Judgment :- 1. The former is a Writ Petition presented by All India Lawyers Union, Tamil Nadu, represented by its Secretary with a prayer for issue of a writ of declaration declaring that the practising advocates in the State of Tamil Nadu are entitled to be included in the Category of Non-OYT Special and consequently directing the Chief General Manager, Tamil Nadu Telecommunications Circle, Madras and the Chief General Manager, Madras Telephones (Respondents 2 and 3) to treat the applications of practising Advocates/Lawyers in Tamil Nadu in the Non-OYT Special Category and provide telephone connections to them. The first respondent is the Union of India represented by its Secretary to Government, Department of Communications. The latter is a Writ Miscellaneous Petition for an interim direction pending disposal of the Writ Petition. In paragraph 3 of the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, it is stated that the petitioner is an All India body of Lawyers, whose members are practising Lawyers, retired Judges, Jurists and Law students and that it has branches all over the country having its Head Quarters at Delhi. It is also stated that in each State, the Union has President, Vice-President, Secretary and other Office Bearers and in Tamil Nadu, the Union has about 800 members. It is stated that the petitioner union has been espousing causes of lawyers as well as general public and it has been discharging its obligations as a body to protect the interests of Advocates as well as other toiling sections of the people of the State. The last sentence in paragraph 3 of the affidavit is that the petitioner Union is filing the writ petition in the interest of the Lawyers in the State. There is nothing in the affidavit to the effect that the petitioner is a registered body. 2. The Registry returned the papers calling upon the counsel to state how the writ petition is maintainable by the unregistered Union and to give a list of members of the Union. Counsel represented the papers with the following endorsement:— “With regard to the return it is submitted that already several writ petitions by unregistered bodies have been entertained and relief granted by the Honble Supreme Court. For example, the writ petition by the Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (reported in 1982 (II) LLJ. Counsel represented the papers with the following endorsement:— “With regard to the return it is submitted that already several writ petitions by unregistered bodies have been entertained and relief granted by the Honble Supreme Court. For example, the writ petition by the Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (reported in 1982 (II) LLJ. p. 454) and the Writ Petition (Civil) No. 491/91 by Sub Committee of Judicial Accountability v. Union of India are in point. This writ petition filed by the All India Lawyers Union in the interest of lawyers is therefore maintainable.” 3. The Registry had a doubt as to the correctness of the contention raised in the endorsement and placed the papers before me for orders. I directed the matter to be posted before Court for orders regarding maintainability. The matter was argued by learned counsel for the petitioner at some length and reliance was placed on some rulings of the Supreme Court. I thought it necessary to consider the matter in detail and decide the question, as the same is arising very often in several matters. Hence, I appointed Mr. S. Gopalratnam, Senior Advocate as Amicus Curiae to be assisted by Sri S. Venkateswaran, Advocate, as Junior Amicus Curiae. The matter was argued at length by counsel for the petitioner as well as the Amicus Curiae. 4. In so far as this Court is concerned, the matter is not res integra and the law was laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in Tamil Nadu Panchayat Development Officers Association, Madras v. Secretary to Govt. of Tamil Nadu, Rural Development and Local Administration Dept., Madras and others AIR 1989 Madras 224 = 1989-1-L.W. 239 = 1989 Writ L.R. 84 (F.B.). When that case came before a Division Bench, it was felt that the question should be adjudicated by a Full Bench of the Court, and the following order of reference was made:— “The question that arises for our determination is, whether an unregistered association can maintain a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant wants to strongly rely upon the ruling of the Supreme Court in A.B.S.K. Sangh (Rly) v. Union of India AIR 1981 S.C. 298 and particularly the observations in paragraph 63 at page 317. 3. As against this, learned Government Pleader would rely upon a judgment of a Division Bench reported in Writ Appl. Nos. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant wants to strongly rely upon the ruling of the Supreme Court in A.B.S.K. Sangh (Rly) v. Union of India AIR 1981 S.C. 298 and particularly the observations in paragraph 63 at page 317. 3. As against this, learned Government Pleader would rely upon a judgment of a Division Bench reported in Writ Appl. Nos. 49 to 52 and 58 to 60 of 1983, relied on in North Arcot District Pawn Brokers. Association v. Secy. to Govt. of India (1975) I MLJ 290 = 88 L.W. 65 S.N.. Further reliance is placed on Umesh Chand v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti AIR 1984 All 46 (F.B.) 4. Having regard to the recent trend of the case law enabling even a body of persons to agitate a common cause under writ jurisdiction, we are of the view that the Writ Appeal Nos. 49 to 52 and 58 to 60 of 1983, of this Court referred to and cited in North Arcot District Pawn Brokers Association v. Secy. to Government of India 1975 I Mad. LJ 290 = 88 L.W. 65 S.N. requires reconsideration. “5. Having regard to the importance of the question and in as much as this question is likely to occur often in view of the recent trend of the law, we are of opinion that it is desirable to have the same adjudicated by a Full Bench of this Court.” 5. The Full Bench thought it unnecessary to discuss the question in detail and answered the Reference in the following words:— “After going through the papers and on hearing the counsel, we are of the view that in view of R. 2-B of the Rules framed by virtue of Art. 225 of the Constitution, to regulate proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution, this question pales into insignificance, as any body of persons who wish to jointly agitate a matter or espouse a common cause can invoke the benefit of the said rule. Accordingly, we hold that an unregistered Association cannot maintain the writ petition.” Apparently, the Full Bench thought that the question would not arise in actual practice in view of Rule 2-B framed by this Court under Article 225 of the Constitution of India, governing writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, we hold that an unregistered Association cannot maintain the writ petition.” Apparently, the Full Bench thought that the question would not arise in actual practice in view of Rule 2-B framed by this Court under Article 225 of the Constitution of India, governing writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The said Rule is in the following terms: “Where several persons seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is open to the court to permit them to join in a single petition having regard to the nature of their grievance, the source of the right which they seek to enforce, the nature of the cause of action alleged and the nature of the relief prayed for.” It is significant to note that one of the members of the Division Bench, which made the order of reference was himself a party to the Full Bench which decided the matter. 6. Prior to the ruling of the Full Bench, the view taken by this Court consistently in all cases was that unregistered associations were not legal entities and could not maintain proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A Division Bench of this Court in W.A. Nos. 49 to 52 and 58 to 60 of 1968- Authoor Vivasaya Abhivirdhi Sangam and others v. State of Madras by the Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, Fort St. George, Madras. 9, stated the proposition thus:— “The appellants in W.A. Nos. 49, 52 and 60 of 1963 are associations which have been registered under the Societies Registration Act. Those in W.A. Nos. 51 and 58 and 59 of 1963 are unregistered associations which cannot be regarded as having any independent legal existence. They cannot obviously file or maintain applications under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even as regards registered societies it cannot be said that they are persons aggrieved by the order of the Government. It has not been claimed that the association or anyone of them owns lands in the ayacut and that the imposition of the additional assessment directly affected them or the particular association as a society. It may be that the members of the association feel aggrieved by the enhancement of the assessment, and in that sense the society might perhaps be interested in doing all things necessary for getting them reliefs. It may be that the members of the association feel aggrieved by the enhancement of the assessment, and in that sense the society might perhaps be interested in doing all things necessary for getting them reliefs. That cannot amount to legal grievance of the society.” That judgment was followed by Ismail, J. in The North Arcot District Pawn Brokers Association represented by its Secretary A.V. Ananthakrishna Chettiar and others v. The Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue and Insurance) New Delhi, and others 1975 I MLJ 290 = 88 L.W. 65 S. N. There does not appear to be any decision expressing a contrary opinion in this Court. It was in the case of Tamil Nadu Panchayat Development Officers Association, Madras AIR 1989 Madras 224 = 1988-1-L.W. 239 = 1989 Writ L.R. 84(F.B.), the Division Bench felt it necessary to refer the matter to a Full Bench. As seen from the Order of Reference, the Division Bench while making the Order of Reference did not express its own opinion on the question. 7. The settled law in this country is that a non-legal person or a non-juridical person cannot sue or be sued unless expressly provided by a statute or by Rules. S. 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, defines a ‘person’ to include ‘any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not’. The same definition is found in the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891 in S. 2(22). That means that in all Central Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of the Central Act and in every Tamil Nadu Act made after the commencement of the Tamil Nadu Act, the aforesaid definition would apply unless there is something repugnant in the said Act or Regulation or in the context. Though an unincorporated association or ‘body of individuals’ is to be considered to be a ‘person’ as defined by the General Clauses Act, an unregistered association or body of individuals cannot be treated as a person or of legal entity. It cannot have a right to sue or be sued, unless specified by a statute or rule. Though an unincorporated association or ‘body of individuals’ is to be considered to be a ‘person’ as defined by the General Clauses Act, an unregistered association or body of individuals cannot be treated as a person or of legal entity. It cannot have a right to sue or be sued, unless specified by a statute or rule. Article 367(1) of the Constitution of India reads that ‘Unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under Article 372, apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India. Article 226 of the Constitution uses the expression “person” when it refers to the power of the High Court to issue writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. Article 226 of the Constitution is silent as to who can move the High Court for issue of such writs. There can be no doubt whatever that a writ can be moved only by a ‘juridical person’ or a ‘person’ in the eye of law, and can be issued only against a ‘person’ as defined by the General Clauses Act. 8. In Sabitri Motor Service v. Asansol Bus Association AIR 1951 Calcutta 255, a Special Bench held that the word ‘Association’ found in S. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, does not mean an association which was incorporated and which could be regarded as a legal entity. Taking into account the context in which the expression “any association representing persons interested in the provision of road transport facilities” was occurring in S. 47(f) of that Act, the Bench held that the said expression was wide enough to include an association consisting of a number of owners of omnibuses, financially interested in the provision of road transport facilities and did not bar an unregistered association from preferring an objection under S. 47 of that Act and later an appeal under S. 64(f) of that Act. Thus, that decision turned on the interpretation of the word “association” as found in the relevant section of the statute, having regard to the context in which it was used. But, the legal position that an unincorporated association was not a legal entity, was recognised. 9. Thus, that decision turned on the interpretation of the word “association” as found in the relevant section of the statute, having regard to the context in which it was used. But, the legal position that an unincorporated association was not a legal entity, was recognised. 9. A single Judge of the same Court held that the State Medical Faculty, which had received the statutory recognition and the power of conferring Medical degrees or diploma by the Indian Medical Degrees Act, was a ‘person’ within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (Sec Bijoy Ranjan v. B.C. Das Gupta AIR 1953 Calcutta 289. In that case, the respondent was B.C. Das Gupta, who was the President of the Governing Body of the State Medical Faculty of West Bengal. It was contended that all the other members of the Faculty should be impleaded as parties, as it was an unincorporated body of individuals and a writ could not be issued as against such a body. While negativing that contention, the Court held as stated above. 10. In Radha Gobinda Paul v. Regional Transport Authority, Midnapore AIR 1955 Calcutta 59 the Calcutta High Court held that the ruling of the Special Bench in Sabitri Motor Service v. Asansol Bus Association AIR 1951 Calcutta 255 turned on the provisions of S. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act and would not apply to the proceedings under other Sections. The following passage in the judgment is relevant:— “It follows that so far as the petitioner is concerned in his individual capacity he is certainly entitled to relief in this application. The next question is whether I can grant relief to the association as a whole. It has been held in ‘Sabitri Motor Service Ltd. v. Asansole Bus Association’ AIR 1951 Cal 255 (S.B.) that in as much as S. 47 specifically entitles an association interested in the provision of road transport facilities to make representations, an association which answers that description but is unregistered and unincorporated can nevertheless make representations. It is argued that the power which is exercised under S. 48 and which refers to S. 47 would also give a right to such an association to be heard if it affected its interests. It is argued that the power which is exercised under S. 48 and which refers to S. 47 would also give a right to such an association to be heard if it affected its interests. It might well be so, but in this particular case, it appears that all the members of this unincorporated and unregistered association are not asking for the relief claimed in the petition because some of them have already accepted the rates that have been fixed by the Regional Transport Authority. Therefore, in any event, it is not possible for the Court to grant relief to the association as a whole because it is not a legal entity and all the members thereof do not seek the relief which has been asked for. In my opinion, I cannot grant any relief to the association as a whole in this application.” 11. In Mahir Kumar Dutta v. Ad-hoc Committee, Prachya Bharati (High School) Agartala and others AIR 1959 Tripura 27, it was held by a Judicial Commissioner that the Ad-hoc Managing Committee of the School was a domestic Tribunal and it was a ‘person’ as defined by the General Clauses Act and that a writ could be issued to the same. The relevant part of the reasoning was that the School was a public institution and its Managing Committee was a public body and, therefore, there was nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which barred the Court from issuing a Certiorari to such a body. However, on the merits, it was found that the petitioner had no case and the petition was dismissed. 12. In Manahem v. Union of India AIR 1960 Bombay 196 it was held that the Collector of Customs was not a legal entity, but was merely an office occupied by several persons from time as appointed by the Authorities and a suit could not be filed against or in the name of the Collector of Customs. 13. In Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia, College, Delhi v. State of Delhi AIR1962 S.C. 458, a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court had to consider the validity of Tibbia College Act. The Bench had to decide the nature of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. It was held that a registered Society was not an incorporated body and it had no legal personality. The Bench had to decide the nature of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. It was held that a registered Society was not an incorporated body and it had no legal personality. Though under S. 6 of the Societies Registration Act, a registered society had right to sue or be sued in the name of the President, Chairman, etc., which was referred to by the Court, it was held that it was not a corp oration and not a legal person as such. After referring to the various provisions of the Act, a passage from the law relating to Unincorporated Association (1938 Edn.) by Dennis Lloyd at page 59, in respect of the provisions of the Friendly Societies Act, 1986 was reproduced and it was observed as follows:— “We think that these observations made with regard to similar provisions of the Friendly Societies Act, correctly and succinctly summarise the legal position in respect of the several provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Those provisions undoubtedly give certain privileges to a society registered under that Act and the privileges are of considerable importance and some of those privileges are analogous to the privileges enjoyed by a corporation, but there is really no incorporation in the sense in which that word is legally understood.” Thus, it is clear that whatever may be the position with reference to a registered society, there can be no doubt with regard to an unregistered society that it can have no legal personality. But, this position in law stated categorically by the Constitution Bench was not taken note of by a Bench of three Judges in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others AIR 1979 S.C. 1628 . It was observed by Bhagawathi, J. that a Corporation may be created in one of two ways and it may be either established by a statute or incorporated under a law, such as Companies Act, 1956 or the Societies Registration Act 1860. Obviously, the reference to the Societies Registration Act was by inadvertence and no reference was made to the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in the Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi case AIR 1962 S.C. 458 . Obviously, the reference to the Societies Registration Act was by inadvertence and no reference was made to the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in the Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi case AIR 1962 S.C. 458 . However, the same learned Judge, as a member of Five Judge Constitution Bench in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib AIR 1981 S.C. 487 approved of the aforesaid observation at page 496. 14. In Director General Ordnance Factories Employees Association v. Union of India and Director General Ordnance Factories AIR 1969 Calcutta 149, Basu, J. held that an association of Government Employees recognised by the Government according to the Central Services (Recognition of Service Association) Rules 1959, made in exercise of powers conferred by Article 309 of the Constitution of India, gave the association only a status in its relationship and dealings with the employer, i.e., the Government, and it had nothing to do with the representation of its members in a litigation before a court of law. It was held that in cases where the right of a collective body to bring proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution was challenged, two questions had to be answered: (a) Is the petitioner a legal entity or otherwise permitted by statute to initiate legal proceedings in its own name? (b)Has it been affected by the impugned order as a collective body? The answer to the first question was that a legal proceeding may be maintained only by an individual or other body which is recognised as a legal person and in the case of a body incorporated by law, the corporate body acquires a legal personality of itself and as such entitled to maintain legal proceedings. It was held that an unincorporated association had no legal personality and it was nothing but aggregation of its members, who could only bring legal proceedings in their individual capacity, and even when all of them are affected by an official act, they could challenge that only if all the members join in the proceedings by name. It was held that the Association in such a case, could not maintain an application under Article 226 or other legal proceeding in its own name and even registration under the Societies Registration Act could not confer that right. It was held that the Association in such a case, could not maintain an application under Article 226 or other legal proceeding in its own name and even registration under the Societies Registration Act could not confer that right. The exceptions to the said general rules were pointed out to be a registered trade union which was made a body corporate by S. 13 of the Trade Unions Act empowered to sue and be sued, and an association of workmen, under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, having a right to raise industrial disputes and to represent the workmen throughout the proceedings and an association interested in transport facilities under S. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was further held that even where an association was permitted by law to bring a legal proceeding, it could bring an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India only when its rights as a collective body, as distinguished from the aggregate rights of its members, were affected by the Act challenged in the proceedings. The learned Judge referred to the previous rulings of the same court, the Allahabad High Court and the Supreme Court. I am entirely in agreement with the opinion expressed in that case by Basu, J. 15. In Sribatsha Kanugo and others v. Board of Secondary Education and others AIR 1969 Orissa 30, a Division Bench of that Court held that in view of the definition of “person” in General Clauses Act and the provisions of Article 367(1) of the Constitution of India, the Managing Committee of a School was a ‘person’ and could apply under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that it had a fundamental right to property guaranteed under Article 31(1) of the Constitution of India. It is seen from the facts of the case, that the President of the Committee was the first petitioner and t he Secretary of the Committee was the second petitioner. The third petitioner was one of the members of the Committee and the Committee received donations for the School by registered documents and it held lands donated to the school as trustees for the benefit of the school. The third petitioner was one of the members of the Committee and the Committee received donations for the School by registered documents and it held lands donated to the school as trustees for the benefit of the school. Thus, on the facts it could be said that the members of the Committee were trustees-in-law and, therefore, they could maintain an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, represented by the President, Secretary and one member of the Committee. 16. In State of Kerala v. The General Manager, Southern Railway, Madras AIR 1984 Allahabad 46, the Apex Court held that the Railway Administration or its General Manager was not a legal entity or a Corporate Body or a juridical person to represent the Railway Administration as such in suits and the suit against the Railway Administration or its Manager was not maintainable. The Court held that the definition of ‘Railway Administration’ in S. 3(6) of the Railways Act did not warrant an inference that a suit could be brought against the administration or the Manager of that Railway. 17. In Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar and others v. Krishi Utpadan Mondi Samiti, Bharihana and another AIR 1984 Allahabad 46, a Full Bench of that Court held that an association of persons, registered or unregistered, could file a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for enforcement of the rights of its members as distinguished from enforcement of its own rights—(1) In case members of such an association are themselves unable to approach the Court by reason of poverty, disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position (little Indians), (2) In case of a public injury leading to public interest litigation provided the association has some concern deeper than that of a wayfarer or a busybody, i.e., it has a special interest in the subject matter; (3) Where the Rules or Regulations of the association specifically authorise it to take legal proceedings on behalf of its members, so that any order passed by the Court in such proceedings would be binding on the members and it was held that in other cases, an association, whether registered or unregistered, could not maintain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement or protection of the rights of its members as distinguished from the enforcement of its own rights. The Full Bench referred to some of the rulings of the Supreme Court in Public Interest litigations, in which the question of “standing” had been decided. The observations made by the Supreme Court while deciding the question of ‘locus standi’ were relied on by the Full Bench to lay down the propositions referred to above. The Full Bench did not take note of the fact that an unregistered association was not a legal entity or a legal person, which could maintain a proceeding in a court of law. There was no reference at all to that aspect of the matter by the Full Bench. 18. In fact, the ruling of the Full Bench of this Court in Tamil Nadu Panchayat Development Officers Association case AIR 1989 Madras 224 is directly contrary to the above ruling of the Allahabad High Court. A reference was made to the judgment of Allahabad High Court in the order of reference to the Full Bench by the Division Bench of this Court. An analysis of the aforesaid rulings shows that an unregistered association or body of individuals is not a legal person, which can maintain a proceeding in a court of law. 19. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the normal rule that a non-juridical person cannot maintain an action in a court of law, is not applicable to public interest litigations and after the recognition of such litigations, even non-legal entities could maintain a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. My attention is drawn to various judgments of the Supreme Court most of them being public interest litigations, and reliance is placed on the observations made by the Supreme Court while discussing the question of locus standi by the petitioners before it. The question to be considered is whether there is a change in law on account of the introduction of public interest litigation in the system. In so far as Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned, the law was laid down by a Constitution Bench in categorical terms in Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and others AIR 1962 S.C. 1044 . In so far as Article 226 of the Constitution of India is concerned, the law was laid down by a Constitution Bench in categorical terms in Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and others AIR 1962 S.C. 1044 . It was held that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the relief asked for should be one to enforce a legal right and such right should ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself, who complained of infraction of such right and approached the Court for relief. It was also held that the right that could be enforced under Article 226 of the Constitution also should ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto, this rule might have to be relaxed or modified. 20. Rule 8 of the Rules framed by this Court to regulate proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, makes the provisions contained in Rules 9 to 11 of Order 4 of the Rules of the Appellate Side relating to institution of proceedings applicable to petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. Order 4, Rules 9 to 11 of the Appellate Side Rules require that any proceeding not instituted in conformity with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or of the Appellate Side Rules or any special enactment or the Rules applicable to it, shall be returned to the party or the practitioner concerned for amendment and re-presentation within a prescribed period and provide for posting the matter before court, where the proceedings are not re-presented after a period of three months after the expiry of the time allowed. Thus, the provisions of the Code are made applicable to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There is no separate provision in the Rules with reference to Writ Petitions, which could be classified as ‘public interest liligaliors’ 21. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) represented by its Assistant General Secretary v. Union of India and others AIR 1981 S.C. 344 . It was a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. An objection was taken by the respondent that the first petitioner was an unrecognised Association and the petition to that extent was not sustainable. It was a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. An objection was taken by the respondent that the first petitioner was an unrecognised Association and the petition to that extent was not sustainable. That contention was overruled in the following terms:— “Whether the petitioners belong to a recognised union or not, the fact remains that a large body of persons with a common grievance exists and they have approached this Court under Art. 32. Our current procession jurisprudence is not of individualistic Anglo-Indian mould. It is broad-based and people-oriented, and envisions access to justice through ‘class actions’, public interest litigation’, and ‘representative proceedings’. Indeed, little Indians in large numbers seeking remedies in courts through collective proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive plurality of litigations, is an affirmation of participative justice in our democracy. We have no hesitation in holding that the narrow concept of ‘cause of action’ and ‘person aggrieved’ and individual litigation is becoming obsolescent in some jurisdictions. It must fairly be stated that the learned Attorney General has taken no objection to a non-recognised association maintaining the writ petitions.” 22. No question was raised in that case as to whether the petitioner association was a legal entity on the footing that it was unregistered. It is not known from the report of the case whether the association was registered or not. The contention as to maintainability of the petition was based only on the non-recognition of the association by the employer. 23. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd.) Sindri and others v. Union of India and others AIR 1981 S.C. 344 , the petitioner was a registered Union and, therefore, the question which is being considered by me did not arise for decision. The observations relating to “standing in civil litigation” do not have any bearing on the present question. 24. There was an elaborate discussion as to the scope and nature of a public interest litigation in the famous Judges Transfer case - S.P. Gupta and others v. President of India and others AIR 1982 S.C. 149 . There was no occasion in that case to decide whether a non-legal entity or a non-juridical person could maintain a proceeding in a court of law. All that the Court was concerned there was the locus standi of the individuals, who instituted the proceedings. There was no occasion in that case to decide whether a non-legal entity or a non-juridical person could maintain a proceeding in a court of law. All that the Court was concerned there was the locus standi of the individuals, who instituted the proceedings. However, reliance is placed on certain observations made in the judgment that the normal rules of procedure applicable in ordinary cases should not be applied to a public interest litigation. My attention is drawn to the following passage at page 189:— “It is true there are Rules made by this Court presenting the procedure for moving this Court for relief under Art. 32 and they require various formalities to be gone through by a person seeking to approach this Court. But it must not be forgotten that procedure is but a handmaiden of justice and the cause of justice can never be allowed to be thwarted by any procedural technicalities. The Court would therefore, unhesitatingly and without the slightest claims of conscience cast aside the technical rules of procedure in the exercise of its dispensing power and treat the letter of the public minded individual as a writ petition and act upon it.” But, in the same judgment it was observed that “any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury, arising from breach of public duty or violation of some provisions of Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and observance of such constitutional or legal provisions”. (Underlining mine). As pointed out already, the Court had no occasion to decide whether the petitioner before the Court could be a non-judicial person. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the judgment in Peoples Union for Democratic Rights and others v. Union of India and others AIR 1982 S.C. 1473 corresponding to ( 1982 (II) LLJ 454 ) (cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in the endorsement of re-presentation). It is stated that the Peoples Union for Democratic Rights was an unregistered association. The report of judgment does not contain any indication as to whether the Peoples Union was a registered or an unregistered body. But, there again, the question was not raised as to whether the proceeding could be maintained by an unregistered body. It is stated that the Peoples Union for Democratic Rights was an unregistered association. The report of judgment does not contain any indication as to whether the Peoples Union was a registered or an unregistered body. But, there again, the question was not raised as to whether the proceeding could be maintained by an unregistered body. Objection was taken to the locus standi of the petitioner to maintain the petitions and that was overruled by the Court. It was observed that public interest litigation was a strategic arm of the legal aid movement, intended to bring justice within the reach of the poor masses, who constitute the low visibility area of humanity and it was totally different kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional litigation, which was essentially of an adversary character, where there was a dispute between two litigating parties, one making claim or seeking relief against the other and the other opposing such claim or resisting such relief. Apart from the fact that the question which is now being considered by me was not raised or decided in that case, the characteristic feature of a public interest litigation as stated by the Apex Court in that case is absent in this case. This is not a case of fight for a cause of the poor masses or persons who constitute the low visibility area of humanity, nor is it a case of a person instituting the proceeding for the benefit of persons other than himself. The present writ petition is not only on behalf of the lawyers of the country in general but also on behalf of the members of the petitioner union and thus, this is partly a self interest litigation and partly public interest litigation, if I can use that expression. To speak plainly, this is only a case of a representative action, sought to be instituted by a section of the community of lawyers. 26. In Sudipt Mazumdar v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1983 2 SCC 258 , a Bench of two Judges of the Supreme Court passed an order referring a case to the constitution Bench to give proper guide lines on the various issues involved in it. The order was passed on a letter sent to Justice Bhagwati along with annexures and paper cuttings. The order was passed on a letter sent to Justice Bhagwati along with annexures and paper cuttings. The Bench framed ten questions to be decided by the Constitution Bench, which would arise in every public interest litigation. Three of them are relevant for the purpose of this case. They are questions 3, 7 and 10, which read thus: “3. Can a stranger to a cause be he a journalist, social worker, advocate or an association of such persons initiate action before this Court in matters alleged to be involving public interest or should a petitioner have some interest in common with others whose rights are infringed by some governmental action or inaction in order to establish his locus standi to make such a compliant? 7. If after investigation, it is found that by such a letter a baseless complaint had been made, should not costs be imposed on the person who had written it? can he be treated differently from others? 10. Would such informality not lead to greater identification of the Court with the cause then it would be when a case involving the same type of cause is filed in the normal way?” But, it is not known whether a Bench was constituted pursuant to the said order and the questions raised therein were ever considered. 27. The observations in D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India AIR 1983 S.C. 130 pertained to the locus standi of a Co-operative Society registered under the Societies Registration Act to spouse the cause of retires, who were individually unable to seek redress through labyrinths of costly legal judicial process. As seen from the cause title, some of the petitioners appear to be interested persons. The third petitioner therein was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and it goes without saying that it had a right to sue under the said Act. 28. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and others AIR 1984 S.C. 802 , the petitioner was an organisation dedicated to the cause of release of bonded labourers in the country. The question whether it was a juridical person was not raised. However, Pathak, J. observed that even in public interest litigations, the procedure to be adopted must be a procedure designed and shaped by the court. The following passages in his judgment are relevant and instructive:— “58. The question whether it was a juridical person was not raised. However, Pathak, J. observed that even in public interest litigations, the procedure to be adopted must be a procedure designed and shaped by the court. The following passages in his judgment are relevant and instructive:— “58. The procedures adopted by the Court in cases of public interest litigation must of course be procedures designed and shaped by the court with a view to resolving the problem presented before it and determining the nature and extent of relief accessible in the circumstances. On the considerations to which I have adverted earlier, the court enjoys a degree of flexibility unknown to the trial of traditional private law litigation. But I think it necessary to emphasise that whatever the procedure adopted by the Court it must be procedure known to judicial tenets and characteristic of a judicial proceeding. There are methods and avenues of procuring material available to executive and legislative agencies, and often employed by them for the efficient and effective discharge of the tasks before them. Nor all those methods and avenues are available to the court. The Court must ever remind itself that one of the indicia identifying it as a court is the nature and character of the procedure adopted by it in determining a controversy. It is in that sense limited in the evolution of procedures pursued by it in the process of an adjudication, and in the grant and execution of the relief. Legal jurisprudence has in its historical development identified certain fundamental principles which form the essential constituents of judicial procedure. They are employed in every judicial proceeding, and constitute the basic infrastructure along whose channels flows the power of the Court in the process of adjudication. 59. What should be the conceivable framework of procedure in public interest litigation? This question does not admit of a clear cut answer. As I have observed earlier, it is not possible to envisage a defined pattern of procedure applicable to all cases. Of necessity the pattern which the Court adopts will vary with the circumstances of each case. But it seems to me that one principle is clear. If there is a statute prescribing a judicial procedure governing the particular case the Court must follow such procedure. It is not open to the Court to bypass the statute and evolve a different procedure at variance with it. But it seems to me that one principle is clear. If there is a statute prescribing a judicial procedure governing the particular case the Court must follow such procedure. It is not open to the Court to bypass the statute and evolve a different procedure at variance with it. Where, however, the procedure prescribed by statute is incomplete or insufficient, it will be open to the Court to supplement it by evolving its own rules. Nonetheless the supplementary procedure must conform at all stages to the deviation from the principles of natural justice and other well accepted procedural norms characteristic of a judicial proceeding. They constitute an entire code of general principles of procedure, tried and proven and hallowed by the sanctity of common and consistent acceptance during long years of the historical development of the law. “The general principles of law, to which reference is made here, command the confidence, not merely of the Judge and the lawyer and the parties of the litigation, but supply that basic credibility to the judicial proceeding which strengthens public faith in the Rule of Law. They are rules rooted in reason and fair play, and their governance guarantees a just disposition of the case. The Court should be wary of suggestion favouring novel procedures in cases where accepted procedural rules will suffice.” 67. There is grant merit in the Court proceeding to decide an issue on the basis of strict legal principle and avoiding carefully the influence of purely emotional appeal. For that alone gives the decision of the Court a direction which is certain, and unfaltering, and that particular permanence in legal jurisprudence which makes it a base for the next step forward in the further progress of the law. 68. This warning is of especial significance in these times, during a phase of judicial history when a few social action groups tend to show evidence of presuming that in every case the Court must bend and mould its decision to popular notions of which way a case should be decided.” 29. In “Common Cause” a Registered Society and others v. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 210 , the first petitioner was a registered society, as the cause title itself shows. In “Common Cause” a Registered Society and others v. Union of India AIR 1987 SC 210 , the first petitioner was a registered society, as the cause title itself shows. In Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. AIR 1988 S.C. 2187 , it was held that it could not be said that procedural laws did not apply to public interest litigations and at the same time, it had to be remembered that every technicality in the procedural law was not available as a defence when a matter of grave public importance was for consideration before the court. When the question is whether the party who has instituted the proceeding is a legal person or not, it is not a mere technicality, but it goes to the root of the matter. The basic concept of the jurisprudence cannot be ignored and it is not possible to imagine a situation where a non-juridical person can institute a proceeding in a court of law and seek relief. 30. Reliance is placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Confederation of Joint Action Council of Tamil Nadu Teachers and Employees Association 1988 Writ L.R. 320. It is stated that the said Association was not a registered body. No question was raised in that case as to whether the association was a legal entity and whether it could maintain a writ petition. The only contention related to the locus standi of the association to file the writ petition. Hence, that judgment is of no help to the petitioner. 31. My attention is drawn to the observations of the Supreme Court in Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of U.P. and others 1990 4 S.C.C. 449 administering a note of caution with reference to public interest litigation. The Apex Court, which treated a letter written to the Court as a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, observed as follows:— “Anything which endangers or impairs by conduct of anybody either in violation or in derogation of laws, that quality of life and living by the people is entitled to be taken recourse of Article 32 of the Constitution. But this can only be done by any person interested genuinely in the protection of the society on behalf of the society or community. But this can only be done by any person interested genuinely in the protection of the society on behalf of the society or community. This weapon as a safeguard must be utilised and invoked by the court with great deal of circumspection and caution.” It was found on the facts that there was no violation of any fundamental right, and the allegations were made by the petitioners on account of ugly rivalry between the parties in business and it was observed that the Court must protect the society from the so called ‘protectors’ and that the application was legally devoid of any merit or principles of public interest and public protection. 32. In the Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare Association (Registered) v. State of Karnataka and others AIR 1991 SC 1117 , the first petitioner was a registered body and there was no question as to whether it was a legal person. The contention regarding the “want of standing” was negatived. 33. Much reliance is placed on an order of the Supreme Court in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India and others AIR 1991 S.C. 1598 and a later order in the same case by the same Bench in (1991) 4 S.C.C. 699 . It is argued that the Sub-Committee on judicial Accountability was not a registered body. The question which is now under consideration was not raised before the Apex Court and it had no occasion to consider the same. 34. Thus, it is seen that the Supreme Court has not so far given any ruling that a non-juridical person can maintain a proceeding in a Court of law. The view taken by the Full Bench of this Court in Tamil Nadu Panchayat Development Officers Association case (AIR 1989 Madras 224 = 1989-1-L.W. 239 = 1989 Writ L.R. 84 (F.B.) stands undisturbed. It cannot be challenged on the ground that it failed to consider any prior ruling of the Supreme Court; nor can it be said that because of any subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court, the rule laid down by the Full Bench has ceased to be good law. Even assuming that the Supreme Court had entertained proceedings at the instance of unregistered bodies as contended by learned counsel for the petitioner, that will not enable this Court to overlook the procedure prescribed by law or ignore well-established principles of law. Even assuming that the Supreme Court had entertained proceedings at the instance of unregistered bodies as contended by learned counsel for the petitioner, that will not enable this Court to overlook the procedure prescribed by law or ignore well-established principles of law. It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar and others AIR 1992 S.C. 1593 that a decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law and the High Court cannot be equated with the Supreme Court. Reference is made to Article 142 of the Constitution of India which empowers the Supreme Court to make such orders as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it, which authority the High Court does not enjoy. It is worthwhile reproducing the following passage in that judgment:— “6. A decision is available as a precedent, only if it decides a question of law. The respondents are, therefore, not entitled to rely upon an order of this court which directs a temporary employee to be regularised in his service without assigning reasons. It has to be presumed that for special grounds which must have been available to the temporary employees in those cases, they were entitled to the relief granted. Merely because grounds are not mentioned in a judgment of this court it cannot be under stood to have been passed without an adequate legal basis therefor. On the question of the requirement to assign reasons for an order, a distinction has to be kept in mind between a Court whose judgment is not subject to further appeal and other Courts. One of the main reasons for disclosing and discussing the grounds in support of a judgment is to enable a higher court to examine the same in case of a challenge. It is, of course, desirable to assign reasons for every order or judgment, but the requirement is not imperative in the case of this court. It is, therefore, futile to suggest that if this court has issued an order which apparently seems to be similar to the impugned order, the High Court can also do so. There is still another reason why the High Court cannot be equated with this court. It is, therefore, futile to suggest that if this court has issued an order which apparently seems to be similar to the impugned order, the High Court can also do so. There is still another reason why the High Court cannot be equated with this court. The constitution has, by Art. 142, empowered the Supreme Court to make such orders as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it”, which authority the High Court does not enjoy. The jurisdiction of the High Court, while dealing with a writ petition, is circumscribed by the limitations discussed and declared by the judicial decisions, and it cannot transgress the limits on the basis of whims or subjective sense of justice varying from Judge to Judge.” 35. Mr. K. Chandru, Advocate, who was present in Court at the time of hearing, made a submission that under some enactments, unregistered bodies have been conferred with certain rights enabling such bodies to represent their members. It is pointed out by him that political parties are registered under the provisions of the Representation of Peoples Act for the purpose of allotment of symbols and such political parties are allowed to represent their members in all matters. Even if it is so, that will not make a political party a “legal person” in the eye of law. It is next argued by him that under the provisions of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, Societies are permitted to make representations. According to him, even unregistered societies are recognised for the purpose of the said Act. Though it is not necessary for me to consider the said matter here, I would like to point out that under S. 12B(2) of the said Act, the provisions of Rule 8 of Order I of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are made applicable to the proceedings. Mr. Chandru stated that under the Consumer Protection Act also unregistered bodies are permitted to institute proceedings. There is a definition in the said Act in S. 2(m) that a “person” includes “(i) a firm whether registered or not;(ii) a Hindu undivided family; (iii) a cooperative society;(iv) every other association or persons whether registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or not”. There is a definition in the said Act in S. 2(m) that a “person” includes “(i) a firm whether registered or not;(ii) a Hindu undivided family; (iii) a cooperative society;(iv) every other association or persons whether registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or not”. In view of the said definition, unregistered associations are also enabled to institute proceedings before the form constituted proceedings before the forum constituted under the said Act. 36. It is next contended that Bar Associations and Advocates Associations are conferred with certain rights under the Advocates Act, whether they are registered or not. I am unable to find any reference in the Advocates Act to any association of Advocates. The Act only refers to Bar Council of India and State Bar Councils. The Bar Councils are enabled to frame certain rules under the provisions of the Act. That will not make an unregistered association of advocates a legal entity. In fact, several associations of Advocates are registered. For example, the Madras Advocates Association is a registered body. The Supreme Court Bar Association is also a registered body. 37. Mr. Chandru then drew my attention to the Government Servants Conduct Rules and the recognition afforded thereby to service Associations. The ruling of Basu, J. in Director General Ordnance Factories Employees Association case AIR 1969 Calcutta 149 gives a complete answer to the question raised by Mr. Chandru. Just because the Government confers a statute on such associations and recognises them for certain purposes, the Associations will not become ‘legal persons’ in the eye of law. 38. It is next argued that the rules framed by the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal enabled even unregistered associations or societies to institute proceedings. S. 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, refers to a ‘person aggrieved”. Necessarily, the word ‘person’ will have the definition gives to it in General Clauses Act. It cannot, therefore include an unregistered association, though it may include an unincorporated body of association. S. 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, refers to a ‘person aggrieved”. Necessarily, the word ‘person’ will have the definition gives to it in General Clauses Act. It cannot, therefore include an unregistered association, though it may include an unincorporated body of association. S. 22 of the said Act is to the effect that the Tribuna l shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and subject to the other provisions of the Act and of any rules made by the Central Government, the Tribunal shall have power to regulating its own procedure, including the fixing of places and times of its inquiry. While regulating the procedure, the Administrative Tribunal might have permitted unregistered associations of persons to present applications. I find that Rule 4(5)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1983 contains a provision enabling the Tribunal to grant permission to an association representing the persons desirous of joining in a single application, provided that the application discloses the class/grade/categories of the persons on whose behalf it has been filed. I have already stated that unless expressly permitted by a statute or a rule framed thereunder, it is not possible for a non-legal or non-juridical person to maintain a proceeding in a Court of law. 39. Finally, Mr. Chandru said that when letters and telegrams are treated as writ petitions, it will not be possible for the court to exclude unregistered associations. I do not agree. I practice, there will be no difficulty. Even in such cases, the Registry may take care to ascertain the name of an office-bearer or member and show him as the petitioner in the cause title. As pointed out earlier, the view taken by this Court has always been the same even before the Full Bench judgment. Yet, this court has been entertaining and disposing of public interest litigations all these years. It is not an empty formality of a cause title, but a basic tenet of the jurisprudence that courts of law deal with juridical persons only. Yet, this court has been entertaining and disposing of public interest litigations all these years. It is not an empty formality of a cause title, but a basic tenet of the jurisprudence that courts of law deal with juridical persons only. 40 In the result, I have no hesitation in holding that the judgment of the Full Bench in Tamil Nadu Panchayat Development Officers Association case AIR 1989 Madras 224 = 1989-1-L.W. 239 = 1989 Writ L.R. 84 (F.B.) holds the field and the present writ petition filed by an unregistered union cannot be maintained. The objection raised by the office is sustained and the Registry is directed to return the papers to the petitioners concerned. 41. Before parting with this order, I should place on record my gratitude to the Senior Amicus Curiae Sri S. Gopalratnam and the Junior Amicus Curiae Sri. S. Venkateswaran, who placed all the relevant authorities on the subject and ably assisted me in coming to a conclusion in this case.