ATMA DEVI v. HARBHAJAN SINGH — 1992 DIGILAW 499 (DEL)

P. K. Bahri ( 1 ) THE appellant, Atma Devi, has filed this appeal seeking setting aside of the judgment and decree dated May 15, 1980 by which suit brought by the respondents seeking relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale has been decreed. ( 2 ) THE facts leading to the filing of this appeal, in brief, are that the appellant had purchased a Government built quarter bearing municipal No. 4a/37, Old Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi with leasehold rights of the land measuring 85. 9 sq. yds. vide Lease Deed dated July 16, 1959. Vide agreement (Ex. P-l) dated January 8, 1976 the appellant entered into an agreement for selling the said property in favour of Harbhajan Singh, his brother Jaswant Singh and their mother Bhagwanti for a total sale consideration of Rs. 65,000. 00 out of which Rs. 15,000. 00 were paid before the Sub-Registrar at the time of execution of the receipt (Ex. P-2) which was duly registered on the said date. ( 3 ) SHRI Santokh Singh, PW-1bad brought about the said transaction as a broker and had also signed as one of the witnesses on Ex. P-l and P-2 Kamla Sukhani, sister of the appellant, had also signed as an attesting witness in the said documents. According to the terms of the agreement, the appellant was to obtain necessary permission for selling the property from Land and Development Officer under Section 27 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act No. 33 of 1976 within two months and thereafter was to execute and get registered the Sale Deed in favour of the respondents and the balance consideration of Rs. 50. 000. 00 was to be paid at the time of registration of the Sale Deed. The possession of the said quarter was to be delivered to the respondents on registration of the Sale Deed. ( 4 ) IT appears that no such sale permission had been obtained within the stipulated period. The parties thereafter entered into a supplement agreement dated March 4, 1976 (Ex. P-3) by which the appellant was granted one month more time for obtaining the necessary permission and for executing the Sale Deed. ( 5 ) IT is the case of the respondents that soon after execution of the supplement agreement, the possession of the said property execept a room was delivered to the respondents. P-3) by which the appellant was granted one month more time for obtaining the necessary permission and for executing the Sale Deed. ( 5 ) IT is the case of the respondents that soon after execution of the supplement agreement, the possession of the said property execept a room was delivered to the respondents. The said government built quarter comprised of two regular rooms, astore, a kitchen, a bathroom, W. C. , a glazed verandah and front and rear open courtyards. ( 6 ) IT was averred in the plaint by the respondents that the appellant had resiled from the agreement and had not taken any steps for obtaining the necessary permission from the authorities and thus respondents, who had been all the time ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, had got served a legaal notice dated March 18, 1976 (Ex. P-4) through their counsel on the appellant in which all the facts were enumerated and the appellant was called upon to obtain the necessary permission and excute and register the Sale Deed within the stipulated time. Ex. P. 5 is the postal receipt and Ex. P-6 is the A. D. card vide which notice is shown to be served on the appellant on March 19, 1976. It appears that no reply was sent by the appellant controverting the facts mentioned in this notice. In this notice, it was clearly mentioned that in pursuance to the aforesaid agreements for sale, the appellant had delivered vacant possession of one store, one room, one kitchen, latrine, bathroom, verandah and courtyards to the respondents. ( 7 ) THE respondents then brought the suit seeking decree for specific performance of the aforesaid agreements for sale and for getting the possession of the remaining room. ( 7 ) THE respondents then brought the suit seeking decree for specific performance of the aforesaid agreements for sale and for getting the possession of the remaining room. ( 8 ) THE appellant in the written statements, while admitting the execution of the original agreement as well as the supplement agreements, took the plea that the time was the essence of the contract and it was the plaintiffs_ respondents who were to take steps for obtaining necessary permission for selling the property from the L and D. O. and for that purpose the appellant had given a plan of the property and duly signed application alongwith a power of attorney to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs had failed to take any steps in that regard and thus had committed a breach of the terms of the agreement subsequently arrived at. It was further pleaded by the appellant that in fact the sale consideration agreed upon was Rs. 9s,000. 00 although the market value of the property was not less than Rs. l,50,000. 00 and Rs. 30,000. 00 were to be paid by the respondents at the time of taking the possession and the blance Rs. 50,000. 00 was to be paid at the time of execution and registration of the Sale Deed and the respondents have not performed their part of the contract in paying Rs. 30,000. 00 initially at the time of taking possession and thus, they had committed the breach of the agreement. ( 9 ) IT was also pleaded by the appellant that the appellant was entitled to forefeit the sum of Rs. 15,000. 00 received by her as earnest money. The appellant also came up with a story that in fact through fraud and misrepresentation, the respondents had got possession of the two rooms by introducing one Harjit Kaur to whom she agreed to let out those two rooms and lateron it turned out that Harjit Kaur was no other person than respondent Harbhajan Singh s wife and in fact Harjit Kaur and respondent Bhagwanti had been tenants under her and in that connection legal proceedings have been taken by the appellant. She had pleaded that the consideration mentioned in the agreement was not the real consideration agreed upon and the same was totally inadequate and unconscionable and Santokh Singh, broker, had played a fraud in connivance with the respondents inasmuch as he had taken away the sale deed from the appellant and handed over the same to the respondents. In the. written statement, the appellant did not deny the factum of having received legal notice from the repondents but she had failed to take any plea with regard to that notice. In para 4 of the written statement, she took a contradictory plea that in fact she continued to remain in possession of the entire proper as owner whereas in the preliminary pleas she had taken up the stand that two rooms were handed over to Harjit Kaur treating her as a tenant. ( 10 ) IN replication, the respondents controverted the pleas of the appellant and denied that they had played any fraud or had made any misrepresentation in obtaining the possession of the portion of the property. They also controverted that they introduced Harjit Kaur for getting premises oil rent for her. They have denied that there was any change in the terms of the agreement by which they had agreed to take the permission from the L and D. D. or they had obtained any application form signed from the appellant or had obtained any power of attorney from the appellant. They deny that the real consideration of the property in question was Rs. 95. 000. 00 and they were to give Rs. 30,000. 00 at the time of getting possession of the premises. ( 11 ) IT appears that during the pendency of the suit, the appellant filed an application (LA. 2486/79) wherein she came up with the plea that a compromise was arrived at between her and the respondents is proceedings being held by S. N. Kumar, J. , (as he then was) and by virtue of that compromise, the appellant was to pay Rs. 15,000. 00 to the respondents by May 7, 1979 but as appellant could not arrange the amount, so she paid Rs. 15,000. 00 to respondent Harbhajan Singh out of Court on May 9, 1979 and thus, there, existed no further dispute between the parties and so, tin suit be dismissed as withdrawn. This application was filed on August 8,1979. 15,000. 00 to the respondents by May 7, 1979 but as appellant could not arrange the amount, so she paid Rs. 15,000. 00 to respondent Harbhajan Singh out of Court on May 9, 1979 and thus, there, existed no further dispute between the parties and so, tin suit be dismissed as withdrawn. This application was filed on August 8,1979. An affidavit in support of this application was filed on August 17, 1979. On November 21, 1979, the appellant moved an application (1. A. 3749/79) in which she mentioned that at the time when she had paid Rs. l5,000. 00 toharbhajansingh, Harbhajan Singh had given a receipt. Photocopy of the same was filed alongwith the application. The appellant moved another application on 26th September 1979 (LA. 3164/79) in which she had taken the plea that Harbhajan Singh alongwith certain other parsons had on June 3, 1979 forcibly entered her house. and beat her up and took away Rs. 15,000. 00 and also the aforesaid. receipt alongwith certain gold ornaments belonging to her and the matter was reported to the police and to the higher authorities including the then Prime Minister. It is also mentioned in that application that on July 7, 1979 the plaintiff had handed back the possession of the property and on August 1, 1979 a report was lodged against the appellant that she had forcibly broken open the locks of the premises which were earlier in possession of the respondents. She also made a grievance that on August 6,1979 also Harbhajan Singh alongwith Certain bad elements had held out threats to her and has not been allowing her to enter the house. All these averments of the appellant which were taken in those applications were controverted by the respondents. It was. denied that at any time any compromise had been arrived at by virtue of which the appellant had paid Rs. 15,000. 00. The execution of any receipt by Harbhajan Singh was also controverted. Following issues were framed : - 1. Is the suit not properly valued for the purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction ? 2. Were the agreements dated January 8, March 4, 1976 executed : between the parties, as alleged or otherwise? 3 Were the plaintiffs ready and willing to perform, their part of the contract ? 4. Has the defendant committed breach of the agreement, as alleged by the plaintiffs ? 5. 2. Were the agreements dated January 8, March 4, 1976 executed : between the parties, as alleged or otherwise? 3 Were the plaintiffs ready and willing to perform, their part of the contract ? 4. Has the defendant committed breach of the agreement, as alleged by the plaintiffs ? 5. Has the failure been committed by the plaintiffs, as alleged by the defendants and therefore a sum of Rs. 15. 000. 00 paid by the plaintiffs stand forefeited ? 6. Relief.-Following additional issue was also framed on February 21, 1980 : - "has the defendant paid Rs. 15,000. 00 to the plaintiffs in full and final settlements of the plaintiffs claim in the suit ?" ( 12 ) THE learned Single Judge after recording the evidence and hearing the arguments held that the suit is properly valued for the purposes of Court fees and jurisdiction and the original argeement and the supplement agreement were duly executed between the parties and the sale consideration was Rs. . 65,0001- and that plaintiffs have been ready willing to perform their part of the contract and it is the appellant/defendant who had committed breach of the terms of the agreement -and the respondents/plaintiffs have not committed any default in performing their part of the agreement and that no compromise had been arrived at and a sum of Rs. 15,000. 00 had not been paid and the photocopy of the receipt produced by the appellant was not genuine inasmuch as no receipt was executed by Harbhajan Singh. So, all the issues were decided against the appellant and the suit was decreed as aforesaid. ( 13 ) THE learned Counsel for appellant, Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, has not been able to assail the findings returned by the Single Judge on various issues. So, all the issues were decided against the appellant and the suit was decreed as aforesaid. ( 13 ) THE learned Counsel for appellant, Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, has not been able to assail the findings returned by the Single Judge on various issues. He has confined himself by addressing arguments that in this case the appellant who is an old lady has been duped by the respondents inasmuch as according to the terms of the agreements the respondents were to get the vacant possession of the property only at the time of execution, and registration of the sale deed, yet the respondents have managed to get possession of a major -portion of the property even before the execution and registration of the sale deed and have not been paying any rent or damages for use and occupation to the appellant and also have been retaining the balance amount of the consideration. He has argued that even the learned Single Judge had observed in the judgment that it remained a mystery as to how the respondents came into possession of the major portion of the property which was not in consonance with the terms of the agreement. He has urged that in view of these material facts the respondents ought not have been granted the discretionary relief of the specific performance of the agreement of sale of the immovable property. He has also prayed that this Court should award some damages to the appellant for use and occupation of the property in question by the respondents for all these years. ( 14 ) BEFORE dealing with these contentions, we may state that findings of the learned Single Judge on the merits of all the issues are clearly unassailable. As far as issue No. I is concerned, the value for the purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction has to be the sale consideration mentioned in the agreement for sale which was Rs. 65,000. 00 and thus the suit has been rightly held to be properly valued for the purposes of Court fees and jurisdiction on that basis. ( 15 ) THE original agreement dated January 8, 1976 and the supplement agreement dated March 4, 1976 were admittedly executed between the parties. There is no dispute about that fact. The plea of the appellant that in fact orally the sale consideration was agreed to be Rs. 95. 000. ( 15 ) THE original agreement dated January 8, 1976 and the supplement agreement dated March 4, 1976 were admittedly executed between the parties. There is no dispute about that fact. The plea of the appellant that in fact orally the sale consideration was agreed to be Rs. 95. 000. 00 is not borne out from any evidence and moreover the same being against the written terms of the agreement has to be completely ignored. Even otherwise, admittedly, the younger sister of appellant was one of the attesting witnesses of the agreement as well as of the receipt which was duly registered, yet. for. reasons unknown, the appellant had not cared to examine her sister as witness to, prove her plea that in fact the sale consideration agreed upon between the parties was Rs. 95,000. 00 and not Rs. 65,0i00. 00. Admittedly, PW. 1 was a broker who brought about this transaction. He has categorically stated that sale consideration agreed upon between the parties was Rs. 65. 000. 00. The appellant herself is not a truthful person. She has spoken lies at different stages of the case, so her mere bald statement that sale consideration was Rs. 95. 000. 00 , which is contrary to the terms of the agreement, cannot be given any credence. ( 16 ) IT is significant to mention that before filing of the suit, the respondents had served a legal notice on the appellant in which the details of the agreement were indicated and the sale consideration was shown as Rs, 65,000. 00. No reply to this notice was sent. Surprisingtly although in the written statement the factum of receipt of the notice was not denied, but at the time appellant appeared in the witness box, she went on to deny the receipt of the said notice and even denied her signatures on the A. D. receipt. It is pertinent to mention that in the original agreement it was clearly provided that it was the appellant who was to obtain the necessary permission from the Land and Development Office which was also repeated in the supplement agreement, yet the appellant in the written statement had. come up with the plea that it was the respondents who were to obtain the necessary permission. come up with the plea that it was the respondents who were to obtain the necessary permission. The appellant had not been able to lead any evidence apart from her own statement that she had executed any power of attorney in favour of Harbhajan Singh or she had give application duly signed for getting permission from the Land Development Office. The failure of the appellant to send any reply to the legal notice served on her would also lead to an inference that it was the appellant who was going back on the agreement and perhaps wanted to resile from the agreement as she was considering that the market value of the property is much more than for what she had agreed to sell the same to the respondents. ( 17 ) THE appellant s version that in fact she was duped in letting out the premises to Harjit Kaur who she later on came to know was the wife of Harbhajan Singh was also not proved on the record. She had, after the filing of the present suit, filed a petition before the Rent Controller against Harjit Kaur and that petition came to be dismissed on merits with findings that appellant had failed to prove that any tenancy had been created in favour of Harjit Kaur and a finding was also given that respondents were in possession of the property in part performance of the agreement for sale. ( 18 ) THE is no mystery as far as factum of respondents coming into possession of the property is concerned because the execution of the sale deed was being delayed on failure of the appellant to secure the necessary permission. It is because of the said reason that supplement agreement was entered into on March 4,1976 by which more time was given to the appellant to obtain the necessary permission. It would show that respondents were ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement i. e. for paying the balance consideration if the necessary permission was to be obtained and the sale deed was to be executed and registered. May be, in order to show her bonafideat that time when she had no thought of resiling from the agreement, she thought it fit to give possession of a portion of the property to the respondents. May be, in order to show her bonafideat that time when she had no thought of resiling from the agreement, she thought it fit to give possession of a portion of the property to the respondents. The respondents, in their legal notice dated March 18, 1976, categorically asserted that they have been inducted into possession of a portion of the property in pursuance to the agreement for sale and this fact was not controverted by the appellant by sending any reply to the said notice. The appellant has failed to show that she had come up with the story of being duped to part with possession by the respondents before the present suit was filed by the respondents. She had admittedly instituted the proceedings under the Rent Control Act much after the filing of the present suit. It is also explained by the appellant that in case she was to abide by the terms of the agreement, why she would have agreed to create any tenancy in the property in question. According to her plea that she did not know Harjit Kaur and her mother and she did not know that they were relations of Harbhajan Singh, still she would like the Court to believe that she created tenancy in favour of Harjit Kaur knowing very well that in accordance with the agreement to sell she was to give vacant possession of the property to the respondents on execution and registration of the Sale Deed. ( 19 ) NOW coming to the plea of the appellant that during the pendency of the suit, on the basis of some compromise, she hadpaidrs,15,000. 00 to Harbhajan Singh in full and final satisfaction of the claim of the respondents in the present suit, we may mention that appellant s statement in Court in support of this plea bristles with falsehood. It appears that at the time proceedings in the suit were being conducted by S. N. Kumar, J. , some efforts were made for bringing about some compromise and the case was being adjourned for that purpose. On March 22, 1979, the case was adjourned to May 7, 1979 for compromise. On the said date, the case was adjourned to. May 9, 1979 at 2 P. M. Then, the case was adjourned to May 24, 1979. The case was at that time at the stage of final arguments. On March 22, 1979, the case was adjourned to May 7, 1979 for compromise. On the said date, the case was adjourned to. May 9, 1979 at 2 P. M. Then, the case was adjourned to May 24, 1979. The case was at that time at the stage of final arguments. According to the plea taken by the appellant in application (I. A. 2486/79-), she had paid Rs. 15,000. 00 to Harbhajan Singh on May 9, 1979. The original application presents a dismal picture. It appears that in the first sentence it is typed that the Hon ble Judge was pleased to adjourn the matter to August 6, 1979 for compromise vide his Lordship s order dated March 23 1979, but then the date has been cut off with ink and the date August 7, 1979 had been written and before that, another date in ink was written which was again cut off. Then, this application appears to have been typed on July 10 1979. The date was again cut off with ink and changed to July 20, 1979. The application appears to be signed by the appellant on July 23,1979. There was no mention in this application that she had obtained any receipt from Harbhajan Singh while she piad Rs. 15,000. 00 to Harbbajan Singh on May 9, 1979. In the affidavit which came to be attested on August 17, 1979, again there is no reference made by the appellant that any receipt was given by Harbhajan Singh when allegedly Rs. 15,000. 00 were paid to him by the appellant. It is pertinent to mention that in case she had paid Rs. 15, 000. 00 to Harbhajan Singh on May 9, 1979 on the basis of compromise arrived at and a receipt had been taken from Harbhajan Singh it is not understood why this fact was not brought to th6 notice of the Court when case came up forbearing on May 24, 1979. Harbhajan Singh as well as appellant bad appeared in person before the Court and they sought adjournment on the ground that they wanted to engage lawyers. The case was directed to be placed before Deputy Registrar for further proceedings on August 8, 1979. Till August 8, 1979. the appellant set over the mattered came to file the application only. on that date only after the case bad been adjourned by the Deputy Registrar. The case was directed to be placed before Deputy Registrar for further proceedings on August 8, 1979. Till August 8, 1979. the appellant set over the mattered came to file the application only. on that date only after the case bad been adjourned by the Deputy Registrar. As soon as the application came up for hearing on August 27, 1979. Harbhajan Singh, even before the Deputy Registrar, stated that no compromise had been arrived- at. It is significant that the appellant in her statement even tried to go against the record by stating that she was not aware that any date May 24, 1979 had been fixed and she had appeared before the Court on that date. In the face of the record, it is not possible to believe the appellant that she had not appeared before the Court on May 24,1979. ( 20 ) IN her statement as R. W. 2, the appellant stated that she came to the Court on May 9, 1979 and had brought Rs. 15,000. 00 which she placed before the Judge and the Judge had given the money to plaintiff who, after counting the same, stated that he would receive the money after the other two plaintiffs were to be present and thereafter the Court asked them to sit outside and let the other plaintiffs come. No such facts have been recorded in the order dated May 9. 1979. According to the appellant, one Bir Singh and Shyam Lal, who were by chance present outside the Court were the witnesses to the said payment made by her to Harbhajan Singh and Harbhajan Singh had already the receipt in his pocket which he gave after signing in English and Bir Singh also signed the same and on July 20, 1979 Harbhajan Singh gave her the keys of the house. ( 21 ) SHE had not given out as to how and when she got prepared the photocopy of the receipt. She stated that some days before or after July 1979, Harbhajan Singh came and took away the original receipt forcibly alongwith Rs. 15. 000. 00 and gold ornaments and she went to lodge the report with the police but it was not recorded with the police. She stated that some days before or after July 1979, Harbhajan Singh came and took away the original receipt forcibly alongwith Rs. 15. 000. 00 and gold ornaments and she went to lodge the report with the police but it was not recorded with the police. The appellant had not placed on record any representation, made by her to any higher authorities complaining about this alleged high handedness on the part of Harbhajan Singh having committed such a robbery. ( 22 ) ON the other hand, the appellant admitted that a criminal case had been registered against her on the allegations made by Harbhajan Singh s wife that she had forcibly on August 1, 1979 broken open the locks of the said property and is on bail in that criminal case. The photocopy of the receipt produced on the record (Ex. RI) does not show as to when this amount of Rs. 15,0001- had been paid. The signatures purporting to be of Harbhajan Singh appearing on this receipt are not decipherable at all. The words recorded in the receipt are: "received Rs. 15,000. 00 (Rupees Fifteen Thousand) only from Shrimati Atma Devi D/o Sh. Khub Chand in the compromise from the Court of Hon able Justice Shri S. N. Kumar. on 22-3-1979. "the attesting witness of this receipt Bir Singh turns out to be a complete stranger who has not given his address on the receipt and he was produced in Court by the appellant and Bir Singh deposed that he had come to the Court in connection with some matter and wanted to meet his Counsel and he found this payment , being made by appellant to Harbhajan Singh and he witnessed the payment and signed the receipt. He admitted that he did not know the parties at all earlier. It is clearly surprising that appellant should have got attested the receipt from a complete stranger who even did not bother to write his address. In Court he had stated that he was working with M/s Ishwar Saran Gupta and Sons, 1387, Chawri Bazar. Delhi. Later on, it appears that respondents made an enquiry and found that no such firm existed at that place an application was moved for recalling Bir Singh for further cross-examination on new facts. In Court he had stated that he was working with M/s Ishwar Saran Gupta and Sons, 1387, Chawri Bazar. Delhi. Later on, it appears that respondents made an enquiry and found that no such firm existed at that place an application was moved for recalling Bir Singh for further cross-examination on new facts. The application was allowed, but it appears that the witness had disappeared and even the appellant could not find out the whereabouts of the said witness except for staling that he had gone away from Delhi. It was in view of these facts and- circumstances that the learned Single Judge gave a categorical finding that story of a compromise having been arrived at and Rs. 15. 000. 00 having been paid on the basis of the receipt is totally. false. We entirely agree with the reasons given by the learned Single Judge in arriving at the said conclusion from the facts appearing on the record, in case the appellant-was having any receipt showing payment ofrs. l-5,000. 00 itisnot understood why no mention -of such receipt was made in the first application or in the affidavit filed subsequently and why the said receipt was not filed on record alongwith the application. And in case the receipt had been taken away by Harbhajan Singh forcibly, as alleged by the appellant, prior to the filing of the application, it is not understood why such a fact was not mentioned in the said application itself. ( 23 ) THERE were two versions available as to how the possession came to be given to the respondents. The case of the respondents. was that soon after the execution of the supplementary agreement, the possession of the portion of the property was given in pursuance to the agreement for sale. The version given by the appellant was that she was duped in parting with the possession of the property by the respondents by introducing Harjit Kaur as tenant. The version given by the appellant was found to be false, so it has to be held that the version given by the respondents was correct, particularly when this version came to light in legal notice given by the respondents as early as on March 18, 1976 to which the appellant did not send any reply. So, there is no mystery as to how the respondents came into possession of the portion of the property. So, there is no mystery as to how the respondents came into possession of the portion of the property. As the respondents have come into possession of the portion of the property as prospective vendees on the basis of the agreement for sale, this, there is no legal right of the appellant to demand any demages for use and occupation of the said portion from the respondents. ( 24 ) IT is quite evident that it is the appellant who had resiled from the agreement and was not ready and willing to perform her part of the agreement. It is quite evident from the evidence that the respondents have always been ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement. As soon as they found that the appellant was trying to resile from the agreement, they immediately served a legal notice and also instituted the suit promptly. So, we endorse the findings of the Single Judge on a)l the issues and find no force in the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant and find no merit in this appeal. . ( 25 ) HOWEVER, during the pendency of this appeal, an application (I. A. 652/92) was filed in which the appellant prayed for directing the respondents to pay damages by way of mesne profits for use and occupation of the premises. In this application, the appellant had referred to some statement of Harbhajan Singh dated April 6,1985 of which a photocopy is attached. It is really surprising as to from which record this statement has been taken. If we peruse this photocopy, we find that this statement has been recorded in some proceedings in Suit No. 261 /76. We have gone through the record of the case and find no such statement had been recorded. It is also pertinent to mention that the appellants had produced similar photocopy of the statement of Harbhajan Singh alongwith the application before the Single Judge and the said application was rejected by the learned Single Judge vide order dated September 3, 1985. No appeal was filed by the appellant against that order. Even during the course of the arguments, learned Counsel for the appellant could not explain as to where this statement had been recorded and how photocopy of such a statement had been obtained and filed. No appeal was filed by the appellant against that order. Even during the course of the arguments, learned Counsel for the appellant could not explain as to where this statement had been recorded and how photocopy of such a statement had been obtained and filed. So, no importance can be attached to this fact mentioned in the application that such a statement had been made by Harbhajan Singh by which he had acknowledged the payment of Rs. 15. 000. 00 and had agreed to give up the claim with regard to the property in question. This is another ill-advised effort of the appellant to forge a statement and produce the photocopy at first before the Single Judge and without filing any appeal against the order by which the application in this connection was rejected, she has filed the photocopy of the statement alongwith this application wherein no prayer is made for leading any additional evidence for proving such a statement of Harbhajan Singh. It appears that even the appellant is not very sure about her facts and to say the least is coming up with some forged documents to see somehow that she succeeds in her efforts to get the decree set aside which has been passed against her. We might have taken a serious view of her blantant lies and her forging documents and producing them on judicial record, but keeping in view that she is an old lady, we refrain from taking any action against the appellant. We find no merit in this appeal which we hereby dismiss but considering the old age of the appellant and keeping in view the fact that Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, Advocate, has appeared as Amicus Curiae for the appellant, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.