Judgment : This, habeas corpus petition is for directing the respondent, who is the wife of the petitioner, to produce their minor child Deepak before this Court and Tor directing the custody of the said minor child to be given to the petitioner. 2. This petition came up on 110. 1992 before us for filing counter, and the learned counsel for the respondent requested further time for filing counter. However, we, after going through the allegations in the affidavit in support of the petition, asked the learned counsel for the petitioner how this habeas corpus petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, is maintainable on the very allegations made in the said affidavit. In other words, will not this Court be justified in holding than on the very allegations in the supporting affidavit, the petitioner could only move the proper civil court under the Guardians and Wards Act for the relief sought for in this petition? In reply to the said quary, the learned counsel for the petitioner addressed arguments on that point regarding the maintainability. 3. Before setting out his submissions regarding the same, we may set out hereunder the material averments as found in the affidavit in support of the petition: The respondent and the petitioner were married on 4. 1981 and the abovesaid child Deepak was born to them on 26. 1982. At the time of the marriage, the petitioner was working in Vijaya Bank at Cannanore and the respondent was working in Southern Railways at Madras. In August, 1981, the petitioner secured a transfer to Madras and stayed with the respondent at her parents’ house. Then, the petitioner found that the respondent was suffering from some serious mental disorder. During the end of 1981, it was found that the respondent was pregnant and so the petitioner could not insist on her consulting a psychiatrist. After some time, the petitioner set up a separate apartment for their residence, but yet the respondent continued to live in her parents’ house. Four months after the delivery, the petitioner brought the respondent and the child to the abovesaid separate apartment. Even then, the respondent’s mental condition was one of “dull lethargy and total disinterest in the child”. When going to the officc, the petitioner used to leave the child with the respondent’s parents. The symptoms of the respondent, within a short time, changed to violence. Even then, the respondent’s mental condition was one of “dull lethargy and total disinterest in the child”. When going to the officc, the petitioner used to leave the child with the respondent’s parents. The symptoms of the respondent, within a short time, changed to violence. The father of the respondent and the petitioner took her for treatment to a psychiatrist. Then, the petitioner used to take her for treatment to the doctor every week. During 1983, the respondent’s mental illness became worse. She received treatment for her mental illness as an in-patient at Sri Venkatesh Nursing Home between September, 1983 and 110. 1983. Even after discharge from the Nursing Home, there was no improvement. Due to her mental illness, the respondent could attend office for only about 1 1/ 2 years from out 5 years between 1981and 1986. In May, 1985, the petitioner was transferred to Brah-mavara Branch. After consulting another psychiatrist, the petitioner brought the respondent and the child to Kambadakone village, where the petitioner has his own ancestral house. After being there for about two months, the respondent returned with her child to her parents’ house at Madras for further medical treatment and joining duty. During the petitioner’s visits to Madras, he found that the respondent’s condition was no better and she was not going to work and he, therefore, brought her back to his house in Kambadakone village in March, 1986. On 15. 1986, the respondent deserted the petitioner and left with the child for her maternal home at Madras. Since 15. 1986, the respondent had remained in her maternal home with the abovesaid child Deepak. Since the respondent’s condition of mental instability had grown from bad to worse, the petitioner was constrained to move the Tellicherry Subordinate Judge, praying for divorce. Though served with summons, the psychiatrist, who had treated the respondent at Madras, did not appear to tender evidence. The original petition was ultimately dismissed for want of clinching evidence to show the mental incapacity of the respondent. As the father and natural guardian of the abovesaid child Deepak, aged ten years, the petitioner wants custody of the child. The petitioner, all along postponed demanding custody of Deepak since he was expecting a resolution of the question of custody in the divorce proceeding itself. It will be in the interest of the minor Deepak if the custody is given to the petitioner. The petitioner, all along postponed demanding custody of Deepak since he was expecting a resolution of the question of custody in the divorce proceeding itself. It will be in the interest of the minor Deepak if the custody is given to the petitioner. The respondent’s mental illness renders her incapable of taking care of the welfare of the said child. The petitioner is employed in the bank, drawing about Rs.5,000 per month. His father, who is a practicing ayurvedic doctor and his mother arc with him. The respondent, though an employee of Southern Railways drawing about Rs.3,000 per month, due to her mental illness, she is unable to attend office and is on extended period of leave. The attentions of her parents are divided between caring for her and the child Deepak. 4. From the abovesaid averments, it is clear that eversince 15. 1986, for the past six years, custody of the child Deepak is only with the respondent-mother. On our questioning the learned counsel for the petitioner, he also submits that the abovesaid divorce petition was filed by the petitioner-husband in 1991 as O.P.No.93 of 1991 and it was dismissed on 16. 1992. Though in the abovesaid affidavit it is stated that all along the petitioner postponed demanding custody of Deepak since he was expecting a resolution of the question of custody in the divorce proceeding itself, the learned counsel for the petitioner, in answer to a question put by us, represented that the petitioner did not take up the question of custody of the said child in the said divorce petition, but reserved that question to be decided later. In fact he read out the following passage reported to be in the petitioner’s divorce petition: "This petitioner intends to initiate separate proceedings for the custody of his child". 5.In this background we have to see whether the present habeas corpus petition is maintainable. When we mentioned to the learned counsel for the petitioner that on the above facts, the petitioner should have only sought the relief prayed for, in the appropriate civil Court, under the Guardians and Wards Act, the learned counsel for the petitioner represented that the said remedy is not an efficacious remedy since there will be a long delay in getting the relief under Guardians and Wards Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relies on the decision in Vijayalakshmi v. Inspector of Police, Kantr and another, 1991 L.W. (Crl.) 227, where no doubt a Bench of this Court has exercised its jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, in a habeas corpus petition, and directed the husband to deliver the child to the wife. But, the question regarding the maintaina-bilily of a habeas corpus petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India was not considered by the said Bench, though on the peculiar facts before the said Bench, this Court though it is fit to give the relief prayed for therein as stated above. 6. However, the said question was actually considered in extenso in Dr.K.M.R.Sultan Akbarsha v. Sultan-sopia Begum, 1982 L.W. (Crl.) 139 by another Division Bench of this Court. That was also a habeas corpus petition filed by the father against the mother for the custody of the child and the relevant observation therein is as follows: "We are therefore, of opinion that merely because the petitioner happens to be the father of minor Perosha, he cannot expect, as of right, an order in his favour in these proceedings. He must further satisfy the court that the welfare and interests of the minor concerned warrant that the minor is removed from the custody of the first respondent and placed in his custody. As far as this aspect is- concerned, a proper decision can be rendered only after evidence is recorded in both sides. Only after the evidence is recorded, the court will be in a position to know as to who would be the proper person with whom the custody of the minor should be entrusted. For following such a procedure, undoubtedly, the civil court exercised its powers under the Guardians and Wards Act, is more suited than this Court exercising writ jurisdiction. The only circumstances in which we can justifiably deviate from this procedure is where the life, health and morale of the minor are in danger or where the child is likely to be removed from the jurisdiction of the court clandestinely or within a short time or where the party having custody of the child is ex-facie shown to be of depraved and immoral character and it will not be conducive to the interests of the minor to leave it in the custody of the person any longer. None of these conditions exists here. The only ground put forward in the petition is that the first respondent was about to take the minor to Dubai with her present husband. This averment has been refuted in categoric terms by the first and second respondents and we have no reasons to doubt the correctness of their statements. We do not, therefore, find any urgency or extraordinary feature in the case which would justify our exercising the special writ jurisdiction of this Court and issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner. We are clearly of opinion that the proper course to be followed is to direct the parties to have their rights regarding the custody of the minor child adjudicated by the District Court, Nagapattinam. We may also mention here about a contingency which is likely to arise if there is a blanket exercise of the writ jurisdiction vested in this Court in matters regarding the custody of children. Irrespective of an order passed by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction regarding the custody of a minor, it will be open to the father, mother, or in their absence, other close relations of the minor, to move the civil court under the Guardians and Wards Act, for an order of appointment as guardian of the minor and for suitable orders regarding the custody of the minor. The enquiry in such proceedings will be a full-fledged one, i.e., recording of evidence, cross examination of witnesses, etc. Unlike the enquiry in a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution. The civil court, after taking into consideration, the evidence adduced by the parties before it may well come to the view that the custody of the minor should be entrusted to some other person rather than the person approved by the High Court in the writ proceedings in the best interests and welfare of the minor. In such a case, there will be a conflict of decisions and resultant anomalous situ-ations. Such a situation should also be avoided. On account of this factor also, we think that the exercise of writ jurisdiction in matters relating to the custody of minors should be restricted only to those cases where the expedi-ency of the situation warrant such exercise of powers. Such a situation should also be avoided. On account of this factor also, we think that the exercise of writ jurisdiction in matters relating to the custody of minors should be restricted only to those cases where the expedi-ency of the situation warrant such exercise of powers. In as much as the first respondent has already filed a petition under the Guardians and Wards Act, the petitioner may put forth his claim in those proceedings for obtaining the minor’s custody and seek appropriate reliefs." The abovesaid observation makes it clear that the normal procedure in such cases is, the party aggrieved should only resort to the remedy under Guardians and Wards Act. The Division Bench, which decided the abovesaid case also makes it clear that the only circumstance in which the Court can justifiably deviate from the abovesaid normal procedure and entertain a habeas corpus petition is "where the life, health and morale of the minor are in danger or where the child is likely to be removed from the jurisdiction of the court clandestinely or within a short time or where the party having custody of the child is ex-fade shown to be of depraved and immoral character and it will not be conducive to the interest of the minor to leave it in the custody of the person any longer." In the present case, there is no such averment at all in the supporting affidavit. .7. That apart, not only right from 1986 the petitioner has not taken any steps to get the custody of the child, but even in his divorce proceeding in 1991, he did not ask for the custody of the child, which he could have done. Sec.26 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that in any proceeding under the said Act, the Court may, from time to time, pass such interim orders and make such provisions in the decree as it may deem just and proper with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of minor children, consistently with their wishes, wherever possible, and may after the decree, upon application by petition for the purpose, make from time to time, all such orders and provisions with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of such children as might have been made by such decree or interim orders in case the proceeding for obtaining such decree werestill pending. So, the said section provides for the court making suitable orders for the custody of the children of the parties in any proceeding under the said Act and empowers the court to pass not only the above referred to interim orders, but also orders subsequent to the decree with reference to the custody of children. So, under the abovesaid section, jurisdiction to pass orders with respect to the custody of minor children continues evenafter the main proceeding initiated under the Act has come to an end. VideA.R.M.Rajoo v. Hamsa Rani, (1974)2 M.L.J. 237 .A.I.R. 1975 Mad. 15. 8. Further,as per Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, the natural guardian of a Hindu minor, in respect of the minor’s person is, in the case of a boy, the father, and after him, the mother: provided that the custody of the minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother. So, at least after the above said boy Deepak completed the age of five years, that is, after 26. 87 itself, the petitioner could have filed a petition under the Guardians and Wards Act for the custody of the said child, if really he was anxious to get back the child to his custody on the grounds alleged by him or otherwise. But, he has not done so. 9. Further, when the petitioner himself admits in his supporting affidavit that the respondent-wife is an employee of the Southern Railway drawing as much as Rs.3,000 per month, on the face of it, it may not be difficult for the wife to look after the child with her abovesaid substantial salary and also with the help of her parents. In the supporting affidavit also, it is not stated that she could not draw the above said monthly salary in view of her alleged mental illness and consequent non-attendance of the office. It is only staled therein that due to her mental illness, she is unable to attend office and is on extended periods of leave, and that the respondent could attend office only for about 11/2 years from out of 5 years between 1981 and 1986. But, these allegations are quite vague. Further, what is the position after 1986 is also not alleged clearly. But, these allegations are quite vague. Further, what is the position after 1986 is also not alleged clearly. Anyway, when it is admitted in the supporting affidavit itself that the abovesaid divorce petition was dismissed for want of evidence to show the mental incapacity of the respondent, this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, cannot go into these several questions of fact for coming to a decision regarding the welfare and interest of the said minor Deepak. Therefore, though there is no absolute bar for this Court to entertain a habeas corpus petition by one of the parents against the other seeking the relief of custody of the child, we arc of the view that no case is made out for the exercise of the said jurisdiction on the very allegations made in the abovesaid supporting affidavit itself. .10. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner did not cite the following decisions, we think it would be fair to refer to those decisions ourselves, in the above context. In Dr. (Mrs.) Veena Kapoor v. Varinder Kumar Kapoor, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 792: 1982 M.L.J. (Crl.) 336: 1981 S.C.C. (Crl.) 810: (1981)3 S.C.C. 92 , the Supreme Court no doubt entertained the habeas corpus petition filed by the wife against the husband, claiming custody of their child, aged just 11/2 years. In the said decision, no doubt, the. Supreme Court after observing, “it is difficult for us in this habeas corpus petition to take evidence without which the question as to what is in the interest of the child cannot satisfactorily be determined”, no doubt though it fit to direct the District Judge concerned to make a report, after taking evidence to be let in by the parties, to the Supreme Court, on the question as to whether the custody of the child should be handed over to the petitioner-wife, taking into consideration the interest of the minor. Presumably since the child in question there was a tender child of 11/2 years and the petitioner was mother of the child, the Supreme Court took up the abovesaid exceptional step to get the report from the District Judge concerned, after permitting the parties to let in necessary evidence in the matter. But, the facts in the present case are entirely different as stated above and the child in question is also not a tender child, but a boy aged ten years. 11. But, the facts in the present case are entirely different as stated above and the child in question is also not a tender child, but a boy aged ten years. 11. In Dushyant Somal v. Sushma Somal, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1026: (1981)2S.C.C. 277: (1981)2 S.C.J. 877 also, facts were different from the present case. There, impudently disregarding the Court’s order, the husband had snatched away the child from the wife and the wife had to file a habeas corpus prayed for by the wife, it also observed as follows: “There can be no question that a writ of habeas corpus is not to be issued as a matter of course, particularly when the writ is sought against a parent for the custody of a child. Clear grounds must be made out.” In Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh Sandhu, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1224: (1984)3 S.C.C. 695:1984 S.C.C. (Crl.) 464: (1984)2 S.C.W.R. 116: (1984)1 Crimes 928, in a habeas corpus petition, remedy of custody of child was given to the mother as against the father. But, there again mother obtained order of the English Court, directing her husband to deliver custody of the child to her and on that basis filed a writ petition in the High Court in India. Thus, there again, there was a special reason for affording the relief in a habeas corpus petition. As already stated, the present case is entirely different and even on the very allegations in the sup-portingaffidavit, there is no warrant for exercising the jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. It may also be stated that normally when there are laches on the part of the petitioner, the writ jurisdiction will not be exercised, particularly when there is no violation of fundamental rights. 12. In the result, the habeas corpus petition is dismissed.