JUDGMENT 1. - By this joint writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 2-11-89 issued by the District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur by which their seniority position in the seniority list dated 8-8-84 has been altered to their prejudice. They have prayed that the order dated 2-11-89 be quashed and set aside and the Respondents be directed to make promotions as per seniority list dated 8-8-84. 2. Briefly, the case of the petitioners is that they had been appointed as L.D.C. under the Judgeship of District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur in the year 1974 by orders dated 18-7-74, 24-7-74 and 19-8-74, which were issued after they had passed the competitive examination held by the District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur on 24/26-5-74. All the petitioners were confirmed as L.D.C. with effect from 1-3-78 vide order dated 12-9-78. Respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were initially appointed on purely ad hoc basis in Census Department of the Government of Rajasthan. On account of the abolition of the posts of Clerk in the Census Department, they were absorbed on temporary basis by the District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur vide orders dated 15-3-74, 19-3-74 and 19-7-74. Before their absorption, the Respondents Nos. 3 and 4 had neither passed the competitive examination under the Rajasthan Subordinate Civil Courts Ministerial Establishment Rules 1958 nor under the Rajasthan Subordinate Ministerial Staff Rules, 1957. Competitive tests were held in the years 1975, 1976 and 1977. Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 have appeared in the competitive examinations held in the years 1975 and 1976, but they did not succeed. They passed the competitive examination held in the year 1977 and were thereafter selected for regular appointment as L.D.Cs. They were confirmed as L.D.Cs. with effect from 1-1-82 by an order dated 23-4-82 issued by the District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur. In the seniority list of L.D.Cs. published vide order dated 8-8-84 of Respondent No.2, the petitioners have been shown at serial Nos. 43, 44, 45 and 48 respectively, whereas Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 have been shown at serial Nos. 94, 104 and 105 respectively. In the seniority list of L.D.Cs. published vide order dated 8-8-84 of Respondent No.2, the petitioners have been shown at serial Nos. 43, 44, 45 and 48 respectively, whereas Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 have been shown at serial Nos. 94, 104 and 105 respectively. The seniority has been assigned to the petitioners as well as private respondents according to the date of their regular appointment/ confirmation in the cadre of L.D.C. The Respondent No. 2 made promotions to the post of U.D.C. on the basis of the seniority list dated 8-8-84 and persons up to serial No. 40 have already been promoted as U.D.C. Those persons whose names figure at serial Nos. 41, 42, 46 and 47, are no more in the service under Respondent No. 2 and therefore, the petitioners are now at serial Nos. 1 to 4 in the seniority list dated 8-8-84. The Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 seems to have made representations against their placement in the seniority list dated 8-8-84 and without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, Respondent No. 2 has issued an order dated 2-11-89 and changed the seniority position of the petitioners, vis a vis Respondents Nos. 3 to 5. This order has been issued on the basis of an order dated 21-5-86 passed by Hon'ble K.S. Lodha, J., as also an order dated 18-6-89 passed by the District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur. The petitioners were not given copies of these orders. They were not given any notice or opportunity of hearing before issuing order dated 2-11-89. The petitioners have stated that although there is a provision for filing the appeal before the High Court under Rule 25 of the Rajasthan Subordinate Civil Courts Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1986, but appeal preferred by one of the direct recruits from Kota District has been rejected by the Appellate Authority and, therefore, no useful purpose would have served by filing another appeal on the same subject matter. 3. The petitioners have challenged the order dated 2-11-89 on the grounds that it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The seniority position of the petitioners has been altered to their disadvantage without being afforded an opportunity of hearing. No notice was given to the petitioners containing a proposal for effecting change in their seniority position. The petitioners have challenged the order dated 2-11-89 on the grounds that it has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The seniority position of the petitioners has been altered to their disadvantage without being afforded an opportunity of hearing. No notice was given to the petitioners containing a proposal for effecting change in their seniority position. The seniority list dated 8-8-84 has already been acted upon and many promotions have been made on the basis of the said list. Any change in this list at this belated stage and that too without compliance of the provisions of natural justice, is liable to be declared as illegal, arbitrary and unjustified. The petitioners have also questioned the legality of the order dated 21-5-86 on the basis of which the impugned order dated 2-11-89 has been passed. The case of the petitioners is that the posts of L.D.C.'s are required to be filled by competitive examination or by transfer either under the provisions of 1958 Rules or under the provisions of 1986 Rules. The Respondents have passed the competitive examination for the first time in the year 1977. Therefore, they can be treated to have been regularly appointed only in the year 1977. As against this, the petitioners had passed the competitive examination in the year 1974 and have been confirmed in the year 1978. The Respondents have been confirmed in the year 1982. Therefore, there can be no justification for placement of these Respondents above the petitioners. The order dated 21-5-86 has been passed on an assumption that the employees who are declared surplus from Census Organisation must be deemed to have been substantively absorbed in the service of various Judgeships. This assumption is clearly contrary to the provisions of the Rules and, therefore, there can be no justification, whatsoever, for treating the competitive examination passed by such persons as qualifying examination and giving them the benefit of total length of service for the purpose of seniority. 4. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have in their reply stated that non-petitioners Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were not absorbed on ad hoc basis but at the initial stage their appointment was temporary and later on they were confirmed according to the prevalent rules. It has been admitted that in the seniority list dated 8-8-84 the names of the petitioners were placed above the Respondents Nos. 3 to 5. 3, 4 and 5 were not absorbed on ad hoc basis but at the initial stage their appointment was temporary and later on they were confirmed according to the prevalent rules. It has been admitted that in the seniority list dated 8-8-84 the names of the petitioners were placed above the Respondents Nos. 3 to 5. It has then been stated that the order dated 2-11-89 has rightly been passed and it does not suffer from any infirmity. This order has been passed on the basis of the letter dated 18-9-88 of the High Court, wherein it had been observed that the seniority should take place from the date of joining in the Judgeship. This direction was given in the appeals filed by Shri Ramesh Kumar and Shri Munshiwar Singh. LDCs of Kota Judgeship. It has also been observed in the order passed by the appellate authority it has been observed that the recruitment test passed by surplus employee shall be treated as qualifying test. It is also the case of the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that since order dated 2-11-89 has been passed on the basis of the order passed by the appellate authority (Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.S. Lodha) on 21-5-86, there was no necessity of giving any personal hearing to the petitioners before passing the impugned order. The case of the employees of Kota Judgeship is identical to the case of Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 and the Respondents have correctly determined the seniority on the basis of the order dated 21-5-86. Regarding promotion it has been stated that the petitioners do not fall within the one of consideration and, therefore, they do not have any right to make a grievance. 5. Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 have filed a separate reply. In that reply it has been asserted that the petitioners cannot be termed as aggrieved persons so far as the order dated 2-11-89 is concerned. It has also been stated that joint writ petition filed on behalf of the petitioners is not maintainable. Each petitioner has his own individual case. Their seniority is individual and, therefore, they ought to have filed separate writ petitions. The Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 have then stated that their case was one of absorption and as such, it was not necessary for them to appear in the competitive examination held in the years 1975, 1976 and 1977. Each petitioner has his own individual case. Their seniority is individual and, therefore, they ought to have filed separate writ petitions. The Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 have then stated that their case was one of absorption and as such, it was not necessary for them to appear in the competitive examination held in the years 1975, 1976 and 1977. The surplus employees were required to be confirmed on the post on which they were absorbed without any requirement of passing the competitive tests. It has been admitted by the Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 that they have passed the test held in the year 1977. Regarding order dated 23-4-82, it has been stated that the said order is only an order of confirmation and not an order of appointment. In the seniority list dated 8-8-84 these respondents were erroneously placed at serial Nos. 94, 104 and 105. The Respondents submitted their representaiions against the said seniority list. The list itself did not indicate as to what criteria or rule had been followed in the preparation of the seniority list. The Respondents have disputed the claim of the petitioners that the seniority has been assigned on the basis of the date of regular appointment/regular selection. By making a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Direct Recruitee Engineer Grade II Association v. The State of Maharashtra, (1990) 1 SCC 715 : (1990 Lab IC 1304) , the Respondents have stated that their seniority has to be determined with effect from the date of their initial appointment. i.e., 1974. While referring to the order of Mr. Justice K.S. Lodha, which was passed by him on 21-5-86 in respect of the employees of the Judgeship of Kota, Respondents have asserted that the cases of S/Shri S. K. Sharma, Prabhu Dayal Singh, Mahesh Chand Parakh, Ram Gopal Mathur and Bhuvneshwar Prasad are identical to those of Respondents and in view of the decision of the competent authority regarding the employees of the Judgeship of Kota it was bounden duty of Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to have assigned seniority to the Respondents at proper places on the basis of their length of service determined with reference to their date of joining. Reference has also been made to the decision of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1574/85 Ganpat Singh Devra v. Rajasthan High Court decided on 10-8-90 . 6. 1 and 2 to have assigned seniority to the Respondents at proper places on the basis of their length of service determined with reference to their date of joining. Reference has also been made to the decision of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1574/85 Ganpat Singh Devra v. Rajasthan High Court decided on 10-8-90 . 6. In the additional pleas the Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 have stated that they were appointed in the Census Department in the year 1971. They were declared surplus because the Census operation came to an end. The Government of Rajasthan then took a policy decision to absorb the employees in Government Departments and Corporations where vacancies were available. The General Administration Department of the Govt. of Rajasthan wrote letter dated 5-6-73 to all Heads of the Departments for absorption of employees of the erstwhile Census Department. The High Court wrote a letter dated 28-1-74 to the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur and directed him to absorb the surplus employees of the Census Department. By an order dated 21-2-84, the High Court ordered creation of the post of Copyist-cum L.D.C., in various judgeships including the judgeship of Jaipur City and Jaipur District. It was also directed in the order dated 21-2-74 that these posts be filled from the retrenched staff of the Census Department. In pursuance of the aforesaid orders, the Respondents were appointed by different orders as LDCs on temporary basis. The candidates were required to pass only the typing test and the test prescribed in General Rules (Civil) 1952. In the order of Bhanwarlal Karigar, reference has been made to the prescribed typing test and competitive examination but in view of the decision given by Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.S. Lodha, such test can only be treated as qualifying test. The Respondents had submitted representation for correction of their placement in their seniority list. A committee was constituted by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur and thereafter, the matter was decided in favour of the Respondents. Reference has also been made to the case of one Shri Muneshwar Singh, in whose case, a direction was issued that the passing of recruitment test at a subsequent date will not affect the seniority of the employee. Reference has also been made to the case of one Shri Muneshwar Singh, in whose case, a direction was issued that the passing of recruitment test at a subsequent date will not affect the seniority of the employee. The Respondents have further stated that at the worst it is a case of regularisation of the services and, therefore, the seniority must be assigned to the Respondents from the date of their joining the service in the Judgeship. From the pleadings of the parties the question which arises for determination is as to whether the Respondents have correctly been assigned seniority on the basis of their length of service or on the basis of their date of joining, irrespective of the date of passing of the competitive examination by them. 7. Shri Ajay Rastogi, learned counsel for the petitioners, invited the attention of the Court to the various provisions contained in 1958 Rules and 1986 Rules and argued that the petitioners have been substantively appointed in service after passing the requisite competitive test and they have a right to be assigned seniority from the date of order of appointment. The Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 were appointed purely on ad hoc basis in Census Department. They continued to enjoy the status of ad hoc appointees on their absorption in the judgeship. These Respondents were required to pass the competitive examination for regular recruitment and they in fact passed the examination in the year 1977, after they had failed in two previous attempts in the years 1975 and 1976. They cannot be given the benefit of length of service either from the date of appointment in the Census Department or from the date of joining in the Judgeship for the purpose of determination of their seniority in the cadre of L.D.C. Shri Rastogi submitted that the seniority list dated 8-8-84 has been prepared by the Respondent No. 2 in accordance with the provisions of the Rules. There was no justification for changing this seniority list on the basis of the order dated 21-5-86 passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.S. Lodha or on the basis of any other order issued by the High Court on its administrative side. Shri Rastogi argued that no notice or opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioners before effecting change in their seniority position. Justice K.S. Lodha or on the basis of any other order issued by the High Court on its administrative side. Shri Rastogi argued that no notice or opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioners before effecting change in their seniority position. Therefore, the action taken by Respondent No. 2 is in clear violation of the principles of natural justice and is liable to be quashed on that ground. Shri R.M. Lodha and Shri S.K. Keshote who appeared on behalf of the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 respectively, on the other hand urged that the appointment of the Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 were on temporary basis. They were declared surplus from the Census Department and were then absorbed in the Judgeship at Jaipur. These persons continued in service till they qualified the test held by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur. Their appointment must be treated as regular from the date of initial appointment. It is a case of regularisation of the existing appointees. Both Shri Lodha and Shri Keshote urged that when a decision had been given by the appellate authority in the matter relating to Kota Judgeship, it was obligatory for the Respondent High Court to give effect to the decision in all other similar cases. Therefore, no illegality has been committed by the Respondent No. 2 in issuing order dated 2-11-89. 8. In order to determine the question formulated hereinabove, it will be useful to refer to the provisions contained in Rules 6, 14 to 19 and Rule 21 of the Rajasthan Subordinate Civil Courts Ministerial Establishment Rules 1958 as also Rule 26 of the Rajasthan Subordinate Courts Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1986. It will also be appropriate to make a reference to the provisions contained in Rule 2 and Rule 11(3), (4) and (5) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Absorption of Surplus Personnel) Rules, 1969: Rule 6 of 1958 Rules : "Methods of Recruitment. It will also be appropriate to make a reference to the provisions contained in Rule 2 and Rule 11(3), (4) and (5) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Absorption of Surplus Personnel) Rules, 1969: Rule 6 of 1958 Rules : "Methods of Recruitment. - Recruitment to the staff after the commencement of these rules, shall be made, - (a) to the cadre of Stenographers as Stenographers grade III by selection; (b) to the general cadre as Lower Division Clerks by a competitive examination; and (c) to other posts in each cadre by promotion within the same judgeship; Provided that post in any cadre may also be filled by transfer of a person holding a post in another Judgeship corresponding to a post in the cadre concerned, with the concurrence of the District and Sessions Judge concerned and the approval of the Rajasthan High Court. The High Court may also for special reasons transfer any member of ministerial establishment from the judgeship to another. Rule 14 to 19 of 1958 Rules : Frequency of examinations. - Early in each year or as the circumstances may require each District Judge shall recruit as many candidates for his judgeship as are required for the vacancies likely to arise in the course of the year. Authority for conducting the examination and syllabus. - The examination shall be conducted by the District Judge or by a Senior Judge or Munsiff if such power is delegated to any one of them by the District Judge on the basis of likely vacancies during a year. The syllabus of the examination shall be as given in Schedule. Inviting of applications. - The applications to sit at the examination shall be invited by the District Judge by advertising the posts in such manner as he may deem fit and shall be made in Form A given in Schedule. The applicant shall be required to deposit a sum of Re. Inviting of applications. - The applications to sit at the examination shall be invited by the District Judge by advertising the posts in such manner as he may deem fit and shall be made in Form A given in Schedule. The applicant shall be required to deposit a sum of Re. 1/ - as application fee in the District Court: Provided that the persons repatriated from Burma and Ceylon on or after 1-3-1963 and from East African countries of Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar shall be exempted from payment of cost of application form prescribed by the Commission or the Appointing Authority, as the case may be, subject to the condition that the Commission or the Appointing Authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that such persons are not in a position to pay such fee. 17. Deleted. Canvassing. - No recommendation for recruitment either written or oral other than that required under the Rules, shall be taken into consideration. Any attempt on the part of a candidate to enlist support directly or indirectly for his candidature by other means may disqualify him for recruitment. Registration of Selected candidates. - The names of candidates selected on the basis of the aggregate marks obtained by them shall be entered in order of merit in a bound register in the prescribed form and each entry shall be initialled and dated by the Appointing Authority: Provided that no candidate who failed to secure atleast 40% of the total marks with at least 30% marks in each paper at the Competitive Examination shall be selected. If two or more of such candidates obtain equal marks in the aggregate their names shall be arranged in order of merit on the basis of their general suitability. An entry shall be made in the remark column against the name of a candidate who has qualified himself as a Stenographer. Note:- An official working in the regular line shall be deemed to have qualified himself as a Stenographer if at any examination held by the Public Service Commission he is certified to possess a speed of 100 words per minute in shorthand and 40 words per minute in type-writing. (2) The name of any candidate entered under sub-rule (1) may be removed for inefficiency or misconduct. (2) The name of any candidate entered under sub-rule (1) may be removed for inefficiency or misconduct. (3) If any such candidate has not been given an appointment offered in strict order of seniority according to the list in the bound register prescribed under sub-rule (1) within one year from the date of his recruitment, his name shall be automatically removed from the register of recruited candidates. Ia must then take his chance with others for recruitment again in a subsequent year. Rule 21 of 1958 Rules : Seniority. - Seniority in Service for the purpose of promotion shall ordinarily be determined from the date of the order of confirmation in the grade and if such date is the same in the case of more than one per on then according to their respective positions in that next lower grade: Provided that the seniority inter se of persons appointed to a particular class of posts-before the commencement of these rules shall be determined, modified or altered by the appointing authority on an ad hoc basis. Rule 26 of 1986 Rules : Seniority. - Seniority in Service for the purpose of promotion shall ordinarily be determiend from the date of the order of confirmation in the grade and if such date is the same in the case of more than one person than according to their respective positions in the next lower grade: (i) Provided that the seniority inter se of persons appointed to a particular class of posts before commencement of these rules shall be determined, modified or altered by the appointing authority on an ad hoc basis. (ii) Provided further that seniority in service for the purpose of promotion of a member of the Staff transferred from one Judgeship to another Judgeship or from High Court to a Judgeship under the proviso to Rule 6 shall be determined on the basis of length of service of the person transferred in the cadre from which promotion is under consideration. In doing so, however, the previously determined inter se seniority of employees belonging to the same Covenanting state shall not be disturbed. Explanation.- 'Lenght of Service' in the above proviso means length of permanent service in the case of a person appointed substantively and length of temporary service in the cases of a person appointed temporarilly. In doing so, however, the previously determined inter se seniority of employees belonging to the same Covenanting state shall not be disturbed. Explanation.- 'Lenght of Service' in the above proviso means length of permanent service in the case of a person appointed substantively and length of temporary service in the cases of a person appointed temporarilly. (iii) The inter se seniority of persons appointed by promotion to the posts of Lower Division Clerks against the vacancies reserved under proviso to Rule 6(b) shall be determined on the basis of length of continuous,service." Rule 2 of 1969 Rules "Scope and Applicability. - Notwithstanding anything contained in any service rules or orders for the time being in force regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to the various services or posts in connection with the affairs of the State, surplus personnel shall be eligible for recruitment and appointment by absorption to such service or posts in accordance with these rules subject to the availability of vacant posts ; Provided that:- (i) nothing contained in these rules shall apply to posts encadred in the All India Services, the Rajasthan Higher Judi Service, the Rajasthan Judicial Service, the Rajasthan Secretariat Service, the Rajaa an Administrative Service, the R Sxi an Police Service, the Rajasthan Accounts Service and the Rajasthan Tehsildar Service. (ii) nothing contained in these rules shall apply to the persons holding posts of Statisticians in the Directorate of Economics and Industrial Survey prior to the abolition of that department and subsequently absorbed as Statistical Assistants in the Directorate of Economics and Statistics on their having been rendered surplus and thereafter being adjudged suitable for appointment to the service under Rule 24 of the Rajasthan Statistical Subordinate Services Rules, 1971. Rule 11(3), (4) and (5) of 1969 Rules - In the case of surplus employees absorbed under sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 where the posts on which they were absorbed fall within the purview of the Commission on the date of publication of these rules and in the case of surplus employees absorbed either under subrule (1) or under sub-rule (3), of Rule 7, where the post on which they were absorbed fall within the purview of the Appointing Authority, if on the date of being declared surplus they held ad hoc appointment for 3 years or more on the post from which they are declared surplus or equivalent posts, appointment to the new posts, shall be in an ad hoc capacity as provided for in category (e) specified in the table given in sub-rule (1) of Rule 7 and their suitablity shall be adjudged by the Commission or the Appointing Authority, as the case may be, for such new posts. (4) In the case of surplus employee absorbed either under sub-rule (1) or under sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 where on the date of being declared surplus, they held ad hoc appointments for less than 3 years on the post from which they are declared surplus or equivalent posts appointment to the new posts shall be only in an ad hoc capacity as provided in category (e) specified in the table given in sub-rule (1) of Rule 7 and they shall have to seek regular direct recruitment along with open market candidates in the normal course and in accordance with the provisions of the relevant service rules. (5) It will not be necessary to adjudge the suitability of those permanent or temporary absorbed surplus employees who were initially appointed on previous posts either on the recommendation of the commission or in a regular manner by the appointing authority and who are subsequently appointed to new posts." 9. Analysis of the rules quoted herinabove show that for the purpose of recruitment on the post of L.D.Cs. in the Subordinate Civil Courts, competitive examination has to be faced by the eligible candidates. Analysis of the rules quoted herinabove show that for the purpose of recruitment on the post of L.D.Cs. in the Subordinate Civil Courts, competitive examination has to be faced by the eligible candidates. Only by virtue of proviso to Rule 6 of 1958 Rules and by virtue of similar proviso under 1986 Rules, a post of L.D.C. can be filled by transfer of the existing employee by one Judgeship to another but this can only be done with the approval of the Rajasthan High Court. Under 1986 Rules, 10% of the vacancies are required to be filled by promotion from amongst Class IV employees who have put in five years service in the concerned Judgeship and possess the academic qualification prescribed under the Rules for the post of L.D.C. No other method of recruitment has been specified in the Rules. Therefore, it can be said that the only mode of regular recruitment is the competitive of/transfer under 1958 Rules and competitive examination/ transfer/ promotion from amongst Class IV employees under the Rules of 1986. Rules of 1958 do not contain any provision for making of temporary appointment but under 1986 Rules, such a provision has been made in the form of Rule 23(3). As far as the provision regarding seniority is concerned, under Rule 21 of 1958 Rules, the seniority is ordinarily required to be determined from the date of confirmation in the grade. Similarly, in Rule 26 of 1986 Rules, the critaria for seniority for the purpose or promotion is the date of confirmation in the grade. This rule also provide that seniority shall ordinarily be determined from the date of order of confirmation. The only exception which has been carved out is in the matter of seniority of persons appointed by way of promotion under the provision of proviso to Rule 6(b) of 1986 Rules. In both the sets of Rules, a person appointed by direct recruitment is required to be placed on probation and the Rule regarding confirmation envisages the confirmation of a probationer. Both the sets of rules provide that the appointing authority shall feel satisfied that his integrity is unquestionable and that the employee is otherwise fit for confirmation. Additional condition for passing departmental examination has been prescribed in Rule 31 of 1986 Rules. 10. Both the sets of rules provide that the appointing authority shall feel satisfied that his integrity is unquestionable and that the employee is otherwise fit for confirmation. Additional condition for passing departmental examination has been prescribed in Rule 31 of 1986 Rules. 10. Although 1958 Rules and 1986 Rules do not contain the provision for appointment of LDCs except by way of competitive examination, 1969 Rules, which have also been framed the Governor in exercise of his power under Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, do provide for an additional mode of appointment. Rule 2 of 1969 Rules begins with a non-obstante clause. The non-obstante clause gives overriding power to the provisions of 1969 Rules qua any other rules regulating recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to various services of posts of persons appointed to various services or posts in connection with the affairs of the State except in respect of the services which have been kept out of the preview of the application of 1969 Rules by virtue of proviso (i) or proviso (ii) of Rule 2 of 1969 Rules. Rule 7 of these rules provide for procedure for absorption and as per Rule 7(1)(d), a person holding a temporary post on the date of being declared surplus, can be appointed on temporary basis or on ad hoc basis according to the nature of the appointment held by him on the date of being declared surplus. Rule 11(4) envisages that a person who has rendered less than three years service on the post from which he is declared surplus, appointment to the new post shall only be on ad hoc capacity and he shall have to seek regular direct recruitment along with the open market candidates in the normal course and in accordance with the provisions of the relevant service rules. Thus, by virtue of 1969 Rules, an surplus employee could have been appointed on a post encadred in 1958 Rules and can be appointed in a post encadred in 1986 Rules. 11. Therefore, the appointment of Respondents No. 3 to 5 can be said to have been made as surplus employees in accordance with the provisions of 1969 Rules. This is being mentioned by me even in the absence of any specific plea by either of the parties except a vague reference by Respondents No. 3 to 5 in their reply. 11. Therefore, the appointment of Respondents No. 3 to 5 can be said to have been made as surplus employees in accordance with the provisions of 1969 Rules. This is being mentioned by me even in the absence of any specific plea by either of the parties except a vague reference by Respondents No. 3 to 5 in their reply. Except the provisions of 1969 Rules, there is no source of power which was available either with the High Court or with the learned District Judge to have appointed Respondent No. 3 to 5 as L.D.Cs. 12. The next point which now requires examination is as to whether the Respondents No. 3 to 5 can be assigned seniority on the basis of total length of service. The facts which have come on record clearly prove that Respondents No. 3 to 5 were appointed on purely temporary basis in the Census Department. Their appointments, were not preceded by any selection by a competent authority and were not in accordance with the provisions of any set of statute rules or administrative orders. The order of their absorption also indicate that they were holding temporary ad hoc posts at the time of declaration of surplus. They were absorbed in the service of the Judgeship of District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur on temporary basis. Atleast in one of the eases it was made clear that the candidate will' have to pass the competitive examination held in the years 1975, 1976 and 1977. They were thereafter confirmed in the year 1982. Can it be said that their seniority could, be determined on the basis of their total length, of service or from the date of their appointment in the service of the Judgeship of District Judge, Jaipur City Jaipur or from the date of their passing the competitive examination. Shri Lodha, learned counsel for Respondents No.1 and 2 laid much emphasis on the word 'ordinarily' used in Rule 21 and 26 of 1958 and 1986 Rules respectively. He argued that the cases of the Respondents constitute a special class in themselves and, therefore, the ordinary rule of seniority being determined on the basis of the date of order of confirmation could not have been applied. He urged that the word 'ordinarily' gives ample discretion to the competent authority to determine the seniority on any other criteria including the criteria of length of service. He urged that the word 'ordinarily' gives ample discretion to the competent authority to determine the seniority on any other criteria including the criteria of length of service. Shri Lodha further argued in the light of the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in various cases, the High Court and Respondent No. 2 were fully justified in applying the rule of total length of service for the purpose of determination of seniority. If the word 'ordinarily' is construed in the light of the Supreme Court's decisions, it cannot be said that any illegality has been committed by Respondent No. 2 in giving benefit of seniority to Respondents No. 3 to 5 on the basis of length of service. 13. The word 'ordinary' means regular; usual; normal; common; according established order; of characteised by peculiar or unusual circumstance. The word 'ordinarily', used in Rule 21 of 1958 Rules and Rule 26 of 1986 Rules, signifies that in the normal circumstances, the seniority shall be determined from the date of order of confirmation in the grade. Only in exceptional circumstances or in unusual circumstances, seniority can be determined by a criteria other than the date of order of confirmation. This, however, does not mean that the seniority can be determined on the basis of the principles which have not been accepted in the service jurisprudence applicable in this country. The concept of confirmation has been characterised as inglorious uncertainty in S.B. Patwardhan v. State of Maharashtra, 1977 Lab IC 1367 : ( AIR 1977 SC 2051 ) of the service and recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court are suggestive of the thinking that the requirement of confirmation of a Government servant should not be stretched too far, particularly when the confirmation is not based on predictable and certain factors/circumstances. In earlier pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the element of confirmation was treated as determinative of serniority, however, from 1980 onwards, there has been a series of decisions where the Court has given importance to the nature of appointment for the purpose of determination of seniority. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. M.J. Siddiqui, AIR 1980 SC 1098 :(1980 Lab IC 644) , Baleshwar Dass v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 41 : (1980 Lab IC 1155) , P.D. Agarwal v. State of U.P. AIR 1987 SC 1676 : (1987 Lab IC 1307) . In State of Uttar Pradesh v. M.J. Siddiqui, AIR 1980 SC 1098 :(1980 Lab IC 644) , Baleshwar Dass v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 41 : (1980 Lab IC 1155) , P.D. Agarwal v. State of U.P. AIR 1987 SC 1676 : (1987 Lab IC 1307) . The Supreme Court has held that if an employee has been appointed in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Rules or administative orders, where the rules have not been framed for the purpose of regular recruitment his appointment must he treated as substantive appointment and he shall be assigned seniority with effect from the date of appointment on the basis of such regular selection. Availability of a permanent post and existence of order of confirmation will not be necessary for the purpose of treating the employee as a substantive appointee. Thus, emphasis has been placed on the mode of selection of the employee which precedes the appointment. The Court has also drawn distinction between an appointment made after regular selection and an appointment made without such regular selection. Appointments made in the second category are termed as ad hoc temporary or stop gap appointments. By and large, the Supreme Court and various High Courts have not accepted the principle of determination of seniority from the date of ad hoc appointment. So far as 1958 Rules are concerned, as I have already noticed that there was a total absence of power with the competent authority to make appointment on temporary basis and any appointment made otherwise than the mode prescribed by Rule 6 of 1958 Rules has to be held as an appointment made on purely ad hoc basis or an appointment made de hors the Rules. Similarly under 1986 Rules although power has been conferred on the competent authority to make temporary appointment by virtue of Rule 23(3), it is clear that an appointment made under Rule 23(3) is in total contrast to an appointment made after following the prescribed procedure for making the direct recruitment. All the three respondents were appointed in the Census Department on purely temporary basis against the ad hoc posts and therefore, their appointment cannot be treated as one made after following the procedure prescribed for making regular selection. All the three respondents were appointed in the Census Department on purely temporary basis against the ad hoc posts and therefore, their appointment cannot be treated as one made after following the procedure prescribed for making regular selection. None of the Respondents can be treated as member of service of the earst while Census Department and their appointment continued to be purely temporary and ad hoc on their absorption in the service of the Judgeship of District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur. Therefore in my considered opinion, Respondents No. 3 to 5 cannot be asigned seniority on the basis of the total length of service or even on the basis of the date of their joining service in the Judgeship of District Judge, Jaipur City. The word 'ordinarily' used in Rule 21 of 1958 Rules or in Rule 26 of 1986 Rules cannot be stretched too far to confer power on the competent authority to assign seniority to Respondents No. 3 to 5 or other similarly situatted persons by counting their total length of service which include service on ad hoc/temporary appointment. 14. In Direct recruitee Engineer Grade II Association v. the State of Maharashtra (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the various decisions of and then deduced the following principles for determination of seniority : "To sum up, we hold that: (A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiaion in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority (B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rifles but the appointee continues in the post uniterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted. (C) When appointments are made from more than one source, it is permissible to fix the ratio for recruitment from the different sources, and if rules are framed in this regard they must ordinarily be followed strictly. (C) When appointments are made from more than one source, it is permissible to fix the ratio for recruitment from the different sources, and if rules are framed in this regard they must ordinarily be followed strictly. (D) If it becomes impossible to adhere to the existing quota rule, it should be sub-situated by an appropriate rule to meet the need of the situation. In case, however, the quota rule is not followed continuously for a number of years because it was impossible to do so the inference is irresistible that the quota rule had broken down. (E) Where the quota rule has broken down and the appointments are made from one source in excess of the quota, but are made-after following the procedure prescribed by the rules for the appointment, the appointees should not be pushed down below the appointees from the other source inducted in the service at a later date. (F) Where the rules permit the authorities to relax the provisions relating to the quota, ordinarily a presumption should be raised that-there was such relaxation when there is a deviation from the quota rule. (G) The quota for recruitment from the different sources may be prescribed by executive instructions, if the rules are silent on the subject. (H) If the quota rule is prescribed by an executive instruction, and is not followed continuously for a number of years, the inference is that the executive instruction has ceased to remain operative." 15. The controversy which had arisen before the Supreme Court in the case of Direct Recruit's case was that the appointments had been made to Engineering services in violation of the quota rules. The appointments continued for number of years and thereafter the appointees were regularised in service. In the given facts and situation, the Court held that once the services of the appointees had been regularised and there was a break down of quota rule, the period of officiating service will be counted for the purpose of determination of seniority. 16. In Ganpat Singh Deora v. The Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1574/85 decided on 10-8-1990) challenge was made to the seniority assigned to the petitioners by the Rajasthan High Court in the cadre of L.D.Cs. 16. In Ganpat Singh Deora v. The Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1574/85 decided on 10-8-1990) challenge was made to the seniority assigned to the petitioners by the Rajasthan High Court in the cadre of L.D.Cs. The date of confirmation of the petitioners was subsequent to the date of confirmation of Respondents No. 3 to 17 even though they had been appointed earlier. The petitioners contended that their seniority should be counted from the date of appointment after selection whereas the Respondents contended that the senioriy was determined from the date of confirmation. After making reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Direct Recruit's case, the learned Judge observed as under : "Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court that if the initial appointment is made as a stop gap arrangement i.e. on ad hoc basis without following the rules then of course, that will not be counted for seniority but if any incumbent is appointed on a post according to rule, then his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. In this case, I have already held that the appointments of the petitioners were made in a regular way according to the rules under the specific orders of Hon'ble Chief Justice whereby the formality of taking their written test was abondoned by relaxing the rules and, therefore, when it was a regular appointment according to the Rules and procedures ordered to be followed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice then such a course adopted by the Registry for appointment of the petitioners was in accordance with the Rules and it was very much a regular appointment and therefore, seniority will have to be given to such appointees from the date of their appointment and not from the date of their confirmation." 17. It is clear from the above observations that the learned single Judge has considered the date of regular appointment as the yardstick for determination of serniority, in contradistinction to an appointment made without following the procedure prescribed by rules. It is clear from the above observations that the learned single Judge has considered the date of regular appointment as the yardstick for determination of serniority, in contradistinction to an appointment made without following the procedure prescribed by rules. In Masood Akhtar Khan v. State of M.P. 1990 (4) SCC 211 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred the Direct Recruit's case and then held that if initial appointment is not made in accordance with the rules, the subsequent regularisation of service does not entitle an employee to get the benefit of intervening service for seniority. Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in D.N Agarwal v. State of M.P. (1990) 2 SCC 553 : (1990 Lab IC 1156) and in Delhi Water Supply and Sewerage Disposal Committee v. R.K. Kashyap (1989) Suppl 1 SCC 194: ( AIR 1989 SC 278 ) . In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under at page 284: "The ground of counting service in favour of one should not however, be violative of principle of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16. The length of service in ad hoc appointment or stop gap arrangement made in the exigencies of service without considering the claims of all the eligible and suitable persons in the cadre ought not to be recognised for the purpose of determining seniority in the promotional cadre. To give benefit to such service would favour few and would be contrary to the principle of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16." In Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India, 1991 Lab IC 216 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court again reiterated the principle of computation of seniority with effect from the date of substantive appointment. In that case, attempt was made to convince the Court that principle No. (B) laid down in Direct Recruit's case should be interpreted so as to count ad hoc service for the purpose of determination of seniority once the employee is regularised. After considering the various decisions including Direct Recruit's case, the Supreme Court proceeded to hold that if benefit of ad hoc service is given, it will be contrary to equality clause. In para 23 their Lordships observed as under :It is notorious that confirmation of an employee in a substantive post would take place long years after the retirement. After considering the various decisions including Direct Recruit's case, the Supreme Court proceeded to hold that if benefit of ad hoc service is given, it will be contrary to equality clause. In para 23 their Lordships observed as under :It is notorious that confirmation of an employee in a substantive post would take place long years after the retirement. An employee is entitled to be considered for promotion on regular basis to a higher post if he/she is an approved probationer in the substantive lower post. An officer appointed by promotion in accordance with rules and within quota and on declaration of probation is entitled to reckon his seniority from the date of promotion and the entire length of service, though initially temporary, shall be counted for seniority. Ad hoc or fortuitous appointments on a temporary or stop gap basis cannot be taken into account for the purpose of seniority, even if the appointee was subsequently qualified to hold the post on a regular basis. To give benefit of such service would be contrary to equality enshrined in Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the Constitution as unequals would be treated as equals. When promotion is out side the quota, the seniority would be reckoned from the date of vacancy within the quota, rendering the previous service fortuitous. The previous promotion would be regular only from the date of the vacancy within the quota and seniority shall be counted from that date and not from the date of his earlier promotion or subsequent confirmation. In order to do justice to the promotees it would not be proper to do injustice to the direct recruits. The rule of quota being a statutory one must be strictly implemented and it is impermissible for the authorities concerned to deviate from the rule due to administrative exigencies or expediency. The result of pushing down the promotees appointed in excess of the quota may work out hardship but it is unavoidable and any construction otherwise would be illegal, nullifying the force of statuory rules and would offend Articles 14 and 16(1). Therefore, the rules must be carefully applied in such a manner as not to violate the rules or equality assured under Article 14 of the Constitution."Again in para 23 their Lordships observed as under: "The controversy is as to which of the propositions would apply to the facts of this case. Therefore, the rules must be carefully applied in such a manner as not to violate the rules or equality assured under Article 14 of the Constitution."Again in para 23 their Lordships observed as under: "The controversy is as to which of the propositions would apply to the facts of this case. The proposition 'A' lays down that once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of confirmation. The latter part thereof amplifies postulating that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and is made as a stop-gap arrangement, the period of officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for reckoning seniority. The quintessence of the proposition is that the appointment to a post must be according to rules and not by way of ad hoc or stop-gap arrangement made due to administrative exigencies. If the initial appointment thus made was dehors the rules, the entire length of such service cannot be counted for seniority. In other words the appointee would become a member of the service in the substantive capacity from the date of his appointment only if the appointment was made according to rules and seniority would be counted only from that date." 18. Thus, their Lordships of the Supreme Court categorically rejected the plea that once an appointee is regularised in service, the total length of service should be counted for the purpose of determination of seniority. 19. Even in Direct Recruit's case, in para 13 of the judgment, their Lordships had observed as under: "We, therefore, confirm the principle of counting towards seniority the period of continuous officiation following an appointment made in accordance with the rules prescribed for regular substantive appointments in the service." 20. In my opinion, from perusal of the last decision in Keshav Chandra's case read with the Masood Akhtar's case, it becomes absolutley clear that if an appointment has been made in contravention of the Rules or if an appointment is made on temporary basis without following the procedure prescribed for regular selection, such appointment cannot confer any right upon the employee and he cannot be assigned serniority on the basis of total length of service. Both in Masood Akhtar's case (supra) and Keshav Chandra's case (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court had referred to the earlier decision of Direct Recruits'case and then held that an ad hoc or termporary appointee cannot have his total length of service counted for the purpose of determination of seniority. After regularisation or after regular appointment, also seniority cannot be reckoned on the basis of total length of service. The seniority can only be reckoned from the date of regular appointment made in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the service rules or where the rules have not been framed, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the administrative orders. This is precisely what has been held by Chopra, J. in Ganpat Singh Deora's case (supra). It is thus, clear that the principle of determination of seniority on the basis of substantive appointment or appointment made after regular selection is the only recognised criteria for determination of seniority where no other criteria has been prescribed in the statutory rules or by administrative orders in absence of rules. 21. In the light of these principles, the Rule 21 of 1958 Rules and Rule 26 of 1986 Rules would mean that the normal rule of seniority is the date of order of confirmation. But even in cases where the order of confirmation has not been issued, the seniority can be determined on the basis of the date of appointment after regular selection or in case of ad hoc appointees, from the date of passing of the order of regular selection. Thus, ordinarily under these rules the seniority has to be determined on the basis of the date of confirmation in the grade but this normal rule can be departed by determination of the seniority on the basis of the date of regular appointment. No other yardstick or criteria can be adopted for the determination of seniority and it is not open to the competent authorities including the High Court to determine or direct determination of seniority by taking into consideration the ad hoc-or officiating or temporary service rendered by a person on the basis of his appointment made otherwise than after regular selection. No other yardstick or criteria can be adopted for the determination of seniority and it is not open to the competent authorities including the High Court to determine or direct determination of seniority by taking into consideration the ad hoc-or officiating or temporary service rendered by a person on the basis of his appointment made otherwise than after regular selection. Since the Respondents No. 3 to 5 were appointed on ad hoc/temporary basis by absorption and they did not have any regular appointment to their credit in the Census Department, their seniority can be reckoned only from the date of passing the competitive examination and they cannot be assigned seniority by counting the period of service rendered by them prior to the passing of competitive test. Therefore, the order dated 2-11-1989 by which they had been assigned seniority by counting their earlier service, has to be held to be illegal. 22. Now, I may examine the order dated 21-5-1986 passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.S. Lodha on the basis of which impugned order dated 2-11-1989 has been passed. Om Prakash Pal was appellant in the appeal which came up for decision before the Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.S. Lodha. He was regarding seniority. Learned Appellate appointed as L.D.C. in the Judgeship of Authority has not referred to any provisions District Judge, Kota after regular selection in accordance with the procedure prescribed by 1958 Rules. Respondents were appointed as L.D.C. in that Judgeship as surplus hands of Census Department. They had not passed the recruitment test at the time of their appointment. But later on, they cleared the recruitment test. All of them were subsequently confirmed. Om Prakash Pal was assigned seniority below the surplus hands of Census Department. He contested his seniority position on the ground that the surplus hands were not appointed after following the procedure prescribed by the Rules and therefore, they cannot be assigned seniority on the basis of length of service. The learned Judge, while deciding the appeal, observed that in the order of appointment it was not indicated that the surplus hands were to be subjected to recruitment test or typing test before appointment. They were only called upon to pass test within six months. Therefore, the case of the Respondents clearly stood on a different footing. They were not direct recruits but surplus hands of the Census Department. They were only called upon to pass test within six months. Therefore, the case of the Respondents clearly stood on a different footing. They were not direct recruits but surplus hands of the Census Department. They had put in more than three years' service in the Census Department and the recruitment test was only a qualifying test for them and since they passed the test, their appointment will be deemed to be valid from the date of their initial appointment. In my opinion, the reasoning given by the learned Appellate Authority in the Appeal of Om Prakash Pal's case is not correct. The learned Appellate Authority proceeded on an assumption that the test in which the surplus hands had appeared was merely a qualifying test and not a competitive test and, therefore, they were entitled to count their total length of service for the purpose of determination of service. This assumption of the Appellate Authority has no legal sanction or foundation in the scheme of 1958 Rules. Learned Appellate Authority has not held that the provisions of 1958 Rules and particularly the mode of recruitment prescribed in those Rules was followed. Similarly the learned Appellate Authority has not even adverted to Rules of law on the basis of which it came to. the conclusion that the absorbees were entitled to the benefit of total length of service, i.e., form the date of initial appointment, for the purpose of seniority qua a direct recruitee. 23. I have already discussed the entire scheme of the rules and in my opinion surplus hands, who were holding the posts of L.D.C. on an ad hoc/temporary basis cannot claim that their total length of service shall be counted for the purpose of determination of seniority. Such surplus hands can become members of the service only after passing the competitive examination prescribed under the Rules of 1958. Since Respondents No. 3 to 5 passed the competitive test only in the year 1977, they became members of service only in 1977 and, therefore, they could not have been assigned seniority on the basis of length of service which they had rendered as ad hoc/ temporary appointees. Respondents No. 3 to 5 were very much conscious of their position as ad hoc/temporary appointees and precisely for this reason, they have faced the competitive tests held in the years 1975, 1976 and in 1977. Respondents No. 3 to 5 were very much conscious of their position as ad hoc/temporary appointees and precisely for this reason, they have faced the competitive tests held in the years 1975, 1976 and in 1977. Since they had passed the test in the year 1977 they could not have been placed in the seniority list above the petitioners who were appointed in 1974 after passing the competitive test. 24. In view of the above discussion, I do not consider it necessary to decide the question as to whether the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the ground of violation principles of natural justice. 25. In the result, this writ petition succeeds, and it is hereby allowed. Order dated 2-11-1989 is declared as illegal and it is hereby quashed. The petitioners shall be assigned seniority above the Respondents No. 3 to 5 and their position as it was obtaining in the list dated 8-8-1984 should be restored. If promotions have been made on higher posts, in the meantime the cases of the petitioners shall be considered for such promotion retrospectively in accordance with the rules and on promotion they be given all consequential benefits. It is, however, made clear that if any surplus employee of Census Department is entitled to the benefit of screening under Rule 11 of 1969 Rules, the concerned District 'Judge will be free to examine his case and extend him the benefit of screening under 1969 Rules. Parties are left to bear their own costs. A copy of this order be sent to the Registrar, Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur.Petition allowed. *******