales Tax Officer, Spl. Having regard to the true meaning of falsely represents' used in clause (b) of S.10 of the C.S.T. Act, there is no doubt that the requisite mental state or mens tea is an essential ingredient of the offence under clause (b) of S.10 of the C.S.T.Act (P.K. Varghese & Sons v. Sales Tax Officer, Spl. Grade, Ernakulam, (1965) 26 STC 323; Bra/a Lai Banki v. State of Tripura & ors. (1990) 78 STC 283). 17. I will now consider whether a transferee of the business of a dealer who may have committed the offences under clauses (b) and (d) of S.10, can be penalised for such offences. When does a dealer become liable to penalty under clause (b) of S.10? As already stated, a dealer commits the offence if he makes the representation referred to in clause (b) of S.10, with the requisite mental state. Penalty can be imposed upon proof of the false representation that the goods were covered by the certificate. If the false representation is proved the authority "may" impose the penalty or he may not. If there exist reasons for not doing so. Until this decision is taken by the authority penalty cannot be mposed. Imposition of penally is not obligatory. It is dieretionary. Therefore, circumstances relevant to a decision to impose penally have to be considered. Consideration of circumstances relevant to the decision to impose penally is a necessary part of the quasi-judicial function of the sales-tax officer. The offences under clauses (b) and (d) of S.10 may be committed in varied circumstances. Every of fence irrespective of the circumstances of its commission, does not attract penalty or the same penally. This is where the dieretion of the respondent comes in. There are varied shades of violation of law. The breach may be technical or the breach is the result of a bonafide belief by the dealer that he was acting under a valid certificate or the sales-tax Authority by passive acquieeence, contributes to the wrong doing, or the false representation was the result of a mistake - these are factors which influence the decision to impose penalty. These are factors which influence the decision to impose penalty must be taken into account by the Sales-tax Officer. (Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The State of Orissa (1970) 25 STC 211. If he does not, the exercise of dieretion is vitiated. 18. These are factors which influence the decision to impose penalty must be taken into account by the Sales-tax Officer. (Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The State of Orissa (1970) 25 STC 211. If he does not, the exercise of dieretion is vitiated. 18. Has the respondent considered the factors relevant to the imposition of penalty on a transferee of the business? It should be remembered that the proceedings under S.10 Aare quasi criminal. As the marginal note to a section indicates, penally is the legislative alternative to prosecution. Therefore the respondent ought to have considered whether the transferee business can be visited with quasi-criminal action. There is no vicarious liability in respect of crimes. But it is urged on the basis of S.26 of the Kerala General Sales Tax act that a transferee of business is liable to pay tax or Penalty as if he were a dealer. I will presently examine the validity of this argument. Penalty can be imposed on "any person" guilty of the offence under clauses (b> and (/I) of S.10A of the C.S.T. Act. "Any person" is not the transferee but the dealer or purchaser of goods, which means the KDHP, ADT and ATE. Thus the CST Act conceives the dealer as the person liable to penalty. Under Ss.10 and 10A of the CST Act which are the substantive provisions in regard to offences and penalty the transferee does not come in the picture as the person having the capacity to commit the offences. The offence of false representation (clause (b)) or the wrongful use of the goods (clause (d) under S.10 of the CST Act can be committed only by the dealer. In this case the petitioner, the transferee was not the dealer, when the liability under Ss.10 and 10A of the C.S.T. Act arose. But then the authorities under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (K.G.S.T. Act for short) enter the eene as agents of the Central Government to "assess collect and enforce payment of tax including penalty" (Sub-section (2) of S.9 of C.S.T. Act). All the provisions of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act apply to such assessment collection and enforcement (Sub-section (2A) of S.9 of CST act. ) Is there anything in S.26 of the KGST Act, which makes the transferee of business of the dealer liable to penalty? 19. All the provisions of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act apply to such assessment collection and enforcement (Sub-section (2A) of S.9 of CST act. ) Is there anything in S.26 of the KGST Act, which makes the transferee of business of the dealer liable to penalty? 19. Recovery of tax when business of the dealer is transferred is dealt with in S.26 of the KGST Act. The transferee is liable to pay tax or "other amount" if the following ingredients are fulfilled. (S.26 of KGST Act). (i) Ownership of the business of the dealer is transferred. (ii) The transferor was liable to pay tax or other amounts payable under the Act. iii) At the time of the transfer, there remained unpaid any tax or 'other amount' 'payable' under the Act. (iv) Tax or "other amoun:" due from the dealer upto the date of transfer remained unpaid, (v) Such "other amount" referred to in the section may be unassessed amount. The respondents urge that the penalty imposed under S.10A of the CSTAct, though not "tax", tails within the meaning of "other amount" referred to in S.26 of the K.G.S.T. Act. If the penally imposed under S.10A of the C.S.T. Act constitutes "other amount" referred to in S.26 of the K.G.S.T. Act, the respondent can recover the penalty from the tranferee of the dealer's business The distinction between "penalty" and "other amount" needs to be borne m mind. The amount of penally, is not a certain sum. The amount of penalty is subject to the upper limit of one and half times of the tax leviable under the Act. It becomes a certain amount oily when levied. Secondly there is no obligation on the authorities to impose penalty Loon consideration of the circumstances in which the offence was committed and the lature of the offence, the authority may refrain from imposing penalty. That is why the word "may" has been used in S.10A of the C.S. f. Act. The tax on the sale of the goods becomes payable upon the sale of goods, though the tax is fixed by assessment. While the amount of tax is assesed. in the case of penalty, there is no assessment. It is payable only when levied. The words "other amount" have been qualified by saying that such amount may be "unassessed". Assessment is a process connected with tax and not with penalty. While the amount of tax is assesed. in the case of penalty, there is no assessment. It is payable only when levied. The words "other amount" have been qualified by saying that such amount may be "unassessed". Assessment is a process connected with tax and not with penalty. After the tax is assessed, penalty may be levied. Therefore the word "assessed" suggests that the "other amount" is the amount which is subject to the process of assessment Since the amount of penalty is not "assessed", it is outside the meaning of the words 'other amount". 20. There are specific provisions in the K.G.S.T. Act, which impose liability to pay penalty on persons other than dealers. These provisions to which I will presently call attention indicate that wherever the legislature intended to make successors-in-interest of the dealer liable to penalty, it has done so in clear words. Since there is no Income such provision imposing penalty on the transferee of the owner of business, the legislature did not intend to make transferees liable to penalty for an offence committed by the dealer. Now consider the effect of Ss.20 and 21A of the K.G.S.T. Act. Executor, administrator or other legal representative of a deceased dealer is deemed to be a dealer. In respect of any amount assessed, payable and levied on the deceased dealer such legal representative is liable to the extent of the assets of the deceased in the hands of the legal representative. (S.20 of the K.G.S.T. Act). A firm's liability to pay penalty has been expressly carried forward to make the firm liable to penally even after its dissolution. (S.21 A of the K.G.S.T. Act). Therefore, the liability of successors-in-interest to pay tax and penalty has been expressly provided, where they are intended to be liable. The cases of legal representative of a deceased dealer, and dissolved firm, illustrate this point. If the legislature intended that transferee of the business of a dealer, is liable to pay penalty for the offence committed by the dealer, the legislature would not have failed to so provide. Therefore, the legislative intent is clear. lt did not contemplate that transferee of the business of a dealer should be liable to pay penalty for the offence committed by the dealer. 21. I hold that a transferee of the business of a dealer is not liable to penalty. Therefore, the legislative intent is clear. lt did not contemplate that transferee of the business of a dealer should be liable to pay penalty for the offence committed by the dealer. 21. I hold that a transferee of the business of a dealer is not liable to penalty. The summary of my reasons staled in paragraphs 17-20 is given below. The imposition of penalty under S.10A of the C.S.T. Act is a quasi-criminal function. The liability for a crime cannot be imposed vicariously. Transferee of a business can commit the offences under S.10 of the C.S.T. Act only after he becomes a dealer. On the date on which the dealer committed offence the transferee did not possess the capacity to commit the offence. S.26 of the K.G.S.T.Act does not make transferee liable to penalty, because the word "other amount" used in that section does not include the amount of penalty imposed under S.10A of the C.S. T. Act. 22. The impugned orders are alleged to suffer from non-application of mind. Since the petition succeeds on first three points, it is unnecessary to decide the point. 23. In the case of KDHP the goods under the head "cultivation" and "crop protection" were disallowed. The authorities who ought to have amended the certificate did not do so with the result that the certificate which included the above goods continued to be used by the dealer. It is therefore urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that the KDHP committed no offence of false representation that the goods were covered by the certificate. This is apparently true, but not really ture. The dealer, aware of the order by which these goods were disallowed, continued to use the certificate. The certificate was not physically amended. But the order deleting the goods clearly means that the dealer knew that it was ordered to be amended. Therefore when he used I he certificate ordered to beam ended but not actually amended, he was representing that he was 24. entitled to buy the goods, a fact which he knew to be false. The argument is untenable. 25. Learned counsel for the respondent urged that the words "other amount" occurring in S.26 of the K.G.S.T. Act include penally imposed under S.10A of the C.S.T. Act. I have already rejected this submission in paras. I'- and 20 above. entitled to buy the goods, a fact which he knew to be false. The argument is untenable. 25. Learned counsel for the respondent urged that the words "other amount" occurring in S.26 of the K.G.S.T. Act include penally imposed under S.10A of the C.S.T. Act. I have already rejected this submission in paras. I'- and 20 above. Counsel then urged that Ss.36 and 37 of the K.G.S.T. Act provide alternative remedies of revision applications before the Deputy Commissioner and the Board of Revenue respectively. According to him, (his petition instituted without exhausting the alternative remedy should be dismissed. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. (Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. & anor. v. State of Orissa & anor., (AIR 1983 SC 603) writ petitions challenging the validity of the orders of assessment of Sale tax were dismissed by the Orissa High Court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal "on the short ground that the petitioners have an equally alternative efficacious remedy by way of an appeal to the preeribed authority...." I do not think that this judgment assists the respondents. There is a significant difference between the remedy of an appeal and the revision application. This existence of a chance of having the impugned orders revised is not adequate and efficacious remedy. In AS. Bava, (Collector of Customs & Excise, Cochin v. AS. Bava, 1967 KLT 935) the Supreme Court held that "the existence of a remedy by way of revision does not bar the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a petition under Art.226". In my opinion the remedy by way of revision is not adequate and efficacious. Secondly, on the authority of AS. Bava, this Court's jurisdiction is not affected by such remedy. This petition has been pending in this Court for over four years. Is it right, and just at this distance of time that the petition should be dismissed merely because the petitioner has not resorted to a revision application? This question was rightly answered in the negative in Padmanabhan. (Padmanabhan v. Kerala State Handloom Development Corpn., (1991)2 KLT SN 55 case No.66). I am of the opinion that this petition should not be dismissed merely because the petitioner has not exhausted the remedy of Revision Applications. 26. In view of my findings I allow the petition. The orders of the respondent referred to in prayer clause (ii) paragraph 11 of the petition are hereby quashed. I am of the opinion that this petition should not be dismissed merely because the petitioner has not exhausted the remedy of Revision Applications. 26. In view of my findings I allow the petition. The orders of the respondent referred to in prayer clause (ii) paragraph 11 of the petition are hereby quashed. The respondent shall refund to the petitioner the entire amount of penalty recovered from them pursuant to the orders referred to in prayer clause (ii) of the petition. The respondent shall pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date on which the petitioner paid the penalty till the dale of the refund of the amount to the petitioner.