J. K. Mehra ( 1 ) THIS civil revision petition is directed against theorder of eviction passed by Shri V. K. Shall, Add ). Rent Controller, Delhi, asbe then was, in Eviction Case No. 37 of 1986 whereby the Add ). Rent Controller after examining the evidence had come to the conclusion that bonafide need of the landladies had been established and had ordered eviction ofthe petitioner from the premises in dispute shown in the plan Ext. A-5 andbad further directed that the decree of eviction shall not be executedfor a period of six months from the date of the order. ( 2 ) THE matter was listed for admission before N. N. Goswami, J. on 17/05/1990 when the following order was passed. "i have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and I donot find much merit in the petition. However, the Counsel submitsthat the petitioner may be asking for some further time to handover vacant possession of the premises. Let notice issue to therespondent to show cause as to why some further time be notallowed to the petitioner. The notice be made returnable for 5/07/1990. " ( 3 ) THE matter came up again on 5/07/1990 before the same Judgeand on that day it was adjourned to 26/07/1990. The respondents-landladies undertook not to execute the eviction order till the next date of hearing. This undertaking was continued until 22/10/1990 when thecourt ordered stay of dispossession till further orders. The petition wasadmitted on the petitioner submitting that certain subsequent event hadintervened as a result whereof additional accommodation had become available to the landladies. The subsequent event was brought on record videc. M. 1859 of 1990 in reply whereof the respondents admitted that the husband of respondent No. 2 and the younger son of respondent No. 1 ownedplot measuring 116 sq. yds, bearing municipal no E-5/3,krishan Nagar,delhi. ( 4 ) IT is admitted that all the respondents currently are residing withtheir father-in-law at property bearing No. B-1/5. Krishan Nagar, Delhi. Itwas also stated that respondent No. 3 as also respondent No. 1 continued tobe in dire need of accommodation and that none of them can in their ownright occupy the said newly constructed property at E-5/3, Krishan Nagar andthey continued to press their claim in respect of property in dispute bearingno. D-4/13, Krishan Nagar, Delhi. Krishan Nagar, Delhi. Itwas also stated that respondent No. 3 as also respondent No. 1 continued tobe in dire need of accommodation and that none of them can in their ownright occupy the said newly constructed property at E-5/3, Krishan Nagar andthey continued to press their claim in respect of property in dispute bearingno. D-4/13, Krishan Nagar, Delhi. ( 5 ) I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have alsogone through the material on record. ( 6 ) IN fact, I am required now to decide only, as to whether in thelight of changed conditions the eviction petition can still be sustained or hasthe need of landladies been fully met by acquisition of additonal accommodation. I need not go into the questions which have already been decidedin the impugned order and in respect whereof this Court had already held on 17/05/1990 that there was no merit in the petition. However, a notice wasissued on that day to show cause as to why some further time be not allowedto the petitioner (tenant ). Therefore the fact that the landladies were notoccupying any place in B-1/5, Krishan Nagar in their own right as it isowned by their father-in-law or that they had an income of approximatelyrs. I lac per annum or that the husband and daughter of respondent No. 3-landlady are disabled and need ground floor accommodation. The premisesin dispute are stated to be only the ground floor of property No. D-4/13,krishan Nagar, Delhi owned by all the landladies. ( 7 ) THE only factor which has intervened now is the construction ofa house by the husband of respondent No. 2 and younger son of respondentno 1. By the huband having acquired reasonably suitable accommodationby constructing a new house, I feel that the need of respondent no. 2 shouldbe deemed to have been fully met. But the same cannot be said of respondents nos. 1 and 3. Respondent No. 1 has asserted her claim to stay in herown property rather than to be dependant on one of the sons while respondent no. 3 has neither acquired any additional accommodation nor has herneed for ground floor in any manner diminished or satisfied. It is asserted bycounsel for the respondents that alternate accommodation should becomeavailable to the parties in their own right. However, on further questionbeing raised from Court, Counsel conceded on behalf of respondent no. 3 has neither acquired any additional accommodation nor has herneed for ground floor in any manner diminished or satisfied. It is asserted bycounsel for the respondents that alternate accommodation should becomeavailable to the parties in their own right. However, on further questionbeing raised from Court, Counsel conceded on behalf of respondent no. 2that she could move into that house along with her husband but in respectof respondents 1 and 3 he asserted that the need of these two and theirrespective family inembers except the need of younger son of respondentno. 1 still persisted. ( 8 ) I find that the eviction petition was filed on 4/02/1986and that more than 6-1/2 years have already goneby in this litigation andthat the respondents have not been able to get the possession of the premiseseven though the Trial Court had passed the order on 17/01/1990 andon admission this Court had issued a show cause notice only to find out as towhy some Further time be not allowed to the petitioner. ( 9 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on anumber of authorities. The case of R. B. Kapoor v. Manek N. Dustur, 1988 (1)RCR 246 is mainly on the question of the Court in revision considering productional of additional evidence. That power is not disputed but the questionof considering of production of any additional evidence in the present casecould not arise because of the admitted position of facts. The petitioner hasdrawn my attention to Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain, (1986) 4supreme Court Cases 736. In this case the ground floor of the house hadfallen vacant more than once during the pendency of eviction proceedingsbut was not occupied by the landlady and it was taking cognizance of thisspecial fact that the Supreme Court had disentitled the landlady from seekingeviction. Further another fact which weighed with the Supreme Court wasthat the landlady in that case asserted that she must have means to livebefore she can utilise it to live and for that reason she must let one floor onrent as rental income is the only source of her income. This reason did notprevail with the Supreme Court. I am afraid the facts of this case are different from the one which was before the Hon ble Supreme Court and do notprovide any guidelines for the situation which has come to prevail in thepresent cases. This reason did notprevail with the Supreme Court. I am afraid the facts of this case are different from the one which was before the Hon ble Supreme Court and do notprovide any guidelines for the situation which has come to prevail in thepresent cases. The next ruling cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioneris Sushila Devi and Others v. Avinash Chandra Jain and Others (1987) 2supreme CourtCases 219. In this case the Supreme Court had held that thehigh Court should objectively apply its mind to landlord s claim for evictionhaving regard to the object and purpose of the eviction provision as alsoacute housing shortage in Delhi and satisfy itself that order made by Rentcontroller was in accordance with law and that dismissal of the revision onthe ground of tenant s long stay of over 40 years in the demised premiseswas held to amount to non-application of mind. The Court in that case hadheld that eviction sought on the ground of bona fide personal of the landlordcannot be allowed merely because the tenant was staying in the demisedpremises for over 40 years. There cannot be any quarrel with this propositionof law for the Court has to come to the conclusion with regard to the bonafide requirement of landlord and not to order eviction on the sole groundthat the tenant has already occupied the premises for long. ( 10 ) ON the other hand the Hon ble Supreme Court in Pratima Deviv. T. V. Krishnan, 1987 (1) JT 764 has observed that in considering the availability of alternate accommodation the Court has to consider not merelywhether such accommodation is available but also whether the landlord hasa legal right to such accommodation. This position of the Supreme Courtwas followed by this High Court by Single Judge in Anil Kumar Jauhar andam. v. Atlas Cycle Industries, 38 (1989) Delhi Law Times 233 where thequestion was as to whether petitioner in that case had a legal right tocontinue to live in the house owned by his mother and the question was answered in the negative and that it was held that the petitioner did not have alegal right to stay there. ( 11 ) APPLYING the above law to the facts of the present case I feel thatthe bona fide requirement of respondent no. ( 11 ) APPLYING the above law to the facts of the present case I feel thatthe bona fide requirement of respondent no. 2 has come to an end because itcannot be said that wife has no legal right to stay in the house of her husband. but the same cannot be said for respondents 1 and 3. ( 12 ) THE bona fide requirement of respondent No. 1 continues tosubsist notwithstanding her younger son having acquired an interest in thehouse built by the husband of respondent no. 2 while the position in respectof the need of respondent no. 3 has remained unchanged and her need forground floor premises appears to be urgent in view of the disability of thehusband and daughter to climb tairs. Even assuming that the need of respondent no. 2 has come to an end I do not find any justification to interfere withthe eviction order passed against the petitioner by the Additional Rent Controller in view of the subsisting need of respondents 1 and 3. In view of the above finding, this petition is dismissed. However, Idirect that the decree for eviction shall not be executed for a period of twomonths from today. Parties are left to bear their own costs,