Judgment Choudhary S.N. Mishra, J. The instant appeal against the judgment and decree, dated the 25th February, 1981, raises a short and solitary issue of limitation governing the suit for realisation of Rs.12,427/- 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal at e as follows: The plaintiff-appellant is a limited company and registered under the Money Lenders Act. The defendant executed two Makfula deeds commonly known as mortgage deed on 14.2.70 for a sum of Rs.7,000/- after receiving the consideration amount. The lands mentioned in the said two mortgage deeds were fully described in schedules of the plaint. The period described in the said deeds for repayment of the amount is three years, but the defendant failed to repay the loan and hence, the suit. 3. The defendant appeared and contested the suit. Apart from taking formal grounds, it is also alleged that the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by limitation. 4. The execution of the aforesaid two deeds in favour of the plaintiff is admitted, but denied that any consideration money was passed on him. It is also alleged that the aforesaid two mortgage deeds were executed by him under coercion in order to save himself from the criminal case, which had been filed by the plaintiff against him. 5. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the Court below: "1. Is the suit as framed maintainable? 2. Whether plaintiff has got any cause of action for the suit? 3. Is the suit time barred? 4. Had the mortgage deeds in suit been valid and legally executed? 5. Are the mortgage deeds for consideration or they have been executed under coercion, intimidation and undue influence? 6. The court below took up issue nos. 4 and 5, at first, and, after having dismissed both oral and documentary evidence, recorded its finding as follows: "From the consideration of the above evidence, I am of the opinion that the Makfula deeds were validly and legally executed. They are for consideration. These issues are, therefore, decided accordingly in favour of the plaintiff:" 7. The court below, after discussing the evidence-oral and documentary-held; "True it is that the deeds were executed by the defendant to avoid a criminal proceeding but that criminal prosecution was for realisation of genuine amount due from the defendant to the plaintiff. They are for consideration. These issues are, therefore, decided accordingly in favour of the plaintiff:" 7. The court below, after discussing the evidence-oral and documentary-held; "True it is that the deeds were executed by the defendant to avoid a criminal proceeding but that criminal prosecution was for realisation of genuine amount due from the defendant to the plaintiff. On this ground, the defendant cannot avoid enforcement of Exts. 9 series. These two issues are decided accordingly in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant." 8. As regards issue no. 3, the court below has found that the mortgage amount alongwith the interest thereon, according to the stipulation in the said deeds, were payable by the defendant by the 30th Jeth 1380 corresponding to 1973, and as per the stipulations contained in the two mortgage deeds executed on 14.2.70, the money was to be paid back to the plaintiff some time in Jeth, 1973. 9. The court below, on the basis of the aforesaid averment in the two mortgage deeds, applying Article 28 of the Limitation Act, 1973, came to the conclusion that the period of limitation for filing the suit is three years from the date specified for payment and accordingly held as follows : "The suit was therefore to be filed sometime in 1976, but the plaintiff filed the suit on 18.6.77, one year after the expiration of the limitation period. In my opinion, therefore, the suit is barred under the Limitation Act." Accordingly, the suit was dismissed and hence, this appeal. 10. Mr. Y.V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant has submitted that the court below has committed illegality in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff as barred by limitation. Learned counsel further submitted that the court below bas wrongly applied Article 28 of the Limitation Act 1963. In the facts and circumstances of the case, Article 62 will apply and not Article 28, as has been held by the court below. 11. The learned counsel, while developing his argument, has submitted that the recital in the aforesaid two mortgage deeds (Exts. 9 and 9A) clearly shows that the said deeds cannot be treated as bonds. In the facts and circumstances of the case, Article 62 will apply and not Article 28, as has been held by the court below. 11. The learned counsel, while developing his argument, has submitted that the recital in the aforesaid two mortgage deeds (Exts. 9 and 9A) clearly shows that the said deeds cannot be treated as bonds. The learned counsel concedes that if the two deeds are held to be bonds, than, no doubt, Article 28 is applicable, but if they are held to be mortgage deeds, Article 62 of the Limitation Act will apply, which prescribes 12 years' limitation for filing such a suit in this connection, Mr. Giri drew my attention to Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which reads as follows: "'Mortgage', 'mortgagor', 'mortgagee', 'mortgage money' and 'mortgage-deeds'.- (a) A mortgage is the transfer of an interest in specific 'immovable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability. The transferor is called a mortgagor, the transferee a mortgagee; the principal money and interest of which payment is secured for the time being are called the mortgage-money, and the instrument (if any), by which the transfer is effected is called a mortgage-deed " 12. The learned counsel, in support of the appeal, has further submitted that, in facts and circumstances, Article 62 of the Limitation Act, 1963, will apply, which runs as follows : "To enforce payment Twelve When the money of money secured years sued for be by a mortgage of comes due." otherwise charged upon immovable property. 13. The learned counsel, in support of his contention, has relied upon a decision in Durga Prasad Ghamarya vrs. Maria Galstaun & ors. (A.I.R. 1955 Cal. 194) wherein their Lordships have held in paragraph 18 as follows: "If, therefore, there is transfer of an interest in immovable properly (either by a deed or deposit of title deeds) and such transfer is made to secure advance already made and to be made then there is a mortgage and all the advances which may have been made both prior to the date of the said transaction and subsequent thereto would be covered by the said mortgage. In other words, there is in such a case one mortgage covering all such advances. This result, in my opinion, follow from the definition of' mortgage' 13. Mr. R.C. Ram, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the defendant-respondent, on the other hand, has contended that the aforesaid mortgage deeds (Exts. 9 & 9A) are not documents of mortgage, but in fact, are bonds, and, therefore, the court below has rightly relying upon Article 28 of the Limitation Act, decided the suit as being barred by limitation. Article 28 of the Limitation Ad reads thus: "On a Single bond where a Three years The day so specified. day is specified for payment. 14. The learned counsel further submitted that it cannot be said that by virtue of aforesaid mortgage deeds (Exts. 9 and 9A), the transfer of interest has been effected in terms of section. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act and, therefore, according to learned counsel, Article 62 of the Limitation Act will have no application in the instant case. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the defendant-respondents relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in M/s Damodar Valley Corporation vrs. The State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 440) and in Sun dram Finance Limited vrs. The State of Kerala & ors., (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1178). A perusal of the aforesaid judgments, however, shows that the facts as also the issues for consideration in the said decisions were entirely different from those of the present case and therefore, the ratio of the judgments cannot be said to be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 15. In this connection, section, 58(b) of the Transfer of Property Act is also relevant, which reads as follows: "Simple mortgage - Where, without delivering possession of the mortgaged property, the mortgager binds himself personally to pay the mortgage-money,' and agrees, expressly or impliedly, that, in the event of his failing to pay according to his contract, the mortgagee shall have a right to cause the mortgaged property to be sold and the proceeds of sale to be applied, so far as may be necessary, in payment of the mortgage-money the transaction is called a simple mortgage and the mortgagee a simple mortgagee." As stated above, the two mortgage deeds, aforesaid, namely, Exts. 9 and 9A, were executed on 14.2.70, wherein the time fixed for repayment was three years and according to the said stipulation, the suit ought to have been filed on or before February, 1973, as contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant respondent; whereas the instant suit was filed in July, 1977 and, therefore, according to the learned counsel, is barred by limitation in terms of Article 28 of the Limitation Act. 16. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the appellant, referring to the aforesaid two mortgage deeds, submitted that there are mortgage deeds and not the bonds, as contended by the learned counsel for the defendant respondent and, therefore, Article 62 is applicable which is relevant in the facts and circumstances of this case. 17. From a mere perusal of the aforesaid two mortgage deeds, it can be held that they are not the bonds but are definitely the mortgage deeds in terms of section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act. Even assuming that by virtue of the aforesaid mortgage deeds (Exts. 9 & 9A), there is no transfer of interest as submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent, yet section 58(b) comes in aid to the plaintiff appellant. 20. As stated above, all the issues have been answered in favour of the plaintiff-appellant except issue no. 3, which has been decided against the plaintiff. Consequently, the suit was dismissed as being barred by limitation. It is true that section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that the suit instituted after the period of limitation will be dismissed subject to the provisions of sections 4 to 24 even though limitation has not been pleaded as a defence. 21. In the instant case, the suit was tiled for the realisation of the amount in question and the said advance was secured by the two mortgage-deeds aforesaid, which clearly stipulate that in case of failure to repay the loan, the said amount will be realised by selling the movable property mentioned in the aforesaid mortgage deed. In that view of the matter, undoubtedly, in the instant case, it is a transfer of an interest in the movable property through the aforesaid mortgage deeds. In that view of the matter, undoubtedly, in the instant case, it is a transfer of an interest in the movable property through the aforesaid mortgage deeds. If that is so, then in that case, Article 62 of the Limitation Act will apply and the limitation prescribed for filing the suit will be governed by Article 62 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes the period of limitation 35 twelve years. I am, therefore, of the view that the finding of the court below on the issue in question, is erroneous and, thus, not sustainable in law. 22. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the court below is set aside and the suit is decreed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.