JUDGMENT 1. Issues raised in these Original Petitions are identical. Contesting parties in these Original Petitions are also the same. Therefore, I consider it advantageous to dispose of these Original Petitions by a common judgment. Petitioner in O.P. 1629/1988 is the third respondent in O.P. 9450/1991. Her appointment in the University as Lecturer in Law is under challenge in O.P. 9450/1991. I am referring to the parties as they are arrayed in O.P. 9450/1991. 2. The short facts germane for decision of these Original Petitions are as follows:- Cochin University of Science and Technology invited applications for the post of Lecturer in Commercial Law/Labour Law by notification dated 25th June, 1987. In pursuance to that notification, third respondent, petitioner in O.P. 1629/1988, put in her application. After a due process of selection, University prepared a ranked list. Third respondent was assigned rank No. 4. It is common case that the post of Lecturer in Law was to go to a member of the Backward Community, namely Muslim Community. No candidate of that community was available in the ranked list. So, University appointed a candidate, who was ranked No. 1 in Open Merit quota. 3rd respondent challenges that appointment by filing O.P. 1629/1988 on the ground that she being a member of the Backward Community, should have been preferred and the post available to the Backward Community should not have been allotted to Open Merit quota. It is her case that though born as a Syrian Christian, she is entitled to be treated as a member of the Latin Catholic Community, which is a Backward Community. This stand of the 3rd respondent was not accepted by the University. Hence O.P. 1629/1988. 3. Cochin University of Science and Technology invited applications for the post of Lecturer in the Department of Law by notification dated 17th November, 1989. In pursuance to that notification, petitioner and third respondent applied. Two vacancies were available and two candidates were to be given appointment. After a due process of selection, a ranked list was prepared on 20th July 1991. Petitioner was assigned rank No. 4 and the third respondent rank No. 2. First vacancy, which went to open merit, was filled up by appointing a candidate, who was assigned rank No. 1. Two vacancies were available and two candidates were to be given appointment. After a due process of selection, a ranked list was prepared on 20th July 1991. Petitioner was assigned rank No. 4 and the third respondent rank No. 2. First vacancy, which went to open merit, was filled up by appointing a candidate, who was assigned rank No. 1. The second post goes to a member of the Backward Community as per R.14 to 17 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, which are to be followed in the appointments in the University. Third respondent, who was denied the benefit of R.14 to 17 while making the selection in pursuance to the notification dated 25th June, 1987, was found by the University as a member of the Backward Community and was appointed. Petitioner, a member of the Latin Catholic Community by birth, who is entitled to benefits under R.14 to 17 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, was denied appointment. Hence she challenges the appointment of the third respondent. 4. The stand taken by the Cochin University in these two Original Petitions in conflicting. Sri K. S. Radhakrishnan, learned counsel representing the University, tried to sustain the contradictory stand of the University by saying that the University was giving preference to the higher rank obtained by the candidates at the selection. This stand should not have been taken by the learned counsel representing an institution like the Cochin University. If R.14 to 17 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules are governing the appointments to the posts in the University, which fact is not in dispute, the rank obtained at the selection is not the decisive factor. Learned counsel should not have advanced an argument that the rank obtained by the candidate at the time of the interview was taken as the decisive factor. In other words, learned counsel did not try to support third respondent's appointment as a member of the Backward Community. 5. Third respondent in O.P. 9450/1991 is a member of the Syrian Christian Community by birth. That community, it is conceded before me, is not entitled to the benefits of R.14 to 17 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. She has been married by a member of the Latin Catholic community. 5. Third respondent in O.P. 9450/1991 is a member of the Syrian Christian Community by birth. That community, it is conceded before me, is not entitled to the benefits of R.14 to 17 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. She has been married by a member of the Latin Catholic community. Latin Catholics are entitled to the benefits of R.14 to 17 of K. S. and S. S. R. In Public Service Commission v. Dr. Kunjamma Alex ( 1981 KLT 24 ), a Division Bench of this Court considered the status of a Syrian Catholic girl married by a Latin Catholic. The Bench took the view that by reason of the said marriage, a change of community had taken place in regard to the lady and she became a member of her husband's community, namely, Latin Catholic (other than Anglo - Indian) community. Consequently it was held that she is a member of a Backward Community. On this basis, it was argued that 3rd respondent is a member of a backward community and her appointment is not open to challenge. The decision in 1981 KLT 24 was taken up in appeal before the Supreme Court by the Public Service Commission. The Supreme Court in that appeal passed the following order: "Special Leave to appeal granted. The outcome of this Appeal shall not affect the present position "of the respondent under the High Court Judgment. The operation of the judgment of the High Court generally stayed except in respect of the respondent". By this order of general stay, the principles of law stated by the Division Bench of this Court should not be acted upon by any authority. It applies only to the respondent before Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, namely, Dr. Kunjamma Alex. That cannot have any application to other persons. It means that a lady belonging to the Syrian Christian Community by birth when marries a Latin Catholic will not become a member of the Latin Catholic community, entitled to claim the benefits of R.14 to 17 of the General Rules. According to Sri K. Ramkumar, learned counsel representing the third respondent, the order of stay passed by the Supreme Court can apply only to Public Service Commission and Dr. Kunjamma Alex. It has no application to any other individual. I do not find any merit in this contention. According to Sri K. Ramkumar, learned counsel representing the third respondent, the order of stay passed by the Supreme Court can apply only to Public Service Commission and Dr. Kunjamma Alex. It has no application to any other individual. I do not find any merit in this contention. Public Service Commission, while advising candidates, has to apply principles contained in R.14 to 17 of the General Rules. In applying that principle, if the Commission can act against the law stated by the Division Bench in 1981 KLT 24 , it means that that decision cannot be pressed into service for extending the benefits contained in R.14 to 17 to similarly situated persons. If the Commission, which makes the selections to various posts in Government service can act against the law stated by Division Bench, other authorities while applying the principles of reservation should not implement the law stated in 1981 KLT 24 . Another argument advanced by the learned counsel is that in case the stay petition is varied and the Supreme Court approves the decision rendered by this Court in 1981 KLT 24 , what will happen to the right of the petitioner. This aspect was considered by me in O.P. 5574/1990. I took the view that petitioner's right to approach this Court with a fresh Original Petition, in the event of the decision in 1981 KLT 24 affirmed by the Supreme Court, has been reserved. Such reservation can be made in the instant case as well. The same course of action was adopted by a Division Bench in W. A. 542/1986. Another contention raised was that a Single Judge should not act against 1981 KLT 24 . I do not find any merit in this contention in view of the general nature of the order of stay passed by the Supreme Court. Division Bench in W. A. 542/1986 did not follow the principle of law stated by this Court in 1981 KLT 24 . 6. Learned counsel representing the third respondent in O.P. 9450/1991 has brought to my notice three decisions of the Supreme Court, N. R. Horo v. Jahan Ara ( AIR 1972 SC 1840 ), C. M Arumugam v. S. Rajagopal ( AIR 1976 SC 939 ) and Soosai v. Union of India ( AIR 1986 SC 733 ). The first decision referred to was one coming under the Representation of People Act. The first decision referred to was one coming under the Representation of People Act. Sri Jaipal Singh was elected to the Lok Sabha from a Constituency reserved for Scheduled Tribes. On his death, his widow filed nomination papers for contesting that election. That nomination paper was rejected on the ground that she is not a member of the Scheduled Tribe because she was a Christian by birth and on her marriage with Sri Jaipal Singh, she did not become a member of the Scheduled Tribe. While considering that question, Their Lordships took the view: "Even if the respondent (Mrs. Jaipal Singh) is "not a member of the Munda tribe by virtue of birth she having been married to a Munda after due observance of all formalities and after obtaining the approval of the elders of the tribes would belong to the tribal community to which her husband belongs on the analogy of the wife taking the husband's domicile". This conclusion was arrived at on the basis of the evidence in the case. Ceremonies peculiar to the Munda tribe were performed for the marriage of the respondent with Jaipal Singh. A new name was given to the bride at the time of the marriage. All the functions were held at the supervision of the elders of the Munda tribe. On the facts, Their Lordships came to the conclusion that the following matters were established in the case: "(1) The Mundas are endogenous and inter marriage with non Mundas is normally prohibited. (2) That a Munda male along with his family on marrying a non Munda girl is often excommunicated or out casted. (3) That the rule of endogamy is not so rigid that a Munda cannot marry a non Munda after performing special ceremonies. (4) That such marriages have been and are being sanctioned by the Parha Panchayat. (5) That where a Munda male and his family are out casted for marrying a non Munda they are admitted to the tribe after certain special ceremonies are performed". On the basis of these findings, Their Lordships came to the conclusion that the Returning Officer was not justified in rejecting the nomination paper filed by Mrs. Jaipal Singh. 7. In the second decision cited, the question that was considered by Their Lordships was the effect of reconversion to Hinduism. That question arose in an appeal filed under the Representation of People Act. Jaipal Singh. 7. In the second decision cited, the question that was considered by Their Lordships was the effect of reconversion to Hinduism. That question arose in an appeal filed under the Representation of People Act. It was held that on reconversion to Hinduism, a person can once again becomes a member of the caste in which he was born and to which he belonged before reconversion to another religion, if the members of the caste accept him as a member. These decisions, according to me, are not of any help in deciding the issue as to whether a candidate not belonging to backward community is entitled to claim benefits of R.14 to 17 of the General Rules when she is married by one belonging to a backward community. Socially and educationally backward communities are given certain protections under Art.15 and 16 of the Constitution. R.14 to 17 are made to give effect to those protections. Can those protections be extended to persons who are married into such communities? 8. In the third decision referred to, the question that arose was whether the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 is constitutionally invalid on the ground that only Hindu or Sikh members of the castes enumerated in the Schedule to that order are deemed to be Scheduled Castes for the purpose of Constitution of India. Petitioner therein was a Hindu belonging to Adi Dravida caste. His case was that on conversion to Christianity, he continues to be a member of the Adi Dravida caste, one of the castes enumerated in the Schedule to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. He was denied benefits of welfare assistance intended for Scheduled Castes on the ground that he is a Christian. Hence the question was whether a Hindu belonging to Scheduled Caste retains his caste on conversion to Christianity. Assuming that the caste is retained oh conversion from one religion to another, Their Lordships while declining relief to the petitioner observed: "It is not sufficient to show that the same caste continues after conversion. It is necessary to establish further that the disabilities and handicaps suffered from such caste membership in the social order of its origin - Hinduism - Continue in their oppressive severity in the new environment of a different religious community". This shows that change of community by itself will not entitle one to claim the benefits. It is necessary to establish further that the disabilities and handicaps suffered from such caste membership in the social order of its origin - Hinduism - Continue in their oppressive severity in the new environment of a different religious community". This shows that change of community by itself will not entitle one to claim the benefits. Some additional facts will also have to be established. 9. Even if third respondent is treated as a member of the Latin Catholic community by marriage, she will not become entitled to the benefits under R.14 to 17 of the General Rules. I find it difficult to accept the contention that a person born and brought up otherwise than a member of a socially and educationally backward community will by reason of the marriage alone become a member of such class. Social and educational backwardness is the result of very many factors. It cannot be acquired by a simple ceremony of marriage. By virtue of the provisions contained in Art.15 and 16 of the Constitution, the Government of Kerala enumerated certain communities as socially and educationally backward classes for making special provision for their advancement. A member of the Forward Community by marrying a member of the Backward Community, will not become entitled to the special provisions made by the State for the advancement of the members of the socially and educationally backward classes. If the third respondent wants to claim the benefit of those provisions, she must not only show that she has become a member of that Community, but should also establish that she has been subjected to the disabilities and handicaps suffered by the members of such socially and educationally backward communities, as has been held in the decision reported in AIR 1986 SC 733 . In the absence of such evidence in the case, the third respondent cannot claim the benefit of the provisions contained in R.14 to 17 of the General Rules. 10. In view of what has been stated above, I hold that the petitioner in O.P. 1629/1988 is not entitled to claim the post by invoking the provisions contained in R.14 to 17 of the General Rules. Original Petition is accordingly dismissed. 10. In view of what has been stated above, I hold that the petitioner in O.P. 1629/1988 is not entitled to claim the post by invoking the provisions contained in R.14 to 17 of the General Rules. Original Petition is accordingly dismissed. The Cochin University of Science and Technology was clearly in error in appointing the third respondent in O.P. 9450/1991 to the post of Lecturer in Law on the ground that she is entitled to the benefits of R.14 to 17 of the General Rules. Accordingly, I set aside the order passed by the Cochin University appointing the third respondent as Lecturer in Law. First respondent is directed to make appointment in strict compliance with the provisions contained in R.14 to 17 of the General Rules. Original Petitions are disposed of in the above terms. Issue photo copy of the judgment to the parties on ususal terms.