JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.—Respondents-landlord, namely, Arya Samaj Mandir, Subathu, through its President, sought the petitioners eviction from a residential set comprising one room, kitchen, verandah, latrine and bathroom located in the ground floor of House No. 337, Chowk Bazar, Subathu on two grounds; non-payment of arrears of rent and the same being required by it for its own use as accommodation for school and office. The arrears of rent were tendered on the first date of hearing and as such the first ground did not survive In respect of the second ground, the Rent Controller found that the premises were, in fact, required bonafide by the respondent for running a school and on that basis an order of eviction against the petitioner was passed. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal, which was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority. These two orders, passed on 9th June, 1988 and 11th January 1990, respectively, by the Rent Controller, Solan and Appellate Authority Solan, are under challenge in this revision petition at the behest of the tenant. 2. The petitioners sole contention is that the ground on which his eviction was sought is not available to the respondent, since such requirement for running a school cannot be said to be a reasonable and bonafide one. It has been urged that eviction of a tenant on the ground of use and occupation can be sought by a landlord under the provisions of Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 198? (Act No. 25 of 1987) (hereinafter to be called as "the Act"), from a residential building only and as such the requirement in order to be bonafide must be for a residential purpose. There being a prohibition under the Act for converting the use of a building from residential into non-residential one, except with the permission in writing of the Controller, and any unauthorised conversion has been made punishable under section 30 of the Act, the running of a school being a non-residential purpose, the order for eviction cannot be sustained. The submission on behalf of the respondent is that the landlord in this case being a juristic entity, the words use and occupation have to be construed liberally and opening of a school by a juristic landlord would be a sufficient ground to seek eviction I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and also gone through the record. 3. 3. The protection, which has been provided under section 14 of the Act to a tenant is against eviction from a building or rented land except in execution of a decree, passed before or after the commencement of the Act, in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 4. The grounds seeking eviction of a tenant are enumerated in Clause (i), sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (ii), clauses (iii) to (v) of sub-section (2), sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b), clauses (c) and (d) of sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act. The same may be classified as under: Under sub section (2) : Clause (i) non-payment of arrears of rent; Clause (ii) without the written consent of landlord; (a) transfer of rights under the lease or subletting ; (b) using for a purpose other than that for which let out; Clause (iii) Commission of acts likely to impair materially value and utility. Clause (iv) acts and conduct being nuisance to the occupiers of buildings in the neighbourhood. Clause (v) Ceasing to occupy for a continuous period of twelve months. Under sub-section (3): Clause (a) in case of residential building: (i) requirement for own occupation ; (ii) ceasing to be in the service or employment when building let for use by reason of being in service or employment ; (iii) requirement for the occupation of landlords family being a member of Armed Forces in case serving under special conditions ; (iv) tenant having built or acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a residence. Clause (b) in case of rented land: (i) requiring for his own use ; (ii) requiring for construction of residential or non-residential building or for establishment of industry ; (iii) sub-letting on higher rent. Clause (c) in case of any building or rented land, requiring the same for: carrying out building work at the instance of Government, Local Authority, Improvement Trust or under some improvement or development scheme ; or carrying out of repairs, building, re-building ; or making substantial addition or alterations ; or having become unsafe and unfit for human habitation. Clause (d) in the case of residential building: requiring for use as an office or counselling room by his son who intends to start practice in specified professions or for the residence of son who is married. 5. Clause (d) in the case of residential building: requiring for use as an office or counselling room by his son who intends to start practice in specified professions or for the residence of son who is married. 5. Sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act says that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession in the case of a residential building if be requires it for his own occupation. This ground is available subject to the fulfilment of two conditions namely, that the landlord is not occupying another residential building owned by him in the urban area concerned and he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause, within the last five years of the filing of the application, in the urban area concerned. 6. The respondent-landlord sought petitioners eviction on the aforementioned ground enumerated in section 14 (3) (a) (i) of the Act and both the authorities below held that the eviction of a tenant could be ordered from the residential premises for running a school, since it was one of the requirements of the respondent being its personal need. 7. The authorities below have, as a matter of fact, totally lost sight of a few important provisions of law as also the scheme of the Act. 8. A building’ has been defined in clause (b) of section 2 of the Act to mean any building or part of a building let out for any purpose whether being actually used for that purpose or not, including any land, godowns, out-houses or furniture let out therewith, but does not include a room in a hotel, hostel or boarding house. Buildings, in so far as the Act is concerned are of two types—residential and ‘non-residential’. Residential building has been defined in clause (b) of section 2 of the Act to mean any building which is not a non-residential building. Buildings, in so far as the Act is concerned are of two types—residential and ‘non-residential’. Residential building has been defined in clause (b) of section 2 of the Act to mean any building which is not a non-residential building. A non-residential building, as per clause (e) of section 2 has been defined as under: "(e) ‘non-residential building means a building being used — (i) mainly for the purpose of business or trade; or (ii) partly for the purpose of business or trade and partly for the purpose of residence, subject to the condition that the person who carried on business or trade in the building resides therein: Provided that if a building is let out for residential purpose, separately to more than one person, the portion thereof let out for the purpose of residence shall not be treated as non-residential building. Explanation — Where a building is used mainly for the purpose of business or trade, it shall be deemed to be a non-residential building even though a small portion thereof is used for the purpose of residence” Besides building another category of property defined in the Act is rented land which has been defined in Clause (g) of section 2 of the Act to mean any land let out separately for the purpose of being used principally for business or trade. 9. 9. The other relevant important definitions in section 2 of the Act are that of landlord and tenant’ in Clauses (d) and (J), respectively, which reads as under: "(d) landlord’ means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf, or for the benefit, of any other person, and includes a tenant who sub-lets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, a specified landlord, and every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord; * * * * * * * * * * * * (j) ‘tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after termination of the tenancy and in the event of the death of such person such of his heirs as are mentioned in Schedule I to this Act and who were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified, respectively in Explanation I and Explanation II to this clause, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, except with the written consent of the landlord, or a person to whom the collection of rent of fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of tents for shops has been framed out or leased by a municipal corporation or a municipal committee or a notified area committee or a cantonment board. Explanation I.—The order of succession in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy shall be as follows: (a) firstly, his surviving spouse ; (b) secondly, his son or daughter, or both, if there is no surviving spouse, or if the spouse did not ordinarily live with the deceased person as member of his family upto the date of his death ; (c) thirdly, his parent(s), if there is no surviving spouse, son or daughter of the deceased person, or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter, or any of them, did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death ; and (d) fourthly, his daughter-in-law, being the widow of his predeceased son, if there is no surviving spouse, son, daughter or parent(s) of the deceased person or if such surviving spouse, son, daughter, or parent(s) or any of them did not ordinarily live in the premises as a member of the family of the deceased person upto the date of his death. Explanation II.— The right of every successor, referred to in Explanation I, to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy, shall be personal to him and shall not, on the death of such successor, devolve in any of his heirs." 10. Reading of definitions of landlord and tenant’ would suggest that subject-matter of lease or letting dealt with under the Act is either a ‘building or rented land’. A building has further been classified separately as residential or non-residential one A careful perusal of section 14 of the Act shows that some of the grounds on which eviction can be sought are common both for rented land and building, may be either residential or non-residential, but some of the grounds are exclusively meant for either residential building or for rented land. 11. There are six separate grounds, as mentioned in Clauses (i) to (v) of sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act. All of them are equally applicable in case of rented land and building whether it be residential or non-residential one. Likewise, the three separate grounds specified under Clause (c) of sub-section (3) of section 14 are also equally applicable to any building (whether residential or non-residential) and rented land. All of them are equally applicable in case of rented land and building whether it be residential or non-residential one. Likewise, the three separate grounds specified under Clause (c) of sub-section (3) of section 14 are also equally applicable to any building (whether residential or non-residential) and rented land. There is no other ground which applies to a building and rented land equally. 12. Three grounds under Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 14 are exclusively meant for eviction of a tenant from a rented land. 13. Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 14 details four different grounds, besides the grounds enumerated under Clause (d) of the same subsection (3). These are exclusively meant and are available only for a residential building. 14. From a bare reading of section 14 of the Act, it can be seen that the eviction of a tenant under sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act can be sought by a landlord only from a residential building, if he requires it for his own occupation. Whether such requirement for his own occupation by a landlord has also to be only for residential purpose and for no other purpose is the next question arising for consideration Running of a school or requirement of accommodation for office purposes is admittedly not a residential purpose within the meaning of Clause (h)of section 2 of the Act, It is a non-residential purpose. 15. Section 12 of the Act prohibits the conversion of a residential building into a non-residential one by any person, except with the permission in writing of the Controller. Contravention of the provisions of section 12 has been made punishable under section 30 of the Act. Admittedly, in the case there is no permission granted by the Controller for conversion of the premises in question. In these circumstances, ordering the eviction of a tenant from the residential premises on the ground of self use by the landlord for non-residential purpose will indirectly have the effect of conversion of the residential building into non-residential one without permission. Somewhat similar provisions in the other rent control legislations have been judicially interpreted, 16. In these circumstances, ordering the eviction of a tenant from the residential premises on the ground of self use by the landlord for non-residential purpose will indirectly have the effect of conversion of the residential building into non-residential one without permission. Somewhat similar provisions in the other rent control legislations have been judicially interpreted, 16. In Attar Singh v. Inder Kumar, AIR 1967 SC 772, the landlord had sought the eviction of a tenant from rented land, which had been taken on rent for the purpose of a fire-wood store ; on the ground that the same was needed by him for erection of a residential house. The tenants case was that even if the landlord required the land for construction of a residential house, he could not be given an order of ejectment under section 13 (3) (a) (ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (briefly the Punjab Act) The said provision in the Punjab Act reads as under:— "(3) (a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession......... * * * * * (ii) in the case of rented land, if— (a) he requires it for his own use ; (b) he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose of his business any other such rented land, and (c) he has not vacated such rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the urban area concerned." 17. While construing this provision, it was held that the Rent Control legislation being an ameliorative piece of legislation the words "for his own use" in sub-clause (a) must be limited to mean that eviction of a tenant cannot be ordered unless the landlord requires such land for the same purpose for which it had been let, that is, principally for trade or business. In para 9 of the report, it was held as under: "It should therefore be clear that ‘for his own use’ in sub-clause (a) means use for the purpose of business principally, for otherwise we cannot understand why, if the landlord had given up some rented land which he had taken for business principally, he should not be entitled to recover his own rented land if he required it (say) as in this case, for constructing a residential building for himself. The very fact that sub-clauses (b) and (c) require that the landlord should not be in possession of any rented land for his own business and should not have given up possession of any other rented land, i.e, land which he was principally using for business, show that he can only take advantage of sub-clause (a) if he is able to show that he requires the rented land for business. Otherwise the restrictions contained in sub-clause (b) and sub-clause (c) would become meaningless, if it were held that sub-clause (a) would be satisfied if the landlord requires the rented land for any purpose as (for example) constructing a residential house for himself We are of opinion therefore that sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) in this provision must be read together, and reading them together there can be no doubt that when sub-clause (a) provides that the landlord requires rented land for his own use, the meaning there is restricted to use principally for business or trade. We have already said that the Act is an ameliorative piece of legislation meant for the protection of tenants, and we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the words for his own use9 in sub-clause (a) in the circumstances must be limited in the manner indicated above, as that will give full protection to tenants of rented land and save them from eviction unless the landlord requires such land for the same purpose for which it had been let i.e. principally for trade or business. We are, therefore, of opinion that the view taken in the case of Municipal Committee Abohar is incorrect, and as the respondent landlord required the land in this case not for business or trade principally but only for constructing a house for himself he is not entitled to eject the appellant under section 13 (3) (a) (ii)." 18. We are, therefore, of opinion that the view taken in the case of Municipal Committee Abohar is incorrect, and as the respondent landlord required the land in this case not for business or trade principally but only for constructing a house for himself he is not entitled to eject the appellant under section 13 (3) (a) (ii)." 18. Clause (g) of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Loaging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Act No. 57 of 1947), sets out a ground for eviction of a tenant from the premises, if the same are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust. Section 25 of the said Act further provides that a landlord cannot use the premises which, as on the date, when the Act came into force, were used for a residential purpose, nor can he permit the same to be used for non-residential purposes- Sub-section (2) of section 25 makes provision for punishment to a landlord who contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 25 of the said Act with imprisonment for a term which may extend for three months or with fine or with both. 19. Interpreting the provisions of the said Act, in Bapubhai Mohanbhai v. Mahila Shahkari Udyog Mandir, AIR 1975 SC 2128, in which the premises were admittedly used for a residential purpose when the Act came into force and the eviction of the tenant was sought for non-residential purposes, it was held by the Supreme Court that in view of the wording of the non-obstante clause of section 13 (I), the provisions of that section must have priority over the rest of the Act and the requirement which runs counter to the prohibition contained in section 25 cannot be said to be a reasonable requirement and accordingly eviction cannot be ordered, which would have the effect of permitting the landlord to contravene the provisions of the Act. 20. As noticed above, sub-section (1) of section 14 prohibits the eviction of a tenant in occupation of a building or a rented land therefrom except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 20. As noticed above, sub-section (1) of section 14 prohibits the eviction of a tenant in occupation of a building or a rented land therefrom except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 12 further prohibits conversion of residential building into non-residential one except with the permission, in writing, of the Controller and section 30 of the Act makes conversion without such permission, to be punishable one. Before ordering the eviction of a tenant, on any of the grounds mentioned in sub sections (2) and (3), the Controller as per sub-section (4) of section 14 is further required to record his satisfaction about the claim of the landlord being bonafide. 21. Considering the historical background and the objects of various Rent Control Laws in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, AIR 1974 SC471, it was held that the strain of the last world war. Industrial Revolution, the large scale exodus of the working people to the urban areas and the social and political changes brought in their wake social problems of considerable magnitude, complexity and their concomitant evils. The country was faced with spiraling inflation, soaring cost of living, increasing urban population and scarcity of accommodation. Rack renting and large scale eviction of tenants under the guise of the ordinary law, exacerbated those conditions making the economic life of the community unstable and insecure. To tackle these problems and curb these evils, the Legislatures of the States in India enacted Rent Control legislations. 22. The Act being a beneficial legislation, both to the landlord and the tenant, as can be seen from the scheme thereof, it protects the tenants against unreasonable evictions and exorbitant rent. It also ensures certain limited rights, some of which, as noticed above in sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 14 to the landlord to recover possession on stated contingencies, such a legislation, as held in Sega Begum v. Abdul A had Khan, AIR 1979 SC 272, should be interpreted in such a way as to achieve the object of enabling landlord to evict a tenant where the statute so provides. 23. But it should not be so liberally construed as to enable the landlords to evict tenants whenever they desire under the garb of personal requirement. 23. But it should not be so liberally construed as to enable the landlords to evict tenants whenever they desire under the garb of personal requirement. In Precision Steel arid Engineering Works v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Taya, AIR 1982 SC 1518, the majority view of the court was expressed by holding that the object and purpose of rent control legislation, namely, of putting a fetter on the unrestricted right of re-entry enjoyed by the landlords with a view to protecting the tenants assuming security to tenures must always inform and guide the interpretive process of such socially oriented beneficial legislation. The enabling provisions of the Rent Restriction Act are not to be so construed or interpreted as would make the protection conferred on the tenant illusory by a liberal approach to the desire of the landlord to evict a tenant under the camouflage of personal requirement. 24. The true interpretation which deserves to be given to the words "own occupation" as contained in sub-clause (i) of clause (a), sub-section (3) of section 14 of the Act is that the occupation should be for residential purpose and not for non-residential purpose. In other words, in the case of a residential building, eviction cannot be ordered if the landlord requires the same not for his own occupation as residence but for a purpose which under the Act is a non-residential one. Such a requirement cannot be said to be bonafide one. Even if the landlord being a juristic person, when law prohibits eviction, on the ground alleged, order of eviction cannot be passed 25 In this view of the matter, it has to be held that the eviction of the petitioner was sought by the respondent from a residential building for its own occupation, namely, for running a school being a non-residential purpose. Consequently, the petition for eviction on this ground was not maintainable and the petitioner could not have been ordered to be evicted therefrom. 26. In the result, the revision petition is allowed. The orders of the authorities below are set aside. However, there will be no order as to costs. Revision petition allowed