ISRANI, J.—This Habeas Corpus Petition has been filed by Rais Khan, brother of detenu-Shafi Mohammed, who has been detained under the provisions of Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (for brevity, the Act of 1988), with the prayer that respondents be directed to release him from the same. 2. Briefly stated, a preventive party, while on patrol duty, on March 22, 1991, at Kota-Bundi road was checking vehicles, during which they stopped a truck, bearing No. MKM 1636, at about 12 Oclock in the noon, which was coming from Kota. On enquiry, it was found that detenu-Shafi Mohammed, Babu Bhai and Bhagwan Singh were travelling in the truck. After interrogation and search, a cement bag, lying in the tool-box behind the seat of the driver, was found. Upon opening it, eight black and three blue coloured rexine bags were found. When these rexine bags were opened, in the presence of independent witnesses, polythene bags were found, containing some black substance. When tested and smelled, the substance was found to be opium. The opium was weighed and found to be 27.800 Kgs. net. The detenu alongwith two other persons, named above, were arrested under Section 8/18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic substances Act, 1985 (for short, the Act of 1985) and the opium seized along with the truck were taken into Government custody and panchnama was prepared on the spot. Out of the seized opium, two samples of 24 gms, each were drawn and sealed and, thereafter, the same were sent for chemical analysis. The report of the chemical examiner revealed that the samples drawn from the opium were found to be within the meaning of opium under Section 2 (xv) of the Act, 1985. The detenu moved an application for bail before the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Kota, but the same was rejected on April 27, 1991. Thereafter, another bail application was filed in the High Court under the provisions of Section 439, Cr. P.C, which was also dismissed, on August 30, 1991. While in custody, order dated August 27, 1991 (Anx.l) was served upon the detenu and by exercising powers under Sec. 3(1) of the Act of 1988, he was ordered to be detained and kept in custody at District Jail, Kota. While passing the above mentioned detention order, grounds of detention (Anx. P.C, which was also dismissed, on August 30, 1991. While in custody, order dated August 27, 1991 (Anx.l) was served upon the detenu and by exercising powers under Sec. 3(1) of the Act of 1988, he was ordered to be detained and kept in custody at District Jail, Kota. While passing the above mentioned detention order, grounds of detention (Anx. 1-A) alongwith some documents were supplied to him, which were relied upon by the detaining authority. A Representation (Anx. 2) against the order of detention was sent to the President of India, under Registered Post, on October 10, 1991. Vide letter dated October 30, 1991 (Anx. 4) he was informed that the same has been rejected by the Central Government. On November 1, 1991, the detenu was produced before the Advisory Board, where he presented a memo of appeal to the Board. On November 29, 1991, a communication was received from the Board, conveying him rejection of his appeal/representation. 3. It is submitted by Mr. S.S. Hasan, learned counsel, that the order of detention has been passed for one year (from 7.9.91 to 6.9.92). It is further submitted that the detention order was passed after a long delay of five months. The detenu was arrested on March 22,1991, and detention order was passed only on August 27, 1991. This, according to the learned counsel, vitiates the detention. It is submitted by Mr. Praveen Balwada, learned counsel, that there has been no delay and the position has been fully explained in the return filed on behalf of the respondents. Keeping in view the large quantity of seized opium and detenu being habitual offender, the case was examined in detail and, after careful consideration, a proposal for detaining him under the provisions of the Act, 1988, was sent to the Commissioner, Narcotic, Headquarters at Gwalior vide letter dated June 11, 1991. He, after careful consideration, forwarded it to the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi and the Ministry, after careful consideration, issued the detention order and the grounds of detention vide letter dated August 27,1991, which was received in the Office of the Narcotic Commissioner, Gwalior on September 6, 1991. 4. From the facts mentioned above, it is clear that the proposal for detention itself was wiritiated only in June, 1991 and consideration at various levels in the Government does require reasonable time. 4. From the facts mentioned above, it is clear that the proposal for detention itself was wiritiated only in June, 1991 and consideration at various levels in the Government does require reasonable time. The detenu was already in jail and we are, therefore, of the opinion that the time taken in finalising the proposal is not unreasonable. Reliance was placed on Shri K.P.M. Basheer vs. State of Karnataka and another (1). This was a matter under COFEPOSA Act, 1974, in which, on search, two gold pellets were recovered from the detenu on November 12, 1990 ad the order of detention was passed on 7.01.1991, but the same was served on the detenu on June 28, 1991. It was held by the Apex Court that delay of more than five months in executing the order of detention has remained unexplained, which shows, that detention cannot be sustained, since the live and proximate link between grounds of detention and purpose of detention is snapped on account of undue and unreasonable delay in securing the appellant/detenu and detaining him. The explanation that various efforts were made to trace the detenu at his given address, but he could not be traced, was not found to be sufficient. This authority is of no assistance to the detenu, since the question of long delay in executing the order of detention on the detenu in the case under consideration does not arise. In Bhagwan vs. Union of India and others(2), it was held by this Court that since there is no material on record to disturb the detention and no affidavit of any of the authorities concerned has been placed on record, the detention order is illegal and the detenu was directed to be released, who had been in jail for a period of four months. This authority also is of no assistance to the detenu, since sufficient material has been placed on record in the matter under consideration. It may be pointed out that there can be no hard and fast rule, regarding the time to be consumed in passing the detention order. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. This authority also is of no assistance to the detenu, since sufficient material has been placed on record in the matter under consideration. It may be pointed out that there can be no hard and fast rule, regarding the time to be consumed in passing the detention order. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. It was observed by the Apex Court in Kamarunnissa vs. Union of India and five other petitioners (3) that "whether or not the delay, if any, is properly explained, would depend on the facts of each case and, in the present case, we are satisfied that there was no delay at all, as is apparent from the facts narrated above." In K. Aruna Kumari vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (4), it was observed by the Apex Court that " having regard to the circumstances, there is no doubt that the respondents have satisfactorily explained the delay in passing the order. The delay cannot by itself vitiate the decision to detain a person and this is fully demonstrated in the case of Rajendra Prashad vs. State of U.P. (5), wherein the order was passed after seven months and in Smt. Hemlata Kantilal Shah vs. State of Maharashtra (6), the orders of - detention were passed five months later." In the matter under consideration, the time taken for passing the order of detention is about 2 1/2 months only. We, therefore, do not find any force in this contention and the same is rejected. 5. The second contention raised by the learned counsel is that since the detenu was already in jail and his bail application had been rejected by the Sessions Judge, Kota, on April 27, 1991, there was no need to have passed any detention order on August 27, 1991. It is submitted that from the documents supplied alongwith the detention order, it is evident that the respondents did not know that the application of detenu for grant of bail was pending before the High Court. It is further submitted that since the bail application of the detenue had already been rejected by the Sessions Judge, there was no imminent possibility of detenu being set at liberty. It is also submitted that there is merely a bald statement that the detenu would repeat his criminal activities or that there would be possibility of grant of bail by the Court to the petitioner. It is also submitted that there is merely a bald statement that the detenu would repeat his criminal activities or that there would be possibility of grant of bail by the Court to the petitioner. We do not find any force in this contention of the learned counsel. The order of detention is passed on subjective satisfaction of the authorities concerned. It is mentioned in para 4 of Anx. 1-A dated August 27, 1991 that the detenu admitted that the said opium of 27.800 Kgs. was brought by him from his house in village Nayagaon near Raipur and he kept the same in the tool-box of the said truck. In his statement, he also admitted that earlier also, he transported contraband opium in the same truck. Babu Bhai and Bhagwan Singh-the two other persons, travelling in the same truck, also confirmed that the said opium was brought by the detenu-Shafi Mohammed from the village mentioned above and kept in the tool-box of the truck by him for disposal at Delhi. In paras 8 and 10, it has further been mentioned that the concerned officer is satisfied that there is compelling necessity in view of the likelihood of the detenus being released on bail under the normal law and the likelihood of his indulging in illicit traffic of narcotic drugs, as was evident from the trend of his activities, to detain him under the provisions of the Act of 1988, with a view to preventing him from engaging in possession, concealment and transportation of narcotic drugs. Thus, it is evident that the concerned authorities were satisfied that the detenu is likely to indulge in his nefarious activities again, if he is released on bail by any court. Admittedly, the authorities have knowledge that the detenu is trying to bail out and his application was rejected by the Sessions Court at Kota. It does not require us to come to the conclusion that since the detenu is trying to get himself released on bail in Sessions Court, he can try for the bail in the High Court also. From the facts mentioned above, it is clear that the detenu did try to get bail from the High Court and his application was rejected on August 30, 1991. From the facts mentioned above, it is clear that the detenu did try to get bail from the High Court and his application was rejected on August 30, 1991. In N. Meera Rani vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and another (7), it was held by the Apex Court that the detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order; but, even so, if the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied on cogent material that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order cannot be validly made even in anticipation to operate on his release. This authority evidently is of no help to the detenu, as from the documents supplied, it is clear that the detaining authority was having full knowledge regarding efforts of the detenu to get himself released on bai.- The authorities, after considering all the facts, came to the conclusion that if the detenu is released, he will again indulge in his smuggling activities of the narcotic drugs. In Kamarunnissa vs. Union of India (supra), the Apex Court held that " even in a case where a person is in custody, if the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. In the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probabilities indulge in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition, to question it before a higher court." From the facts stated above, it is clear that all these grounds have been considered by the detaining authority and exist in the case under consideration. In M. Mohammed Sultan vs. Joint Secretary to Government of India (8), it was held by the Apex Court that even a solitary statement of smuggling mentioned in the grounds will be enough to pass a detention order, if a reasonable inference can be drawn from the detenus past conduct about the likelihood of his repeating the prejudicial activity in future. We, therefore, do not find any force in this ground also, which is rejected. 6. The third contention raised by the learned counsel is that even though, when the truck was intercepted and checked, the detenu alongwith two other persons, mentioned above, were arrested and criminal proceedings under the provisions of the Act, 1985 have been launched against all the three persons, but only Shafi Mohammed, the detenu, has been detained under the provisions of sub-Section (1) of Sec. 3 of the Act, 1988. This shows, according to learned counsel, non-application of mind and arbitrary action of the detaining authority. If there was any danger of the kind mentioned in Anx. 1 and Anx. 1-A, it can be from all the three persons, therefore, the order is vitiated on this ground also. We have already extracted certain portions of Anx. 1-A, which mentioned the grounds of detention of the detenu. If the concerned authorities had detained all the three persons, without sufficient material, perhaps, this may have been a ground for quashing the detention order, regarding such persons against whom sufficient material was not placed on record. The fact that out of three persons arrested together, only one Shafi Mohammed has been detained, shows that this has been done, after proper application of mind. It was admitted by the detenu that he had brought the opium from his house in village Nayagaon and had placed the same in the tool-box. He further admitted that he had been indulging earlier also in similar activities. It was admitted by the detenu that he had brought the opium from his house in village Nayagaon and had placed the same in the tool-box. He further admitted that he had been indulging earlier also in similar activities. The other two persons, namely, Babu Bhai, co-driver and Bhagwan Singh, Cleaner, have also confirmed the statement given by the detenu. Thus, it is clear that detenu is the person, who was responsible for first obtaining the opium, keeping it in his house, thereafter, putting it in the truck, concealing the same in some bag and tool-box. It was he, who was driving the truck and wanted to dispose of the opium in Delhi. Thus, the question of non-application of mind or passing any order in arbitrary manner does not arise. We, therefore, do not find any force in this contention of the learned counsel also, which is rejected. 7. The last ground raised by the learned counsel is regarding delay of 21 days in considering the representation sent by the detenu to the President of India vide letter dated October 10,1991. This was rejected on October 30, 1991. In para 9 of the return, filed by the respondents, it has been explained that the representation of the detenu was received in the Office of the President on October 12, 1991. This was forwarded to the Finance Ministry, Department of Revenue, New Delhi. Thereafter, it was sent to the Commissioner, Narcotic, Headquarters at Gwalior. From there, it was sent to the Deputy Commissioner, Narcotic, Kota, where the detenu was arrested, in the first instance. After receiving the comments, from all the authorities, mentioned above, the same was rejected on October 30, 1991. This shows that the matter has been considered expeditiously and it cannot be said that there is any unjustified delay in considering and disposing of the representation of the detenu. Whatever time consumed, has been fully explained by the respondents. The learned counsel has placed reliance on Ramesh Chandra vs. State of Rajasthan & Others (9). This was a matter under National Security Act, 1980, in which, representation sent to the Home Secretary of the State was sent for comments to the District Magistrate after 12/13 days. After the comments were received from him, it was rejected after two weeks. The learned counsel has placed reliance on Ramesh Chandra vs. State of Rajasthan & Others (9). This was a matter under National Security Act, 1980, in which, representation sent to the Home Secretary of the State was sent for comments to the District Magistrate after 12/13 days. After the comments were received from him, it was rejected after two weeks. It was held by this Court that since no explanation good, bad or in-different has been furnished by the State and the delay caused in considering the application, shows extreme laxity with which the representation was dealt with, hence, the detention order was quashed. However, as already explained above, there has been no delay in considering the representation given by the detenu, which was addressed to the President of India and travelled several offices and cities and was finally disposed of within 20 days. The time consumed, has been fully explained. We, therefore, do not find any force in this contention. In Badhrunnissa vs. Union of India and others (10), it was held by the Apex Court that whether there is delay in disposal of representation, would depend upon the facts of each case. Seeking comments of sponsoring authority is necessary and consequent reasonable delay of 4-5 days in unavoidable. Having regard to the processes of receiving the representation from detenu by jail authorities and sending it to COFEPOSA unit, obtaining comments of sponsoring authority, taking decision by the concerned Ministry and communicating the same to the detenu, as also the non-working days and the postal delays, it was held that delay in disposal of the representation was fully explained. The same is the case in the matter under consideration and the delay has been fully explained and time consumed is quite reasonable. 8. No other ground has been raised. 9. In the result, the habeas corpus petition is dismissed, with no order as to costs.