Judgment :- 1. These writ petitions can be disposed of on a very short ground. Though the main facts are similar, there may be small differences with regard to one or two cases. But, it is wholly unnecessary to refer to the facts in detail. The prayers in W.P. Nos. 11274 of 1992, 6780 of 1992, 6761 of 1992, 8611 of 1992 and 6478 of 1992 are the same and the challenge is of the grant of permits to various private operators by the Tribunal under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. In so far as one of the cases is concerned, viz., W.P. No. 11274 of 1992, it is stated that the permit has been granted under the provisions of the old Motor Vehicles Act and it will stand on a different footing. With regard to the point that I am going to deal with, there is no difference between that case and other cases. 2. W.P. No. 13313 of 1992 and W.P. 6284 of 1992 are for issue of Mandamus filed by the grantees from the Tribunal for enforcing the orders of the Tribunal granting permits in their favour. Since the Regional Transport Authority has not carried out the orders of the Tribunal, they have chosen to file the petitions for issue of Mandamus. 3. The writ petitions can be disposed of on a common ground viz., that the objection raised by the petitioner in W.P. Nos. 11274 of 1992, 6611 of 1992, 6760 of 1992, 6761 of 1992 and 6478 of 1992 is based on a scheme notified under the provisions of S. 88 of the old Motor Vehicles Act. Subsequently, notifications were issued by the State Government approving of the Draft schemes. The said notifications were subject matter of challenge in W.P. Nos. 7201 7202 etc. of 1990. A Division Bench of this Court considered the matter in detail and by order dated 31.10.1990, all the writ petitions were allowed and the notifications issued by the Government were quashed. The Division Bench had given certain reasons for allowing the writ petitions. One such reason was that the notifications issued by the Government were beyond the period of limitation specified in S. 100 (4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 4. The Division Bench had given certain reasons for allowing the writ petitions. One such reason was that the notifications issued by the Government were beyond the period of limitation specified in S. 100 (4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 4. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners who challenge the grant of permits in favour of the private operators that the ruling of the Division Bench is no longer good law in view of the later ruling of the Supreme Court taking a contrary view on the provisions of S. 100(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and, therefore the judgment of the Division Bench should be held to have got automatically nullified and it cannot stand in the eye of law and the finding that the notification could not stand in the way of the grant of permit in favour of the private operators is invalid and unsustainable. 5. Learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Krishnan Kumar v. State of Rajasthan AIR1992 S.C. 1789. The appeal before the Supreme Court was directed against the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan dismissing a writ petition challenging the scheme for nationalisation of a route which was in dispute. The Court had to consider the provisions of S. 68 of the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and the provisions of S. 100 of the new Motor Vehicles Act of 1988. Reference was made to the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Yogeshwar Jaiswal v. State of Transport Appellate Tribunal AIR 1985 S.C. 516 , Omkar Singh v. Regional Transport Authority Agra AIR 1986 S.C. 1719 , David Nandan v. State of Rajasthan 1987 Suppl. SCC 438 and Srichand v. Government of U.P. AIR 1986 S.C. 242 , in which the schemes proposed under S. 68-C of the old Act were quashed on the ground of inordinate delay for which there was no valid explanation. The Supreme Court observed that in those cases the schemes were quashed by the Court on the ground of inordinate delay and that would not mean that whenever there was delay, the schemes would lapse automatically under the provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court observed that in those cases the schemes were quashed by the Court on the ground of inordinate delay and that would not mean that whenever there was delay, the schemes would lapse automatically under the provisions of the Act. The following passage in the judgment of the Supreme Court is relevant and it is relied on by learned counsel for the petitioners in the writ petitions to quash the grant of permits:— “In the instant case, the proposed scheme had been approved by the hearing authority under S. 68D (2) of the old Act in 1984 within five years of the proposal of the scheme but when the matter was placed before the State Government for issue of final Notification under S. 68D(3) of the old Act, the appellant and other affected operators approached the Minister for Transport and stalled the issue of final Notification as a result of which delay was caused. The appellant was himself responsible for the del ay and therefore he is not entitled to complain of the delay. Moreover this Court has not ruled in the aforesaid decisions or in any other decision that delay would automatically render the scheme illegal. Since under the old Act no time frame was prescribed for finalising a scheme penal consequences could not ensue. Under the old Act a scheme proposed under S. 68 could continue to remain in force till it was quashed. Since the scheme proposed on 11.10.1979 had not been quashed by any Court, the same continued to be in force on the date of commencement of the new Act. In the absence of any provision in the old Act rendering the scheme ineffective on the ground of delay, the scheme proposed under S. 68C of the old Act could not lapse ipso facto. Moreover, now the State Government has already issued final Notification under S. 100(3) of the new Act on 29.8.1990, as a result of which the route has been notified. In this view ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Court are not applicable to the instant case at this stage.” 6. Moreover, now the State Government has already issued final Notification under S. 100(3) of the new Act on 29.8.1990, as a result of which the route has been notified. In this view ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Court are not applicable to the instant case at this stage.” 6. Learned counsel submits that the view taken by the Supreme Court is directly contrary to the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the cases referred to above with the result that the judgment of the Division Bench would automatically get nullified and it is as if the judgment of the Division Bench was never valid in the eye of law. I am unable to agree with this contention. No doubt, the Supreme Court has declared the law in another case which runs counter to the view taken by the judgment of this Court. But that would not automatically render invalid the judgment of the Division Bench in the given cases. The ultimate order passed by the Division Bench is one to quash the notification issued by the Government. That order is based on some reasons. Just because the Supreme Court has taken a different view with regard to one of the reasons of the Division Bench, it does not mean that the Supreme Court has overruled the judgment itself. So long the judgment is not quashed or set aside by the Supreme Court in an appropriate proceeding, that judgment will be binding and valid as between the parties thereto. It is not in dispute that Special Leave Petitions have been filed by the petitioner Corporation before the Supreme Court against the judgment of the Division Bench and notices have been ordered in the said Special Leave Petitions. As at present, Special Leave has not been granted. The Supreme Court had not granted any interim orders in the interlocutory applications filed by the Corporation against the private operators, who are grantees of permits. But they permitted to operate their buses during the pendency of the proceedings in the Supreme Court. One cannot say that the Supreme Court may not ultimately uphold the judgment of the Division Bench on some other ground or that it will undoubtedly reverse the judgment of the Division Bench. But they permitted to operate their buses during the pendency of the proceedings in the Supreme Court. One cannot say that the Supreme Court may not ultimately uphold the judgment of the Division Bench on some other ground or that it will undoubtedly reverse the judgment of the Division Bench. Whatever may be the position, it is clear that so long as the judgment of the Division Bench is not reversed by the Supreme Court, that will hold good as between the parties to the same. I cannot accept the contention that the judgment of the Division Bench vanishes into thin air once the Supreme Court declares the law and because of Art. 141 of the Constitution of India, the judgment of the Division Bench becomes a nullity. 7. This is the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 648 of 1972. By its judgment dated 15-11-1979, a Division Bench of this Court held that the particular order in question in that case might be a wrong order in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Charma Transport Corporation v. Kannan Lorry Service AIR 1977 S.C. 1564 . But that order having become final, it was not open to the petitioner therein to file applications for reconsideration of the application for renewal which had already been disposed of. The Division Bench pointed out that the concerned authority had jurisdiction to pass the said order and just because it might be a wrong order because of the view expressed by the Supreme Court, it would not be automatically invlaid. The reasoning of the Division Bench would squarely apply to the facts of this case. 8. Reliance is placed by Mr. Palani, learned counsel appearing for the State Transport Undertaking on the following judgments of the Supreme Court (1) Shenoy & Co. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Bangalore AIR 1985 S.C. 621 , (2) A.S. Gaurava v. S.N. Thakur AIR 1986 S.C. 1440 and (3) Suresh Chandra Varma v. Chancellor, Nagpur AIR 1990 S.C. 2023 . The first of the decisions of the Supreme Court relates to a case in which a common judgment was rendered by the High Court in a batch of writ petitions. By the said judgment the High Court held that the Karnataka Tax On Entry Of Goods Into Local Areas For Consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act (1979) was not valid. The first of the decisions of the Supreme Court relates to a case in which a common judgment was rendered by the High Court in a batch of writ petitions. By the said judgment the High Court held that the Karnataka Tax On Entry Of Goods Into Local Areas For Consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act (1979) was not valid. An appeal was filed by the State against one of the cases dealt with by the common judgment. That appeal was allowed and the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Act. The question arose in the later case before the Supreme Court whether the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court would have the effect of reversing the judgment of the High Court in all the other cases against which no appeal was filed. The Court held that the common judgment rendered by the High Court had been reversed by the Supreme Court, though it was done in one appeal only. It was pointed out that it was not necessary for the Court to have entertained appeals against all the cases and it was sufficient if an appeal w as filed in one case because it was a common judgment which was challenged before the Supreme Court. The relevant portion of the judgment reads thus:— “The challenge to the constitutional validity of 1979 Act proceeded on identical grounds common to all petitioners. This challenge was accepted by the High Court by a common judgment and it was this common judgment that was the subject matter of appeal before this Court in Harisa Corporations case AIR 1981 S.C. 463 ). When the Supreme Court repelled the challenge and held the Act constitutionally valid, it in terms disposed of not the appeal in Hansa Corporations case alone, but all petitions in which the High Court issued Mandamus on the non-existent ground that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid.” It was also pointed out by the Court that it was open to the other parties to have appeared before the Supreme Court and argued in support of the judgment of the High Court. They, not having done so, could not be heard to say that the decision was taken by the Supreme Court behind their back or profess ignorance of the fact that the appeal was filed by the State against the common judgment. They, not having done so, could not be heard to say that the decision was taken by the Supreme Court behind their back or profess ignorance of the fact that the appeal was filed by the State against the common judgment. In another part of the judgment, the Court observed: “By setting aside the common judgment of the High Court, the mandamus issued by the High Court is rendered ineffective not only in one case but in all cases.” The reasoning of the Supreme Court in the above case will not apply to the present case as the judgment in Krishnan Kumars case AIR 1992 S.C. 1789 did not arise out of one of the cases dealt with by the Division Bench of this Court. 9. The second of the cases was under the Criminal Procedure Code. A complaint was dismissed for default by the Magistrate and by a later order, it was restored. The contention was that the Magistrate had no inherent power to restore the complaint which was once dismissed. The contention was overruled and the matter was taken to the High Court. The High Court also confirmed the view taken by the lower court that there was inherent power for reviewing the earlier order. The view taken by the High Court was later reversed by the Supreme Court in a later decision in which it was held that the criminal court had no inherent power of review. Taking advantage of the judgment of the Supreme Court, an application was filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate contending that the proceedings after the earlier order of dismissal of complaint were without jurisdiction in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court and the Magistrate was requested to drop further proceedings. That contention was accepted and the proceedings were dropped. A revision filed against the said order to the Additional Sessions Judge was accepted and the decision of the Magistrate was reversed. Against the said order, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution was filed in the High Court and the Delhi High Court dismissed the same in limine observing that there was no sufficient reason to interfere with the impugned order. It was that order of the Delhi High Court which was challenged before the Supreme Court. Against the said order, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution was filed in the High Court and the Delhi High Court dismissed the same in limine observing that there was no sufficient reason to interfere with the impugned order. It was that order of the Delhi High Court which was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Apex Court pointed out that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and it would have not only prospective operation but also retrospective operation and, therefore, it applied to the proceedings pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate and he was right in restoring the order of dismissal, holding that the subsequent orders were invalid as the Court had no power to review. The relevant passage in the said judgment reads thus:— “There is nothing like any prospective operation alone of the law laid down by this Court. The law laid down by this Court applies to all pending proceedings. If the Sessions Judge had expressed his helplessness because of the earlier order of the High Court binding on him and had allowed the revision on that ground, we could have understood the reasoning behind it. He got rid of the effect of this Courts judgment by observing that a decision by this Court cannot be treated as “a sort of legislation by Parliament” and thus overlooked the binding nature of the law declared by this Court, mandating under Art. 141, every court subordinate to this Court to accept it. The High Court could have, if it had examined the matter, corrected the error into which the Sessions Judge fell.” 10. The next judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above was one under the Nagpur University Act (26 of 1974). Referring to a contention put forward by the appellant that the judgment was based on the law as it stood at that time and it could not be invalidated, the Court observed thus:— “9. The second contention need not detain us long. It is based primarily on the provisions of S. 57(5) of the Act. Referring to a contention put forward by the appellant that the judgment was based on the law as it stood at that time and it could not be invalidated, the Court observed thus:— “9. The second contention need not detain us long. It is based primarily on the provisions of S. 57(5) of the Act. The contention is that since the provisions of that Section give power to the Chancellor to terminate the services of a teacher only if he is satisfied that the appointment “was not in accordance with the law at the time in force” and since the law at that time in force, viz., on March 30, 1995 when the appellants were appointed, was the law as laid down in Bhakares Case , (1986) Lab I.C. 1481) (supra) which was decided on December 7, 1984, the termination of the appellants is beyond the powers of the Chancellor. The argument can only be described as naive. It is unnecessary to point out that when the Court decides that the interpretation of particular provision as given earlier was not legal, it in effect declares that the law as it stood from the beginning was as per its decision, and that it was never the law otherwise. This being the case, since the Full Bench and now this Court have taken the view that the interpretation placed on the provisions of law by the Division Bench in Bhakares case (supra) was erroneous, it will have to be held that the appointments made by the University on March 30, 1985 pursuant to the law laid down in Bhakares case (supra) were not according to law. Hence, the termination of the services of the appellants were in compliance with the provisions of S. 57(5) of the Act.” That judgment will also have no bearing on the present case. The three rulings of the Supreme Court referred to by learned counsel do not have any relevance to the present case. 11. Reliance is placed on the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in M.L. Krishnamurthy v. District Revenue Officer, Vellore AIR 1990 Madras 87 which arose under the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act (21 of 1958). The three rulings of the Supreme Court referred to by learned counsel do not have any relevance to the present case. 11. Reliance is placed on the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in M.L. Krishnamurthy v. District Revenue Officer, Vellore AIR 1990 Madras 87 which arose under the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act (21 of 1958). The following passage is referred to by learned counsel:— “Where the Supreme Court deliberately and with intention of settling the law, pronounces upon a question, such pronouncement is the law declared by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Art. 141 of the Constitution of India. In other words, the law declared by the Supreme Court is made the law of the land. Once the law has been so declared by the Supreme Court, it is no longer possible to hang on to views expressed earlier by this Court or by any other High Court running contrary to the said law, on the simple ground that these views were not analysed touched upon, referred to and overruled specifically by the Supreme Court, while declaring the law.” 12. The proposition laid down by the Full Bench has no bearing on the present case. I have already pointed out that so long as the quashing of the notifications issued by the Government by the Division Bench continues to exist, it is not open to the petitioners to rely upon the schemes said to have been notified by the Government and on that footing object to the grant of permits. If the petitioners cannot rely upon the said schemes which are not in existence in the eye of law, in view of the judgment of the Division Bench, the petitioners have no locus standi to object to the grant of permits in favour of private operators. I have expressed the view in W.P. No. 10284 of 1992 in my judgment dated 13.8.1992 that the State Government undertaking will not have locus standi to make any complaint against the grant of permit in favour of private operators in view of the provisions of the new Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Garg etc. etc. v. Union of India and others etc. AIR 1992 S.C. 443 . 13. In the view I have taken on this question, I am not considering the other points argued by counsel on both sides. 14. etc. v. Union of India and others etc. AIR 1992 S.C. 443 . 13. In the view I have taken on this question, I am not considering the other points argued by counsel on both sides. 14. Hence, the writ petitions filed by the State Transport Undertaking have to fail and they are hereby dismissed. In other words, W.P. Nos. 6478, 6611, 6760, 6761 and 11274 of 1992 are dismissed. Consequently, the petitions filed for issue of mandamus by the grantees of permits have to be allowed. W.P. Nos. 6284 and 13313 of 1992 are allowed. The parties will bear their respective costs. 15. The Regional Transport Authority, Trichy will implement the order of the Tribunal and issue the necessary permits within four weeks from the date of receipt of this order. It is stated by the writ petitioner in W.P. No. 13313 of 1992 that he has to produce some documents and he will be able to do it within a period of two months from this date. Hence, the Regional Transport Authority, Salem is directed to implement the order of the Tribunal and issue permits to the petitioner in W.P. No. 13313 of 1992 within four weeks from the date on which the necessary formalities are completed by the petitioners.