SALDANHA M.F., J.:—The facts of this case are distressing. The refreshing aspect is that the two learned Counsel, Mr. Pradhan for the petitioner and Mr. Vakil on behalf of the respondents have presented their respective view points effectively and efficiently. This petition has been preceded by a series of litigations, some of which, I shall refer to only to the extent necessary. The petitioner an Assistant Commissioner of Police, has approached this Court invoking its inherent powers as also its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India with a prayer that the proceedings instituted against him, his family members and others under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act be quashed and for incidental reliefs. 2. The trial has not commenced and under these circumstances, this Court would have normally shut out the petition at the threshold. The petition is an abnormally long one, running into as many as 386 pages drafted by the petitioner in person, and it is only on the unusual circumstances set out in this case that a speaking order had to be passed at the admission stage and rule was issued. 3. Issues of considerable importance have fallen for decision in this proceeding which are first summarised. 4. A novel dimension relating to the exercise of powers under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code has been projected in this proceeding viz., that the High Court can be approached for purposes of stopping the continuation of injustice. Additionally, the petition raises an interesting issue viz., the question as to whether even at a pre-trial stage, a sanction order can be struck down on the ground that the sanctioning authority has overlooked and by passed the material ingredients of the offence. The petitioner has also raised another issue of equal importance which centres around an interesting but extremely important aspect of section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. It is his grievance that the authorities put together all the material on the basis of which it is alleged, that he was found in possession of assets disproportionate to his known source of income. It is his grievance that the authorities put together all the material on the basis of which it is alleged, that he was found in possession of assets disproportionate to his known source of income. The contention raised is that an offence can be said to have been disclosed only if and when the public servant cannot satisfactorily account and that it is a requirement of law that this opportunity to account be afforded to the public servant, before a conclusion is arrived at and then only can an offence be registered if the accused cannot satisfactorily account. The petitioner contends, and the respondents cannot deny that no such opportunity was afforded prior to the registration of the offence herein and so far as the application of section 5(1)(e) of the Act is concerned, the petitioner contends that the proceedings against him are liable to be quashed on this ground. 5. In justification of his having invoked the powers under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, the petitioner has relied on findings of this Court which establish gross mala fides on the part of the authorities and it is, therefore, contended that section 482 would be attracted to the extent that the prosecution would have to be quashed on the ground that it constitutes abuse of the process of Court. The petitioner has supported this argument by illustrating how unjustifiably and maliciously the Dept. commenced inquiries on the alleged corruption charges and then, suspended him on this ground on the very day on which his juniors were promoted and denied him his promotion; and thereafter retained him under suspension even when the next batch of officers were promoted. Undoubtedly, if on facts a prima facie case of corruption is made out, the issue of mala fides would not be of consequence in a proceeding at this stage, unless the petitioner is able to demonstrate that his challenge on points of law is sustainable. On the undisputed facts of this case, however, section 482 would be of assistance to him, in so far as he is able to demonstrate from the material adduced by the prosecution that the chances of a conviction are not only remote but near impossible. First, the relevant facts. 6. The petitioner hails originally from Belgaum in the State of Karnataka, belongs to the Scheduled Caste and comes from the economically weaker section of society. First, the relevant facts. 6. The petitioner hails originally from Belgaum in the State of Karnataka, belongs to the Scheduled Caste and comes from the economically weaker section of society. He joined the police force as a P.S.I. cadet on 1-6-1966 and after completing his training at the Police Training College at Nasik, he was posted as a Police Sub-Inspector in the local police force in 1968. In September, 1974, he was promoted to the post of Police Inspector and in August 1981, he was promoted to the post of Assistant Commissioner of Police. According to him, he held various important assignments and his record was unblemished. Moreover, he had been highly commended by the superiors from time to time. He was given a special assignment as a Vigilance Officer with the office of the Transport Commissioner and as stated by his learned Counsel, it was in the course of this assignment that he got on the wrong side of certain officials who were involved in a very large inter-State racket having political patronage. He was, therefore, rewarded with the posting at a punishment station viz., the Control Room at the office of the Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay where he was effectively relegated to the position of a glorified telephone operator. Simultaneously, in order to hit back at him, without there being any complaint from any quarters, the Anti-Corruption authorities were asked to commence inquiries into his assets etc. What is pointed out is that at the departmental level, there was neither cause nor complaint to justify this step. What is emphasised is that the starting point of all corruption cases is a complaint from outside or from the Department based on some gross or persistent misconduct. In this case, the reason as to why the A.C.B. commenced investigations is shrouded in total secrecy. The serious step of the Anti-Corruption Bureau officers starting on a searching investigation was undertaken but it is respectably defined by the prosecution as “discreet inquiries”. It is relevant to point out that while in service in the police department, the petitioner completed his B.A. (Spl.), LL.B. and LL.M. and according to him, he is at present prosecuting his studies for his Doctorate in Law under the guidance of the Head of the Department of Law, Bombay University. 7. Then came “the unkindest cut of all”. It is relevant to point out that while in service in the police department, the petitioner completed his B.A. (Spl.), LL.B. and LL.M. and according to him, he is at present prosecuting his studies for his Doctorate in Law under the guidance of the Head of the Department of Law, Bombay University. 7. Then came “the unkindest cut of all”. The petitioner states that on 19-1-1989, a suspension order was pasted on the door of the petitioner's residence. The order was ante-dated to 17-10-1988 and was served on the petitioner on the same day on which officers junior to him were promoted. This was followed by a long sequence of litigation, all of which makes pathetic reading-with the petitioner violently trying to have the suspension order revoked and the department repeatedly reissuing his suspension order after it is once struck down by the Court and once withdrawn and by these means, the petitioner continued in and out of active service, but mostly, out of it until the filing of the present petition on 7-8-1991. The petitioner thereafter took out contempt proceedings against the respondents on the ground that they had failed to reinstate him in spite of directions from the Supreme Court and after an order of this Court, the respondents finally reinstated the petitioner. The petitioner at that time was appearing in person and in order to hit back at him, even though the hearing of this petition was part-heard, the department posted him at the other end of the State, Nagpur. When it was pointed out to the department that it constitutes interference with the course of judicial proceedings, the department transferred the petitioner to Nasik and simultaneously, approached the Supreme Court. This Court had directed that the petitioner should be posted somewhere in the vicinity of Bombay and it is against all these orders that the State moved the Supreme Court once again. The Supreme Court, after hearing the parties, clarified that the earlier orders were only recommendations and not directions, permitted the petitioner to join his duties at Nasik and directed that the present petition be heard and disposed of expeditiously. It was pursuant to these directions that the matter was taken up for hearing. 8. Mr. The Supreme Court, after hearing the parties, clarified that the earlier orders were only recommendations and not directions, permitted the petitioner to join his duties at Nasik and directed that the present petition be heard and disposed of expeditiously. It was pursuant to these directions that the matter was taken up for hearing. 8. Mr. Vakil, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State has raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of this petition on the ground that an alternate remedy exists as far as the reliefs claimed by the petitioner are concerned, which is by way of an application to the trial Court to discharge the petitioner. Mr. Vakil states that the petitioner is debarred from invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, when it is demonstrated that the Sessions Court viz., the learned Special Judge before whom the case is pending is entitled to examine the very issues which are the subject matter of this petition and to discharge the accused if there is no ground in law for proceeding. A subsidiary argument canvassed by Mr. Vakil proceeds along the footing that it would not be open to this Court to take cognizance of any submissions canvassed by the accused on merits because the evidence is yet to be led and it is only after that process is completed can the Court evaluate the adequacy or otherwise of the material in relation to the charges. He states that there are repeated references in the petition whereby the petitioner has disputed the correctness or the validity of the material adduced against him and that this Court at the pre-trial stage cannot even examine those issues. On the other hand, Mr. Vakil contends that it is well-settled law, that the accused must first exhaust his remedy before the trial Court after which alone he can move this Court and lastly, Mr. Vakil states that the present petition has been filed after a long lapse of time and virtually at a point when the prosecution is about to start with the trial. Mr. Vakil alleges that the filing of this petition is motivated by the fact that the accused desires to delay the trial in an attempt to litigate and put off the inevitable result. 9. Apart from these, Mr. Mr. Vakil alleges that the filing of this petition is motivated by the fact that the accused desires to delay the trial in an attempt to litigate and put off the inevitable result. 9. Apart from these, Mr. Vakil advanced the general submission that the jurisdiction under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code is not contemplated as a measure to be invoked for purposes of quashing corruption cases at the pre-trial stage which was something virtually unheard of. He adverted to one of the grounds of challenge contained in this petition which questions the validity of the sanction order and points out that the courts have always taken the view that a challenge to the sanction order can only be examined after the sanctioning authority has given evidence and justified the grounds on which the sanction has been accorded. Mr. Vakil concluded by stating that this was not a case where there was any substance in the allegations of mala fides and that consequently, this petition should be dismissed on a preliminary consideration without any further detailed examination. 10. Before hearing Mr. Pradhan on the preliminary objection, I asked him as to whether, without prejudice to the petitioner's contention, he would desire to apply for discharge before the trial Court. Mr. Pradhan, after instructions from the petitioner who is present in Court, stated that he desires to proceed with the matter on merits, adding that the petitioner's career and his very survival in the Department is dependent on a time-bound relief. Mr. Pradhan has advanced a number of submissions in support of not only the maintainability but the necessity of the petition being heard by the High Court which I shall summarise below : (a) That the Sessions Court is grossly over-loaded with work and that even the 1986-87 cases are not being taken up. As far as the non-custody cases are concerned, there are matters of the year 1983-84 pending. There are only two Special Judges who have been directed to proceed strictly in serial order and, therefore, even if an application for discharge is to be filed, due to the sheer inability of the trial Court to find enough time, the same will not be heard for some years. There are only two Special Judges who have been directed to proceed strictly in serial order and, therefore, even if an application for discharge is to be filed, due to the sheer inability of the trial Court to find enough time, the same will not be heard for some years. In the meanwhile, the accused who has already been superseded and though a Bombay Officer, maliciously posted at Nasik will be deprived of all his further promotions for no fault of his. He points out that all his junior officers have superseded him several years back only because of the pendency of this case. He, therefore, submits that it is in the interests of justice that this petition which has come up for hearing under the directions of the Supreme Court should be disposed of on merits. (b) Mr. Pradhan states that the petitioner who, at the relevant time was under suspension, had drafted the petition himself and that is why it runs into 386 pages. Mr. Pradhan states that having regard to the well-settled position in law, he is aware of his limitations that he cannot dispute facts while dealing with the matter on merits at the pre-trial stage and, therefore, agrees to proceed on the basis of the record as it is. In fact, he proposes to raise only pure challenges of law and does not propose to touch on facts except briefly. (c) Mr. Pradhan states that no alternate remedy is available to him because the point of law canvassed in this case viz., the breach of the rules of natural justice is not something the learned Special Judge can examine at the pre-trial stage more importantly because the Sessions Court is not invested with any inherent powers of quashing the prosecution. The limited ground that can be canvassed in a discharge application is that the evidence taken as a whole cannot satisfactorily sustain the charge. The main grounds in this petition are of a type that cannot be considered by the Sessions Court but only by the High Court in exercise of inherent powers. (d) More importantly, the principal ground on which an order for quashing is sought is that the institution of this prosecution against the accused is motivated, mala fide and constitutes an abuse of the process of Court. (d) More importantly, the principal ground on which an order for quashing is sought is that the institution of this prosecution against the accused is motivated, mala fide and constitutes an abuse of the process of Court. The power to quash a prosecution on these grounds vests with the High Court and it is, therefore, that the petition will have to be heard by this Court itself. 11. This petition originally came up for admission before me and I had occasion, as indicated in the speaking order passed at the admission stage, to go through the entire petition and the annexures and to hear the petitioner in person. There are serious charges of mala fides against the respondents and against the State Government. This petition has been preceded by earlier litigation on the Original Side and in the orders that have been passed in those proceedings, the Court has passed severe strictures against the respondents after examining the charges of gross mala fides. The High Court was more than satisfied that the accused who is an officer of the Police Department and who belongs to the backward class is being harassed and victimised and there is no manner of doubt on a reading of those orders that the sole purpose of doing this was in order to deprive him of his promotion though he was found fit for a higher post and to ensure that persons junior to him were promoted. It is relevant to point out that even though the State of Maharashtra has approached the Supreme Court more than once in these proceedings, that the aforesaid findings have not been disturbed by the Supreme Court and have, therefore, become final. That is an issue of some significance because the petitioner has pointed out, that he was posted to Nagpur as Vigilance Officer in the Transport Department which was a very special assignment given to the petitioner in view of the fact that he was a very good and a very upright officer. As indicated in the pleadings, all of which facts remain undisputed, to the misfortune of the petitioner, he came across a multi-crore inter-State racket which he decided to break and it was at this stage that he was suddenly stripped of that position and steps were taken to institute proceedings against him on a corruption charge. As indicated in the pleadings, all of which facts remain undisputed, to the misfortune of the petitioner, he came across a multi-crore inter-State racket which he decided to break and it was at this stage that he was suddenly stripped of that position and steps were taken to institute proceedings against him on a corruption charge. This action was intelligently planned because it was the finest way of conveying the message not only to the petitioner but to all other honest officers that they would not be spared if they interfered with such flourishing businesses which have political patronage. The investigations are supposed to have gone on for some years even though to my mind, they could have been completed within a matter of days. 12. The petitioner hails from Belgaum which is in the adjoining State of Karnataka but virtually on the border of Maharashtra. The prosecution alleges that the Investigating Officer went there and that he has found out about the family background of the petitioner and his wife. He has also listed out the properties such as the house and a plot of land located there, certain bank accounts and the fixed deposits etc., belonging to the petitioner. The venom with which the petitioner was treated is exemplified from the description of what took place when his flat was raided and the manner in which his wife and children were tortured and humiliated over a period of several days. Not a single friend or acquaintance of the petitioner was spared and the interesting part of the investigation is that all amounts belonging even to family members and friends, one of which consists of the provident fund amount of his elder brother were summarily attached. The idea appeared to be to virtually attack the petitioner from every conceivable angle. It was pointed out to me during the hearing that the petitioner's elder brother who was a teacher and whose provident fund, the bank accounts etc., were attached on the allegation that they are the petitioner's assets, when he was grievously ill and desperately required finance for being treated for kidney failure. The petitioner was required to virtually beg one Court after another to release some amount of money. The petitioner was required to virtually beg one Court after another to release some amount of money. In the course of this procedure, whatever small amounts were released were received too late on each occasion as a result of which, the petitioner's brother went from bad to worse and finally died. It is in this background that the present petition has been filed and it was on the unusual and compelling facts of this case that I had made the Rule returnable within a period of four weeks. That order was passed on 7th August, 1991 after which the respondents successfully protracted the hearing of the matter on refusing to reinstate the petitioner in service while continuing to act in contempt of Court orders. For several weeks, in spite of specific directions from this Court, the orders were not complied with and the State thereafter sought time to move the Supreme Court, as a result of which litigation, the petition could not be heard. 13. It is relevant to point out that all through this period, the petitioner has been deprived of his promotion and is required to work in his original position at Nasik. Normally, this would not have happened, as the officer belongs to the Bombay cadre and his family is at Bombay. As is to be expected, a contention was raised that no suitable post was available for the petitioner in Bombay and that on this ground, initially, an attempt was made to post him to Nagpur but that the order being struck down, he was posted to Nasik. That the prejudice to the petitioner is gross and that it is continuing, is a matter beyond dispute. The solitary ground on which all this is being done is that there is a prosecution pending against him on serious corruption charges. The petitioner has made out in this petition a strong challenge to the maintainability of the prosecution against him and his family members and, to my mind, under these circumstances, it is imperative that in the interests of justice, the petition be heard on merits and that too by the High Court. 14. Mr. The petitioner has made out in this petition a strong challenge to the maintainability of the prosecution against him and his family members and, to my mind, under these circumstances, it is imperative that in the interests of justice, the petition be heard on merits and that too by the High Court. 14. Mr. Pradhan is right when he points out to me that the Sessions Court is so much over-loaded and so short of Judges that regardless of directions from this Court, it is physically impossible for a discharge application to be taken for hearing out of turn. I need to add that the hearing of the application would be time-consuming and it would be unfair to disturb the hearing of the old cases by any such directions. Moreover, Mr. Pradhan is virtually in an invincible position when he pointed out, that the Sessions Court is not invested with the jurisdiction of deciding the issues involved in this proceeding. The relief prayed for is that the proceeding be quashed on the ground that its institution is vitiated by serious mala fides, that on the face of it, there is no substance in the charges and that consequently, the prosecution be quashed. Undoubtedly, these are reliefs which cannot be granted by the learned Sessions Judge and, therefore, it is this Court alone which is competent to do so. The preliminary objection raised is wholly devoid of any substance whatsoever and stands rejected. 15. Mr. Pradhan presents a clean and clear-cut challenge to the sanction order that is the prerequisite for a valid prosecution. This order is dated 3rd February, 1990 and the sanction has been accorded by the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department. Though it appears that this sanction order suffers from non-application of mind, it would not be permissible to record any such conclusive finding unless and until the ritual of the sanctioning authority stepping into the witness box is completed. The order commences with five recitals, all of which are not of any consequence and concludes with the accord of sanction. There is a schedule attached to the sanction order about which, I shall comment presently. Mr. The order commences with five recitals, all of which are not of any consequence and concludes with the accord of sanction. There is a schedule attached to the sanction order about which, I shall comment presently. Mr. Pradhan has stated that the essence of the charge against the accused is that the assets alleged to be in his possession after a long period of service in the Police Department are disproportionate to the known source of income and that he cannot satisfactorily account for the same. In order to pad up the justification for proceeding against the petitioner, the investigating authority has, in the charge-sheet, included his wife, his nephew, his brother-in-law and two other persons who are styled as his associates and it is the sum total of all the assets of all these persons which have been aggregated. After all this labour, since the prosecuting authority was more anxious to register an offence against the petitioner than to act fairly or in accordance with the law, he was neither asked for an explanation nor afforded what the law rightfully entitles him to. Mr. Pradhan states that if the sanctioning authority who is a highly placed officer of the Government had in fact gone through the papers or taken a little trouble to read the relevant sections, that it would have occurred to him as clear as day-light that the most elementary requirement of law is missing from the sanction order viz., the fact that the petitioner cannot satisfactorily account for the assets that are attributed to him. I am not dealing with the substantial issue as to whether the accused can be made to account for assets belonging to other persons which again is extremely doubtful, but that is a disputed area and I am hence not touching on it. Suffice it to say that in the absence of the sanctioning authority recording and holding that the accused could not satisfactorily account for disproportionate assets, no sanction could ever have been granted. 16. It is well-settled law that the term “disproportionate” presupposes that the parameters between the assets that could have been acquired and those that are in fact found must be sufficiently wide. 16. It is well-settled law that the term “disproportionate” presupposes that the parameters between the assets that could have been acquired and those that are in fact found must be sufficiently wide. It is evident from the schedule that through a crude exercise, an attempt has been made to total up the earnings of the petitioner right through his career to thereafter deduct what according to the Department could have been his expenditure and a conclusion has been arrived at that since the difference works out to approximately Rs. 5.6 lacks after 22 years of service, that an offence is disclosed. The period in question extends from 1-1-1965 to 16-2-1988 viz., the period during which the petitioner was in the service of the police department. I fail to understand how certain elementary aspects can be overlooked while dealing with a serious issue like sanction. The Supreme Court in the case of (Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P.)1 , A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 677, had occasion to observe : “The grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to Government servants against frivolous prosecutions and must therefore be strictly complied with before any prosecution can be launched against the public servant concerned.” One assumes that even a Government servant is permitted to invest his savings and if he does so, that they will multiply many times over. If he is shrewd enough to invest wisely, the position would be even better. The Anti-Corruption Bureau, however, proceeds on the footing that the savings are not invested and calculates only the original amount. This flaw is fundamental. 17. The admitted position is that the petitioner was never afforded an opportunity of accounting for whatever assets are attributed to him prior to registration of the offence. I shall presently deal with the charge-sheet but I need to mention here that the two major heads of assets that are grouped together is a house at Belgaum standing in the petitioner's wife's name which stands on a plot of land and the Investigating Officer has valued the house at Rs. 3 lacs and the plot of land at Rs. 1 lacs. Mr. Pradhan stated at the Bar that this is an old property for which a price of Rs. 3 lacs and the plot of land at Rs. 1 lacs. Mr. Pradhan stated at the Bar that this is an old property for which a price of Rs. 20,000/- was paid several years back and which may have appreciated many times over today, because Belgaum is now a large city and had the petitioner been given an opportunity of explaining, he would have adduced proof of the fact that this asset has been over-valued by about 40 times by the Investigating Officer in an attempt to foist a false charge against him. The undisputed position being that the petitioner was never afforded an opportunity to account for his assets, there could have been no question of even recording a finding that an offence has been disclosed against him in law or for the matter of sanctioning the prosecution. 18. I need to add here that Mr. Vakil vehemently opposed any consideration of the sanction order on the ground that it is only after the concerned authority, is given a fair chance to explain his position that a Court can give a finding on the validity or otherwise of a sanction order. To a pointed question from the Court as to how good this proposition would be in a case where the sanction order lacks the necessary ingredients of law and whether any amount of padding up through oral explanations in the witness box can cure a legally defective sanction order, Mr. Vakil maintained that it is well-settled law that a sanction order does not have to record reasons nor has it to be a speaking order and, therefore, such legal dissection is not permissible. In fairness to what the learned Counsel submitted. I do concede that a sanction order is not to be subjected to microscopic scrutiny nor is it required to represent reasons or grounds in support of the decision. This does not detract from the essential requirements of law, that the anatomy of a valid sanction order, as of necessity require a basis skeleton embodying the essential legal ingredients and brief recitals from which it can be clearly inferred that there has been judicious application of mind. If the law were to permit cryptic and defective sanction orders to be amended, cured and resurrected through oral evidence in the witness box, there would have been little sanctity attached to a valid sanction order. If the law were to permit cryptic and defective sanction orders to be amended, cured and resurrected through oral evidence in the witness box, there would have been little sanctity attached to a valid sanction order. It has been said, times without number, that a public servant enjoys some protection and immunity from a prosecution and that the sanctioning authority owes the sacred duty of doing a judicial evaluation of the case which must necessarily be independent from that of the Investigating Authority. That the draft sanction order comes from the Investigating Authority who has opined that it is a fit case for prosecution is well accepted and it is, therefore, that the sanction order must reflect the all important aspect viz., that the case has been independently considered by a responsible authority of the Government and the misconduct found to be grave enough to warrant a prosecution. The sanction order is the starting point of a long process of disaster for a public servant who is invariably suspended and is required, according to the present time-frame, to wait for anything upto two decades before a prosecution and the appeal therefrom are completed. One does not have to recount as to what happens to the employee physically, mentally and economically, not to mention his immediate family and, therefore, no laxity can be permitted in respect of the accord of sanction. 19. Mr. Vakil has contended, that there are presumptions in respect of official acts and it will have to be presumed that the accord of sanction was properly and validly done. I shall illustrate only one sentence from para 3 of the sanction order which reads. “And whereas the Government of Maharashtra having fully examined the material before it and considering all the facts and circumstances disclosed herein, is satisfied that there is a prima facie case made out against the accused person and that it is necessary in the interest of justice that the accused person should be prosecuted in the Court of competent jurisdiction for the said offence.....”. The Government acts through its officers to whom powers are delegated and it is true that in appropriate cases, the orders are passed by an authority for and on behalf of the Government under the rules of business applicable thereto. The Government acts through its officers to whom powers are delegated and it is true that in appropriate cases, the orders are passed by an authority for and on behalf of the Government under the rules of business applicable thereto. This sanction order, in this case, is signed by the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra by order and in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra. There is nothing in this order to indicate as to whether the signatory or any other officer on his part was the one who had personally scrutinised the file and arrived at a subjective satisfaction that is a legal pre-requisite. This satisfaction, in other words, the conclusion that as a requirement of law is something that emerges from the record which justifies a prosecution, is the end result of a process of application of mind and in a valid sanction order, it will have to be indicated as to who on behalf of the Government went through that procedure. It is perfectly permissible under the rules of business for the powers to be delegated but the least that must be stated in the sanction order is that a particular officer went through this procedure. Unless this is done, it would be highly uncertain at the stage of the trial as to who arrived at the satisfaction and who is to be held answerable for it. This is not a mere technicality but to my mind, is indicative of a rather cavalier treatment of the case and smacks of the all too well-known procedure whereby the police submit a draft which is scrutinised by the department and mechanically signed by the head of the department. I am reasonably confident that having regard to the calibre and competence of the senior officers who man the position in question, that had the files in question been placed before him for a thorough evaluation, that this sort of sanction order would not have resulted. 20. With regard to the remaining submissions canvassed by Mr. Vakil, to my mind, suffice it to say that no amount of oral evidence or patch work from the witness box could save the sanction order in this case. Leaving aside the question as to whether there is due application of mind or not, it will have to be struck down on the basic ground that it is a defective sanction. Leaving aside the question as to whether there is due application of mind or not, it will have to be struck down on the basic ground that it is a defective sanction. 21. Mr. Pradhan, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has submitted that his challenge to the present prosecution is far more comprehensive and substantial. He does not rest content with an invalid sanction order because he states that this prosecution has been used as a ploy to deprive a senior Police Officer of his rightful entitlements and that the department would be only too glad to recommence the proceedings and carry on for another two decades so that his client reaches superannuation even before the case is completed. He has pointed out to me that the prosecution will have to be quashed on merits because the ingredients of the offence that are condition precedent for the registration of such an offence are non-existent. Mr. Pradhan relies on the wording of section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act which reads as follows :— “5(1)(e) if he or any person on his behalf is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession, for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known source of income.” 22. He points out that the gravamen of the charge is that the public servant is found to be in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to known sources of income for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account. According to Mr. Pradhan, the law envisages that if pursuant to the preliminary investigations carried out by the agency concerned, it appears to the department that the public servant is in possession of such assets directly or through others that he must be given an opportunity of accounting for them. He states that through such a procedure, the public servant can satisfy the Government that there is a satisfactory explanation for the assets in question. It is quite possible that the person against whom the investigation is directed will not be able to account or that the explanation given is wholly unsatisfactory. In both these cases, a prosecution would be justified because the requisite ingredients of the offence are made out. The authorities would, therefore, be within their rights to register an offence and to proceed. In both these cases, a prosecution would be justified because the requisite ingredients of the offence are made out. The authorities would, therefore, be within their rights to register an offence and to proceed. 23. In the present case, Mr. Pradhan points out, that this requirement of affording the accused an opportunity of accounting was deliberately by-passed. Mr. Pradhan goes to the extent of stating that the list of assets enumerated are grossly over-valued and that the petitioner has nothing to do with several of them. The department itself is unable to establish any nexus whatsoever between the petitioner and the amounts in question and as an indication, he cites the provident fund amount of the petitioner's brother who retired as a teacher that has been included in the so-called assets of the petitioner. He further alleges that it is a matter of record of which the department and the Investigating Officer were aware, that the petitioner was earlier employed with the Forest Department and the Commercial Tax Department, both of which have been deliberately suppressed while taking into account his earnings over the years. These are indications of the fact that the bald accusations made against the petitioner are without substance and if he had been asked to account for whatever is alleged against him, he would have been in a position to totally destroy the entire case that has been fabricated. Knowing and being aware of this position, the Investigating Officer refused to afford him an opportunity of satisfactorily accounting. Mr. Pradhan states that this is a condition precedent before the A.C.B. can even say that an offence is disclosed against a public servant. He further points out to me that the investigation is supposed to have commenced on 1st January, 1987 and that, after as long a period as 14 months, an F.I.R. was registered. The Investigating Officer is at Bombay, the petitioner was very much at Bombay and Mr. Pradhan states at the Bar that though his client repeatedly requested the concerned authorities to give him an opportunity, that the aggression, hostility and venom that was directed against the petitioner was so intense that these requests were contemptuously refused. The Investigating Officer is at Bombay, the petitioner was very much at Bombay and Mr. Pradhan states at the Bar that though his client repeatedly requested the concerned authorities to give him an opportunity, that the aggression, hostility and venom that was directed against the petitioner was so intense that these requests were contemptuously refused. He states that there was a pattern in this conduct because, the F.I.R. was registered on 16th February, 1988 and that circumstance has been used against the petitioner upto the present date, initially to deny him his promotion and thereafter, to keep him under suspension. 24. Mr. Pradhan contends that it is true that several months thereafter on 8-6-1988, a letter was written to the petitioner asking him to account for the properties in his possession. At this point of time, an offence had already been registered against petitioner and he was an accused person facing serious charges of corruption. Anything the petitioner said at this point of time was liable to be used against him. Having regard to the provisions of Article 20, sub-section (3) of the Constitution, the petitioner was entitled for his own protection, to refrain from stating anything. Mr. Pradhan points out that any explanation at this point of time would have been futile and would have been mechanically rejected since the authorities had recorded the conclusion that a corruption offence has been committed by him for which purpose, an offence had already been registered and, therefore, the service of the letter asking him to show cause was a worthless and sham formality. He goes on to submit that this situation did not happen by accident because the A.C.B. authorities are well versed with the provisions of law that the explanation from an accused is asked for as a matter of routine in every case and in this background the departure in his case was an indication of the highest form of mala fides. In any event, Mr. Pradhan submits that in the absence of an opportunity to satisfactorily account that the most important ingredient which is condition precedent for the registering of an offence was lacking and that the F.I.R. would, therefore, have to be quashed on this ground alone. 25. Mr. Vakil seriously disputes this position in law. In any event, Mr. Pradhan submits that in the absence of an opportunity to satisfactorily account that the most important ingredient which is condition precedent for the registering of an offence was lacking and that the F.I.R. would, therefore, have to be quashed on this ground alone. 25. Mr. Vakil seriously disputes this position in law. He submits that the investigations that are carried out prior to the registering of an offence are in the nature of discreet inquiries. To a specific question from the Court as to whether or not a full fledged police officer of the A.C.B. at State expense and under the authority and power vested in him under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, carries out the so-called “discreet inquiries” which are no different from a normal investigation. Mr. Vakil answered that they cannot be placed on par. He stated that the unearthing of hidden assets and finding out the various avenues through which the public servant may have acquired properties in other persons names are required to be ferreted out but that none of these can be seized at this point of time. It is only when the department is satisfied that such assets are in existence and that they are in fact grossly disproportionate that an offence is registered. Mr. Vakil clarifies, that the lodging of the F.I.R. in this case only signifies that the first phase of inquiries has given rise to a situation whereby enough material has emerged to indicate prima facie that an offence is disclosed. According to Mr. Vakil, the accused cannot be asked to account at this stage because no seizures have taken place and the moment he is so alerted, many of the clandestine assets and holdings could either vanish or change complexion. The entire prosecution could be severely damaged and for this reason, it is necessary that an offence be registered so that the authorities can, in exercise of the powers vested in them, seize the assets in question. 26. As regards the requirement of permitting the accused to satisfactorily account, it is Mr. Vakil's contention that in keeping with the requirements of law, the petitioner was asked to show cause in writing by a letter dated 8-6-1988 to which the accused sent a reply stating that under Article 20, sub-clause (3) of the Constitution, he is protected. Mr. 26. As regards the requirement of permitting the accused to satisfactorily account, it is Mr. Vakil's contention that in keeping with the requirements of law, the petitioner was asked to show cause in writing by a letter dated 8-6-1988 to which the accused sent a reply stating that under Article 20, sub-clause (3) of the Constitution, he is protected. Mr. Vakil states that the prejudice pleaded by the petitioner is totally misconceived because, he is completely protected by any explanation which he puts forward in so far as if he can completely account for the assets, he is entitled to insist that no further steps be taken against him. Whatever statements or documents he produced in the course of the investigation will not prejudice him at the trial, because, it is material on which he is relying. Mr. Vakil strongly submitted that there is no requirement of law whereby the accused can insist that he be given an opportunity to satisfactorily account prior to the registration of the F.I.R. He also submitted that it is open to the accused to satisfactorily account for the properties at the trial in which case, he will not be convicted. This, to my mind, is virtually begging the question. 27. The issue does not require any elaborate or intricate consideration. In the first instance, one has to take into account the fact that the department has conducted elaborate inquiries prior to arriving at a conclusion that a corruption offence has been made out. As is indicative from the F.I.R., all the requisite details such as the properties. Bank accounts, F.D.R. numbers etc., have all been tabulated and it is also obvious that the officer has gone to each of the institutions or persons concerned. To contend that if the accused were asked to show cause, the assets could evaporate if, to my mind, an absurdity. The Police Officer has officially visited each of the banks etc., and disclosed his identity and every asset having been completely evaluated, any move on the part of the accused thereafter will be wholly unsuccessful and would only work to his prejudice. The Police Officer has officially visited each of the banks etc., and disclosed his identity and every asset having been completely evaluated, any move on the part of the accused thereafter will be wholly unsuccessful and would only work to his prejudice. One only needs to draw a parallel with an identical situation in departmental proceedings where, in keeping with the rules of natural justice, before an employee is charge-sheeted or before he is placed under suspension, the result of the inquiry is put to him, he is asked to account and to show cause why further action should not be taken. This is the very essence of and the very minimum that the rules of natural justice demand in such situations. It is not a matter of courtesy but an inflexible rule of law and the by-passing of this procedure would vitiate everything that follows. 28. There can be no compromises in such a situation and the mala fides that are alleged apart, as a pure requirement of procedural law, it will have to be held that the opportunity to satisfactorily account must be afforded before an offence is registered. 29. In the case of a public servant, there is an additional reason for this because the registering of an offence is virtually the point of no return. That any explanation will either be considered or that it will be upheld thereafter is virtually a fond delusion because, the inevitable reply would be that an offence having been registered, the explanation is unsatisfactory and that, the accused must await the adjudication before the Court. What is most disastrous is the inevitable fall out from the registering of an offence because, the authorities would be fully justified in suspending an officer if a corruption charge has been registered against him. Apart from the irreparable damage to his reputation, he would be only entitled to a subsistence allowance and the personal trauma to him and his family would immediately commence. As has happened in the present case, the public servant would find that even if for any reason he is not suspended, that this is a valid ground to withhold all further promotions and in whatever proceeding he seeks to challenge the action, the standard defence of the department would be that there is a corruption offence registered against him and that, he must await its adjudication. Such charges create their own bias and a real prejudice results. It is for this reason that I have categorised the registering of the offence virtually as a point of no return, and with ample justification. 30. The issue as to whether a public servant against whom a charge in respect of being in possession of disproportionate assets is contemplated should be afforded a hearing prior to the registration of an offence can best be resolved by testing the issue on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution. Singhal, J., in the (In re the Special Court's Bill, 1978)2, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 478, observed as follows :— “For no one can ever deny that all persons charged with crime must, in law, stand on the same footing at the Bar of Justice. Such an equality should be assured not only between one accused and another but also between the prosecution and the accused. This is not a mere 'rights explosion' but, as will appear, it is what our Constitution has carefully, assuredly and fully provided for every citizen of the country. Article 21 of the Constitution is, by itself, enough to bring this out.” In the (Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India)3, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597 supra, Chandrachud, J., had occasion to observe : “But the mere prescription of some kind of procedure cannot ever meet the mandate of Article 21. The procedure prescribed by law has to be fair, just and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary. The question whether the procedure, prescribed by law which curtails or takes away the personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 is reasonable or not has to be considered not in the abstract or on hypothetical considerations like the provision for a full dressed hearing as in a Court-room trial, but in the context, primarily, of the purpose which the Act is intended to achieve and of urgent situations which those who are charged with the duty of administering the Act may be called upon to deal with.” In the same case, Bhagwati, J., observed : “Is the prescription of some sort of procedure enough or must the procedure comply particular requirement? Obviously, procedure, cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable. Obviously, procedure, cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable. This indeed was conceded by the learned Attorney General who with his usual candour frankly stated that it was not possible for him to contend that any procedure howsoever arbitrary, oppressive or unjust may be prescribed by the law.” Applying these principles, one needs to recall the observations of Krishna Iyer, J., when he pointed out that “natural justice cannot be cut from a criminal trial”. Having regard to the procedure followed in relation to the investigation of corruption charges under section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, one needs to bear in mind that unlike in the case of offences under the Indian Penal Code, substantial inquiries/investigations are carried out and completed prior to arriving at a conclusion as to whether or not, there is ground to hold that an offence has been completed. That procedure cannot be one-sided in the face of a statutory requirement which prescribes that the accused must be afforded an opportunity of being heard. Undisputedly, therefore, that opportunity has to come prior to the stage when conclusions are reached, if at all it is to be meaningful. 31. Mr. Pradhan in support of his submission with regard to the protection available to the petitioner under Article 20(3) of the Constitution, relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Veera Ibrahim v. State of Maharashtra)4, reported in 1976 S.C.C.(Cri.) 278 : A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1167, wherein the Supreme Court has summarised the position as follows : “In order to claim the benefit of the guarantee against testimonial compulsion embodied in Clause (3) of Article 20, it must be shown, firstly, that the person who made the statement was 'accused of any offence'; secondly, that he made this statement under compulsion. The phrase 'accused of any offence' includes within its ambit only a person against whom a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence has been levelled which in the normal course may result in his prosecution.” 32. In this decision, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle enunciated in (R.C. Mehta v. State of West Bengal)5, reported in A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 940. It is Mr. In this decision, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle enunciated in (R.C. Mehta v. State of West Bengal)5, reported in A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 940. It is Mr. Pradhan's submission that the petitioner was fully justified in adopting the contention that once a formal accusation relating to the commission of the offence by way of registration of the F.I.R. had taken place that this in the normal course would result in his prosecution and, therefore, the petitioner was entitled to claim the constitutional immunity. Mr. Vakil has disputed this position and pointed out that in satisfactorily accounting for the assets that have been listed by the prosecution, the accused is under no degree of compulsion to make any statements that would incriminate him whereas in fact if he had a valid explanation, the prosecuting authority would have refrained from proceeding further and the petitioner would have been discharged. He further submitted that the compulsion contemplated by Article 20 was in relation to a situation where an accused is forced to give or produce evidence against himself whereas in this case, the position was exactly the opposite in that, the accused was being given an opportunity to exonerate himself and, therefore, that this judgment had no relevance. 33. To my mind, this controversy is quite secondary to the main issue and I, therefore, do not propose to examine it in depth. The intricacies as to whether the immunity claimed by the petitioner under Article 20(3) was validly claimed or not does not require final determination. Suffice it to say that there is considerable substance in the contention because, the subject matter of the charge being the accountability or otherwise of the assets whatever the petitioner pointed out or produced in his support could have gone against him at the trial. Moreover, the point of time at which this opportunity was afforded to him was the wrong one and, therefore, he was within his rights in so far as it was an empty eye-wash. I shall presently deal with the head of mala fides which, incidentally, is the petitioner's main ground of challenge from which it will be crystal clear that anything the petitioner did and whatever material he produced in support would never have saved him from a prosecution because the singular objective was to keep him under a cloud for as many years as possible. It is in this background that the plea of the petitioner has to be viewed and I have no hesitation in holding that the so-called offer made on 8-6- 1988 after the offence had been registered was a worthless exercise and the petitioner's not having responded cannot, therefore, be viewed as a circumstance to his detriment. 34. In support of his submission that the Court must interfere in exercise of its powers under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, in so far as no offence can be said to have been made out in law against the petitioner, Mr. Pradhan relied on the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (State of Haryana and others v. Bhajanlal and others)6, reported in 1992 S.C.C. (Cri.) 426. At paragraph 76 of that judgment, the Court observed as follows :­ “The gravamen of the accusation is that Shri Bhajan Lal has amassed huge assets by misusing his ministerial authority earlier to 1986 which assets are disproportionate to his known and licit source of income. It has been repeatedly pointed out that mere possession of any pecuniary resources or property is by itself not an offence, but it is the failure to satisfactorily account for such possession of pecuniary resources of property that makes the possession objectionable and constitutes the offence within the ambit of section 5(1)(e) of the Act. Therefore, a Police Officer with whom an investigation of an offence under section 5(1)(e) of the Act is entrusted should not proceed with a preconceived idea of guilt of that person indicted with such offence and subject him to any harassment and victimisation, because in case the allegations of illegal accumulation of wealth are found during the course of investigation as baseless, the harm done not only to that person but also to the office he held will be incalculable and inestimable.” (Emphasis supplied) In another decision in the case of (P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras)7, reported in 1970 S.C.C. (Cri.)240, the Supreme Court observed as follows : “Before a public servant, whatever be his status, is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty which amount to serious misdemeanour or misconduct of the type alleged in this case and a first information is lodged against him, there must be some suitable preliminary enquiry into the allegations by a responsible officer. The lodging of such a report against a person specially one whom like the appellant occupied the top position in a department, even if baseless, would do incalculable harm not only to the officer in particular but to the department he belonged to, in general. The means adopted no less than the end to be achieved must be impeccable.” 35. I have already held that as reiterated by the Supreme Court in Bhajanlal's case, the essence of the charge under section 5(1)(e) stems from the inability to satisfactorily account and in the circumstances of this case, where the petitioner was given no opportunity to satisfactorily account, it cannot be said that any offence whatsoever has been made out against him in law. The continuation of the prosecution will, therefore, be rendered impermissible and must, therefore, be quashed. 36. Coming to the second main head of challenge on the ground of mala fides, Mr. Pradhan pointed out that quite apart from the refusal to follow the basic rules of natural justice, it can be demonstrated that the petitioner who belongs to the scheduled caste and comes from the economically weaker section of society, and who had an unblemished record in the course of his earlier career which included a sizeable number of good entries, cash rewards and appreciation from his superiors, was promoted to the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police in August 1981. The petitioner continued to distinguish himself in the Crime Branch at the Juvenile Police Unit and was thereafter posted as Principal of the Traffic Institute of the Traffic Control Branch which institution is the only one of its type in India. He worked as the Vigilance Officer in the Transport Commissionerate for the whole of Maharashtra and held the post for about three years. This heavy but delicate assignment was so much appreciated by his superiors, that they recommended him advance increment, award of the police medal and derequisition of his premises. 37. According to the petitioner, it was at this stage of his career that he made the mistake of taking action against a nation-wide multi-crore racket concerning the transport business in which a bunch of corrupt officers under patronage were making huge amounts of money. 37. According to the petitioner, it was at this stage of his career that he made the mistake of taking action against a nation-wide multi-crore racket concerning the transport business in which a bunch of corrupt officers under patronage were making huge amounts of money. Inevitably, the petitioner was immediately recalled and sent to a punishment station viz., the Control Room, which, for all intents and purposes, is a post similar to that of a glorified telephone operator. Even if it were to be held that the uncontroverted pleadings in the petition can be acted upon, I would prefer not to do so except to draw appropriate inferences only from the facts that speak for themselves. There is no ostensible reason why an officer of such a background as the petitioner should have been abruptly brought back and consigned to the Control Room except that a decision was taken to hit back at him. The petitioner does not seem to be wrong in his grievance because this was the starting point of the investigation against him into corruption charges. It would be difficult to accept the respondent's contention that this timing was a mere coincidence because of what subsequently followed. Corruption enquiries are always set in motion on a complaint-in this case there is none. 38. That there was a distinct vendetta against the petitioner is more than fully established from the events that followed. He relies on the reply of the State Home Minister on the floor of the house in response to a question wherein it was confirmed that there was absolutely no complaint against the petitioner regarding corruption during his entire service tenure and the Minister went on to add that the petitioner had good entries to his credit. In September 1988, the Departmental Selection Committee met and it is the petitioner's case that he was at the top of the list for promotion to the post of Deputy Commissioner of Police. An unpardonable incident that has invited strictures from the Division Bench of this Court confirms the petitioner's charge that the action against him bristles with mala fides. Pursuant to the selection for promotion, it appears that the department decided to supersede the petitioner and was, therefore, looking for an opportunity to do so. An unpardonable incident that has invited strictures from the Division Bench of this Court confirms the petitioner's charge that the action against him bristles with mala fides. Pursuant to the selection for promotion, it appears that the department decided to supersede the petitioner and was, therefore, looking for an opportunity to do so. On 19th January, 1989, a suspension order dated 17th October, 1988 was pasted on the front door of the petitioner's residence even though he was a Senior Police Officer and was very much in the city of Bombay all through this period. On the same day, the petitioner's juniors were promoted. The respondents are unable to give any respectable or plausible explanation for not having served the suspension order on the petitioner for over three months or for having pasted it on his front door on the morning of the day when his juniors were being promoted. The petitioner has pointed out a list of officers against whom corruption charges were under investigation or were pending and who have not been suspended and the irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that the order of suspension itself which has its roots in the present corruption charges was being used as a handle to cover up for the supersession. 39. The petitioner challenged the validity of the suspension order as also the fact that he was not being paid his subsistence allowance and it is unnecessary for me to burden this judgment with the gory details of the manner in which the department repeatedly acted in contempt for Court orders even in matters of payment of the petitioner's salary and allowances as also refused to respect successive Court orders by passing a fresh order of suspension every time the previous one was set aside or invalidated. The petitioner was required to litigate virtually from Court to Court and upto the Supreme Court and backwards right up to the date of the filing of this petition when the department successfully defied or circumvented every Court order and kept the petitioner under suspension all through, making a big issue of the fact that there are serious corruption charges pending against him and that the Court should not interfere on this ground. Suffice it to say that the earlier orders of this Court are eloquent on the point of gross mala fides on the part of the department, severe structures were passed and the petitioner was ordered to be reinstated and it is a matter of record that even the Supreme Court refused to expunge the strictures in question. Those observations which are in the strongest terms and which have now become final, do not at all speak well for the department. The fact remains, however, that the learned Judges who heard each of the proceedings were fully convinced that there was no justification in suspending the petitioner. 40. After the present petition was admitted, the petitioner relied on the last order of the Supreme Court and pointed out to this Court, that the respondents were in contempt in so far as they were still refusing to reinstate the petitioner in service. When this Court passed an order that the petitioner be so reinstated, the respondents reacted with characteristic smartness by posting the petitioner at the other end of the State at Nagpur even though he is a Bombay Officer and his petition was part-heard before this Court. The petitioner at that stage had no Advocate and was appearing in person. This Court had to take a serious view of such rank contempt displayed by the respondents and they were directed to post the petitioner in or around Bombay, which the respondents refused to do in spite of repeated directions. No affidavit was filed in that contempt petition but oral statements were made to the effect that no suitable post was available in or around Bombay even in the adjoining Districts and it was only after the Court passed a series of stringent orders that the respondents agreed to post the petitioner at Nasik. In the meanwhile, the hearing of the petition was delayed on the ground that the respondents desire to approach the Supreme Court against the interim orders in the contempt proceedings. That exercise was gone through and the Supreme Court did not interfere with the directions to reinstate the petitioner who, by then, agreed to accept the posting at Nasik. That no suitable post was available anywhere in or around Bombay was impossible to accept more so, because, the falsity became self-evident, when the respondents were not willing to file an affidavit confirming this fact. That no suitable post was available anywhere in or around Bombay was impossible to accept more so, because, the falsity became self-evident, when the respondents were not willing to file an affidavit confirming this fact. According to the petitioner, he is yet to receive his salary for this period. 41. Normally, this sequence of events would have no place in a petition of the present type but as I shall presently illustrate, where the corruption charges are being used as a ploy for playing havoc with the petitioner's career and where the respondents are in an indefensible position in this charge, the unusual situation that arises is that the abuse of the process of the Criminal Court would have to be stopped in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court, which is precisely the relief claimed in the petition. The nexus, therefore, is not remote but is direct. The petitioner has pointed out that because of the cussedness with which he was kept under suspension, that he was again by passed and a second group of officers, junior to him, were promoted. The department was happily contending before every Court that the corruption charges entitled it to not only keep the petitioner under suspension but more importantly, to put his promotion orders into cold storage. Unfortunately, with the limited number of Special Judges available, the calculations of the department would be wonderfully served and the objective of keeping the petitioner under suspension till he reaches the age of retirement would also be achieved because the pile up of cases before the trial Court is such, that it would be many years before the petitioner's trial commences. Mr. Vakil repeatedly offered to start with the matter immediately and I had to point out to him that there is no ground on which five and six year old cases could be pushed back and this case taken up out of turn. While dealing with the head of mala fides which would have a direct bearing on the justification or otherwise in the matter of quashing the prosecution, I need to mention that Mr. Vakil who advanced an argument, that even if it is demonstrated that the department is ill-disposed towards the petitioner, that this Court cannot use that as a ground for quashing the proceedings, if they are otherwise validly instituted. Mr. Vakil who advanced an argument, that even if it is demonstrated that the department is ill-disposed towards the petitioner, that this Court cannot use that as a ground for quashing the proceedings, if they are otherwise validly instituted. Mr. Vakil relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and others)8, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 67, wherein it was held that nothing can be added or subtracted to what is mentioned in the First Information Report or complaint or the material gathered in the course of investigations and that the material will have to be accepted at face value. This is precisely the basis on which I have proceeded because I have refused to permit the petitioner's learned Counsel to make any submissions with regard to the matter on merits in so far as that is within the ambit of the trial Court. There is only one limited area of the case where I have permitted argument and this was because the learned Counsel for the respondents referred to the same from the record and I shall briefly summarise the heads, the submissions of learned Counsel on both sides and my observations thereon :— (a) In the first instance, Mr. Vakil was critical of the fact that the petitioner and his family members had opened a number of bank accounts at different times. Mr. Pradhan's immediate reply was that these are Savings Bank Accounts opened at different places at different times and he requested the Court to look at the balance in these accounts, mostly old ones, some of which have been dormant and reflect balances of Rs. 55.05, Rs. 42.35, Rs. 24.03, Rs. 7.05, Rs. 6.50, Rs. 5.00 etc., and the sum total of all these 14 accounts spanning the entire period aggregating a princely total of Rs. 17,517.48/—. Mr. Vakil tried in vain to convince me that it is this number of Bank Accounts and not the small amounts therein that attracts suspicion. They are accounts opened at different places over the years which were not closed and can never advance the prosecution case by even an inch. On the contrary, it is an indication of the laboured efforts made by the A.C.B. to build up a case where none exists. I do not consider this head even worthy of consideration. They are accounts opened at different places over the years which were not closed and can never advance the prosecution case by even an inch. On the contrary, it is an indication of the laboured efforts made by the A.C.B. to build up a case where none exists. I do not consider this head even worthy of consideration. (b) Next came the involved charge that the department has aggregated all the investments standing in the names of all the accused who include his relations and friends in the form of F.D.R./S.S.D.S./V.C.C.S./P.C.C.S. aggregating a sum of Rs. 4.41,204.45/—. It needs to be mentioned that Mr. Vakil also relied on the fact that loans totalling Rs. 1,22,250/— against these investments were taken between the period 1982-1985 and that these loans, along with interest have been repaid. Mr. Pradhan stated at the Bar that even though he does not desire to trouble this Court with the details, that it is necessary to point out that these amounts relate to all the accused and not to the petitioner alone but more importantly, that the picture presented is totally false. He states that the Investigating Officer has deliberately suppressed the fact that all the investments have to be examined in the face of the petitioner's total savings through his period of 22 years of service. Mr. Pradhan rightly pointed out that this is without taking into account his earlier years of service and totally ignoring the fact that even at the rates of interest applicable to such investments, that the amount multiplies every few years by virtue of the compounding of the interest and that it is, therefore, absolutely false and impermissible to take the last aggregate. Mr. Pradhan stated that had the petitioner been given a chance to show cause that he would have demonstrated that every small amount invested has grown over the years and that the sum total that emerges after 22 years can never represent the original investment. As an indication, he points out that a deposit receipt of this type represents a face value of the amount payable on maturity which includes the interest that has compounded over the years and, therefore, these end products cannot be mechanically totalled and treated as assets disproportionate. He also points out that the loans taken against such investments are in the nature of an overdraft which is invariably adjusted when the amount matures. He also points out that the loans taken against such investments are in the nature of an overdraft which is invariably adjusted when the amount matures. In substance, he alleges that the respondents are playing with figures in order to create a sense of bias in the mind of the Court and in order to justify a baseless charge. 42. One does not require to go through a procedure of trial to accept the correctness of Mr. Pradhan's submissions because the aggregate of investments made over the years are not representative of their original quantum. One does not need to conjecture as to whether the petitioner could have speculated or whether he could have multiplied his savings through lucrative means of investments but the fact does remain, that the bald allegation levelled against the petitioner under this head does appear to be highly suspect and hollow. One does not require the skills of a highly placed Police Officer to see through the fallacy of these figures. Even without the petitioner accounting, this Court will have to take judicial notice of the fact that these investments double every five years. The earlier amounts would multiply at least ten times and later ones progressively less, but the present face value bears no proportion to the original investment. It is unfortunate, to say the least, that this is the calibre of the investigation and the quality of the charges against the petitioner. (c) The major assets shown against the petitioner's name is house situated in the petitioner's home town of Belgaum which has been valued at Rs. 3 lakhs and the plot value at Rs. 1 lakh. Mr. Vakil states that the petitioner or his wife could never have obtained this amount of money through honest means even if one were to argue that all the petitioner's savings over the years were used for this purpose. Mr. Pradhan again attacked the correctness of these figures by pointing out, that they were grossly inflated by the Investigating Officer who has put them down on the basis of his own estimates of current market value. According to Mr. Mr. Pradhan again attacked the correctness of these figures by pointing out, that they were grossly inflated by the Investigating Officer who has put them down on the basis of his own estimates of current market value. According to Mr. Pradhan, it is the original price of the property that has to be taken into account which is less than 10% of what is pointed out and which is deliberately suppressed and he repeated once again his contention that in order to fabricate a false charge against the petitioner and keep him bound down on that basis and under a cloud till the end of his career, that these distorted figures have been presented. 43. The Courts have taken judicial notice of these aspects while dealing with numerous corruption cases under section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and have repeatedly pointed out that it is not the market value of the asset or the Investigating Officer's estimation thereof on the basis of the F.I.R. or when the investigation was taken up that is at all material. For purposes of computation when the department proceeds on the original figures as far as the earnings are concerned, if there is to be any honesty in the investigation, it is the original figures in respect of the acquisition of each asset and of each investment that an honest investigation should place before the Court. It is on the basis of this form of juggling that the department alleges in the F.I.R. that the disproportionate assets are in the vicinity of about Rs. 8.35 lakhs on 16- 2-1988. The same authority which computed the total assets at Rs. 9,43,946.93 on 16-2-1988 inflated the figure to Rs. 15,00,764.06 on June 8, 1988, when the petitioner was asked by letter of that date to account for the properties, and for some strange reason, drastically dropped the figure of aggregate assets to Rs. 12,01 ,971.62 (which is a good three lakhs less) and again, dropped the figure of disproportionate assets to Rs. 5,66,604.01. Again, on 16-2-1988, the F.I.R alleged that the only savings which the petitioner could be in possession of are to the extent of Rs. 1,08,435/—; the sanction order at paragraph 8 accepts the position that his savings as on 16-2-1988 could have been Rs. 6,35,367.41. 5,66,604.01. Again, on 16-2-1988, the F.I.R alleged that the only savings which the petitioner could be in possession of are to the extent of Rs. 1,08,435/—; the sanction order at paragraph 8 accepts the position that his savings as on 16-2-1988 could have been Rs. 6,35,367.41. Admittedly, the petitioner was not allowed to explain anything and the investigating authority was playing around with the figures and presenting a widely divergent picture from stage to stage of the case. This is the degree and level of credibility that is required to be attached to the manner in which the Investigating Authority has gone about its business over the years, and it is solemnly insisted upon before me that the prosecuting agency be permitted to continue this sinister game without interference from this Court. 44. I am aware of the fact that the prosecution can always contend that it will explain these seemingly irreconcilable situations and that even if the gulf is narrowed down, as long as it is within the ambit of disproportionate assets, that the prosecution is still justified. I do not need to repel this argument because, this is not the stage to record any findings with regard to these matters, but the limited purpose of setting out these figures is that, in the first instance, their wide variations lend support to the general head of challenge that they are grossly inflated and fabricated which explain the inconsistencies; and the petitioner was not allowed to tender his explanation as he would have been in a position to demolish the entire case against him if that opportunity were afforded. Secondly, for the reasons set out by me above, there is substance in the petitioner's plea that on an overall view of the matter, he would be justified in pointing out that even taking the prosecution case at its face value a conviction is remote; which is an understatement. 45. In this context, Mr. Pradhan has placed strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Madhavrao Scindia v. Sambhajirao)9, reported in 1988(2) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)232 : A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 709, wherein the Court observed as follows :— “The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court 'cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.” Every one of the observations would apply to the latter in the facts and circumstances of the present case. On the basis of these observations I have no hesitation in holding that the ratio of the aforesaid decision applies squarely to the facts of the present case and that this Court would be failing in its duty if the proceedings before the trial Court were not to be quashed. 46. The Courts over the years have exercised inherent powers in various situations and at various stages of proceedings and the guidelines underlining the situations in which such exercise of power would be justified are now well-crystallised. Occasions do arise, however, when a new facet or a new dimension is thrown up and the present proceeding presents one such. The inherent power which the High Court is invested with could also be exercised in a case of the present type to prevent the continuation of the injustice. This, to my mind is one more area in which the Courts will have to be vigilant and will have to come out strongly. I do not need to add that the further justification for such exercise of power can be amplified in the present case from the following: (a) That this so-called massive investigation has involved a lot of time and expenditure of the department and I have already illustrated the dismal results of all that effort and expenditure. (b) The department used this proceeding as a handle to suspend the petitioner, thereby keeping a senior Police Officer away from his post of duty and preventing him from working. (b) The department used this proceeding as a handle to suspend the petitioner, thereby keeping a senior Police Officer away from his post of duty and preventing him from working. The proceeding having been quashed, the State is subjected to a considerable expenditure of reimbursing him without having got the benefit of his services. But for the intervention of the courts, this exercise would have continued for another decade. (c) That this proceeding was used as a handle for denying the petitioner's promotion and on the proceeding being quashed, it would result in considerable upheaval in the department because the petitioner will have to be restored to his rightful place but more importantly, the petitioner being entitled to a deemed date of promotion, will have to be paid his arrears for the higher post from that deemed date without his having served the Government in that position. (d) The number of proceedings both on the original side and on the appellate side, culminating with this heavy petition, the hearing of which has been successfully protracted for over a year, not to mention the load on the trial Court, if the entire trial had to be gone through before the petitioner was ultimately exonerated. 47. To my mind there are only a few reasons why the powers under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code in the interest of the welfare and survival of the justice dispensation system, will also have to be pressed into operation to weed out worthless litigation of the present type at the earliest available opportunity. 48. Mr. Vakil forcefully contended that this petition is premature. I think what has just been mentioned by me will abundantly indicate that it is timely. 49. I am required, as of necessity, to deal with the last aspect of the case because the petitioner has not only made out a case of mala fides and succeeded in his endeavour but the description of what he was subjected to the illness, trauma and torture that he and his wife went through, the humiliation faced by them and the agony to which his own daughters and son were subjected to is heart-rending. He has pointed out how the Investigating Officers even went to the schools where his young children were being educated for which I do not see any justification and how his daughters who were aged 15 and 11 and his son who is aged about 7 were so humiliated, that their young lives were completely shattered. The vindictiveness with which these proceedings were pursued has been referred to in the earlier orders passed by this Court and the petitioner has, therefore, prayed for the award of heavy compensation against the State on the ground that the action was thoroughly unjustified. The Supreme Court and the High Courts have, in appropriate cases, awarded such compensation, and to my mind, this is one case which would so qualify. The petitioner has prayed that the compensation should be quantified at Rs. 50 lakhs, Rs. 25 lakhs and Rs. 10 lakhs towards damages to the reputation, mental torture and financial loss to the petitioner. Even if the petitioner does qualify for compensation, I would consider that he should set out itemwise the heads, the grounds and the justifications therefor, so that this Court could, after hearing the respondents, pass appropriate orders. For that purpose, the petitioner is granted the liberty of presenting a separate and a subsidiary petition, which can be disposed of independently of the present one. 50. For the reasons set out in this judgment, the petition is allowed. The proceedings pending before the learned Special Judge at Greater Bombay viz., Special Case No. 18 of 1990 are quashed. It is necessary to further clarify that all orders such as attachment, etc., that are an off-shoot of those proceedings are quashed and set aside and as a necessary consequence, attachments against the assets shall stand vacated and it is directed that the same wherever seized or taken charge of shall be restored forthwith. Rule absolute accordingly. Petition allowed.