G. C. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant feels aggrieved by his conviction for offence punishable under section 302, I. P. C. and sentence of life imprisonment by judgment dated 23/11/1987 passed by Shri M. P. Maher, Sessions Judge, Bastar in S. T. No. 231/87 and has preferred this appeal challenging legality and validity thereof. ( 2 ) THE appellant is alleged to have committed murder of his own wife deceased Sautandas on 24/2/1987 by throttling or strangulating her. The prosecution alleges that the appellant was married to the deceased about 8 months before the date of the incident and was going with her on a bicycle to village Chandrapur. It is alleged that he reached Chandrapur and informed Jagdish (P. W. 2) that when he was coming to him with the deceased, few persons met him in the jungle and threatened to assault him. His bicycle was left in the jungle. Jagdish is said to have accompanied the appellant to the spot but found neither the deceased nor the bicycle. Several other persons of the village; searched the deceased and the bicycle in the nearby area but failed to find anything. The appellant is also said to have told the same thing to Dukalu (P. W. 1 ). The appellant also lodged the report at Police Station Kondaga on as per (Ex. P8 ). It appears that the appellant was-suspected to be involved in murder and therefore was taken in custody. Thereafter at his instance bicycle was got recovered. The dead body was recovered earlier and was sent for post mortem examination which was performed by Dr. S. K. Rao who gave his report (Ex. P-6) and opined that the death was due to asphyxia caused by throwing or strangulation. Doctor also found four ribs of the deceased fractured besides several other injuries. After investigation the accused was charged as above and was put under trial. ( 3 ) LEARNED Sessions Judge relying on the evidence of Dr. Rao and the post mortem report, Ex. P-6 held that the injuries found on the person of the deceased were ante-mortem and that she die4 because of asphyxia caused due to throttling or strangulation. The learned judge however found no direct evidence of appellant's involvement with the killing. He therefore, relied upon the. circumstances which according to him formed a chain connecting the appellant with the crime. P-6 held that the injuries found on the person of the deceased were ante-mortem and that she die4 because of asphyxia caused due to throttling or strangulation. The learned judge however found no direct evidence of appellant's involvement with the killing. He therefore, relied upon the. circumstances which according to him formed a chain connecting the appellant with the crime. The most important conduct which according to the learned Sessions Judge gave rise to that conclusion, was the statement of the appellant leading to the discovery of bicycle. The learned judge, therefore, held the appellant guilty and convicted and sentenced him as aforesaid. ( 4 ) THE, deceased died because of ante mortem injuries found on his person, is not challenged in this court. The question requiring consideration of this court is whether the circumstances which could give rise to the conclusion of the appellants guilt, are established by evidence on record and whether those circumstances form a chain, to connect the appellant with the crime. This court having given its anxious consideration to all the facts and circumstances is not satisfied that the legal requirement is fulfill in the present case. It is well established that circumstantial evidence should be of a type which should leave no hypothesis pertaining to the innocence of the accused. Those circumstances should be fully established and each circumstance should form a chain and when connected together should point out to the guilt of the appellant. In the instance case following circumstances may indicate the innocence of the appellant: i) Jagdish (P. W. 2) proved that the appellant was married with the deceased only 8 months before but does not indicate his ill-will or annoyance with the deceased; ii) The place which was pointed out as the place where he left the deceased, is not said to be the place where he could not have left the deceased. ( 5 ) INDEED the evidence of Jagdish (P. W. 2) indicates that not only he but several others had searched the deceased on 25/2/1987 but did not find anything in the area. While keeping this fact in mind, circumstances against the appellant may now be considered. The most important circumstance against the appellant according to the learned judge is the discovery of bicycle at his instance. The appellant is alleged to have given his statement (Ex. P-1) which relates to the discovery of bicycle. While keeping this fact in mind, circumstances against the appellant may now be considered. The most important circumstance against the appellant according to the learned judge is the discovery of bicycle at his instance. The appellant is alleged to have given his statement (Ex. P-1) which relates to the discovery of bicycle. After recording his statement as per (Ex. P-1) the cycle was seized from the spot as per memo (Ex. P-2 ). Since the spot where the cycle was seized has different than the spot indicated by the appellant in his report, the learned judge has held that the appellant had given false information about the incident and the fact that the cycle was discovered at his instance from a different place, indicates that the incident was within the appellants knowledge. Thus according to the learned judge it is clear that the crime was committed by the appellant. The question for consideration is whether the aforesaid conclusion is legally tenable. ( 6 ) SINCE there is no eye witness of the incident and the prosecution rests upon the circumstantial evidence of discovery of cycle, the evidence of Itwari Ram Shandiya (P. W. 6), the Investigating Officer, may be looked into as he would be the most important witness disclosing the circumstances in favour of the prosecution. This witness admits that the appellant had reported on 26/2/1987 that some persons had apprehended him on way when he was with his wife, as a result of which he left his wife and bicycle in the jungle. The report was recorded as (Ex. P-8) and the witnesses started investigation on the same. According to, this witness he recorded Dehati Marg (Ex. P-9) on 28/2/1987 and started investigation during which he found prima facie evidence agirist the appellant and therefore recorded F. I. R. (Ex. P-10 ). Apparently therefore Dehati Marg is the starting point of investigation. A look into that document reveals that the deceased he killed at 2. 00 p. m. on 24/2/1987 by throttling. Marg seems to have been recorded at 5. 00 a. m. on 28/2/1987 at village Ingara. This report does not indicate that the appellant gave intimation leading to the discovery of the dead body. Surprisingly Ex. P-1 is the memorandum of the appellant recorded at 00-15 hours on 28/2/1987. The statement when read would indicate that even the dead body was got discovered by the appellant. 00 a. m. on 28/2/1987 at village Ingara. This report does not indicate that the appellant gave intimation leading to the discovery of the dead body. Surprisingly Ex. P-1 is the memorandum of the appellant recorded at 00-15 hours on 28/2/1987. The statement when read would indicate that even the dead body was got discovered by the appellant. But this is not the prosecutions case nor the prosecution has relied upon the memorandum (Ex. P-1) for that purpose. Pursuant to this memorandum bicycle was seized from the spot at 10-10 hours on 28/2/1987. Normally the dead body should also have been recovered at that time. But surprisingly there is no evidence as to when the dead body was discovered. Itwari (P. W. 6) has stated that after recording (Ex. P. 9) he got the panchnama prepared and sent the dead body for post mortem to Kondagaon. It was thereafter that the appellant was taken into custody and interrogated during which he gave the statement (Ex. P-1 ). If the statement of this witness is accepted it will indicate that after discovery of dead body and sending the same to Kondagaon for post-mortem examination, the appellant was interrogated. Necessarily the document (Ex. P-1) was scribed subsequent to panchnama (Ex. P-5) and post-mortem requisition forming first 2 pages of (Ex. P-6) These pages would indicate that the dead body was sent for post-mortem examination at 12. 00 noon on 28/2/1987. In such a situation the memorandum could be recorded thereafter and not before that Even if the memorandum is said to h6ve been recorded thereafter it will require explanation as to bow the dead body was discovered. No witness has deposed about finding of the dead body. Then this would therefore, throw doubt about the timing given in this document and would justify the statement of Dukalu (P. W. 1 ). In para 3 he has stated that seizure memo etc. were preparedt at police station where he wasrequired to sign. Dukalu is a witness to Ex. P-1, P-2, P-4 and P-S. If this piece of statement of the witness is believed, it will make the whole prosecution story suspicious. Possibility of dead body being found during the search undertaken by the police after recording the report of the appellant cannot be ruled out. Dukalu is a witness to Ex. P-1, P-2, P-4 and P-S. If this piece of statement of the witness is believed, it will make the whole prosecution story suspicious. Possibility of dead body being found during the search undertaken by the police after recording the report of the appellant cannot be ruled out. Once it is held that seizure memo is of doubtful character, the necessary conclusion would be that the seizure of bicycle from the place of the incident as per (Ex. P. 2) is also doubtful. It would, therefore, appear that the most important Circumsantance viz, recovery of bicycle from the spot at the instance of the accused is doubtful. According to the learned judge this circumstance was the link of the chain. However, this court finds the said link missing. Under these circumstances this court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellant in accordance with law. For this reason this court is unable to sustain the appellants conviction. ( 7 ) THE appeal succeeds and is allowed by setting aside the conviction and sentence and acquitting the appellant from be charges. The appellant is directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. Appeal allowed. .