JUDGMENT 1. - These special appeals have been filed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 18.2.1992. Both the above appeals are disposed of by this common judgment since the points involved are common. 2. The dispute relates with regard to the admission of the petitioners in M.D. Anasthesia (P.G. Course), which was not granted to them initially. 3. The submission of Mr. Mridul appearing on behalf of Dr. Mahendra Vangani and Dr. Sushil Pokharna is that the learned Single Judge has erred in relying the provisions of the Ordinance issued on 7.10.1989, whereas it was admitted that the provisions of Old Ordinance issued in April, 1989 are applicable to the petitioner. It has further been submitted that if there is no reshuffling or filling up of the vacancies within a period stipulated in the Ordinance, the vacancies should not be allowed to lapse and that since there was no reshuffling within, a period of 3 weeks, hence no second reshuffling is possible. It has also been submitted that the candidates who have not approached the court have no to claim any benefit and since provisional admission was granted to the petitioners they have studied and have appeared in the examination, they should be directed to continue their further studies in M.D. Course. 4. Brief facts of the present appeals are that till 1988 there were no examinations for admission in M.D. Course and Diploma Course. It was in the year 1989 that for the time the examinations were conducted for giving admissions to the various students in M.D. Course and Diploma Course in various specialities in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar v. M.L.N. Medical College, 1991(1) SCT 373 (SC) : [1990(5) SLR 68 (SC) : AIR 1991(2) 2030]. 5. Appellants Dr. Mahendra Vangani, Sushi Pokharna and Dr. Mrs. Smita Sinha appeared in the said examination and were placed in the merit list at serial Nos. 315, 316 and 308 respectively. The merit fist was prepared on 28th August, 1989 and the last date for depositing the fees was notified from 1st September to 7th September. The last candidate, who was given admission according to the merit list was at No. 226(1). Since the present appellants were not within the merit list, they were not given admission. The merit fist was prepared on 28th August, 1989 and the last date for depositing the fees was notified from 1st September to 7th September. The last candidate, who was given admission according to the merit list was at No. 226(1). Since the present appellants were not within the merit list, they were not given admission. In accordance with Ordinance No. 278-E the reshuffling for the first time was done on 18th January, 1990 and the appellants were given admission in Diploma course on 24/25th January, 1990. The first vacancy was created in June, 1990 and the second vacancy was created in December, 1990, due to resignation of Dr. Sanjay Bajaj and Dr. Mrs. Ranjna Solanki. The writ petition by the first two appellants were filed on 13.5.1991 and, thereafter, Dr. Mrs. Smita Sinha filed the writ petition on 27th August, 1991. The relevant provisions of the unamended Ordinance 218-E was as under : "The vacancies due to not joining within the stipulated time shall be filled by reshuffling on the basis of merit-cum-preference list within 3 weeks. The vacancies after reshuffling or at a later date not exceeding 6 month from the date of initial appointment shall be filled in from amongst the candidates in the waiting list. 6. The provisions of the above ordinance were subsequently amended on 7th October, 1989, which read as under : "The vacancies due to non-joining within the stipulated time shall be filled by reshuffling on the basis of merit-cum-preference list, and the resultant vacancies or such vacancies which cannot be filled by re-shuffling shall be filled by taking candidates from the waiting list on merit-cum- preference basis, at the earliest, but, not later than six months from the date of initial appointment. No admission shall be made after six months from the date of initial appointment, even if any vacancy is left unfilled or any vacancy occurs subsequently." 7. Mr. Rastogi appearing on behalf of Dr. Mrs. Smita Sinha has submitted that since she it at merit No. 308 and the two candidates have already been given provisional admission, therefore, her rights should not be affected, and she should also be given admission in M.D. Anaesthesia. The appellants Dr. Mahendra Vangani and Dr. Sushil Pokharna were given provisional admissions on 3.6.1991 when the stay order was granted and later on confirmed on 30.7.1991. The appellants Dr. Mahendra Vangani and Dr. Sushil Pokharna were given provisional admissions on 3.6.1991 when the stay order was granted and later on confirmed on 30.7.1991. They were also allowed to appear in the first examination of M.D. Course, whereas Dr. Smita Sinha was not granted admission and in the stay order dated 28.10.1991, it was observed that the fact of there being more meritorious students then the two petitioners of writ petition No. 3004/91, was not informed to the Court. The writ petitions were ultimately dismissed on 18.2.92. Dr. Mrs. Smita Sinha though joined the department of Anaesthesia on 24th January, 1990, but on 21st February, 1990 she applied for two months leave due to medical reasons (hepatitis). On 3rd May, 1990, she sought extension of her leave for period of two months and again on 3rd July, 1990 for another two months and, thereafter, on 18th September, 1990 she further applied for extension of her leave for another 3 months. She joined on 17th December, 1990 and worked till February 23, 1991. On 18th February, 1991 the Principal and Controller S.M.S. Medical College, Jaipur had written to the Professor and Head of the Department of Anaesthesia that Dr. Smita Sinha after pursuing her remedies only for one month has absented without any information and her explanation regarding absence was not found satisfactory. On 28th June, 1901, on the recommendation of the Central Post Graduate Admission Board, Jaipur she' was sanctioned leave without the stipend for the period from 23.2.1990 to 16.12.1990 and 24.2.1991 to 5.7.1991. It was specifically made clear that this period shall not be counted for her training period for eligibility to appear in D.A. examination. 8. The various points, which have been raised from both the sides on the basis of the facts as stated above are adjudicated upon as hereunder :I. Whether the decision of the learned Single Judge dated 18th February, 1992 is illegal on the ground that he has held that the amendment of 7th October, 1989 is applicable ? 9. The provisions of Ordinance 278-E have been reproduced above. A bare perusal of the Ordinance as it existed in April, 1989 contemplates that there has to be reshuffling on the basis of merit-cum-preference list within 3 weeks. 9. The provisions of Ordinance 278-E have been reproduced above. A bare perusal of the Ordinance as it existed in April, 1989 contemplates that there has to be reshuffling on the basis of merit-cum-preference list within 3 weeks. Reshuffling is a facility to the selected candidate and, therefore, the reshuffling has to be made from one speciality to the other in a situation where a particular candidates has not joined or opted their speciality and, therefore, a vacancy has fallen in that speciality. Thus the work of reshuffling has to be made within 3 weeks from the last date, which was fixed for admission out of the candidates who were already admitted. The provisions of reshuffling are not applicable to those candidates who have not been admitted and are in the waiting list. The candidates who have already been admitted have a preference from those who are only in the waiting list and, therefore, the first exercise contemplated by the Ordinance is of re-shuffling. Admittedly, reshuffling was not done in the present case within a period of 3 weeks as contemplated by the Ordinance. 10. The submission of Mr. Mridul is that if the authority has failed or defaulted in reshuffling within the stipulated period then that cannot be taken against the appellants. If the authorities have failed to discharge their duties then they may be liable for such action, as may be permitted under law, but no right would be conferred upon the appellants for admission on that ground. It is also to be seen that after the reshuffling the vacancies have to be filled within a period not less than 6 months from the date of initial appointments from the candidates who are in the waiting list. The case of the appellants falls in the later clause, if they are in merit in the waiting list. The amended Ordinance has only made explicit what was implicit in the earlier Ordinance and a specific language has been used that no admission should be made after 6 months from the date of initial appointment, ever if any vacancy left unfilled or any vacancy occurs subsequently. The amended Ordinance has only made explicit what was implicit in the earlier Ordinance and a specific language has been used that no admission should be made after 6 months from the date of initial appointment, ever if any vacancy left unfilled or any vacancy occurs subsequently. The earlier Ordinance has provided that the vacancies from the waiting list have to be filled within a period of six months and, therefore, even if for the shake of arguments the Ordinance vide resolution No. 8 dated 7th October, 1989 is not taken into consideration, the position remains that for claiming any right of admission, the petitioner-appellants are not entitled for being considered in the reshuffling within a period of 3 weeks because they were not admitted. It is only the choice of particular speciality which is affected and not the admission, which has already been granted to the candidates who are already meritorious in reshuffling. The question of consideration of the appellants could have been only for filling up the vacancies after reshuffling at a later date not exceeding six months from the date of initial appointment and even for that purpose only those candidates would have been considered who were in the merit in the waiting list. Admittedly none of the appellants were in merit and, therefore, they could not have been considered. It may be stated over here that the provisions of Ordinance 278-E(2) contemplates the minimum period of training in a particular speciality as of not less than 21/2 years for M.D. Course. This has been so provided because for the purpose of filling up of the vacancies from the waiting list, six months period have been allowed by the Ordinance and, therefore, a candidate has to undergo training of not less than 21/2 years for the particular speciality, for which he is given admission. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pradeep Jain v. Union of India ( AIR 1984 SC 1420 ) have laid down guidelines with regard to the resolution and admission to Post Graduate Course. In Dinesh Kumar v. M.L.N. Medical College [1990(5) SLR 68 (SC) : AIR 1990(SC) 2030 : 1992(2) SCT 99 (SC)] the Supreme Court has observed that the time-bound programme for the purpose of admission should have been followed and a warning was administered to every one associated with the scheme of implementing the directions contained in the earlier judgment. In Dinesh Kumar v. M.L.N. Medical College [1990(5) SLR 68 (SC) : AIR 1990(SC) 2030 : 1992(2) SCT 99 (SC)] the Supreme Court has observed that the time-bound programme for the purpose of admission should have been followed and a warning was administered to every one associated with the scheme of implementing the directions contained in the earlier judgment. Stress was laid down on the time-bound programme. 12. In Subodh Notiyal v. Stale of U.P., ( AIR 1991 Supreme Court 1131) it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that this being a technical course a student should not be admitted four months after commencement of the course. 13. In Ajay Pradhan v. State of M.P. ( AIR 1988 SC 1875 ) it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that there was no question of a right of admission to a seat falling vacant in the midst of, or towards the end of, the academic year. If no vacancy occurs within a period of six months then a candidate in the waiting list has no right for admission. This conclusion is supported not only from the specific language of the Ordinance that the vacancies are to be filled after reshuffling at a date not later than six months from the date of initial appointment from amongst the candidates in the waiting list, but also from the requirement that for a particular speciality one has to undergo training of not less than 21/2 years. The admissions, which have been given preferentially have no sanction of law and on the contrary it has been observed in U.P. Junior Doctors Action Committee v. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani, ( AIR 1992 Supreme Court 671 : 1992(2) SCT 99 (SC) that provisional admission should not be given. Similar views have been taken in Prabir Kumar Ghosh v. University of Calcutta V/s Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani (AIR 1991 Calcutta 173). 14. While interpreting the Ordinance, it has to be seen as to whether the appellants are entitled for admission in accordance with the language used in the ordinance. The language of the ordinance being specific, the appellants have no right to get admission in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance and the judgment of the learned Single Judge in correct.II. The submission of Mr. Mridul is that whether the seats which fall vacant after six months should be allowed to lapse. The language of the ordinance being specific, the appellants have no right to get admission in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance and the judgment of the learned Single Judge in correct.II. The submission of Mr. Mridul is that whether the seats which fall vacant after six months should be allowed to lapse. For this argument it is sufficient to say that it is for the respondents to make a provision in this regard and if there is no such provision, the language used has to be strictly construed. The admission after lapse of a period of six months from the date of initial appointment can create number of problems to the institutions. The candidate has to attend the classes regularly besides the practical classes and the training which is imparted in the hospitals. This being the technical training if the admissions are allowed on the ground that the seat should not be allowed to remain vacant, would be either to out the respondents in a position to provide such further training so that the minimum training period in a particular speciality of 21/2 years is undergone or the candidate is deprived of such benefit of the Education in the regular classes or the practical classes or the training in the hospital. In these circumstances, it would not be proper to construe that simply because there is a vacant seat which has been created after lapse of a period of six months, the admission should be allowed to some candidate amongst the waiting list. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in a case where no vacancy arises within a period of six months from the date of initial appointment no candidate from the waiting list can have the right of admission.III. The submission of Mr. Mridul that since there was no reshuffling within a period of 3 weeks as contemplated by the Ordinance, therefore, there could not be any second reshuffling is not based on the proper appreciation of the language of the Ordinance. The Ordinance has not contemplated the second reshuffling. There is only one reshuffling which is contemplated a period of 3 weeks and, thereafter, it is only the filling of the vacancies from the waiting list and this second exercise cannot be considered to reshuffling. The Ordinance has not contemplated the second reshuffling. There is only one reshuffling which is contemplated a period of 3 weeks and, thereafter, it is only the filling of the vacancies from the waiting list and this second exercise cannot be considered to reshuffling. The persons who have already been admitted on account of the reshuffling on 18th January, 1990 have not been made as parties in the writ proceedings nor their admissions/appointments could be challenged and therefore, this ground of Mr. Mridul has also no force. The submission that the period of 5 months and one week should be counted from 18.1.1990 i.e. the date of reshuffling is also contrary to the language of the Ordinance.IV. His further submission is that the persons who have not approached the Court have no right to be considered. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Ashim Kumar Mohanti [1989(5) SLR 1 (SC) : AIR 1981 (SC) 487 ] where the time for admission is the particular academic session was long over and none of the waiting list candidate came for ward to press their claim, the Apex Court has held that ordinarily more meritorious candidates, if any, would have been entitled to preference over the respondents, but in the circumstances of this case, objection was not sustainable. In the present case the first vacancy has fallen due in June, 1990 and the second vacancy has fallen due in December, 1900 as stated above. The appellants filed writ petitions in May, 1991 and have only disclosed their serial numbers in the waiting list, but have not disclosed that there were more meritorious persons in the said waiting list and it was only for this reason that on 28.2.1991 when this fact was brought to the knowledge of this court in Writ Petition No. 4787/91, it was observed that the court was not informed that there were more meritorious students than the two petitioners. The stay application however in Writ Petition No. 4787/91 was dismissed. For this reason no relief could be given to appellants.V. The last submission of Mr. Mirdul is that since the appellants were granted provisional admission on equity/mercy ground, they should be allowed to continue their further studies. The stay application however in Writ Petition No. 4787/91 was dismissed. For this reason no relief could be given to appellants.V. The last submission of Mr. Mirdul is that since the appellants were granted provisional admission on equity/mercy ground, they should be allowed to continue their further studies. Reliance has been placed on Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Muzeeb [1980(3) SLR 467 (SC) : AIR 1981 (SC) 487 ] wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has refused to exercise its discretion in setting aside the selection made after lapse of about 18 months, since to do so would be to cause immense hardship to those students in whose case the validity of selection could not otherwise be questioned and who have nearly completed 3 semesters. Similarly in Kirti v. State of J & K (AIR 1981 SC 1109), the admission of the candidates who have already completed few months of their studies were not disturbed in order to avoid serious prejudice and detriment to their career. A very strange situation arises where provisional admission is given to a candidate by the court and it is for this reason that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has deprecated this type of practice. 15. In the present matter, it has been submitted by Mr. Goyal, appearing on behalf of the respondents that the appellants have appeared in the first examination and the papers are similar to those of diploma course and, therefore, since the appellants are not entitled for admission under law, they should be considered to have appeared in the diploma course for which admission was given to them in January, 1990. The diploma course is of two years and the degree course is of 3 years. 16. It would not be proper for this court to say that a candidate who has appeared and/or qualified the examination of Post Graduate Course should be considered to have qualified the examination of diploma course. Two of the appellants have under gone the regular classes from 3rd June, 1991 and in the special circumstances of the case, which should not create any precedence for future, we consider it proper to direct that Dr. Mahendra Vangani and Dr. Two of the appellants have under gone the regular classes from 3rd June, 1991 and in the special circumstances of the case, which should not create any precedence for future, we consider it proper to direct that Dr. Mahendra Vangani and Dr. Sushil Pokharna may be allowed to continue the further studies in M.D. Anaeshesia subject to : (i) that they shall have to complete the period of training of 21/2 years, which shall be counted from the date they have joined the Post Graduate Course i.e. 3rd June, 1991 or the subsequent date on which they have actually joined the course; (ii) they will be entitled to appear in the nearest examination after completion of training course of 21/2 years. 17. Since Dr. Smita Sinha has neither joined the course nor has appeared in the examination, not has qualified Ist part of the examination, no relief on equitable ground can be given to her. 18. It is not necessary to consider the additional affidavit submitted by the parties with regard to the vacancies since there is no dispute that the two vacancies have fallen in June, 1990 and December, 1990. 19. in the light of the above discussion, appeal No. 164/92 is dismissed and appeal No. 135/92 is partly allowed as indicated above.Parties are left to bear their own costs.Appeal partly allowed. *******