Judgment :- 1. For the assessment years 1979-1980 and 1980-1981, assessments under the Wealth-Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) were made on 20-12-1983 on the estate of late V.S. Meenakshi Achi, represented by the Executor V.S. Sivalingam Chettiar of Poolankurichi in the status of an individual, under S. 16(3) read with S. 17 of the Act. Against the assessments so made, the assessee, viz., the Executor to the Estate preferred appeals before the Appellate Assitant Commissioner and secured relief in respect of the valuation of certain unquoted Shares held by the assesse in Abirami Cotton Mills Ltd. Aggrieved by me order of the Appellate Assitant Commissioner, the Revenue preferred appeals before the Tribunal against Smt. V.S. Meenakshi Achi, who was impleaded as the respondent in the appeals. These appeals were dealt with by the Tribunal and disposed of in the manner indicated in its order statistical purposes. In these Tax Case Petition, under S. 27(3) of the Act, the Revenue, has sought at direction to the Tribunal to refer a question of law, stated to arise on the application of Rule 1-D of the Rules framed under the Act. An objection has been raised regarding the maintainability of these applications, on the ground that the assessee, viz., the Estate represented by its Executor, was not at all impleaded as a party-respondent to the appeals preferred by the Revenue before the Tribunal, but the dead person and not the assessee had been shown as the respondent and in these Tax Case Petitions also, the dead person alone has been shown us the respondent and not the assessee. It was, therefore, submitted that these Tax Case Petitions under S. 27(3) of the Act, not having been preferred against the assessee, who was subjected to the assessment could not be entertained and a case referred. In meeting the objection so raised, learned counsel for the Revenue pointed out that the omission to show the name of the assessee, viz. the Estate represented by its Executor, as the respondent before the Tribunal and also before the court, was only on account of a typographical error and that should not be made much of. In meeting the objection so raised, learned counsel for the Revenue pointed out that the omission to show the name of the assessee, viz. the Estate represented by its Executor, as the respondent before the Tribunal and also before the court, was only on account of a typographical error and that should not be made much of. Attention was also drawn to the files, where, with reference to the address to which the notice may be sent, it had been stated that the notice should be sent to the Executor and that is sufficient to indicate that the appeals were filed only against the assesee. viz., the Estate represented by its Executor and not the deceased person. Reliance in this connection was also placed on the decisions reported in Rajah Manyam Meenakshamma v. C.I.T. (30 I.T.R. 286), and Sharan Kanta v. C.I.T. (176 I.T.R. 291) counsel for revenue also brought to our notice that T.C.M.P. Nos. 891 and 892 of 1992 have been filed to amend the cause title in the tax case petitions and that, if these petitions are ordered, the defect could be remedied. 2. We have carefully considered the objectives raised and also the argument of learned counsel for the revenue to maintain the application, as filed. In this case, from a perusal of the assessment orders, it is seen that the assessments were made on the Estate. This is also affirmed in para 2 of the affidavit filed in support of T.C.M.P. Nos. 891 and 892 of 1992. There cannot therefore, be any doubt that even according to the Revenue, the assessee was not the deceased person, but only the estate of the decreased person, represented by the Executor. This assessee had preferred appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, in which the Revenue figured as the respondent. It is at once obvious that even during the course of the assessment proceedings and also the appeals, before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner it was only the estate, represented by the Executor, which figured as the assessee and also the appellant and this was within the knowledge of the Revenue. However, when the appeals were preferred the Revenue before the Tribunal they had been filed against the deceased person and not against the assessee. However, when the appeals were preferred the Revenue before the Tribunal they had been filed against the deceased person and not against the assessee. The reliance placed upon column 11 regarding these issue of notice cannot be availed of by the revenue to sustain the applications as filed when the respondent in the Appeals before the Tribunal is admittedly a dead person. The mere filling up of a column regarding the issue of notice, to a third person, cannot avail the Revenue, in other words, the appeal is against one person and the issue of notice is requested with reference to another, who is not the respondent and under those circumstances, the reliance on the filling up the column relating to the issue of notice, cannot, in any manner, advance the case of the revenue. 3. A reference to the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the Revenue may now be made. In Rajah Manyam Meenakshi v. C.I.T. (30 I.T.R. 286), the assessee, in the course of the assessment for the assessment year 1947-1948 returned only the proportionate lease amount in respect of certain graphite mines, which were leased out for 25 years and 30 years respectively, on a lumpsum royalty and claimed that only the proportionate lease amount for one year., was taxable. This was rejected by the Income-tax Officer, and on appeal, it was contended that the amount received represented premium and was, therefore, capital in nature and that was also rejected and later, the assessee died. Later, on 4.7.1951, an appeal was filed before the Tribunal purporting to be by the assessee, signed by a power of attorney agent of Meenakshamma, wife of the deceased assessee. The Tribunal after giving an opportunity to have the legal representative brought on record which was not availed of concluded that the appeal was not validly presented. On a Reference, under S. 66(2) of the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922, a Davison Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court pointed out that the widow of the assessee, being the legal representative of the deceased assessee, was also liable to pay the tax assessed on her husband and was an assessee within the meaning of the definition of an assessee in the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922, and was entitled to file an appeal in her own right. It was further held that the power of attorney agent of legal representative had signed the Memorandum of Grounds of appeal and that was good as the appeal having been presented by the legal representative of the original assessee. It was under those circumstances, the Court held that the description was only a mistake and the memorandum of appeal could be treated as having been filed by the legal representative herself and therefore, the presentation to the Tribunal was proper. It requires to be pointed out that this decision was one, which related to the filing of an appeal by the legal representative of an aggrieved assessee before the Tribunal and not a case, where, as here the. Revenue was fully aware of who the assessee was and in spite of that, it had chosen to show the name of the deceased person as the assessee instead of the real assessee. We are of the view that this decision cannot have any application at all on the facts and circumstances of this case. Similarly, the decision in Swaranranta v. C.I.T. (176 I.T.R. 291) relied on by the learned counsel for the Revenue also does not in any manner assist. In that case, Salim Dass Arbi filed a return of his income for the assessment year 1975-1976 and that return was revised, but during the pendecy of the assessment proceedings, he died on 7.3.1977. Subsequently, his widow was impleaded and notice was issued to her and in her presence, the assessment was finalised and in the course of the assessment order, the death of the original assessee, the brining on record of the legal representative of the deceased and the issue of notice to her and the taking of further proceedings in her presence, were all noticed, but in the heading of the order, the name of the deceased assessee was shown, instead of the legal representative. The assessment order was questioned on the ground that it was null and avoid, as it was made on a dead person. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner agreed with the stand and annulled the assessment. But on further appeal by the Revenue to the Tribunal the order of the Assistant Commissioner was reversed and the assessment order was resorted. The assessment order was questioned on the ground that it was null and avoid, as it was made on a dead person. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner agreed with the stand and annulled the assessment. But on further appeal by the Revenue to the Tribunal the order of the Assistant Commissioner was reversed and the assessment order was resorted. Questioning this, a Reference was made to the High Court and in answering the References, the High Court held that the widow, as legal representative, became a deemed assessee for the purpose of completion of the proceedings and for the recovery of the tax, in her hands and therefore, no exception could be taken to the order passed by the Tribunal. In addition, it was also pointed out that under S. 292-B of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, any mistake, defect or omission in the assessment, if the assessment is in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of the Act, would not invalidate the assessment and that as the entire proceedings were conducted after the death of the original assessee, in accordance with law. The Tribunal was justified in restoring the order of assessment. We are of the view that this decision also does not, in any manner, assist the Revenue. Initially, the husband was the assessee and on his death, his widow, as his legal representative, was impleaded issued notice and in her presence, the assessment proceedings were completed and in fact and in law, she was the assessee at the time when the assessment was so completed and she could not have, therefore, complained that the assessment had been passed against a dead person and therefore, void. In this case, what was find is, that the deceased was not in the picture at all even in the course of the assessment proceedings, as the assessments were made admittedly on the Estate and there could not have, therefore, been any mistake whatever with reference to the assessee, who was subjected to assessment Equally, there could not have been any mistake whatever with reference to the appellant in the appeals filed by the assessee before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In such a situation, it is extremely difficult for us to accept that when the Revenue preferred appeals before the Tribunal, a typographical error had crept in, in that, the name of the dead person has been given as the respondent, instead of the real assessee, viz. the Estate, responded by the Executor. Even S. 42 of the Act. comparable to S. 292-B of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, cannot be pressed into service by the Revenue for it cannot be stated that in substance and effect, the appeals preferred by the Revenue before the Tribunal were either in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of the Act. Ordinarily the appeals, at the instance of the Revenue, before the Tribunal could be filed only against the assessee and not against a dead person and in this case the Revenue with full knowledge as to who was the real assessee, had not chosen to file the appeals against a non-existent person. Under those circumstances, S. 42-C of the Act also cannot be called in aid by the Revenue. We also do not see any useful purpose being served by the amendment applications now filed, for if ordered, they could at best, cure the defect in the cause title in the Tax Case Petitions before this court and would not have the effect of bringing the real assessee on record as a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal. As matters stand, the Revenue had preferred the appeals before the Tribunal and also the Reference application before this Court, against a dead person, who is not the assessee and such applications cannot therefore, be countenanced. We, therefore, dismiss T.C.P. Nos. 215 & 216 of 1988 and T.C.M.P. Nos. 891 and 892 of 1992. There will be, however no order as to costs.