Judgment RAJENDRA SAXENA, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition filed under section 482, Cr. P. C. , has been directed against the order of learned Sessions Judge, Chum, dated 17. 11. 1989, whereby he dismissed the revision petition filed by the petitioners and while confirming the order dated 7. 11. 1988 of the learned S. D. M. , Churu, modified the same and directed the petitioners to run their cotton carding machines from 5 a. m. to 9. a. m. and from 5 p. m. and 9 p. m. only instead of from 8 p. m. to 6a. m. ( 2 ) ON the joint request of the parties, this petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage. ( 3 ) SUCCINCTLY staled the relevant facts are that on the directions of his superiors, the Revenue Inspector, Nagar Palika, Sarda Shahar after inspecting the street known as Pinjaron Ki Galit siluated in Sardar. Shahar on 8. 6. 1987. submitted his even dated report to the Executive Officer. Therein he reported that petitioners Chand and Kalu, Pinjaras have installed two cotton carding machines in their respective shops in the said street, wherein ten more shops are also situated, that their carding machines emit cotton dust, and that the shop keepers of the street as well as the general public feel great difficulty in breathing. He also reported that the cotton dust is likely to be dangerous to the public health and to cause tuberculosis and bronchial ailments. He further reported that such cotton carding machines should not be allowed to run near their public way and that if al all those machines are to continue then their timing of operation should be regulated from 9 p. m. to 7 p. m. , so that it may not cause pollution and public nuisance. Thereupon, the Executive Officer issued notices to the petitioners under section 248, Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 asking them not lo create nuisance by running their cotton carding machines. It appears that on 15. 6. 1987, the Administrator of the said Nagar Palika, who was the S. D. M. , Churu also, in spected the site. As per his memo at the time of his inspection no cotton carding machine was being operated. It appears that on 15. 6. 1987, the Administrator of the said Nagar Palika, who was the S. D. M. , Churu also, in spected the site. As per his memo at the time of his inspection no cotton carding machine was being operated. However, after having inquired from the shop keepers of the said street; he opined that since in the past, there existed only a few shops in the said street, the effect of pollution caused by the Cotton dust was not substantial but with the increase of population and more number of shops in the said street, the omission of cotton dust created pollution in the atmosphere. He; therefore, ordered that the shop keepers running cotton carding machines be ordered to operate their machines only from 7 p. m. to 8 a. m. and restrained from running those machines during the day time, they in compliance of the said order, the Executive Officer, Nagar Palika issued fresh notices dated 15. 6. 1987 to the petitioners. On 16. 6. 1987, the Revenue Inspector inspected the site at 3. 15 p. m. and found that petitioner Chand was running his cotton carding machine, while petitioner Kalu had also operated his machine during day hours. ( 4 ) ON 20. 6. 1987, non-petitioner No. 2 Kishori Lal Agarwal, who was a hard-ware shop and non- petitioner No. 3 Kalu Bisayati, who runs his shop of general merchandise in the said street, which is also known as Shoan Lal Dugar Marg, submitted an application under section 133 read with 142, Cr. P. C. , before the learned S. D. M. , Churu Camp Sardar Shahar, wherein it was inter alia averred that the said street is only 8ft. in width, that about ten shops arc situated on both sides of the street, that petitioners Chand and Kalu operate their cotton carding machines day and night, which emit huge quantities of cotton dust, causing terrible breathing problcms to the inhabitants of the locality and to the passer-byes, which has become hazardous to their health resulting in to dreadful diseases. It was also alleged that they along with other shop keepers had earlier submitted an application before the Nagar Palika, and the petitioners were directed to operate their machines from 9 p. m. , to 7 a. m. only, but they were still running their machines during day hours. It was also alleged that they along with other shop keepers had earlier submitted an application before the Nagar Palika, and the petitioners were directed to operate their machines from 9 p. m. , to 7 a. m. only, but they were still running their machines during day hours. The said non-petitioners also enclosed photo-stat copies of the reports of the Revenue Inspector and the notices issued to the petitioners and prayed that proceedings under section 133, Cr. P. C. be initiated and petitioners be restrained through an injunction under section 142, Cr. P. C. ( 5 ) THE learned S. D. M. by his order dated 20. 6. 1987 asked the Tehsildar to inspect the site and submit his factual report. The Tehsildar in his report dated 22. 6. 1987 mentioned that the petitioners were carrying on their trade of carding the cotton for last so many years, that huge quantity of small particles of cotton is blown in the air from their carding machines causing breathing problems and pollution in the atmosphere, which adversely affects the health of the inhabitants of the locality. He submitted that in the public interest, it was essential to regulate the working hours of those machines from 8 p. m. to 8 a. m. and suggested that those machines should not be allowed to be operated during day hours. ( 6 ) THE learned Magistrate after considering the application, affidavits of non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 and the documents submitted by them as well as the report of the Tehsildar, by his order dated 23. 6. 1987 passed the so called conditional order under section 133, Cr. P. C. Simultaneously, he also issued an ex-parte injunction under section 142 (1) Cr. P. C. , directing the petitioners to run their cotton carding machines from 8 p. m. to 6 a. m. only and not to operate those machines during day hours and to Submit their objections, if any, before him on 10th July, 1987. ( 7 ) THE petitioners is their joint reply dated 24. 7. 1987 asserted that the street in question was known as Pinjaron Ki Gali, that their cotton carding machines have been installed in their respective premises for the last thirty years, that prior to that their ancestors used to do cotton carding manually and that it was their hereditary profession. 7. 1987 asserted that the street in question was known as Pinjaron Ki Gali, that their cotton carding machines have been installed in their respective premises for the last thirty years, that prior to that their ancestors used to do cotton carding manually and that it was their hereditary profession. They admitted that the said street is narrow in width, but averred that the non-petitioners Kishori Lal and Kalu had opened their shops recently. They maintained that they are mere piece rated workers and cater the needs of the villagers and the citizens of the town by carding their cotton, that they do not have enough work to operate their machines day and night and that running to those machines does neither cause any nuisance to the community nor those arc likely to be dangerous to their health. They asserted that the non-petitioners have filed the application against them due to their personal vengeance. They submitted that they were complying with the orders of the Nagar Palika and not operating their machines during day hours. They also submitted that the regulatory order of the Nagar Palika has adversely affected their business because no customer comes to them during night hours. They, therefore, prayed that the conditional order as well as the ex parte injunction order be vacated. ( 8 ) IT appears that on 19. 9. 1987 and 30. 4. 1988, the petitioners filed applications to the S. D. M. for transferring the case to some other court on the ground that he in the capacity of the Administrator, Nagar Palika, had inspected the site and passed various orders and legality and propriety thereof will have to be examined in these proceeding sand, therefore, he was an interested person. The learned S. D. M. dismissed those applications by his order dated 24. 9. 1988 on the ground that the then Presiding Officer, who passed the orders dated 23. 6. 1987, had already been transferred and that such transfer petition should have been filed before the competent court. ( 9 ) THE S. D. M. also directed the Tehsildar to submit his factual report as to whether the ad interim injunction order dated. 23. 6. 1987 was being complied with or not? The Tehsilder vide his letter dated 27. 5. 1988 reported that on the same day at about 7. ( 9 ) THE S. D. M. also directed the Tehsildar to submit his factual report as to whether the ad interim injunction order dated. 23. 6. 1987 was being complied with or not? The Tehsilder vide his letter dated 27. 5. 1988 reported that on the same day at about 7. 45 a. m. petitioner Chand was found running his cotton carding machine and that on inquiry from the inhabitants, it had been revealed that the petitioners run their machines during day hours also. The learned Magistrate after hearing the parties by his order dated 7. 11. 1988. held that the petitioners were not complying with the ad interim injunction order lie ordered the S. H. O. , P. S. , Sardar Shahar to ensure that the petitioners operate their machines from 8. 00 p. m. to 6. 00 a. m. only. He also observed that before making the ad interim order dated 23. 6. 1987 absolute, it was necessary to give an opportunity to the petitioners. Accordingly, he directed them to adduce their evidence. ( 10 ) THE petitioners filed a revision petition before the learned Sessions Judge, Churu. The Sessions Judge held that the learned S. D. M. had in fact issued a conditional order under section 133, Cr. P. C. , that he was also competent to para the impugned injunction order and that the impugned orders did not suffer from any illegality or impropriety. He further held that prima facie, it was a case of causing nuisance and that since the Order under section 142 (1), Cr. P. C. was interlocutory the revision petition against the same was not maintainable. However, keeping in view the comparative convenience and respective rights of the parties and takings humanitarian view, he modified the timings and ordered that the petitioners shall operate their carding mach ands from 5. 00 a. m. to 9. 00 a. m. and from 5. 00 p. m. to 9. 00 p. m. only. Hence this petition. ( 11 ) ON the request of Shri S. K. Goel, to the effect that the petitioners were prepared to take adequate precautions to ensure that the cotton dust does not come outside their shops and that they were ready to provide glass shutters on the doors of their shops, this Court vide its order dated 23. 1. ( 11 ) ON the request of Shri S. K. Goel, to the effect that the petitioners were prepared to take adequate precautions to ensure that the cotton dust does not come outside their shops and that they were ready to provide glass shutters on the doors of their shops, this Court vide its order dated 23. 1. 1990 opined that it would be just and proper to allow them to fix such glass shutters. The Court also directed the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Sardar Shahar to inspect those shops after the fixing of the glass shutters and to report whether sufficient safe-guards have been taken to ensure that the Colton dust is not blown out of the shops, when the carding machines are in operation. Accordingly, the petitioners fixed glass shutters on their shops. The learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate after inspecling the site on 6. 2. 1990 has submitted his report. He has reported that only a small quantity of cotton dust was blown out from the crevices of the doors of petitioners shops, when their carding machines were put in operation and that when the doors of those shops were opened then cotton dust came out and floated in the air in the street. An affidavit of petitioner Chand and a photograph of the glass fitted door have also been filed by the petitioners. ( 12 ) ON the other hand, non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 have filed a site plan of the street-prepared by the Revenue Inspector, Nagar Palika, affidavit of non-petitioner Kalu as well as an application of Smt. Halima wife of petitioner Kalu Pinara seeking permission from the Nagar Palika for issuing a no objection certificate for installation of a three Horse Power electric connection in another shop taken on rent by her and the notification issued by the Nagar Palikadated 17. 10. 1989 inviting objections for such installation of the cotton carding machine. ( 13 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and the learned Public Prosecutor for the State at length and care fully perused the record of the lower court in extenso. ( 14 ) SHRI L. M. Lodha and the learned Public Prosecutor have raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of this petition. ( 13 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and the learned Public Prosecutor for the State at length and care fully perused the record of the lower court in extenso. ( 14 ) SHRI L. M. Lodha and the learned Public Prosecutor have raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of this petition. They have submitted that since the learned Sessions Judge has dismissed petitionerst revision petition, a second revision petition cannot be entertained under section 397 (3) Cr. P. C. They have contended that merely by saying that the jurisdiction of the High Court for exercise of its inherent powers was being invoked under section 482, Cr. P. C. , a statutory bar created by section 397 (3) Cr. P. C. , cannot be brushed aside. They have cited Rajan Kumar Manchanda v. State of Karnataka, Mani Ram v. Mahavir Prasad and Darbara Singh v. State of Rajasthan, wherein it has been held that if a revision petition has been dismissed earlier then in view of the statutory bar under section 397 (3) Cr. P. C. , a further application by the same person is not maintainable and that such persons cannot be allowed to take recourse of section 482, Cr. P. C. , circumventing the provisions of scction 397 (3), Cr. P. C. ( 15 ) ON the other hand Shri S. K. Goel, relying on the law laid down in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra4, has vigorously canvassed that if an order clearly brings about a situation while is an abuse of the process of the court or if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in section 397 (3) Cr. P. C. , can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. He has submitted that Madhu Limayes case was decided by three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court, while Rajan Kumars case has been decided by a two Judges Bench only amt that Madhu Limayes case was also not brought to the notice of the said Bench. Therefore, Rajan Kumars docs not lay down the correct law and that the cases of Mani Ram and Darbara Singh (cited supra), wherein the observations made by the Supreme Court in Rajan Kumars case were followed, have no bearing. Therefore, Rajan Kumars docs not lay down the correct law and that the cases of Mani Ram and Darbara Singh (cited supra), wherein the observations made by the Supreme Court in Rajan Kumars case were followed, have no bearing. According to him in the case in hand, as a matter of fact no conditional order was passed by the learned Magistrate and as such ex parte injunction issued under section 142 (1) Cr. P. C. , suffers from patent illegality, which tantamount to abuse of the process of the court and hence this petition under section 482 Cr. P. C. , is legally maintainable. ( 16 ) I have given my thoughtful consideration. In Amar Nath and: Ors. v. State of Haryana, it was held that the inherent powers of the High Court can be exercised under section 482 Cr. P. C. , when there is no express provision on The subject matter. It was held that where there is an express provision barring a particular remedy, the High Court cannot resort to the exercise of the inherent powers. This was a two Judges Benchs decision. ( 17 ) THERE after in Madhu Limayes case (cited supra), which was a three Judges Bench decision, the correctness of the aforesaid view was doubted and it was held that on this aspect, Amar Naths case did not lay down the correct law. Their Lordships in Madhu Limayes case after reproducing section 482 Cr. P. C. , proceeded to say: At The outset the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court, which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions: (1) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for The redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. In most of the cases decided during several decades the inherent power of the High Court has been invoked for quashing of a. criminal proceedings on one ground or the other. In most of the cases decided during several decades the inherent power of the High Court has been invoked for quashing of a. criminal proceedings on one ground or the other. Sometimes the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court has also been resorted for the same kind of relief by challenging the order taking cognizance or issuing processes or framing charge on the grounds that the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance and proceed with the trial, that the issuance of process was wholly illegal or void, or that no charge could be framed as no offence was made out on the allegations made or the evidence adduced in Court. In the background aforesaid, we proceed to examine as to what is the correct position of law after the introduction of a provision like sub-section (2) of section 397 in the 1973 Code. As pointed out in Amar Naths case (supra) the purpose of pulling a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding is to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases finally. More often than not, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to in relation to interlocutory orders delaying the final disposal of the proceedings. The Legislature in its wisdom decided to check this delay by introducing sub-section (2) in section 197. On the one hand a bar has been put in the way of the High Court (as also of The Sessions Judge) for exercise of the revisional power in relation to any interlocutory order, on the other hand the power has been conferred in almost the same terms as it was in the 1898 Code. On a plain reading of section 482, how ever, it would follow that nothing in the Code which would include sub-section (2) of section 397 also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character, which could not be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in section 397 (2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vaxatiously or as being without jurisdiction. Take for example a case where a prosecution is launched under the Prevention of Corruption Act without a sanction, then the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and after his acquittal a second trial after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrine of Autreois Acquit. Even assuming, although we shall presently show that it is not so, that in such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is an interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the accused upto the end? The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petitioner fled by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter is an appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible. TI ( 18 ) A bare perusal of Rajan Kumars case (supra) reveals that Madhu Limaye s case was not brought to the notice of their Lordships. Therefore, keeping in view the well crystralised principles of law of precedents, the decision rendered in Madhu Limaye s case by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court is bound to be followed. Thus, the well settled position of law is that even though a second revision petition is not entertainable befdre the High Court under section 397 (3) Cr. P. C. , yet in suitable cases it. can press into service the provisions of section 482, Cr. P. C. , for preventing abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the end secure the justice a similar vie was has been taken by this Court in Bhanwar Singh and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan. Therefore, the preliminary objection about the maintainability of this petition is not tenable and the same is hereby over ruled. ( 19 ) NOW let us find out as to whether the so called conditional order passed by the learned S. D. M. under section 133 (1) Cr. P. C. is in fact a conditional order in accordance with law and whether the same amounts to the abuse of the process of the court? ( 20 ) IT may be useful to quote ad-verbatum the operative portion of the conditional order and the injunction order dated 23. 6. P. C. is in fact a conditional order in accordance with law and whether the same amounts to the abuse of the process of the court? ( 20 ) IT may be useful to quote ad-verbatum the operative portion of the conditional order and the injunction order dated 23. 6. 1987 passed by the learned S. D. M. ( 21 ) A careful perusal of the aforesaid order unmistakably reflects that the Magistrate has not recorded therein the satisfaction or his consideration that it was a case public nuisance, that it was not a private dispute between a private member and a public and that it was a case of great emergency of imminent danger to the public inter est. The so called conditional order has also not been spelt out. However, in the stay order under section 142 (1) Cr. P. C. , it has been ordered that the petitioners shall operate their machines only from 8 p. m. to 6 a. m. and shall not run those machines during day hours. ( 22 ) CHAPTER X-B Cr. P. C. deals with public nuisances. Section 133 empowers the Magistrates specified therein to make a conditional order for the removal of such nuisance in emergent cases. Sections 268 to 294-A I. P. C. , relate to public nuisances affecting the public health etc. Section - 268 I. P. C. , lays down that any person is guilty of a public nuisance, who docs any actor is guilty of an illegal omission, which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general, who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity or which must necessarily cause in jury, obstruction, danger or, annoyance to per sons, who may have occasion to use any public right. ( 23 ) IT is needless to mention that nuisances are either public or private. A remedy for the latter is a civil suit, although what constitutes nuisance may be common to both classes. A public nuisance is something, which is offensive an inconvenience discomfort or hut annoying or endangering safety, of the whole community in general. A private nuisance may also amount to a public nuisance if it affects the public generally. ( 24 ) SECTION 133 Cr. P. C. provides a speedy and summary remedy in case of urgency, where danger to public interest or public health etc. A private nuisance may also amount to a public nuisance if it affects the public generally. ( 24 ) SECTION 133 Cr. P. C. provides a speedy and summary remedy in case of urgency, where danger to public interest or public health etc. is concerned. In all other cases the parties should be referred to seek remedy under the ordinary law. The idea is that if immediate steps are not taken, irreparable injury will be caused. Therefore extraordinary powers under this section are meant to be exercised under extra-ordinary circumstances. Since drastic - powers are conferred by section 133 (1), those powers should be sparingly used. ( 25 ) BEFORE initiating proceeding under section 133 (1) Cr. P. C. , the Magistrate after considering the police report and the other information and on taking such evidence (if any) as he thinks fit must satisfy himself that: (a) the act alleged is a public nuisance, i. e. the number of persons injuriously affected is so considerable that they may be reasonably regarded as the public or a portion of it; (b) it is not a private dispute between different members of the public for which the proper forum is the civil court; and (c) it is the case of great emergency of the eminent danger to the public interest. If there is no emergency as for example, when certain mills have been working under a licence for several years or when the alleged nuisance has been in existence for several years, then generally the party should go to the civil court. ( 26 ) THE Magistrate should remember that he is acting purely in the interest of the public and should be on his guard against the use of this section as a substitute for civil litigation to settle private disputes. It is the that no length of user or obstruction can legalise the public nuisance. But if the alleged nuisance is in. existence for several years then all of a sudden and abruptly the provisions of section 133, Cr. P. C. should not be pressed into service. ( 27 ) IN Rameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, it has been observed that the whole of the object of section 133 Cr. But if the alleged nuisance is in. existence for several years then all of a sudden and abruptly the provisions of section 133, Cr. P. C. should not be pressed into service. ( 27 ) IN Rameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, it has been observed that the whole of the object of section 133 Cr. P. C. , is that the public should not suffer and that such dangers or obstructions caused by the members of the public should be removed at the earliest possible moment. The proceedings under section 133 is not to be taken in a case where there is a long user because it is not intended that the proceedings under the said section should be substituted for a civil suit in a civil court. In that case the alleged nuisance, obstruction caused by house constructions on railway land had been there for seven long years and the public did not appear to have been inconvenienced by the same and all of a sudden after lapse of so many years, it was found that there had been an encroachment causing public nuisance. In such a case It was held that provisions of section 133 Cr. P. C. , should not been pressed into service. ( 28 ) IN Shaukat Hussain and another v. Sheodayal8, the applicants worked a small cotton carding machine of 5 Horse Power in a locality in the town of Rewa. Non-applicant filed an application before the Magistrate alleging that the small particles of cotton were blown in the air from the machine and caused harm to breathing, that the machine produced noise, and -disturbance to public peace and prayed that the same must be stopped. The Magistrate- issued a conditional order and accepted the said application and ordered the applicants to stop the workings of the machine. He also ordered the Municipality that the licence granted to the applicants be cancelled. The Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the non-applicant and his two neighbours were the only persons, who had deposed that the said machine worked to their discomfort while large number of neighbours did not support the non-applicant. It was held that no public nuisance existed, that the report of the Health Officer was not a legal evidence unless he was examined in the case and that in such circumstances provisions of section 133 Cr. P. C. , had no application. It was held that no public nuisance existed, that the report of the Health Officer was not a legal evidence unless he was examined in the case and that in such circumstances provisions of section 133 Cr. P. C. , had no application. ( 29 ) IN the instant case, the learned Magistrate has clearly failed to record his satisfaction that the conduct of the trade or occupation of the petitioners injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community and that in consequence thereof such trade or occupation would either be prohibited or regulated. In the impugned conditional order no condition has been laid by the, Magistrate requiring the petitioner to remove such nuisance or to desist from carrying on or regulate the working of the cotton carding machine. It has also not been mentioned in the alleged conditional order that in case the petitioners object so to do, then they must show cause as to why the conditional order should not be made absolute. The form of conditional order is prescribed in Form No. 20, while the form of the injunction order under section 142 (1) Cr. P. C. is prescribed in Form No. 22 of the Second Schedule of the Code. Thus, both these forms are entirely different. In the case in hand, the learned Magistrate has simply written that a conditional order under section 133 Cr. P. C. is passed but it has neither been mentioned that some nuisance existed nor it has been mentioned that any action of the petitioner was injurious to the public health or physical comfort of the community nor it has been mentioned that such trade or occupation should be prohibited or regulated or the machines be removed to a different place. It is also significant to note that no conditional order was served on the petitioners. On the other hand only a copy of the application filed by non-petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 was sent along with the show-cause notices as prescribed in Schedule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code to show cause as to why the said application be not granted. Hence it is abundantly apparent that the basic ingredients of conditional order are conspicuously missing in the order dated 23. 6. 1987 as well as in the show cause notices served on the petitioners in this behalf. Hence it is abundantly apparent that the basic ingredients of conditional order are conspicuously missing in the order dated 23. 6. 1987 as well as in the show cause notices served on the petitioners in this behalf. Simply by writing that a conditional order under section 133 Cr. P. C. , is being issued, it cannot be held that legal and valid conditional order under section 133 (1) Cr. P. C. , was passed because the material ingredients are missing therein. It is needless to emphasize that a conditional order should invariably contain the basic ingredients mentioned in section 133 (1) Cr. P. C. Such an order should also not be vague or indefinite. It should state clearly and definitely as to what is to be done by the person against whom such an order is passed and that if such person objects so to do, then he should show cause as to why the conditional order be rot made absolute. Thus, in, the instant case no conditional order having the pre-requisite conditions was passed by the learned Magistrate. Since in fact no legal and valid conditional order was passed, there was the question of making such an order absolute. To my mind the so called conditional order dated 23. 6. 1987 suffers from patent as well as inherent infirmity. The learned Sessions Judge, has also committed an illegality in observing that since the petitioners had med their reply, it could not be agitated that no conditional order under section - 133 (1) Cr. P. C. was passed by the learned Magistrate. ( 30 ) SECTION 142 (1) Cr. P. C. lays down that if a Magistrate making an order under section 133 considers that immediate measures should be taken to prevent imminent danger or injury of a serious kind to the public, he may issue such an injunction to the person against whom the conditional order was made, or is required to obviate or prevent such danger or injury pending the determination of the matter. Therefore, the jurisdiction to issue an injunction pending inquiry arises only when a valid and legal conditional order under section 133 (1) Cr. P. C. , has been passed and secondly when immediate measures are considered necessary to prevent imminent danger or injury of a serious kind to the public. Thus, section 142 (1) is governed and controlled by section 133 Cr. P. C. , has been passed and secondly when immediate measures are considered necessary to prevent imminent danger or injury of a serious kind to the public. Thus, section 142 (1) is governed and controlled by section 133 Cr. P. C. For this I am for fitted by the preposition of law laid down in Ramjis case reported in 1978 Cr. L. J. (NOC) Allahabad 193. ( 31 ) IN the instant case, admittedly, the petitioners were running their cotton carding machines for last so many years. There is nothing on record to show as to what new or special circumstances took place which aggravated the situation and caused imminent danger or injury of a serioust kind to the public allege sudden and abruptly. ( 32 ) IN Chamunny State of Kerala, it has been observed that before issuing injunction under section 142 (1) Cr. P. C. , notice should ordinarily be issued except in very extreme cases and where delay would result. in dangerous consequences by way of injury to the public. As mentioned earlier since the petitioners were running their cotton carding machines for last so many years, keeping in view the well crystalised principle of natural justice namely audi artem partem the learned S. D. M. should have issued a notice to the petitioners before issuing the injunction pending inquiry. ( 33 ) IT is also worth-while to note that even while issuing the ad-interim injunction, the learned Magistrate did not record that imminent danger or any particular injury to the public existed and that to prevent the same, it was necessary to take immediate measures. On the other hand, he simply issued, the stay order regulating the hours of the operation of the machines. Therefore, firstly no valid and legal conditional order was in existence under section 133 (1) Cr. P. C. , the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to issue an injunction pending inquiry. Secondly the injunction order itself lacks in the material ingredients as enshrined in section 142 (1) Cr. P. C. Therefore, the ex parte ad-interim injunction also tantamount to abuse of the process of the Court. ( 34 ) THE petitioners had submitted their reply as early as on 24. 7. 1987, but for one reason or the other the learned Magistrate did not initiate the inquiry under section 138 Cr. P. C. Therefore, the ex parte ad-interim injunction also tantamount to abuse of the process of the Court. ( 34 ) THE petitioners had submitted their reply as early as on 24. 7. 1987, but for one reason or the other the learned Magistrate did not initiate the inquiry under section 138 Cr. P. C. , and all the time insisted that the interim injunction order dated 23. 6. 1987 be complied with. It is also pertinent to note that the petitioners in their reply had categorically denied the existence of any public nuisance. In such circumstances, the burden of proof in an inquiry under section 138 (1) Cr. P. C. , was on the complainant non-petitioners No. 2 and 3 to prove the contents of their complaint. But the learned Magistrate ignoring the settled principle of burden of proof ordered the petitioners to adduce their evidence. The learned Sessions Judge has also conveniently ignored this patent illegality. ( 35 ) THE resultant of the above discussion is that the order dated 23. 6. 1987 alleged to have been passed under section 133 (1) and 142 (1) Cr. P. C. , as well as the order dated 8. 11. 1988 passed by the learned S. D. M. and also the order of the, learned Session Judge dated 17. 11. 1989 amount to abuse of the process of the court and that to secure the ends of justice those deserve to be quashed. ( 36 ) SHRI S. K. Gael, learned counsel for the petitioner has also filed a copy of the plaint of the civil suit Ram Chandra Soni and Vazir v. Chand, Kalu and Six Ors. T as also the copy of the application file under order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C. P. C. and the certified copy of the order dated 2. 12. 1991 passed by the learned Munsif, Sardar Shahar in Civil Misc. Petition No. 28/89. T as also the copy of the application file under order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C. P. C. and the certified copy of the order dated 2. 12. 1991 passed by the learned Munsif, Sardar Shahar in Civil Misc. Petition No. 28/89. In that case, on the consent of the parties, it has been ordered that the present petitioners and other defendants of that case of the civil suit shall operate their cotton carding machines from 5 a. m. to 9 p. m. and 5 p. m. to 9 p. m. and shall not run those machines during day hours till the final disposal of this revision petition by this court or till the disposal of the civil suit pending before him, whichever is earlier. Shri Gael has urged that since a civil suit in respect of the alleged nuisance caused by the cotton carding machines is pending in the Munsif Court, there is no necessity for a parallel proceedings under section 133 Cr. P. C. I am afraid this contention is devoid of any force or substance. Firstly, non-petitioners Nos. 2 and 3, who have filed the complaint under section 133 Cr. P. C. , are not the party in that suit Secondly the said suit has been filed much after the proceedings were initiated in the case in hand. Thirdly, institution of civil proceedings do not bar the proceedings under section 133 Cr. P. C. Therefore, this contention is hereby repelled. ( 37 ) IN the premises of above discussion, in my considered opinion since no valid and legal conditional order was passed under section 133 (1) Cr. P. C. , by the learned S. D. M. , the ex parte injunction order pending inquiry as well as the proceedings taken by him in this case stand vitiated as those tantamount to abuse of the process of the Court. Hence to secure the ends of justice, I quash the orders of learned S. D. Magistrate, Churn dated 23. 6. 1987 and 7. 11. 1988 as well as the order dated 17. 11. 1989 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Churn. However, the learned Magistrate shall be at liberty to dispose of application filed by the non-petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 dated 20. 6. 1987 in accordance with law. 6. 1987 and 7. 11. 1988 as well as the order dated 17. 11. 1989 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Churn. However, the learned Magistrate shall be at liberty to dispose of application filed by the non-petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 dated 20. 6. 1987 in accordance with law. In the interest of justice, it is also directed that the petitioners shall continue putting glass shutters on their shops as per orders dated 23. 1. 1990 passed by this Court and shall ensure that no cotton dust is blown out from their shops till any other order is passed either by the S. D. M. or by a civil court of competent jurisdiction regarding the operation of the cotton carding machines in dispute. The parties are directed to appear before the learned S. D. M. , Churn on 10. 8. 1992. Petition allowed.