JUDGMENT 1. - In this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing of order dated 18.10.89 (Annexure-7) passed by the Chairman, Indian Red Cross Society, Rajasthan State Branch, Jaipur for suspension of the petitioner. The petitioner has prayed that respondents be directed to give him all consequential benefits including arrears of salary. 2. The petitioner was initially appointed as U.D.C.-cum-Typist-cum-Accountant by an order dated 10.6.71 issued by the Secretary, Indian Red Cross Society (for short 'the Society'). He was confirmed as U.D.C. by order dated 27.6.72. The petitioner was given the designation of Assistant Accounts Officer in the pay scale of Rs. 620-1100 on the basis of the approval given by the Managing Committee vide office note dated 30.6.81. Order in this connection was issued by the Secretary on 8.7.81. The petitioner was then promoted as Deputy Secretary of the Society and St. John Ambulance Association and allied sections, Rajasthan State Branch vide order dated 21.4.89 of the Chairman of the respondent Society. In its meeting dated 5/6.3.89 the Managing Committee of the respondent Society decided that the petitioner be given pay scale of Rs. 2100-3550 with effect from 24.1.89. While the petitioner was holding the post of Deputy Secretary, impugned order of suspension (Annexure-7) was passed by the Chairman on the grounds of registration of case by the Anti Corruption Department on the allegations of corruption, forgery and cheating. The order also records that the petitioner will be entitled to subsistence allowance as per rules. 3. In the writ petition the petitioner has alleged that the order of suspension has been passed by respondent No. 2 on account of his personal malice against him. The petitioner has stated that respondent No. 2 Dr. Pitambar Dayal Mathur, Chairman of the respondent Society entertained impression that the petitioner was instrumental in removal of his son jaideep Dayal Mathur from the post of Assistant Secretary. The petitioner has stated that without there being any post or budgetary provision, respondent No. 2 managed appointment of his son on the post of Assistant Secretary with effect from 1.4.89 in the pay scale of 1720-3350. In its meeting dated 30.7.89 the Managing Committee did not approve of the appointment of Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur. This compelled Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur to tender his resignation by a back dated letter dated 29.7.89 which was shown as accepted on 31.7.89. In its meeting dated 30.7.89 the Managing Committee did not approve of the appointment of Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur. This compelled Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur to tender his resignation by a back dated letter dated 29.7.89 which was shown as accepted on 31.7.89. Respondent No. 2 entertained an impression that the petitioner had instigated the members of the Management Committee for not approving the appointment of Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur. Another reason given by the petitioner for the malice of respondent No. 2 is that the petitioner has raised his voice before the members of the Managing Committee in regard to the misuse of powers and drawal of undue financial benefits by respondent No. 2. After getting rid of the petitioner from the active duty, respondent No. 2 managed issue of Office Order dated 15.11.89 whereby resignation of Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur was allowed to be withdrawn and the period of his absence from duty between 1.8.89 to 14.11.89 was treated as extra-ordinary leave without pay. It has also been stated that although the order dated 15.11.89 (Annexure-2) makes a reference of the fact that the case of appointment of Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur was put up before the Executive Committee in its meeting held on 8.9.89 and after a detailed discussion the committee ratified the appointment of Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur and withdrawal of his resignation, in fact the matter regarding appointment of Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur was not included in the agenda of the meeting of the Executive Committee. Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee dated 8.9.89 have been placed on record as Annexure-3. 4. The petitioner has stated that in order to achieve his ulterior objectives, respondent No. 2 managed lodging of several First Information Reports against the petitioner. One FIR No. 124/89 was lodged with the Anti-corruption Department on 30.8.89. Another FIR No. 236/89 in regard to the same incident was lodged at Moti Dungri Police Station by Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur. A third FIR was lodged with the Central Bureau of Investigation and was registered on 6.8.90. The C.B.I. conducted a search of the residential premises of the petitioner. All these FIR were manipulated by respondent No. 2 and according to the petitioner none of these reports are based on facts. 5. The petitioner was compelled to seek anticipatory bail from the High Court which was granted on 6.11.89. 6. The C.B.I. conducted a search of the residential premises of the petitioner. All these FIR were manipulated by respondent No. 2 and according to the petitioner none of these reports are based on facts. 5. The petitioner was compelled to seek anticipatory bail from the High Court which was granted on 6.11.89. 6. Another branch of plea of mala fide levelled by the petitioner is that he had submitted his protest vide letter dated 8.12.89 and had also requested the respondent Society to release his salary. A notice for demand of Justice dated 9.8.90 was also served by the petitioner through his counsel. Reply of the notice dated 9.8.90 was sent only after a period of one month. The petitioner has stated that he was allowed subsistence allowance only at the rate of 50% of his salary and it was raised to 75% of the salary only with effect from 1.4.91 vide order dated 1.5.91 (Annexure-'N'). 7. The petitioner has also stated that the order of suspension issued by respondent No. 2 is without jurisdiction. By making reference to the provisions of the Constitution of the Society, Rajasthan State Branch, the petitioner has submitted that the appointing authority in the case of the petitioner is the Managing Committee and the appointment of the petitioner was confirmed by the Managing Committee. Therefore, order of suspension could not have been passed by the Chairman on his own authority. In the meeting of the Managing Committee held on 26.9.90 the action of the Chairman was not approved. The petitioner has claimed that in its meeting held on 13.7.91 also the Managing Committee did not approve the action of the Chairman. For the meeting which was scheduled to take place on 29.10.91, no agenda for the approval of the impugned action was circulated. 8. In reply to the writ petition the respondents have claimed that the order of suspension of the petitioner has been passed on account of the registration of the cases against the petitioner on the basis of FIR No. 124/89 and 236/89. Even after registration of the aforesaid cases another FIR No. 29/90 was lodged with the Central Bureau of Investigation on 6.8.90 by the acting Secretary under Section 409 I.P.C. read with various provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Even after registration of the aforesaid cases another FIR No. 29/90 was lodged with the Central Bureau of Investigation on 6.8.90 by the acting Secretary under Section 409 I.P.C. read with various provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Another Criminal case was registered against the petitioner in respect of the allegations of misuse of his position in the matter of allotment of medical shop in the campus of the Society. Departmental inquiries regarding misappropriation of the funds of the Society have been initiated against the petitioner. The respondents have stated that the order of suspension does not suffer from any malice. The petitioner had nothing to do with the appointment of Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur. Respondent No. 2 has filed a separate reply and denied the allegations of mala fide. He has specifically asserted that he does not have any grudge, malice or ill-will against the petitioner and the suspension of the petitioner has absolutely no relevance or relation with the appointment/resignation or reappointment of Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur. It has then been stated that, under the provisions of Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951, the petitioner is entitled to subsistence allowance. Initially he was given 50% subsistence allowance. Subsequently it was raised to 75%. In his rejoinder the petitioner has again stated that respondent No. 2 has been conducting the affairs of the respondent Society in total disregard of the rules and the Constitution. The petitioner has reiterated his allegations that Respondent No. 2 manipulated the appointment of his son Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur. Respondent No. 1 has also filed an application dated 15.11.91 and an affidavit of the Acting Secretary of the Society alongwith the application. Minutes of the proceedings of the meeting of the Managing Committee held on 13.7.91 has been placed on record. Another document containing the proceedings of the meeting of the Managing Committee held on 29.10.91 has also been placed on record as Annexure-3. The petitioner has filed an application dated 20.11.91 and with that he has filed Annexures-22 and 23. 9. Shri R.K. Pareek, learned counsel for the petitioner, has strenuously argued that the order of suspension dated 18.10.89 suffers from malice, bias and prejudice of respondent No. 2. While drawing the attention of the court to the allegations contained in paras 4 and 5 of the writ petition. 9. Shri R.K. Pareek, learned counsel for the petitioner, has strenuously argued that the order of suspension dated 18.10.89 suffers from malice, bias and prejudice of respondent No. 2. While drawing the attention of the court to the allegations contained in paras 4 and 5 of the writ petition. Shri Pareek argued that the sole ground for suspending the petitioner and for taking various actions against him emanates from the fact that the petitioner had raised his voice against the malpractice and misuse of authority by respondent No. 2 and also the fact that respondent No. 2 was under an impression that the petitioner was instrumental in pointing out to the grave irregularity committed in the matter of appointment of Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur. Shri Pareek argued that since Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur was compelled to resign from service, respondent No. 2 decided to teach a lesson to the petitioner. It is he who manipulated the lodging of FIR and initiation of departmental inquiries against the petitioner. Shri Pareek argued and pointed out that after suspension of the petitioner, Respondent No. 2 manipulated passing of Resolution dated 15.8.89 on the basis of wrong facts. Shri S.B. Mathur, learned counsel for respondents, argued that the plea of mala fide raised on behalf of the petitioner is wholly baseless. Shri Mathur submitted that respondent No. 2 has acted in the best interest of the society. When the FIR were registered against the petitioner in relation to the allegations of corruption and forgery, it was considered appropriate to keep the petitioner out of the active service. The order of suspension has been passed in the best interest of the Institution. Shri Mathur submitted that the petitioner has not been able to establish that the contents of the FIRS are false. He has not made any effort for quashing of the FIR by a competent court. Once the cases have been registered against the petitioner under Sections 467, 418, 420 I.P.C. and also under Sections 420, 468, 471 I.P.C. read with the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, there was every justification for passing of the order of suspension. Respondent No. 2 had acted in a bonafide manner while passing the impugned order. 10. Once the cases have been registered against the petitioner under Sections 467, 418, 420 I.P.C. and also under Sections 420, 468, 471 I.P.C. read with the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, there was every justification for passing of the order of suspension. Respondent No. 2 had acted in a bonafide manner while passing the impugned order. 10. It is true that the petitioner has levelled serious allegations of mala fide against the respondent No. 2 and has made a serious effort to establish a co-relation between the order of suspension and the resignation of the son of respondent No. 2 from the post of Assistant Secretary of the respondent Society, however, in my opinion the petitioner has not been able to place cogent material and evidence before the court for substantiating the plea of malice. The petitioner has not placed any documentary or other evidence before the court to show that he was instrumental in bringing about ouster of Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur. He has not placed any thing on record to show that when Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur was appointed in service, he had made any protest or had pointed out the irregularities in the office nothings. He has not been able to show that it was at his instance that the Committee did not approve the appointment of Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur. Whether appointment of Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur was contrary to law or whether respondent No. 2 had manipulated his appointment, resignation and re-appointment in service, are all matters on which it is neither proper nor justified for this court to make an adjudication for the simple reason that Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur is not party to the writ petition and no order or finding pre-judicially affecting his interest can be passed. That apart, the petitioner has not been able to establish the casual relationship between the so called irregularity committed in the appointment of Shri Jaideep Dayal Mathur and his suspension. He has not been able to place convincing material before the court to show that the action of respondent No. 2 in passing the impugned order dated 18.1.89 was actuated by malice. 11. This court cannot be oblivious of the fact that plea of mala fide are very easily raised in the writ petitions but in large number of cases such pleas remain unsubstantiated. 11. This court cannot be oblivious of the fact that plea of mala fide are very easily raised in the writ petitions but in large number of cases such pleas remain unsubstantiated. Heavy burden lies on the petitioner to establish the plea of mala fide. It is the duty of the petitioner to place sufficient material before the court on the basis of which the court can arrive at a conclusion in regard to the plea of mala fide. Incomplete and vague allegations of mala fide cannot be made basis for recording a finding of malice in fact. Since the petitioner has failed to place cogent material before the court in support of his allegations of mala fide, in my opinion the order of suspension cannot be quashed on that ground. 12. Shri Pareek then argued that the order of suspension is a non-speaking order. It does not contain any reason. It has been passed mechanically without application of mind. Shri Pareek placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 , in support of this submission. In my opinion this argument of Shri Pareek is without any merit. The order of suspension passed by the respondent No. 2 is not by way of penalty. The rules governing the conditions of service of the petitioner do not envisage imposition of a penalty of suspension. Thus while passing the order of suspension respondent No. 2 cannot be treated to have acted as a quasi-judicial authority. Order of suspension passed by respondent No. 2 cannot but be treated as an administrative order. Such administrative order is not required to be a speaking order. While exercising administrative power of suspending an employee the competent authority is required to act fairly and reasonably. However, it is not required to act judicially. Order of suspension can be quashed only if it is found to be contrary to law or wholly arbitrary and unreasonable, or where it suffers from mala fides. A perusal of the order Annexure-7 shows that it has been passed because of the fact that two criminal cases, involving serious allegations, were registered against the petitioner. Action was also contemplated against him. In that fact situation, respondent No. 2 observed that it will not be in the interest of the Society to keep the petitioner in active service. A perusal of the order Annexure-7 shows that it has been passed because of the fact that two criminal cases, involving serious allegations, were registered against the petitioner. Action was also contemplated against him. In that fact situation, respondent No. 2 observed that it will not be in the interest of the Society to keep the petitioner in active service. The exercise of power by respondent No. 2 for the reason set out in the order cannot be termed as arbitrary or unreasonable. The principles laid down in S.N. Mukherjee's case (supra) has no relevance to the facts of this case. That was a case in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court had examined a question relating to the requirement of passing of reasoned order by quasi-judicial authorities and tribunals and not in administrative matters. 13. The Third submission of Shri Pareek is that the suspension of the petitioner deserves to be quashed on the ground that it has been unduly prolonged. Shri Pareek submitted that the petitioner had already suffered suspension for over two years and that there was no justification whatsoever for continuing the suspension of the petitioner. Shri Pareek placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Om Prakash v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2257 , B.K. Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, ILR 1979 (Raj.) 515 , a recent decision of this court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4891/90 Jethanand v. State of Rajasthan, decided on 17.1.91 (reported in 1991(1) RLR 369) , Nand Lal Verma v. State of Rajasthan & others, 1989(1) R LR 601 , and Gopal Singh v. State of Rajasthan & others, 1990(1) RLR 175 , Shri S.B.Mathur, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand submitted that the order of suspension must not be quashed only on the ground of delay. He submitted that the petitioner is facing prosecution in the court of law and departmental inquiries, involving extremely serious allegations and if the petitioner is allowed to occupy the office, when he is under cloud, it will result in injury to public interest. Shri Mathur submitted that a man who is charged with the allegations of misappropriation, cheating, forgery etc. must always be kept out of public office. His individual interest is outweighed by public interest which warrants that public property must be protected from miguse by unscrupulous employees and officers. 14. Shri Mathur submitted that a man who is charged with the allegations of misappropriation, cheating, forgery etc. must always be kept out of public office. His individual interest is outweighed by public interest which warrants that public property must be protected from miguse by unscrupulous employees and officers. 14. I have given my serious consideration to this aspect of the matter and have looked into the contents of the FIR and the charge sheets served on the petitioner. The law regarding prolonged suspension has very aptly been discussed by this court in B.K. Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (supra) and by the Supreme Court in Om Prakash v. Union of India (supra). Other decisions of this court and other High Courts are more or less in tune with these two decisions. The principle which emerges from these decisions is that suspension of an employee should not be unduly prologed because it has a serious adverse impact not only on him but his entire family. In B.K. Sharma's case, where the suspension has lasted for almost 11 years the court had compared an employee under long suspension with a patient lying in coma. In other cases also the suspensions have been unduly prolonged without any tangible action in the departmental inquiries or criminal cases. The fact situation obtaining in this case is however not such which warrants quashing of the order of suspension only on the ground of delay. It is neither proper nor reasonable for this court to express any opinion on the merits or demerits on the criminal cases initiated against the petitioner or the departmental inquiries pending against him but it is not possible to hold that the respondents are deliberately delaying the proceedings against the petitioner by adopting dilatory tactics. As already observed by me, the order of suspension has been passed in public interest and, therefore, unless it is shown by the petitioner that the proceedings are being delayed intentionally by the respondents, in my opinion it will be against the public interest to quash the order of suspension only on the ground of lapse of two years. 15. Shri Pareek then argued that the order of suspension should be quashed on the ground that the respondent No. 2 was not authorised to make such an order. Shri Pareek invited my attention to paras 14.3(c) and 14.3(e) of the revised constitution of the respondent Society. 15. Shri Pareek then argued that the order of suspension should be quashed on the ground that the respondent No. 2 was not authorised to make such an order. Shri Pareek invited my attention to paras 14.3(c) and 14.3(e) of the revised constitution of the respondent Society. He referred to the contention raised in the writ petition regarding the lack of authority of respondent No. 2 in passing the order of suspension and submitted that respondent No. 2 had clearly overstepped his jurisdiction in passing the order of suspension of the petitioner. Shri Pareek argued that the appointment of the petitioner as Deputy Secretary had been ratified by the Managing Committee and, therefore, the power of suspension vested solely with the Managing Committee of the respondent Society. He urged that the Managing Committee had neither permitted issue of the order of suspension of the petitioner nor had ratified such suspension. Shri Pareek submitted that the matter relating to the suspension of the petitioner was never placed before the Managing Committe. He specifically referred to order Annexure-16 dated 24.1.89 regarding appointment of the petitioner and Annexures 20, 22, 23 and submitted that the question of suspension of the petitioner was never considered by the Managing Committee. He also draw the court's attention to para 3 of his rejoinder and argued that the agenda prepared for the meeting of the Committee held on 13.7.91 did not contain any item regarding suspension of the petitioner. Thus, there could be no ratification or approval of respondent No. 2. Shri Mathur, learned counsel for respondents, on the other hand argued that in fact respondent No. 2 was himself competent to suspend the petitioner. He submitted that in view of the provisions contained in Para 14.3(c), the Chairman is the Chief Executive of the Society and is entitled to exercise all administrative and financial powers. Shri Mathur then submitted that the question relating to suspension of the petitioner was placed before the Managing Committee in its meetings held on 26.9.90, 13.7.91 and 29.10.91. In the meeting held on 26.9.90 the Committee decided that subsistence allowance should be allowed to the petitioner as per Rajasthan Service Rules. Shri Mathur then submitted that the question relating to suspension of the petitioner was placed before the Managing Committee in its meetings held on 26.9.90, 13.7.91 and 29.10.91. In the meeting held on 26.9.90 the Committee decided that subsistence allowance should be allowed to the petitioner as per Rajasthan Service Rules. In its meeting held on 13.7.91 the Committee approved all the actions of the Chairman and the subsequent arrangements made by him and in the last meeting it took note of he progress made in he matters relating to the petitioner. Shri Mathur argued that all these proceedings show that the Managing Committee was aware of the action taken by the Chairman and it had approved all the actions taken by he Chairman. 16. I have looked into the various agenda items prepared for the meetings of the Management Committee and the Resolutions passed by the Management Committee. It is not the case of the petitioner that the minutes of the meetings of the committee held on 26.9.90, 13.7.91 or 29.10.91 are forged or are not genuine. These minutes clearly show that the Managing Committee consciously approved the action taken by the Chairman. If there was any objection to the action of the Chairman, there was little justification for the Managing Committee to have sanctioned subsistence allowance or to have ratified the arrangements made by the Chairman to carry out the work. Thus, I find that the Managing Committee had taken a conscious decision to approve the action taken by the Chairman of the respondent Society regarding suspension of the petitioner and the order dated 24.1.89 cannot be quashed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In view of the ratification made by the Managing Committee I am not deciding the scope of the jurisdiction and power of respondent No. 2 in ragard to the service conditions of the officers and the employees of Respondent No. 1. 17. The last submission of Shri Pareek is that the petitioner has been denied the benefits of full pay. Shri Pareek argued that in the absence of any statutory rule or contract of service the petitioner has right to get full pay during the period of suspension. 17. The last submission of Shri Pareek is that the petitioner has been denied the benefits of full pay. Shri Pareek argued that in the absence of any statutory rule or contract of service the petitioner has right to get full pay during the period of suspension. Shri Pareek placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers Union, AIR 1959 SC 1342 , and B.R. Patel v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 600 , and large number of other decisions. Shri Pareek also argued that mere adoption of the Rajasthan Service Rules is not sufficient for paying only subsistence allowance to the petitioner instead of full pay. 18. After having given my thoughtful considerations to the submission of Shri Pareek I find little justification for the acceptance of the same. It is an admitted position that Rajasthan Service Rules have been adopted by the respondent society. These rules govern the service conditions of the employees /officers of the Society. Whether Rajasthan Service Rules continue to have statutory flavour in the matter of relationship of master and servant between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 or not, there can be no manner of doubt that once the petitioner joined service of the Society, which has adopted Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951, provisions contained in these rules will form part of the contract of service and there was ample justification for payment of subsistence allowance to the petitioner. There, however, appears to be no justification for not paying the enhanced subsistence allowance to the petitioner in accordance with Rule 53 of 1951 Rules. With the lapse of the period specified in Rule 53, the petitioner became entitled to payment of 3/4th of pay by way of subsistence allowance because it has not been alleged by the respondents that the petitioner is responsible for delaying the proceedings. Thus, to this extent a direction deserves to be given to the respondents. 19. As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition so far as challenge to the order of suspension is concerned. The Writ Petition is dismissed subject to the direction that the respondents shall pay enhanced subsistence allowance to the petitioner in terms of Rule 53 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951. Costs made easy.Petition dismissed. *******