JUDGMENT 1. This writ petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage as the parties have exchanged affidavits. 2. The dispute is about shop no. 32/142 Maniram Ki Bagiya, Kanpur, of which Mandir Lakshmi Narain Trust is the landlord. The shop was let out to Onkar Nath Agrawal (husband of petitioner no. 1 and father of petitioner nos. 2 to 6) who was carrying on business therein under the name and style of Shobha Vastra Bhandar. A partnership deed was executed between Onkar Nath Agrawal and Radhey Shyam Gupta, respondent no. 2 on 971973 whereby it was agreed to start partnership business of hosiery and readymade garments under the name and style of M/s. Purshottamdas Pawan Kumar in the said shop. Onkar Nath Agrawal died on 831985. Raj Kumar Gupta, respondent no. 3, who is the son of Radhey Shyam Gupta, respondent no. 2, moved an allotment application for allotting the shop in dispute to him presumably on the ground that as Onkar Nath Agrawal had admitted Radhey Shyam Gupta, who was not a member of his family, as a partner, he shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building in view of Section 12(2) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It appears that the things moved at a fast speed and the Rent Control Inspector submitted a report and thereafter vacancy was declared on 641985. The shop was then allotted to Raj Kumar Gupta on 851985 and he took possession of the same on 1751985. The petitioners moved an application under Section 16(5) of the Act before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for review of the allotment order. This application was contested by Raj Kumar Gupta alone. The Rent Control & Eviction Officer by order dated 241986 reviewed and set aside the order dated 641985 by which vacancy was declared and the order dated 851985 by which the shop Was allotted in favour of Raj Kumar Gupta. This order was challenged by Raj Kumar Gupta by filing Rent Revision No. 38 of 1986 before the District Judge, Kanpur Nagar, but the revision was dismissed by order dated 2881986. Raj Kumar also approached this Court by filing Writ petition but the same was dismissed summarily on 491986. This order was challenged by Raj Kumar Gupta by filing Rent Revision No. 38 of 1986 before the District Judge, Kanpur Nagar, but the revision was dismissed by order dated 2881986. Raj Kumar also approached this Court by filing Writ petition but the same was dismissed summarily on 491986. After the dismissal of the revision the petitioners moved an application before the Rent Control & Eviction officer on 191986 for restoration of possession of the shop to them on which an order was passed for issuing form C on 491986. Subsequently the petitioners moved another application on 1291986 under Section 18(3) of the Act praying that Form D be issued for restoration of possession of shop to them. Petitioners filed another application on 27986 making the same prayer. Subsequent thereto Radhey Shyam Gupta, respondent no. 2 also moved an application on 3091986 under Section 18(3) of the Act praying that he may be put in actual physical possession of the shop as the allotment order passed in favour of Raj Kumar on 851985 had been set aside. Raj Kumar respondent no. 3 also filed a counter affidavit on 3121986 stating that Radhey Shyam Agrawal being a partner of the firm was also a tenant of the premises and as the petitioner had not impleaded him as a party in the application moved by them for restoration of possession the application was liable to be rejected and further the provisions of Section 18(3) of the Act were not applicable and as such the question of delivering possession to the petitioners did not arise. After hearing the parties the Rent Control & Eviction officer passed an order on 621986 directing that the possession of the shop be restored to the heirs of late Onkar Nath Agrawal and Radhey Shyam Gupta respondent no. 2. The petitioners have filed the present writ petition for quashing of that part of the order by which possession has been directed to be restored to Radhey Shyam Gupta as well. 3. Shri R.K. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that after the allotment order passed in favour of Raj Kumar had been set aside the petitioners alone were entitled to the possession of the shop. Shri K.M. Dayal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for respondent no. 3. Shri R.K. Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that after the allotment order passed in favour of Raj Kumar had been set aside the petitioners alone were entitled to the possession of the shop. Shri K.M. Dayal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for respondent no. 2, has on the other hand contended that after the allotment order was set aside the Rent Control & Eviction Officer has rightly placed the parties back in the position which they had occupied prior to passing of the allotment order, and therefore, the impugned order which has directed that the heirs of Onkar Nath as well as Radhey Shyam shall be put jointly in possession is perfectly correct. It appears from the record that the petitioners moved application on 1291986 under Section 18(3) of the Act for restoration of possession to them and in the impugned order as well the Rent Control & Eviction Officer has mentioned that the order for restoration of possession is being passed under Section 18(3) of the Act. However, in my opinion Section 18(3) had no application to the facts of the present case. Subsection (1) of Section 18 provides that any person aggrieved by a final order made under Section 16 or 19 may prefer a revision to the District Judge on any or more of the grounds enumerated in the section. Subsection (2) of section 18 provides that the revising authority may confirm or rescind the final order or may remand the case to the District Magistrate for rehearing. Subsection (3) of Section 18 provides that when an order under section 16 or 19 is rescinded the District Magistrate shall, on application being made to him in that behalf, place the parties back in the position which they would have occupied but for such order or such part thereof as has been rescinded. Obviously subsection (3) of Section 18 will apply when a final order made under Section 16 has been rescinded by the District Judge in a revision preferred before him. Admittedly in the present case no revision had been filed by the petitioners before the District Judge nor the District Judge has rescinded any order of allotment. Obviously subsection (3) of Section 18 will apply when a final order made under Section 16 has been rescinded by the District Judge in a revision preferred before him. Admittedly in the present case no revision had been filed by the petitioners before the District Judge nor the District Judge has rescinded any order of allotment. It is not in dispute that a review application had been filed by the petitioners under clause (5)(a) of Section 16 of the Act which was allowed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer on 241986 and the allotment order made in favour of Raj Kumar on 851985 was set aside. In such a situation it is clause (b) of subsection (5) of Section 16 of the Act which gives power to the District Magistrate to put the applicant back in possession of the building. It is, therefore, obvious that when the petitioners moved in application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for restoration of possession to them they invoked 'he jurisdiction of the authority under clause (b) of subsection (5) of Section 16 and not under Section 18(3) of the Act. The language used by the legislature in Section 16(5)(b) is different from the language used in Section 18(3) of the Act. While clause (b) provides that where the District Magistrate on review sets aside the order of allotment he shall put the applicant back into possession of the building. Subsection (3) of Section 18 provides that where an order under Section 16 is rescinded the District Magistrate shall place the parties back in the position which they would have occupied but for such order. The word 'applicant' in clause (b) of subsection (5) of Sec. 16 obviously refers to the person who has filed the review application under clause (a) of subsec. (5) of Sec. 16 of the Act. In the present case the review application had been filed by the petitioners alone and not by Radhey Shyam, respondent no. 2. In fact Radhey Shyam was not even party to the review application. Therefore, the Rent Control & Eviction Officer could put only the petitioners back into possession of the shop in dispute and that part of the order which directs Radhey Shyam also to be put in possession of the Shop along with the petitioners is clearly illegal and cannot be sustained in law. 4. Therefore, the Rent Control & Eviction Officer could put only the petitioners back into possession of the shop in dispute and that part of the order which directs Radhey Shyam also to be put in possession of the Shop along with the petitioners is clearly illegal and cannot be sustained in law. 4. It is true that the application moved by the petitioners for being put back in possession of the shop was described as one under subsec. 18 of the Act and the Rent Control & Eviction Officer has also mentioned in the impugned order that he was exercising powers under the aforesaid section, but his order in so far as it directs the petitioners to be put back in possession is within his jurisdiction and can be sustained under clause (b) of subsec. 5 of Sec. 16 of the Act. The order directing restoration of possession to the petitioners cannot be held to be illegal merely because a wrong section has been mentioned in the application moved by the petitioners or in the order passed by the Rent Control & Eviction Officer. In ViceChancellor Jammu University v. D.K. Rampal ( AIR 1977 SC 1146 ) it was held as follows: Where an authority makes an order which is otherwise within the competence it cannot fail merely because it purports to be made under a wrong provision of law if it can be shown to be within its powers under any other provision, a wrong label cannot vitiate an order which is otherwise within the power of the authority to make, Similar view has been taken in Hukum Chand Mills v. State of M.P. ( AIR 1964 SC 1329 ) P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India ( AIR 1958 SC 232 ). Therefore, the impugned order dated 241986 can be sustained only in so far as it directs restoration of possession to the petitioners. The order in so far as it directs restoration of possession to Radhey Shyam, respondent no. 2, cannot be sustained and must be quashed. 5. Shri K.M. Dayal has submitted that after the constitution of the firm on 971973, the firm became the tenant which in effect means that all the partners of the firm became tenants of the shop as held in Pooran Chand v. Rent Control & Eviction Officer (1959 ALJ 343) and Sangam Lal Gupta v. 1st A.D.J. 1984(2) ARC 558). 5. Shri K.M. Dayal has submitted that after the constitution of the firm on 971973, the firm became the tenant which in effect means that all the partners of the firm became tenants of the shop as held in Pooran Chand v. Rent Control & Eviction Officer (1959 ALJ 343) and Sangam Lal Gupta v. 1st A.D.J. 1984(2) ARC 558). With the enforcement of U.P. Act 28 of 1976 on 5.7.1976 the possession of all the partners of the firm became regularised and they all became tenants of the shop and, therefore, both Onkar Nath Agarwal and Radhey Shyam Gupta shall be deemed to be the tenants of the shop in dispute. It is thus submitted that not only the heirs of Onkar Nath Agarwal but Radhey Shyam Gupta, respondent no. 2 as well, is entitled to the possession of the shop. In my opinion the submission made by the learned counsel is wholly untenable in law for three reasons. Firstly, as shown above subsection (3) of Section 18 of the Act is not at all applicable to the facts of the case. Secondly, a deemed vacancy had occurred on 971973 on account of the fact that the original tenant Onkar Nath Agarwal had taken a partner, namely, Radhey Shyam Gupta, and had constituted a firm. This disqualification attached to the original tenant Onkar Nath Agarwal on account of his unilateral act of taking a partner. There is no material on record to show that the landlord accepted either the firm or both the partners as tenant of the shop. The record shows that the landlord continued to issue the rent receipts in the name of Shobha Vastra Bhandar. Along with the rejoinderaffidavit a rent receipt dated 311984 for the period 1111983 to 31121983 has been filed and in this receipt the name of the tenant has been mentioned as Shobha Vastra Bhandar. Thus it is clear that the landlord never recognised or admitted Radhey Shyam either as a cotenant or a joint tenant. The possession of Radhey Shyam over the shop in dispute was, therefore, not with the consent of the landlord. The effect of Section 14 of the Act, therefore, is that the disqualification attached to the original tenant Onkar Nath Agarwal stood removed and his tenancy stood regularised on 571986 and he alone became the tenant of the shop. The possession of Radhey Shyam over the shop in dispute was, therefore, not with the consent of the landlord. The effect of Section 14 of the Act, therefore, is that the disqualification attached to the original tenant Onkar Nath Agarwal stood removed and his tenancy stood regularised on 571986 and he alone became the tenant of the shop. It may be noticed at this stage that in Rent Revision No. 38 of 1986 (Raj Kumar Gupta v. Smt. Meera Agarwal and others) decided by the 9th A. D.J. on 2881986 a finding has been recorded that rent receipts were always issued in the name of Shobha Vastra Bhandar and his tenancy became regularised under Section 14 of the Act. In the writ petition filed by Raj Kumar Gupta in this Court, challenging the aforesaid order, it was observed that the occupation of Onkar Nath Agarwal became regularised under Sec. 14. Therefore, it is clear that Radhey Shyam never acquired status of a tenant of the premises and the question of restoration of possession to him does not arise. The third reason for rejecting the submission of the learned counsel is that the proceedings under subsec. (3) of Sec. 18 of the Act are in the nature of restitution proceedings and not for determining the status of a person as to whether he is a tenant or not. The question whether a person has become an authorised tenant by virtue of Sec. 14 of the Act is wholly beyond the purview of the jurisdiction conferred upon the District Magistrate by the aforesaid provision and he cannot embark upon such an inquiry when an application is moved before him for restoration of possession after a final order under Sections 16 or 19 of the Act has been rescinded in a revision by the District Judge. It has been held in Abdul Gafoor v. R.C. &. E.O. (1984 (1) ARC 327) that the District Magistrate while exercising power under Section 18(3) is like executing court and cannot go behind the order nor can entertain evidence and decide question of possession which is beyond the pale of power conferred by this subsection. 6. Though in my opinion Radhey Shyam respondent no. 2 never acquired the status of a tenant of the shop in dispute but assuming that he did so the facts and circumstances of the case show that he surrendered his tenancy rights. 6. Though in my opinion Radhey Shyam respondent no. 2 never acquired the status of a tenant of the shop in dispute but assuming that he did so the facts and circumstances of the case show that he surrendered his tenancy rights. As mentioned earlier, the proceedings commenced on the basis of the allotment application moved by Raj Kumar Gupta, respondent no. 3 and a vacancy was declared on 641985 and the shop was allotted in his favour on 851985. Raj Kumar also took possession of the shop on 1751985. Radhey Shyam Gupta neither contested the allotment application nor challenged the order declaring vacancy or the allotment order passed in favour of Raj Kumar nor resisted the taking of possession by him. All these orders were challenged by the petitioners alone by filing a review application. He did not come into picture and did not apply for being impleaded either in the review application or in the revision which was filed by Raj Kumar against the order dated 241986 passed by the R.C. & E.O. by which the review application was allowed. It was only after the petitioners had moved applications for restoration of possession to them on 191986 and 1291986 that he woke up and filed an application on 3091986 claiming restoration of possession in his favour. The material on record further shows that proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. were also initiated by petitioner no. 1 Smt. Meera Devi against Raj Kumar Gupta, respondent no. 3, and in the said proceedings Radhey Shyam was impleaded as opposite party no. 2 wherein he also filed a written statement. Copy of this written statement has been filed as Annexure 1 to supplementary affidavit of petitioner no. 1. In his written statement Radhey Shyam stated that a firm by the name of Purshottam Das Pawan Kumar was carrying on business in the shop in dispute but the said firm was dissolved in March, 1985, and thereafter no business was carried on and the shop was locked. He further stated in para 2 that after the dissolution of the firm in March, 1985, the business also came to an end and the R.C. and E.O. declared vacancy and allotted the shop to Raj Kumar Gupta on 851985 and he took possession of the same on 1751985. This document shows that Radhey Shyam did not claim any right over the shop in dispute. This document shows that Radhey Shyam did not claim any right over the shop in dispute. Thus it is apparent that he acquiesced to the order declaring vacancy as well as to the order allotting the shop to Raj Kumar and submitted to the aforesaid orders. The conduct of Radhey Shyam conclusively establishes that even if he had any tenancy rights he surrendered the same and now it is not open to him to claim restoration of possession on the ground that he is also a tenant of the shop in dispute. 7. There is another aspect of the case which has also bearing on the controversy in hand. The deed of partnership which was executed between Onkar Nath Agarwal and Radhey Shyam Gupta on 971973 has been filed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition and the contents thereof are not disputed in the counteraffidavit. Paras 10 & 11 of the deed read as follows: 10. That in case of the death or retirement of any partner the partnership shall be dissolved. 11. That in case of dissolution of partnership either on the death of first party or second party or on retirement of first party or second party, the tenancy right over the premises no. 32/142, where the partnership business is being carried on shall remain with the first party or legal heir or heirs of the first party and neither the second party nor his legal heir or heirs shall have any claim or right over the same. Both under Section 42 and under the terms of the deed the partnership stood dissolved on 831985 when Onkar Nath died. In view of clause 11 of the deed the tenancy rights over the shop in dispute remained with the legal heirs of Onkar Nath, namely, the petitioners, and not with Radhey Shyam. Radhey Shyam being party and signatory to the deed of partnership is bound by the contract entered into by him in so far as petitioners are concerned and it is not open to him to contend that he is still a tenant and is entitled to be put in possession of the shop in dispute. 8. Before parting with the case I cannot restrain myself from making some observation on the conduct of Radhey Shyam Gupta, respondent no. 2. 8. Before parting with the case I cannot restrain myself from making some observation on the conduct of Radhey Shyam Gupta, respondent no. 2. Admittedly the disputed shop was in possession of Onkar Nath Agarwal alone and he alone was carrying on business there. It was Onkar Nath who admitted Radhey Shyam as a partner on 971973 and the partnership deed shows that the share of the former was 55% and of the latter 45%. Onkar Nath died on 831985 leaving behind a young widow and minor children. Within three weeks of his death Raj Kumar Gupta, who is none else but the own son of Radhey Shyam, moved allotment application and got an allotment order in his favour on 851985. It is obvious that the widow and children of Onkar Nath must have been too shocked due to the death of the head of the family and instead of giving financial or moral support to them, Radhey Shyam manipulated through his son to deprive them even of their tenancy rights. It can be presumed that both Raj Kumar and Radhey Shyam are living together as their residential address 33/198 Chowk, Kanpur given in the writ petition has not been disputed in the counteraffidavit. The facts and the circumstances of the case clearly show that the petitioners have suffered extreme hardship and harassment on account of the manipulations of Radhey Shyam. They are out of their business premises since May, 1985, i.e. almost for seven years. I, therefore, consider it proper that respondents be directed to pay a sum of Rs. 2,000 (Rs. two thousand) by way of costs to the petitioners. 9. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 621987 (Annexure 12 of the writ petition) is quashed in so far as it directs restoration of possession to Radhey Shyam Gupta, respondent no. 2. The Rent Control & Eviction Officer, Kanpur Nagar, is directed to restore possession of the shop to the petitioners forthwith. The respondents nos. 2 and 3 will pay Rs. 2000 (Rs. Two thousand) as costs to the petitioners.