In this revision petition the petitioners have assailed a order dated 21.3.90. passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Kohima in Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1989 by which the respondents were allowed to file new/fresh suit. The main grounds taken in this revision petition, inter alia, are two, namely; (1) That the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Kohima has no jurisdiction to allow institution of a fresh suit inasmuch as it is not contemplated under any provision of the Rules for the Administration of Justice, Nagaland. (2) That the impugned order was passed by Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Kohima in violation of the principles of justice inasmuch as Shri Savi who was originally a party in the dispute in Village Court was not a party when the aforesaid impugned order came to be passed in respect of the same subject matter which was decided by the Village Court at Viswema Village. 2. Before the above two issues are dealt with, I would like to advert briefly to the facts of the case. It was on 12.6.80 that one Puzashe the son of late Puzhon of Viswema Village took a loan of Rs.1,000/- from Miakriba Whe against monthly interest of Rs.3.75 per Rs.100/- for a period of 6 months by mortgaging his land situated at Phesazu behind Whedi's residence at Viswema Village. In the aforesaid transaction one Mr. Kruzol stood surety/guarantor for the loan by mortgaging his terrace field which is locally known as `Kintso' to Miakriba Whe. Before the loan was taken it was ascertained from Puzhon that the land in question belonged to Puzashe and so loan could be granted against its security. Several months went by but Puzashe was not able to repay the loan. After expiry of 18 months Mr. Kruzo who stood as a guarantor also approached the Treasurer of Miakriba Whe to forfeit the mortgaged plot and accordingly on 15.1.82 Miakriba Whe informed Kruzo that the land which was mortgaged was forfeited and accordingly the said land was handed over to Miakriba Whe as a whole. 3. Thereafter Miakriba Whe decided to sell the said land and as such first offer went to Mr. Vitsano who is elder brother of Mr. Neimedo that any of the near relatives of Puzashe might buy back the land but there was none amongst the relatives of Puzashe who was willing to buy back the said land. 3. Thereafter Miakriba Whe decided to sell the said land and as such first offer went to Mr. Vitsano who is elder brother of Mr. Neimedo that any of the near relatives of Puzashe might buy back the land but there was none amongst the relatives of Puzashe who was willing to buy back the said land. That is how the said land was sold on behalf of Miakriba Whe to Mr. Savi in 1982. After the purchase of said land Savi took possession and there was no dispute from any quarter till 1986. 4. It was some time in 1986 that one Kerisal began to claim the land as the owner on the ground that he had purchased it from late Puzhon. The Village Council of Viswema Village took up the matter for settlement. Savi claimed that he had purchased it from Miakriba Whe whereas Kerisal claimed that he had purchased it from late Puzhon. The Village Council by its judg­ment and order dated 4.4.87 asked Miakriba Whe to take oath with the lives of three persons stating that "at the time when the said plot of land was about to be sold out both Mr. Puzashe and his near relatives were informed." Against the said order passed by Viswema Village Council, Puzashe approached the Court of DBs at Jakhama. By judgment and order dated 28.11.88 the DBs Court of Jakhama upheld the decision made by Viswema Village Council. 5. Thereafter an appeal was preferred in the Court of DBs at Kohima by Neimedo and Sevil against the order of the DBs Court at Jakhama. At this stage it may be stated that these two persons namely; Neimedo and Sevil were not Parties when the case was decided by the Village Council and also by the DBs Court at Jakhama. The DBs Court at Kohima ordered that there must be an exchange of oath taking by both the parties and that each party would take oath with the lives of five persons and on the basis of such oath the land in dispute would be divided. 6. Against the order passed by the DBs Court of Kohima said two persons namely; Neimedo and Sevil filed another appeal in the Court of Add­itional Deputy Commissioner (J) Kohima and the said appeal was registered as Civil Appeal No.2 of 1989. 6. Against the order passed by the DBs Court of Kohima said two persons namely; Neimedo and Sevil filed another appeal in the Court of Add­itional Deputy Commissioner (J) Kohima and the said appeal was registered as Civil Appeal No.2 of 1989. It may also be stated herein that whereas at Viswema Village claim of ownership was made by one Kerisal on the ground that he had purchased it from Puzhon, strangely he was not in the picture when the matter was further taken up before the DBs Court at Kohima as well as in the Court of Addl. Deputy Commissioner (J) Kohima, Neimedo and Sevil claimed the disputed land to be theirs. This plea of ownership by these two persons to be entirely a new claim. 7. After the purchase was effected in 1982 Savi took possession of the land and he first erected a temporary structure which was subsequently replaced by making permanent structure. At the time of construction between 1982 and 1986 Savi had nothing to do with Neimedo and Sevil. As stated earlier the dispute was raised by one Kerisal and that is how the matter was decided by Viswema Village Council between Kerisal and Savi. The appeal filed by Neimedo and Sevil came to be dismissed by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner (J) by his order dated 21.3.90. However, the appellants (respondents before this Court) were allowed to file "new/fresh suit as per law and Rules if they so desire." 8. The present respondents then filed a fresh suit registered as Civil Suit No. 1 of 1990 in the Court of ADC (J) Kohima making Zakil and others, Puzashe Yohe and Savi Tsukru as respondents/defendants. It is in this back ground that this revision petition has been filed before this Court assailing the impugned order on the grounds stated above. On perusal of the suit filed by the respondents in the Court of Additional Deputy Commissioner (J) the claim of the respondents is that the disputed land is an ancestral property. It is strange that although on earlier occassions one of the plaintiffs in the aforesaid suit, claimed the land to be his on the strength of purchase from one Puzhpn, he has now taken different ground to say that the land in question is ancestral property. It is strange that although on earlier occassions one of the plaintiffs in the aforesaid suit, claimed the land to be his on the strength of purchase from one Puzhpn, he has now taken different ground to say that the land in question is ancestral property. It may also be stated that on earlier occassions when the matter was agitated in the Court of DBs at Kohima as well as in the Court of ADC (J) Kohima, Neimedo and Sevil who are plaintiffs 1 and 2 in the fresh suit, had claimed the disputed land to be theirs. In such a situation there is no doubt that there is a shift in the stand taken by the respondents in respect of the disputed land. In other words they have not been consistent in persuing this case as far as their rights are concerned. 9. Now let me deal with the question as to whether the learned ADC (J) Kohima has jurisdiction to allow the respondents to file a fresh suit in; the circumstances of the case. In certain cases the Court of ADC (J) is competent to pass an order for denovo trial. Such denovo trial is contemplated under Rule 31 of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in Nagaland. The said Rule may be re-produced. "Rule 31: An appeal shall lie from the decision of the Mauzadar, gaonbura, chief, headman of a Khel or other duly recognised village authorities (to the tribal court whenever constituted on otherwise) to the Deputy Commissioner or his Assistant. A record shall be made of the matter in dispute and the decision of the village authorities. If necessary, the court shall examine the parties, and if the decision appears to be just, shall affirm and enforce it as one of its own. If the court sees reason: to doubt the justice of the decision, it will try the case denovo, or refer it to a panchayat as above." 10. A Division Bench of this Court had an occassion to deal with the interpretation and application of Rule 31 of the aforesaid Rules in Shri Medenkaba & others vs. R. Tekatemjen Ao & another reported in (1987) 1 Gauhati Law Reports 156. A Division Bench of this Court had an occassion to deal with the interpretation and application of Rule 31 of the aforesaid Rules in Shri Medenkaba & others vs. R. Tekatemjen Ao & another reported in (1987) 1 Gauhati Law Reports 156. Para 8 of the said judgment is extracted: "The relevant provision in Rule 31 is that "if the Court sees reason to doubt the justice of the decision, it will try the case denovo, or refer it to panchayat as above". In this case there was no reference to a panchayat and hence after the appellate court saw reason to doubt the justice of the decision, it decided that the case be tried denovo. Thus, only after the justice of the decision was doubted, the decision that the case be tried denovo, was taken. `Denovo' means afresh, a new, starting again. In Black's Law Dictionary the meaning of `hearing denovo' is given as: "Generally, a new hearing or a hearing for the second time, contemplating an entire trial in same manner in which matter was originally heard and a review of previous hearing. On hearing `Denovo' court hears matter as court of original and not appellate jurisdiction. "Thus, denovo hearing is decided when the earlier hearing is taken to be of no conse­quence or legal effect. A denovo hearing has, therefore, held as a fresh hearing from the beginning. This interpretation is in conformity with the provision in Rule 31. We, therefore, held that a denovo proceeding held as ordered under Rule 31 of the rules will be an original proceeding for all purposes and must be treated as such.” 11. On perusal of Pule 31 and also para 8 of the said judgment it appears to me that the learned Court of ADC (J) is not authorised to permit the institution of a fresh suit. What Rule 31 contemplates is that if the Court sees reason to doubt the justice of the decision it will try the case denovo. This means that the denovo trial contemplated under this Rule is a trial between the same parties and for the same cause of action and in regard to the same subject matter of dispute. In the present case the suit filed in the Court of ADC is between different persons. This means that the denovo trial contemplated under this Rule is a trial between the same parties and for the same cause of action and in regard to the same subject matter of dispute. In the present case the suit filed in the Court of ADC is between different persons. When the order of dismissal was passed by learned ADC (J) and when fresh suit was ordered to be filed the defendant No.3 (Savi) was not a party. Even Shri Kerisal was not a party in the aforesaid Appeal No. 27 of 1989. If that is so to permit entirely a new suit between different sets of persons would not come within the provisions of Rule 31 of the aforesaid Rules. In the facts and circumstances of such a case to permit a fresh suit to be instituted by persons who were not parties in the earlier suit would affect the merit of the case which has been settled earlier and therefore it would not be to cure a formal defect but would affect the merit of the entire case and therefore such a fresh suit would cut at the very root of the dispute. 12. On perusal of the impugned order no reason has been assigned that fresh suit in the present circumstances is called for. It is no where stated that the learned Court of ADC (J) sees reason to doubt the justice in the decision rendered by the lower Court. Moreover obviously the impugned order by which the respondents were allowed to file fresh suit was passed without hearing Savi who was subsequently impleaded as defendant No.3 in the Court of ADC (J). The impugned order therefore violates the principles of natural justice. 13. Mr. R. Iralu who appears for the respondents submits that fresh suit is permissible under the Rules for the Administration of Justice in Nagaland. Relying on a decision made by this Court (AIR 1982 Gauhati 108) learned counsel submits that this Court should not give emphasis on the technicalities which according to him should be avoided. I have perused this case carefully and I am unable to accept the submissions made in this regard. Mr. Iralu has also relied on (1987) 1 GLR 156 to say that denovo trial means and includes institution of a fresh suit. I have perused this case carefully and I am unable to accept the submissions made in this regard. Mr. Iralu has also relied on (1987) 1 GLR 156 to say that denovo trial means and includes institution of a fresh suit. The submission of the learned counsel on this count is also not acceptable in view of my above finding in this regard. As stated by me above the denovo trial has to be ordered between the same parties. In other words order of denovo trial can be passed only between parties who are before the Court which passes such an order of denovo trial. Mr. Iralu has also urged very strenuously how this Court should exercise inherent jurisdiction and submits that the fresh suit thus instituted is permissible in terms of Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC and in this regard he has relied on AIR 1963 SC 1517. On perusal of this case I am of the view that the facts of this case are different from those of the case in hand. That apart Rules for the Administration being special Rules made applicable to the State of Nagaland are mandatory and therefore provisions of the Rules must be followed strictly whereas the provisions of CPC are followed is spirit. 14. At this stage to allow a fresh suit to be continued would amount to unsettling the matter which has already been settled and this would in the facts and circumstances of this case amount to abuse of the process of law and therefore exercise of inherent jurisdiction as urged by Mr. Iralu will not, in my opinion, promote justice but would retard it. 15. I have perused a copy of the petition addressed to ADC, Kohima by Kerisal on 10.3.86. It has been stated clearly that the land is an ancestral property. This statement made in this application is contrary to his earlier statement before the Village Court. As stated earlier Shri Kerisal took a stand in the Village Court that land was his by virtue of purchase made by him. Therefore the story put up on behalf of the respondents cannot be accepted. At the same time in the same application the construction being made on the land in question by Savi is admitted. Relevant para of the application states: "However Savi doing unauthorised construction on the land and the same is being in progress." 16. Therefore the story put up on behalf of the respondents cannot be accepted. At the same time in the same application the construction being made on the land in question by Savi is admitted. Relevant para of the application states: "However Savi doing unauthorised construction on the land and the same is being in progress." 16. On 2.12.91 from the statement of the learned counsel of both sides it was ascertained that Savi is in possession of the land in question by constructing a permanent house, 17. I have carefully perused the orders passed by Viswema Village Council on 9.9.86 in a dispute between Savi and Kerisal, order dated 4.4.87 passed by the Village Council between Savi and Kerisal (Puzashe and Miakribawhe) and also order dated 28.11.88 passed by the Court of DBs at Jakhama in Case No. 3 of 1984. I have also perused the petition and affidavit filed in this case and I have heard the learned counsel of both sides at length. I am of the view that the decisions rendered by Viswema Village Court and also DBs Court at Jakhama are clear and can certainly be enforced legally. As far as Savi and Kerisal are concerned the matter has been finally settled at village level. It is most unnecessary why the matter has been taken to the Court of DBs at Kohima as well as in the Court of ADC (J), Kohima. The dispute is related to a house site. The Village Council members know well about the subject matter of the dispute. They also have intimate knowledge of the customs and conventions that are applicable to themselves. Litigation must come to an end. If endless litigation is allowed to continue it will surely amount to abuse of the process of law and it will only retard the admini­stration of justice in our land. We must have confidence in the wisdom of the grass root authority, that is, Village Court and also DBs Court which decided the present dispute by following the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The parties are bound by the decisions rendered by the Village Court and also by the Court of DBs at Jakhama. 18. We must have confidence in the wisdom of the grass root authority, that is, Village Court and also DBs Court which decided the present dispute by following the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The parties are bound by the decisions rendered by the Village Court and also by the Court of DBs at Jakhama. 18. In the result the petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 21.3.90 passed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner (J) in Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1989 allowing the respondents to file fresh/new suit is hereby set aside. The orders passed by Village Court at Viswema which was upheld by the Court of DBs at Jakhama by order dated 28.11.88 in Case No. 3 of 1984 shall stand. In the facts and circumstances of the case I pass no order as to costs.