Usha Mehra,j. ( 1 ) THIS order will dispose of Crl. Rs. 102/92 aswell as 117/92. These revisions have arisen from a common order passedby Shri V. S. Aggarwal, Additional Sessions Judge, dated 21/02/1992. Since the common point is involved, therefore, both are disposed of by oneorder. ( 2 ) CENTRAL Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter called the appellant)registered corruption cases against the present respondents under Section120-B. I. P. C. and 5 (2) read with Section 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 lor allegedly accepting bribe. During the investigation theappellant could not collect sufficient evidence to establish criminal conspiracyand abuse of official position by the respondents. In view of lack of evidencethe appellant submitted a report under Section 173 Cr. P. C, before the Specialjudge, Delhi for closure of the case. ( 3 ) THE Special Judge, Delhi by the impugned order rejected therequest of the appellant and directed that at the first instance the prosecution should approach the concerned sanctioning authority before coming tothe Court and further held that the report under Section 173 Cr. P. C. waspremature and therefore not acceptable. ( 4 ) IT is against the impugned order dated 16/08/1991 that thepresent criminal revision has been preferred by the appellant inter alia onthe ground that for filing a report under Section 173 Cr. P. C. for closure ofthe case, no sanction of the sanctioning authority is required. ( 5 ) IN order to appreciate the contention of the appellant, it is worthwhile to refer to some of the relevant provisions. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 has been amended by Act No. 49 of 1988. The Act wasamended to make it more effective by widening the coverage and by strengthening the object. But so for as the scheme of the Act is concerned, thereis infact no change and that has almost remained intact. Section 6 (1) ofthe Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) reads asunder:-Section 6 (1):- "no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable undersection 161 (or Section 164) or Section 165 of the Indian Penalcode or under Sub-see. (2) (or Sub-Sec. (3-A) of Section 5 ofthis Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servantexcept with the previous sanction. (2) (or Sub-Sec. (3-A) of Section 5 ofthis Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servantexcept with the previous sanction. " ( 6 ) THE Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 Section 19 (1) also provides previous section for prosecution in the case of a person employed inconnection with the affairs of the Union, State Government or other authorityand is analogous to Section 6 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947except Clause 19 (3) which provides that on the ground of irregularity ofsanction, no finding of the Court can be. reversed. ( 7 ) THE policy underlying Section 6 or under Section 19 and similarsections, is that there should not be unnecessary harassment of publicservants. The object is to save the public servant from harassment of malacious prosecution. Valid sanction is a prerequisite to the taking of cognizanceof the offences. In the case of R. S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay, (1984) SCC (Cr.)page 172 Supreme Court held that a trial without a valid sanction where oneis necessary under Section 6 is a trial without jurisdiction by the Court. Thequestion for determination in this Criminal Revision is not the validity orinvalidity of the sanction. The question raised by the appellant is whetherthe sanction from the sanctioning authority is a prerequisite for filing afinal report under Section 173 Cr. P. C. even when the prosecution onaccount of lack of evidence is not in a position to charge the respondentswith the offence? Can the Special Judge force the appellant to obtain sanction particularly when appellant is not asking the Court to take cognizanceof the offence as there is no sufficient material to link the respondent withthe offence. In the case of Abhinandun Jha and Others v. Dinesh Mishra,reported in AIR 1968 Supreme Court page 117, Supreme Court was dealingwith the power of the Magistrate under Section 173 of the Code of Criminalprocedure. In that case Dinesh Mishra lodged a First Information Report thathe saw a thatched house, of one Uma Kant Misra, situated on the northernside of the house, burning, and the petitioners herein, running away fromthe scene. The police made an investigation and submitted what is called a final report , under Section 173 (1) of the Code. to the effect that the offencecomplained of, was false. The police made an investigation and submitted what is called a final report , under Section 173 (1) of the Code. to the effect that the offencecomplained of, was false. The Sub-divisional Magistrate received this reporton 13-6-1965, hut in the meanwhile, the respondent had filed what is termed a protest petition challenging the correctness of the report submitted bythe police. The Magistrate after perusing the police diary directed the policeto submit a charge-sheet against the petitioners. It is this order of the Magistrate which was challenged. Patna High Court upheld the order of themagistrate, but the Supreme Court after observing various provisions of thecode of Criminal Procedure held that the Magistrate had no power to callupon the police to submit a sharge-sheet. It was observed that there is nopower, expressly or impliedly conferred, under the Code, on a Magistrate tocall upon the police to submit a charge-sheet, when they have sent a reportunder Section 169 of the Code, that there is no case made out for sending upan accused for trial. The functions of the Magistrate and the police areentirely different, and though, in the circumstances mentioned earlier, themagistrate may or may not accept the report, and take suitable action, according to law, he cannot certainly impunge upon the jurisdiction of thepolice, by compelling them to change their opinion, so as to accord with hisview. The investigation, under the Code, takes in several aspects, and stages,ending ultimately with the formation of an opinion by the police as to whether, on the material covered and collected a case is made out to place theaccused before the Magistrate for trial, and the submission of either a charge-sheet, or a final report is dependent on the nature of the opinion, soformed. . The formation of the said opinion, by the police, is the final stepin the investigation, and that final step is to be taken only by the police andby no other authority. ( 8 ) MR. Lal appearing for the appellant contended that this authorityrelied by the learned Special Judge infact helps the appellant. It is the decision of the investigating agency to form an opinion as to whether any case ismade out or not and if that investigating agency comes to the conclusion onaccount of lack of material or no sufficient material, linking the respondentswith the offence alleged then the final decision is to be formed by the investigating agency. It is the decision of the investigating agency to form an opinion as to whether any case ismade out or not and if that investigating agency comes to the conclusion onaccount of lack of material or no sufficient material, linking the respondentswith the offence alleged then the final decision is to be formed by the investigating agency. By directing to obtain sanction even for submitting finalreport the Special Judge has gone beyond the scope of Section 6 (1) as wellas the mandate given by Supreme Court in the case of Abhinandan Jha. ( 9 ) THIS point came up for consideration before this Court in the caseof Slate (C. B. I.) v. Lachmandas decided in Crl. R. 1/1992 and vide orderdated 18/05/1992 this Court set aside the order of the learned Specialjudge by observing that the previous sanction is necessary only for thepurposes of prosecuting or for filing the charge-sheet but the same is notnecessary for the purposes of filing a final report under Section 173 of thecriminal Procedure Code. In view of the law laid down by this Court, in thecase of State (C. B. I.) v. Lachmandas Gupta and Other the only irresistibleconclusion which can be arrived at is that the impugned order passed by thespecial Judge is liable to be set aside. ( 10 ) FOR the above reasons I accordingly set aside the impugned orderdated 16/08/1991 passed by Shri V. S. Aggarwal, Special Judge, Delhi. The case is remanded to the Special Judge for reconsidering the final reportfiled by the appellant under Section 173 Cr. P. C.