JUDGMENT (ORAL) D.J. Moharir, J. - The petitioner Uttam Sahadu Galkal has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order of his externment dated 30.8.1990, passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Nasik, under Section 56 (1) (a) as well as (b) of the Bombay Police Act, directing him to be externed from the District of Nasik for a period of two years. 2. The petitioner, therefore, preferred an appeal to the State Government under Section 68 of the Act. This appeal came to be dismissed on 22nd November, 1990 and aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has challenged both the original as well as the appellate orders. 3. The petitioner was served with a notice to show cause against his proposed externment from the District of Nasik. This notice is dated 11.9.1989, and conveyed to him that he was found to have been criminally active in the Panchvati area of District Nasik and that such criminal activities had resulted in creating fear and apprehension in the mind of the residents as well as shopkeepers in the said locality and further no one was prepared - out of fear of violence and force from the accused - to appear and give evidence against him in public. The petitioner was informed of such instances of his movements and acts in the said locality starting with the year 1975. He was, therefore, apprised that he had indulged in commission of cognizable offences and further that there were non-cognizable offences also which had been registered against him with the Police Station Panchvati. The petitioner was called upon to appear before the Sub Divisional Police officer for the purpose of this enquiry. He did appear and offered an explanation. The Sub Divisional Police Officer submitted his report to the Sub Divisional Magistrate who again issued a notice to the petitioner and in pursuance of it the petitioner also appeared before him and submitted his arguments. 4. He did appear and offered an explanation. The Sub Divisional Police Officer submitted his report to the Sub Divisional Magistrate who again issued a notice to the petitioner and in pursuance of it the petitioner also appeared before him and submitted his arguments. 4. In the order of externment under Section 56 (1) (a) and (b) passed on 30.8.1990 the Sub Divisional Magistrate therefore held, considering the material which had been placed before him and also after giving a hearing to the petitioner, that he was satisfied that the petitioner's acts and movements were causing and were calculated to cause alarm, harm and danger to the residents and shopkeepers of the locality in question and that he indulged in commission of offences which were punishable under Chapter XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal Code and lastly that in his opinion the witnesses were not willing to come forward to give evidence against him in public by reason of the apprehension as regard to the safety of their person and property in the event of their so giving evidence against him. It was thus that the externment order came to be passed. As stated earlier on appeal the State Government found that no good exception could be taken to the order of externment as passed by, the Sub Divisional Magistrate and, therefore, dismissed the petitioner's appeal on 22.11.1990. 5. Learned counsel Shri Thakur appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the notice to show cause dated 11.9.1989 as also the eventual externment order dated 30.8.1990 both suffered from a vital defect, devise of the taking into consideration of state instances which have, therefore, no proper and appreciable connection with the eventual order of externment that came to be passed. Indeed this would appear true of at least two instances which are at Serial Nos. 1 and 2 in the notice to show cause and are of the year 1975, apart from the fact that the Inquiring Authority which issued the show cause notice as also the Externing Authority which passed the externment order dated 30.8.1990 did take both these entirely old and, therefore, irrelevant instances into consideration. 1 and 2 in the notice to show cause and are of the year 1975, apart from the fact that the Inquiring Authority which issued the show cause notice as also the Externing Authority which passed the externment order dated 30.8.1990 did take both these entirely old and, therefore, irrelevant instances into consideration. Shri Thakur has further pointed out that these two instances were said to be cases, which were at the date of the issuance of the show cause notice as also at the date of the passing of the externment order actually pending the fact of, however, being that in both these cases a composition had come to be already effected. It is only with the third instance which is cited as being Crime No. I 116 of 1988 which could be said to be an instance of pending prosecution against the petitioner. It is, therefore, argued by Shri Thakur that an order of externment or for that matter even the issuance of notice to show cause under Section 59 for proposed externment which is so founded on unsustainable considerations, must be found to be untenable and deserving to be quashed. The submission of the learned A.P.P. for the State is that it is true that the externing authority or for that matter the authority which issued the notice to show cause under Section 59 had both taken into consideration the instances of the petitioner's involvement in commission of the offences in the year1975 but according to him that could not be said to be the only material which came to be relied upon for the purpose of issuance of show cause notice as well as the eventual externment order itself. It is submitted by him that these old instances of 1975 had also been followed by several fresh instances of the year1985, 1987 and 1988 and in addition several offences of non-cognizable nature which had come to be registered with the Police Station Panchavati. It is, therefore, argued by learned A.P.P. that it could not be said by the petitioner that either show cause notice or the externment order had come to be founded only on such stale instances. It is, therefore, argued by learned A.P.P. that it could not be said by the petitioner that either show cause notice or the externment order had come to be founded only on such stale instances. The notice and the order both show that other materials which were recent enough and which would permit a contention that the live link between the material and the order had come to be snapped, then the order could not be said to be vitiated since such appropriate instances had also come to be taken into account. The point to be considered in my opinion is not merely whether due and proper instances of acts indulged in by the petitioner as recent ones, recent in the context of the proceeding had been considered as the foundation for the externment order but more importantly whether there had been an application of mind on the part of the externing authority with, due circumspection, discarding from consideration the old instances and then expressing itself sufficiently in its order, that it had declined to take into consideration such old instances and was, on the basis of some recent ones, still satisfied that an order under Section 56 (1) (a) or for that matter (b) or both was yet found necessary to be passed against the petitioner. Shri Thakur is, therefore, right when he contends that the orders suffered from the defect of non application of mind in that stale instances have come to be considered and had come to be taken into account. 6. The second submission of Shri Thakur is that at any rate the instances as bad been referred to in the show cause notice dated 11.9.1989 have been stated with such a degree of vagueness as make them entirely unintelligible to the petitioner for the purpose of offering any explanation. He has drawn my attention to the wording of these such particulars as have been given in the notice to show cause. Quite obviously the contention about such vagueness and absence of material particulars is founded on an inability to appreciate the correct meaning and the gramatically correct or otherwise expression in the said order. On 28.3.1975 the petitioner was alleged to have indulged in giving dashes to the W.C. and thereby picking up quarrel with her. Quite obviously the contention about such vagueness and absence of material particulars is founded on an inability to appreciate the correct meaning and the gramatically correct or otherwise expression in the said order. On 28.3.1975 the petitioner was alleged to have indulged in giving dashes to the W.C. and thereby picking up quarrel with her. This particular instance as has been already noted, is entirely a stale one but so far as thee intelligibility thereof is concerned, the contention of vagueness would be difficult to be attributed to the instance dated 28.4.1985, which also has no doubt been considered as old one is that the petitioner asked somebody for a match box and on declining to oblige trim (petitioner), he had indulged in improper behaviour. He had indulged in such an improper behaviour on 24.10.1988 by arming himself with a dangerous weapon on 23.10.1988 by indulging in house breaking but Shri Thakur points out the words used are most certainly an entirely un intelligible expression when the house breaking is said to have been accompanied by the commission of a theft and at the same time transgressing the civil right of way of the concerned complainant which is said to have been closed down and denied to him/her. The other instances of dated 11.9.1987, 19.10.1987, 24.10.1988 and 21.6.1989 would also appear to be fairly intelligible but it remains a fact that some of the instances in respect of which his explanation was sought and which went into consideration for the purpose of passing the eventual order of externment were certainly unintelligible enough to deny him a proper and reasonable opportunity of offering his explanation thereto. 7. As held in Chander Dayaldas Sindhi v. Shri M.W. Chitale, Dy. Commissioner of Police,1 Zone II, Kalyan, the vagueness in the notice has to be determined with reference to whether or not the general nature of the material allegation against the proposed externee can be said to give a reasonable opportunity of tendering an explanation regarding them. It was observed that the notice under Section 59 need not disclose the names of the victims or the witnesses furnishing which would frustrate the very purpose for which preventive detention was contemplated. Even so it was held that the authority is bound to disclose the general nature of the material against the person concerned. It was observed that the notice under Section 59 need not disclose the names of the victims or the witnesses furnishing which would frustrate the very purpose for which preventive detention was contemplated. Even so it was held that the authority is bound to disclose the general nature of the material against the person concerned. In respect of some of the instances, considered above it can be safely said that even the general nature of the material had not come to be sufficiently explained and conveyed to the petitioner. 8. The second and even more important contention stressed by learned Counsel Shri Thakur is as regard the inordinate delay which occurred between the notice to show cause under Section 59 and the actual passing of the order of petitioner's externment, the first one being on 11.9.1989 and the next being dated 30.8.1990, respectively. There has been a delay almost of one year in the passing of the externment order which delay, it is contended, defeats the very object of preventive detention, turning such externment into one of a punitive nature. The Additional Public Prosecutor made over a very faint effort to substantiate the delay, submitting that by reason of circumstance which made really expeditious disposal of the proceeding difficult, the delay could not by itself be made a matter of criticism, stand enough for invalidating the order. Actually no proper explanation could be offered by the respondents. In para 13 of the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No. l, it was submitted that much time was required for making the necessary inquiry in the matter as there were large number of cases pending with Inquiry Officer, at that time which resulted in the delay and further that, in any event, there was no malafide involved in the delayed order. This explanation would not appear to be satisfactory if regard is to be had to the observation of the Gujarat High Court in Abbas Husain Fateh Mahammad v. The Deputy Police Commissioner, Surat and another2. In that case there was delay of 7 months and 17 days in passing the externment order after the service of the show cause notice to the proposed externment. In that case there was delay of 7 months and 17 days in passing the externment order after the service of the show cause notice to the proposed externment. This delay was considered and held to be inordinate, which was apart from the fact that the order of externment had also come to be passed by a person who had not himself even heard the arguments advanced on behalf of the petiti ther in that case. Such delay would indeed have to be considered as fatal to the externment order as was held by the High Court. Here the delay would be found to have increased by at least four more months, and stands to be without any satisfactory explanation. 9. In that view, the impugned order of externment as passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate as also the order confirming the same passed in appeal by the respondent No.4 State Government cannot be sustained. This would have to be quashed and set aside to allow the petition. The petition is accordingly allowed and the rule made absolute. Petition allowed. 1. 1984(2) Bom, C.R. 682. 2. 1988 Cri. L.J. 434.