Hazur Singh v. Behari Lal—(12) — 1992 DIGILAW 531 (RAJ)

Honble B.R. ARORA, J.—, This appeal is directed against the decree and judgment dated January 27, 1979, passed by the Additional District Judge, Sri Gangnagar, by which the plaintffs suit was decreed against the appellans. 2. Plaintiff M/s. Behari Lal Banwari Lal, Grain Market, Sri Gangan-agar, filed a suit for declaration and recovery of the bus alongwith the damage of Rs. 13,000/-from the defendants No. 1 and in the alternative for the recovery of Rs. 20,000/- against the defendant No. 2, 3, and 4 viz., Hazoor Singh, Gurdayal Singh and Gurlabh Singh. The case, as set up in the plaint, is that on July 2, 1969, under a hire-purchase agreement the plaintiff delivered his bus No. RJR 6794 to the defendant No. 2 Hazoor Singh. The defendant No. 3 Gurdayal Singh and No. 4 Gulab Singh stood sureties for defendant No. 2. It was, inter alia, agreed that Hazoor Singh, in all, will pay Rs. 16,800/- in twelve instalments of Rs. 1400/- each towards the price of the bus. It was, also, agreed that till the whole amount is paid, the ownershp of the bus will remain with the defendant No. 2. It was further agreed that in case of default in the payment of instalments, the plaintiff will be entitled to interest @ 12% per annum and will, also, have a right to discern the contract and take back the possession of the bus, Defendant Hazoor Singh did not make payment of any instalment and paid only Rs, 500/- on December 17, 1969, and, therefore, the plaintiff, on March 25, 1970, cancelled the agreement and approached the defendant No.2 to regain the possession of the bus. At that time,the plaintiff was informed that the vehicle has already been attached by the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer (R.P.G.T.) Sri Ganganagar, on January 2,1970, against certain tax dues of Buses No. RJR 3107 and RJR 5202 belonging to New India Transport Cooperative Society Ltd. The case of the plaintiff, further, is that after the seizure of the bus, the bus was kept in open by the respondent No. 1 and as it was exposed to sun, air and shower and, therefore, its tyres. tubes, window glasses and the body were damaged, which resulted in a to al damages of about Rs. 10,500/- The plaintiff, also, claimed a sum of Rs. 2500/-as loss of interest. The suit was contested by all the defendants. tubes, window glasses and the body were damaged, which resulted in a to al damages of about Rs. 10,500/- The plaintiff, also, claimed a sum of Rs. 2500/-as loss of interest. The suit was contested by all the defendants. Defendant No.l contested the suit mainly on the ground that there was no hire-purchase agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 2 and it was simply a case of advancement of loan by the plaintiff to the defendant No. 2 for the purchase of the bus and as Hazoor Singh (defendant No. 2) was the registered owner of the bus and, therefore, the bus was attached by the respondent No. i for the realization of the amount of arrears of tax outstanding against the defendant No. 2. The case of the defendants No. 3 and 4, as set-out in their respective written statements, was that though the defendant No. 2 took the bus under a hire-purchase agreement from the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 16,800/-and the respondents No. 3 and 4 stood sureties for him, but as the defendant No. 2 did not pay the monthly instalments and, therefore, the contract stood rescinded on August 2, 1969 itself and if the bus is therefore attached by the d fendant No. 1 then they are not liable for it. On the basis of these pleadings, the learned trial Court framed eight issues. Issue No. 7 was with respect to the jurisdiction of the Court and, therefore, the trial Court, by its order dated April 22, 1974, decided this issue as preliminary issue and held that the Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. 3. The plaintiff in support of its case, examined four witnesses and placed on record seven documents. Ex. 1 (C) is the Entry from the Register of of the Registrar of Firms. Ex. 2(C) is the Certificate of Registration and Fitness of the bus No. RJR 6794, Ex. 3 (C) is the hire-purchase agreement, Ex. 4(C) is the letter dated September 14, 1971, by which the plaintiff was informed that its objections have been rejected. Ex. 5(C) is the notice dated June 21,1971, under Section 80 C.P.C. given by the plaintiff to the defendants and Ex. 6 (C) and Ex. 7(C) are the two A.D. receipts. 3 (C) is the hire-purchase agreement, Ex. 4(C) is the letter dated September 14, 1971, by which the plaintiff was informed that its objections have been rejected. Ex. 5(C) is the notice dated June 21,1971, under Section 80 C.P.C. given by the plaintiff to the defendants and Ex. 6 (C) and Ex. 7(C) are the two A.D. receipts. The defendant No. 2, in support of his case, examined two witnesses only and did not produce any document, while the defendants. No. 3 and 4, also, examined two witnesses and placed on record one documents. Ex. A.l- the Auction Report. The learned trial Court, by its decree and judgement dated January 27, 1979, decreed the plaintiffs suit against the defendants No. 2,3 and 4/1 to 4/4 for an amount of Rs. 20,000/- (Rs. 16,300/- as Principal and Rs. 3700/-as interest alongwith 12% pendents lite and future interest and dismissed the suit against the defendant No. 1, the State of Rajasthan. It is against this decree and judgment dated January 27, 1979 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sri Gangangar, that the defendant No. 2 Hazoor Singh has preferred this appeal. No appeal or cross-objections were filed by the plaintiff or by the State. Even the plaintiff appear inspite of service of notice. 4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the contract stood reseinded when the defendant-appellant did not pay the first instalment, which became due on August 2, 1969. It is. also contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that no liability can be fastened upon the appellant for the illegal action of the defendant No. I, the State of Rajasthan and as it was only on account of the illegal action of the defendant No. 1 that the plaintiff suffered the injury and, therefore, the decree could be passed only against the defendant No. 1 and not against the defendant-app eilant. The learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the State, on the other hand, has supported the decree and judgement, passed by the Court below. A preliminary objection was, also, raised by the respondent No. 2 the State of Rajasthan that no relief, as prayed for by the appellant, can be granted to him as the plaintiff has not preferred any appeal. 5. I have considered the rival submission made by the learned counsel for the parties. 6. A preliminary objection was, also, raised by the respondent No. 2 the State of Rajasthan that no relief, as prayed for by the appellant, can be granted to him as the plaintiff has not preferred any appeal. 5. I have considered the rival submission made by the learned counsel for the parties. 6. Before considering the appeal on merit, it would be proper to first dispose of the preliminary objections raised by the respondent No. 2. Order 41 rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the powers of Court of appeal. It provides that the appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made & to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require. The object of order 41 rule 33 CPC is to enable the appellate Court to do compelete justice between the parties and if the justice of the case may require, to pass any decree or order which ought in law to have been passed by the trial Court but not passed by it. If the circumstances of the case and the interest of justice demand the vatiation of the decree then the appellate Court can deal with the case in a way which seems to be equitable to all the parties concerned and to vary or modiy the decree as the nature of the case may require. The rule further empowers the appellate Court to make whaeter order/decree it seems fit, not only as between the appellant and the respondents but, also, as between the respondent and the respondents. Filing or non filing of appeal or cross-objection does not bar the appellate Court in passing a decree in favour of the respondent if the question raised properly arise out of the judgment of the lower Court and the parties are before the appellate Court, though may be in a different capacity. The rule has been couched in such a way that it gives wide discretion to the appellate Court to consider any objection against any part of the judgment or decree of the lower Court and empowers the Court to vary or reverse the same in order to avoid inconsistent, contractory and unworkable decision. The preliminary objection, raised by the learned counsel for the respondent, has, thus, no merit and deserves to be dismissed. The preliminary objection, raised by the learned counsel for the respondent, has, thus, no merit and deserves to be dismissed. 7. Now coming to the merit of the case, the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that as the defendant-appellant did not make the payment of the first instalment and paid only Rs. 500/-on December 17,1969 and therefore, the contract stood rescinded on August 2, 1969 Condition No. 2 of the Here-Purchase Agreement (EX. 3) (5) reads as under— The owner may terminate with or without notice the contract of hire and forthwith take and recover the possession of the vehicle (a) if any monthly hire or part thereof is in arrear and left unpaid for a period of seven days after the date fixed for its payment for a reason what soever and particularly notwithstanding, any claim which the hirer may have in respect of the policy of the insurance hereinafer mentioned....." It is not in dispute that the Hire Purchase Agreement was entered into on July 2, 1969, and the delivery of the bus was given by the plaintiff to the defendant No. 2 on the same day and the defendant No. 2 did not make any payment against the instalments and paid only Rs. 500/- on December 17, 1969. Neither he made any payment against the instalments not returned the bus. PW 1(C) Banwari Lal has stated that the defendant No 2 did not make any payment against the instalments and continued with the possession of the bus. He cancelled the contract as per Condition No. 5 of the Hire Purchase Agreement in the last week of March, 1970 and not earlier to that he contacted the defendant No. 2 Hazoor Singh for the delivery of the bus, but he was informed that the bus has been attached and seized by the A.C.T.O. (R.P.G.T.P.) for the recovery of the outstanding tax amount and is lying at the Police Station. PW 2(C) Brij Lal is only witness to the execution of the agreement Ex. 3(C) and he has identified the signatures of Hazoor Singh (defendant No. 2) and two sureties Gurdayal Singh and Gurlab Singh. P.W. 3(C) Surendra Pal Singh and PW 4(C) Kheta Singh are the two witnesses, who have been produced by the plaintiff to prove the contract. PW 2(C) Brij Lal is only witness to the execution of the agreement Ex. 3(C) and he has identified the signatures of Hazoor Singh (defendant No. 2) and two sureties Gurdayal Singh and Gurlab Singh. P.W. 3(C) Surendra Pal Singh and PW 4(C) Kheta Singh are the two witnesses, who have been produced by the plaintiff to prove the contract. Therefore, the relevant evidence of this point, produced by the plaintiff is only of PW 1 (C) DW 1/D. 2 Hazoor Singh has stated that he took the delivery of the bus from the plaintiff under a hire-purchase agreerment Ex. 3 (C) and he has to make payment of the instalments of Rs 1400/- per month and the first instalment was to be paid on August 2, 1969, which he could not pay. After ten-twelve days of August 2, 1969, the plaintiff came to him alongwith his gurantors Gurdayal Singh and Gurlabh Singh and informed him that as he had not made the payment of the first instalment and, therefore, he has cancelled the contract and asked him to return the bus. In the cross-examination, this witness has admitted that when the plaintiff came to him alongwith the two guarantors, at that time the bus was not with him and he informed Banwari Lal that the driver and the Coductor of the bus had taken the bus and they would return after one or two days. He has admitted that no written notice, canceling the contract, was given to him by the plaintiff. He has, also, admitted that he neither informed the plaintiff regarding the attachment of the bus nor he went to him to return that bus. He has, also, admitted that except Rs. 500/- he did not pay any amount against the instalments of the price of the bus. He has also admitted that he purchased bus for a consideration of Rs. 16,800/-. In the cross-examination he has stated that he cannot say that Banwari Lal alongwith the guarantors came to him and cancelled the contract after 2 or 2 1/2 months prior to the attachment of the bus, has also, admitted that he made the payment of Rs. 500/- 1 or 1 1/2months prior to the attachment of the bus. Similar is the statement of DW I/D3D4 Gurudayal Singh. 500/- 1 or 1 1/2months prior to the attachment of the bus. Similar is the statement of DW I/D3D4 Gurudayal Singh. He has stated that when Hazoor Singh did not make payment of the first instalment on August 2 1969 then Banwarial came to him and asked him that as Hazoor Singh has not made payment of the first instalment and therefore he has cancelled the agreement and as such the bus may be returned to him. He alongwith Gurulabh Singh went to Hazoor Singh and asked him that as the agreement has been cancelled, he should, therefore return the bus to the plaintiff, but as the bus was not available as the Conductor and the driver of the bus had taken the bus out of the town and, therefore, the delivery of the bus could not be given to the plaintiff. In cross-examination, he has stated that he cannot say whether he alongwith Gurulabh Singh and Banwarilal went to Hazoor Singh two or 2 1/2 months after the attachment of the bus. Though the two witnesses, viz., DW l/D2 Hazoor Singh and DW 1/3D-4 Gurdayal Singh, in the examina-ation-in-chief have stated that the agreement was cancelled after ten or twelve days of August 2, 1969, but in the cross-examination, they have stated that they cannot say that the agreement might have been cancelled two or 2\ month after the attachment of the bus. PW 1 Banwarilal has specifically stated that the agresment was cancelled in the end of March, 1970. If the agreement would have been cancelled in the month of August, 1969, itself, then Hazoor Singh could not have made paymeat of Rs. 59)/-against the instalments in the month of December, 1969, and would not have remained in possesion of the bus. A close reading of the statement of these three witnesses, thus, cleary show that the agreement was cancelled by the plaintiff in the last week of March, 1970, and not earlier to that. According to Condition No. 5, the plaintiff had the option to cancel the contract for the non-payment of the amount of the instalment and the cancellation was not automatic for non-payment of the instalment If the plaintiff did not choose to cancel the agreement prior to March, 1970, defendant cannot take the advantage of the non-cancellation of the contract. According to Condition No. 5, the plaintiff had the option to cancel the contract for the non-payment of the amount of the instalment and the cancellation was not automatic for non-payment of the instalment If the plaintiff did not choose to cancel the agreement prior to March, 1970, defendant cannot take the advantage of the non-cancellation of the contract. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled for the amount of the bus, which was taken by the defendant No. 2 Hazoor Singh under the hire-purchase agreement and the learned lower Court was justified in passing the decree against the defendant No. 2 Hazoor Singh for an amount of Rs 16,800/- alongwith interest. The defendant No. 2 Hazoor Singh, in his statement before the Court, has stated that it was agreed that the non-payment of the instalment will fetch interest 12% per annum and, therefore, the learned lower Court was right in granting interest, also. 8. The next question, which requires consideration, is whether the State is immuned from payment of damages because of the principle of sovereign immunity. The trial Court, though came to the conclusion that the plaintiff suffered the damages of Rs. 10 000/- but refused to grant this amount to him on the ground of the principle of sovereign immunity. The acts of the State of which the Court are debarred from taking action, are the acts done in the exercise of the sovereign powers. In order to claim immunity from the tortious acts of the servants, the State has to show that the act, which caused the injury was done by its officer during his employment and in the Course of the exercise of the sovereign function. In England, the doctrine of immunity is based on the feudalistic concept that the King can do wrong and that it was an attribute of sovereignity that the State cannot be sued in its own Court without its consent. In India the doctrine of immunity was based on this Common Law principle which prevailed in England. In England, this principle of immunity has been abolished by the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947. Learned counsel for the parties, during the course of arguments, have referred before me certain decisions in which the sphere of law of Civil Wrong and thorny fields of sovereign immunity and the liability of the Government for the tortious act of its servant has been considered. 9. Learned counsel for the parties, during the course of arguments, have referred before me certain decisions in which the sphere of law of Civil Wrong and thorny fields of sovereign immunity and the liability of the Government for the tortious act of its servant has been considered. 9. In State of Rajasthan vs. Mst. Vidhyawati (1) the pedestrian was knocked down by a jeep owned and maintaied by the State of Rajasthan for the official use of the Collector of the District. The Apex Court, after considering the law on the point, held that the State can be made vicariousiy liable for the tortious act like any either employer and observed as under: The immunity of the Crown in United Kirgdom was based on the old feudalistic notions of justice, namely, that the King was incapable of doing a wrong, and, therefore, of authorising or instigating one, and that he cannot be sued in his own Courts. In India, ever since the time of the East India Company, the Sovereign has been held liable to be sued in tort or in contract and the common law immunity never operated in India." The Court further observed : When the rule of immunity in favour of the Crown, based on common law in United Kingdom, has disappeared from the land of its birth, there is no legal warrant for holding that it has any validity in this Country, particularly after the Constitution and, therefore, it would be only recognizing the old established rule, going back to more than 100 years atleast if the vicarious liability of the State is up-held by the Court" In M/s. Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain vs. the State of Uttar Pradesh (2) the matter before the Supreme Couit was that Ralia Ram Jain was arrested by the police and on search, some gold and silver were seized from him. The accused was acquitted and after the acquittal, the accused claimed the gold and silver recovered from him. At that time it was revealed that those gold and silver were misappropriated by a Head Constable. The accused, therefore claimed damages from the State. The accused was acquitted and after the acquittal, the accused claimed the gold and silver recovered from him. At that time it was revealed that those gold and silver were misappropriated by a Head Constable. The accused, therefore claimed damages from the State. The Court opined that as the tortious act was committed by the public servant in course of his employment and in the exercise of the statutory functions deligated to him by the Government & therefore, the State is immuned from the liability and the claim of damages is not sustainable. The Apex Court in corning to this conclusion, observed that so far as the seizer of the articles was concerned, that was made by the Officers of the State in the discharge of their official duties and, therefore, for the act of negligence, which was commited by the police while dealing with the property of Ralia Ram, which they seized in the exercise of statutory power, no damages can be awarded. However it was observed by the Apex Court as under : Our only point in mentioning this act is to indicate that the doctrine of immunity, which has been borrowed in India in dealing the question of immunity of the State in regard to the claims made against it for tortious act committed by its servant, was really based on the Common law principle which prevailed in England: and that principle has, now, been substantially modified by the Crown Proceedings Act. in dealing with the present appeal we have ourselves been disturbed by the thought that a citizen whose property was seized by process of law, has to be told when he seeks a remedy in a Court of law on the ground that his property has not been returned to him, that he can make no claim against the State. That, we think, is not a very satisfactory position, of law. The remedy to cure this position, however, lies in the hands of the Legislature." 11. In Kasturi Lals case, so far as the arrest and seizure is concerned, that was in accordance with law and was in discharge of the statutory function while in present case, the seizure of the plainiffs bus was wholly illegal as neither any tax amount was due against the plaintiff nor against the bus in question. In Kasturi Lals case, so far as the arrest and seizure is concerned, that was in accordance with law and was in discharge of the statutory function while in present case, the seizure of the plainiffs bus was wholly illegal as neither any tax amount was due against the plaintiff nor against the bus in question. The bus in question was attached by the A.C.T.O.(R.P.G.T), Sri Ganganagar, thefore recovery of the outstanding dues of R.P.G.T. tax against the buses No. RJK 3107 and RJK 5202 belonging to New India Transport Cooperative Society Limited and the plaintiff has no connection whatsoever with it and, therefore, the ratio of Kasturi Lals case is not applicable in the present case. Even otherwise, in the latter decisions of the Supreme Court, the case of Kasturi Lal has not been followed, but the Supreme Court, in the latter decisions adopted and followed the view taken in Vidhayawatis case, In the case of Rudal Shah Vs. the State of Bihar (3) the petitioner was kept in jail for a period of 14 years after which he was acquitted and in addition to his release, the Supreme Court awarded compensation to the detenu. The Supreme Court, also, awarded compensation in the case of Bhim Singh vs. the State of Jammu and Kashmir (4). In that csae, the petitioner Bhim Singh, who was Member of Legislative Assembly, was arrested by the police officer while he was in Srinagar and was going to attened a meeting of the Legislative Assembly. After arrest, he moved a Habeas Corpus petition but before it could be heard, he was released and, therefore, while deciding Hebeas Corpus Petition, the Supreme Court allowed compensation of Rs. 50,000/- for his wrong detention. In Saheli a Woman Resources Centre through Ms. Nalini Bhanot vs. the Commissioner of Police Delhi (5) the death of a nine years old child took place in the police custody because of beatings and assault by a police officer. The Supreme Court, placing reliance over Vidhyawatis case, held that as the death occurred due to police atrocities and, therefore, the State is liable for the tortious act of its officers. The Apex Court, therefore, awarded compensation of Rs. 75,000/-. 12. In J. Kuppanna Chetty Amubti Ramayya Chetty and Co. vs. Collector of Anantapur (6) the factory of the petitioner was in arrears of income-tax. The Apex Court, therefore, awarded compensation of Rs. 75,000/-. 12. In J. Kuppanna Chetty Amubti Ramayya Chetty and Co. vs. Collector of Anantapur (6) the factory of the petitioner was in arrears of income-tax. The Income Tax Officer issued a certificate to the Collector for the realization of certain arrears. In pursuance to this: the Tehsildar attached the factory building, machinary, boiler,-engine and decorative theatire. The Addhra Pradesh High Court came to the conclusion that through attachment of the boiler made by the Tehsildar was illegal, but as it was done by him in discharging the sovereign function and, therefore, niether the Central nor the State Governments can be made liable for the tort committed by the Tesildar. The view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court is not in consonance with the view taken by the Supreme Court in its later decisions. He working the State from being sued for the injury to its citizen, committed in the illegal and arbitraiy exercise of its sovereign functions, has no moral justification and it is neither logical nor practical. 13. In the State of Gujarat vs. Memon Mohammed Haji Hasam (7), the Custom Authorities seized two motor-trucks, station wagon and other goods belonging to the respondent Mcmon Mohammed on the grounds(a) that the respondent had not paid import duty on the said trucks : (b) that they were used for smuggling goods in the State and (c) that some of the goods were smuggled goods. The respondent preferred an appeal against this order. This appeal, filed by the respondent, was allowed by the Tribunal and the Custom Authorities were directed to return the said vehicles to the respondent. When the respsondent applied for the return of the vehicles, it was found sat those vehicles were disposed of. He, therefore, filed a suit for the return of he said vehicle in the alternative, for the recovery of value of goods and vehicles. The trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff. The State Government preferred an appeal before the High Court of Bombay. The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the State. The State thereafter preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court. The trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff. The State Government preferred an appeal before the High Court of Bombay. The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the State. The State thereafter preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, while dismissing the appeal filed by the State, held that the government is bound to return the said pro-perty by reason of its statutory obligations or to pay its value if it had disabled itself from returning it either by its own act or the act of its agent or servent. The Supreme Court, however, made reference to the judgement in the case of Kasturi Lal (supra) and held that it has no relevance in view of the pleadings by the parties The same view was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in a later decision in the case of M/s. Oswal Spinning and Weaving Mills Limited Vs. the Collector of Customs (8), wherein it was held that the customs authorities are liable to compensate the owner for a loss or damage of the goods seized by the authorities. 14. In the light of the decisions referred above, now it has to be seen whether the State can claim immunity in the present case and whether the A. C. T. O. (R. P. G. T.) Sri Ganganagar was acting under any statu ory authority in seizing the bus No. RJK 6794 belongign to the plaintiff for the recovery of the arrears of R.P.G.T. tax outstanding against two buses Mo. RJK 3107 and RJK 5202 of New India Transport Cooperative Society, of which Hazoor Singh was the Chairman: and whether the exercise of hat authority can be treated to be an exercise of some sovereing power ? We are having under the Rule of Law. Article 300-A of the Constitution of India prohibits depriving any person of his property without authority of law. The Scheme of the Rajasthan Passengers and Goods Tax Act, provides that the recovery of the arrears of tax can be made by the seizure of the bus regarding which the tax is due or from the property of its owner and not from the property of any third person, who had no connection whatsoever with the arrears of tax. The Scheme of the Rajasthan Passengers and Goods Tax Act, provides that the recovery of the arrears of tax can be made by the seizure of the bus regarding which the tax is due or from the property of its owner and not from the property of any third person, who had no connection whatsoever with the arrears of tax. A mode has been given in the Act and the Rules for the recovery of the arrears of tax which have not been followed in the present case and the bus of the plaintiff, who has no connection whatsoever, has been attached and put to auction. The non-compliance of these statutory obligations by the instrumentalties of the State should be treated not merely a technical error but as non-compliance of rules of law counsing substantial injustice to a person who has nothing to pay as the tax, but whose bus has been attached and later on auctioned. Where a citizen has been deprived of his belongings otherwise than in accordance with the procedure prescribed under law, it is no answer to say that the said deprivation was brought about by the officers of the State while acting and discharging the sovereign functions of the State- The action of the A.C.T.O. (RP. G.T.) Sri Ganganagar, in attaching the bus of the plaintiff, was an illegal action without any legal sanction behind it and was taken neither under any statutory authority nor in exercise of any sovereign function, and, therefore, the State cannot claim immunity on the ground of its sovereign function. 15. DW 1/D. 1 Suresh Chandra Sharma, in his statement, has admitted that there was outstanding of R.P.G.T. tax against the New India Transport Cooperative Limited and a warrant for recovery of the amount was issued. This warrant was issued against the New India Transport Cooperative Limited and not against Hazoor Singh, but because Hazoor Singh was the ownerof the New India Transport Cooperative Company and, therefore, his bus No. RJK 6794 was attached. In the cross-examination, he has specifically stated that in the warrant of recovery, the name of Hazoor Singh was not mentioned. This warrant was issued against the New India Transport Cooperative Limited and not against Hazoor Singh, but because Hazoor Singh was the ownerof the New India Transport Cooperative Company and, therefore, his bus No. RJK 6794 was attached. In the cross-examination, he has specifically stated that in the warrant of recovery, the name of Hazoor Singh was not mentioned. Similar is the statement of Om Prakash, the clerk in the Regional Transport Office, who has stated that R.P G.T. tax was outstanding against the buses No. RJK 3107 and RJK 5202 and for the recouery of that amount warrant of attachment was issued but he cannot say that in whose name this warrant was issued. From the reading of the statements of these two witnesses, it is clear that the tax was outstanding against buses No. RJK 3107 and RJK 5202, which belonged to the New India Transport Cooperative Society and nothing was outstanding against the plaintiff or bus No. RJK 6794 and when no tax was due against the plaintiff or the bus No. RJK 6794 then that bus could not have been attached by the respondent. The action of the respondent in attaching the bus of the plaintiff and putting it to auction for the recovery of the tax-amount outstanding against the buses No. RJK 3107 and RJK 5202 is wholly illegal and is an act of exercise of arbitrary powers by the instrumentalities of the State and, therefore, cannot be said to be the sovereign act of the State It is a case of wrongful interference by the officers of the respondent No. 1 with the property of the plaintiff. The pubiic authorities are expected to act within the frame-work of their powers delegated to them under the law and the State cannot take by the plea of immunity to justify the wrongful! action taken by the officers. The exercise of the government powers must be done in conformity with the law and subject to all the conditions and limitations which may have been imposed by the law and if these conditions are not fulfilled and if these limitations are exceeded, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be ousted on the pretext of the sovereign immunity. The powers do not confer a licence upon its officers to act contrary to law in discharge of their duties. The powers do not confer a licence upon its officers to act contrary to law in discharge of their duties. It is only the sovereign function performed in accordance with law that are immuned and not any arbitrary, illegal or unlawful actions of the authorities. 16. Ours is a constitutional democratic country ruled by Rules of Law and the State cannot claim any immunity from payment of damages for the illegal and wrongful action of its officers on the so-called doctrine of sovereign immunity. Time has come to give a good-bye to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and to sweep-off this archaic rule, which has become out-moded in the concept of modern development. In our democratic republic, the sovereignity rests with the people and the government, which is run by the people, elected by the people, cannot seek immunity against themselves. In this view, of the matter, I am of the opinion that the injury to the plaintiff was not caused in connection with the exercise of the overeign power or functions of the State, but on the contrary, the A.C.T.O. (R.P.G T). Sri Ganganagar, who was vested with powers of recovering the arrears of tax, attempted to exercise the powers beyond the powers given to him by the Act by attaching the bus of the plaintiff, which has no connection whatsoever with the arrears of tax, and in such circumstances, no immunity can be claimed by the State and the plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to get the decree for damages passed in his favour and against the State of Rajasthan. The learned trial Court has assessed the damages to the tune of Rs. 10,000/-and no challenge has been made by the State to that verdict. 17. In this view of the matter, the plaintiff is entitled to get this amount of Rs. 10,000/-alongwith interest @ 12% per annum from the date of seizure from the State of Rajasthan for the damages caused to the bus in the custody of the officers of the respondent No. 1 after the attachment, during the pendency of the suit, the bus was auctioned and the auction money of Rs. 4025/-was deposited in the Court. The learned trial Court. while deciding the suit, did not pass any order regarding this amount of Rs. 4025/-. As the attachment of the bus was wholly illegal and, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled for this amount of Rs. 4025/-was deposited in the Court. The learned trial Court. while deciding the suit, did not pass any order regarding this amount of Rs. 4025/-. As the attachment of the bus was wholly illegal and, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled for this amount of Rs. 4025/- of the sale-proceeds of the bus, also. 18. In the result, the appeal, filed by the defendants-appellant, is partly allowed. The decree passed by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff for an amount of Rs. 20,000/- (i.e. Rs. 16,300/- as principal and Rs. 3700/- as interest till the date of the suit) alongwith pendente lite and future interest @ 12% per annum, is maintained, but, however, the decree is modified in the following terms .- (i) the plaintiff will be entitled to realize a sum of Rs. 10,000/- alongwith interest @ 12% per annum from the date of the date of the seizure of the bus, i.e., from Jan. 2, 1970, till realization of the amount from the State; (ii) the plaintiff will be entitled to interest @ 12%per annum since July 2, 1969, upto the date of the seizure, on Rs. 16,300/- from |Hazoor Singh; (iii) the plaintiff will be entitled to realize Rs. 6300/- from Hazoor Singh alongwith interest @ 12% pa. since January 2,1970, till the date of realization; and (iv) the plaintiff will be entitled to withdraw Rs. 4025/- being the sale-proceeds of the bus deposited in the Court during the pendency of the suit and lying deposited in the Court, alongwith interest, if any, earned on the deposit. This amount will be adjusted towards the decretal amount against Hazoor Singh. 19. If the decree, passed by the Court below has already been satisfied by the defendant-appellant, Hazoor Singh, then the defendant-appellant Hazoor Singh will be entitled to get the amount of Rs. 4025/- lying in the Court alongwith interest, if any earned, and he will, also, be entitled to recover the amount of Rs. 10,000/- alongwith interest @ 12% per annum from the State of Rajasthan since the date of the seizure of the bus The defendant-appellant Hazoor Singh will, also, be entitled to the cost of this appeal from the respondent No. 2, i. e. the State of Rajasthan.